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Preface 
I visited Sarajevo for the first time in the summer of 2006, for a short stay of four days, 
on my own. 
The city had been the inaccessible destination of my erratic imagination since I was 
on the edge of my teens, when countless images of its streets and dwellers suddenly 
pervaded the Italian daily news showing “the Bosnian war”. As long as the war lasted, 
my family and I travelled to Croatia to bring humanitarian aids to ‘refugee camps’, 
more or less organised structures hosting the innumerable people fleeing from 
unexpected, at times inconceivable, violence in the area. Almost all of them were 
Bosnians, although very few from Sarajevo. Being quite young (I was 12 in 1992), 
during these journeys I made children play and socialised with girls and boys around 
my age, learning bits and pieces of Serbo-Croat from the talkative youngest and 
practicing English with the elder, with whom I became friend. We played ‘Yugoslav-
Italian’ kids’ games against the odds of the annihilation of normality – lives disrupted 
by something that remained dreadful and obscure. 
My encounter with Sarajevo many years later was thus emotionally loaded with 
anticipation and uncertainty; it had the thrill and the inconsistency of rejoining 
someone I had never actually met, with a mix of joy and sorrow. On the first sunny 
morning, as I wandered through the inner city centre from pedestrian Ferhadija into 
Marshala Tita Street, right at the intersection where the Eternal Flame tirelessly burns, 
an uncanny feeling made me stop for a few minutes. I had the definite impression I 
had already been on that spot, the sense I knew the place – and yet, it was impossible. 
As I walked away reluctantly, I told myself I must have seen the place in newsreel 
footage of the siege: I remembered it. 
Three years later I returned to Sarajevo for a prolonged stay dedicated to 
fieldwork. As I gradually got acquainted with the city, unravelling my paths through its 
alleys and finding my dimension in its spaces, I never experienced again the feeling I 
had at the corner of Marshala Tita the first time. Obviously, I reckoned, it was hardly 
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likely that I actually remembered a precise spot of the city from fast sequences of 
images of those turbulent times.  
Still, I have personal memories of the war. Over the years, those chaotic images 
mingled with the gazes and voices of the people I met in Croatia; my concerned 
monitoring of the news from home combined with the time spent together in ‘camps’ 
and the letters we exchanged when we were distant.  
Those who were my age, or a few years older, grew through their childhood in a 
Yugoslav Socialist Republic, and got caught in incommensurable destructive changes 
in their early teens. I think they are the first reason of my interest and involvement 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to them and their (our) generation this work is 
dedicated. 
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 1 Setting the framework 
1.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the production and articulation of memories of war in the 
city of Sarajevo since the constitution of an independent state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) signed 
at Dayton in late 1995. 
The research revolves around monuments and built cultural heritage as tangible 
signs of memory across the city landscape, and approaches processes of 
memorialisation by looking at policies of preservation, (re)construction and 
rehabilitation drafted and implemented by various institutional and political actors, as 
well as commemorations and public ceremonies performed on specific dates and/or 
at particular memorial sites. 
Aim of the research is to detect, explore, and analyse the main features of today's 
politics of memory in the capital city of BiH, and its recollection of the experience of 
armed conflict (World War II and the 1992-1995 conflict), to grasp the way(s) in which 
the institutional and political realms “make sense” of past struggles in relation to the 
present situation of the country and its future projections. 
Heritage/monuments laws and policies – with a focus on the recognition, 
protection, rehabilitation and (re)construction of monuments and memorials 
dedicated to war – are analysed as part of broader agendas of the politics of memory 
entailing the articulation of particular accounts of the past and their “normalisation” 
within the memorial landscape. At the same time, the study analyses public 
commemoration rituals in and around memorials and monuments, as performative 
practices that concur in the construction of public memory and its inscription on the 
(official) calendar, whether complementing officially sanctioned recollections of the 
past or contesting them to claim divergent accounts and negotiate their recognition 
in the public space. 
 4 
Four key concepts are central in this reflection: memory, identity, heritage and 
conflict, seen through the prism of monument construction and reconstruction as 
practices through which these facets are symbolically and materially entwined in 
carved stone and publicly sanctioned. The focus is directed to the relations between 
these notions, and the ways in which they are used to mutually construct each other: 
the role of (built cultural) heritage in sustaining the construction of collective memory 
as well as in supporting assertions of cultural identity; the complementary functions 
of such constructed memories and identities in underpinning each other; the devising 
of conflict as revolving around particular formulations of memory and identity; the 
(re)construction of identity in the aftermaths of conflict as informed by selective 
accounts of the past; and finally the tailoring of heritage to suit both memory and 
identity constructs.  
The study is concerned with memory in its collective declination.  As such, it does 
not deal with mnemonic aspects of remembering, nor with personal narratives of past 
experiences of conflict, that is, it does not try to unveil or investigate what people in 
Sarajevo actually remember of their (more or less) recent past(s). Collective memory 
is seen as a (social and political) construction devised through processes of selective 
remembering and functional forgetting that are interweaved with a society's 
projections of identity. Similarly, identity is considered as a project and a frame that 
both relies and impinges on memory constructions. Memory and identity are thus not 
givens of a group/society, but rather processes that involve the interplay of a plurality 
of accounts, projections and actors. Heritage is taken into account as a pivotal 
element of such processes for its role as physical marker of particular memories and 
identities and its functions in anchoring them to territory and landscape. The study 
thus concentrates on tangible heritage – especially built cultural heritage – and on 
monuments/memorials that, though not formally recognised as items of cultural 
heritage, play an important role in public ceremonies. As will be explained below, 
monuments and (built cultural) heritage are analysed together to the extent that the 
functions and meanings ascribed to them present similarities within local/national and 
global/international politics concerning memory and identity.  
Conflict is a central theme of reflection in that the study focuses on the 
construction of memories of war in the public space, and on their representation 
through symbols (monuments and memorials) and performances (commemorations) 
across the urbanscape of Sarajevo. Furthermore, processes of recollection and 
memorialisation are loci of conflict insofar as they entail negotiation and contestation 
over the recognition and affirmation of particular reconstructions of the past, and 
more generally struggles over the right and power to partake in the configuration of a 
society's identities and memories. 
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The following sections provide some introductory remarks on memory, identity, 
heritage and conflict – and their manifold relations – to delineate the framework of 
this research. Section 1.2 recollects some central features of the experience of 
destruction of built cultural heritage during the 1992-95 war in BiH. Section 1.3 
illustrates the theoretical background of the study, and delineates the particular 
approach adopted to investigate both monument construction and heritage 
reconstruction as pertaining to memorialisation processes in this specific context. 
Finally, sections 1.4 and 1.5 present, respectively, the study’s research questions and 
the thesis outline. 
1.2 The ‘war against memory’ in BiH 
The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s took 
place amidst extreme violence, with the unfolding of a set of wars on the territories of 
its constituent republics. Politically, the conflicts were dominated by aggressive 
nationalist ideologies that pursued the creation of “nationally” homogeneous states 
through secession from, and/or partition of, the territories of the Yugoslav federation, 
appealing to the right of self-determination of each of its constituent peoples.1 Such 
ideologies revolved around the redefinition of ethnonational identities as 
incompatible group differences, and entailed the appeal to a long history of 
intergroup animosities and wrongdoings. Areas like that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where no ethnic group comprised an absolute majority and the various Yugoslav 
peoples not only coexisted, but had become increasingly intermingled, constituted a 
particular challenge to the implementation of such nationalist projects and the 
ideologies underpinning them. 
The armed conflict that ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 
brought about massive destruction and caused a total displacement of more than 2 
million people over a population of approximately 4.4 millions, of which 1.3 millions 
became refugees outside the country while the remaining 1 million became internally 
 
                                                     
1 See Hayden, Robert M., “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing 
in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23.4 (1996): 783–801, and Woodward, Susan L., Balkan Tragedy: Chaos 
and Dissolution After the Cold War (Brookings Institution Press: 1995). 
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displaced.2 The strives and displacements changed drastically the demographic 
composition of the country and altered its ethnic chart in the service of 
homogenization, transforming what had been for centuries a shared common space 
into a patchwork of areas of predominance of one group over the others (see figures 
1 and 2). The eradication and/or elimination of the ethnic “Other” from contested 
areas was carried out through systematic violence and practices ranging from 
harassment to deportation, torture, rape, detention in camps and mass killings, 
unveiling that strategies of “ethnic cleansing” were integral to the war. Both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) identified genocidal intents in some of the most appalling 
episodes of the conflict, and in 2001 General-Major Radislav Krstic was the first person 
indicted for participating in genocide and committing crimes against humanity in the 
enclave of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995.3 
The onslaught against people to coercively redefine the territorial, political, and 
demographic map(s) of Bosnia and Herzegovina was complemented by deliberate 
violence against the built environment and its cultural and religious symbols.  
The variety of the heritage that characterized BiH's landscape until the early 1990s 
– and the (spatial) relations among its individual items – testified for an environment 
of pluralism and interminglement. The presence of old Muslim, Orthodox, Jewish and 
Catholic buildings within walking distance in the historic centre of Sarajevo is often 
mentioned as an example of cultural pluralism and interrelatedness dating back to the 
city’s foundation period (all buildings except the Catholic cathedral were erected in 
the sixteenth century). A comprehensive gaze on the cultural landscape of the 
country as a whole is of particular importance in understanding items of heritage to 
bear significance on identity not just in their individuality, but rather as elements 
within a common shared culture: 
 
                                                     
2 See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, and Bose, Sumantra, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and 
International Intervention. (Oxford University Press: 2002). 
3 ICTY Case IT-98–33, ‘Srebrenica-Drina Corps’, available at: www.icty.org. In 2006-2007, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina initiated at the ICJ a case against Serbia and Montenegro concerning the application of the 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. The judgement stated that “the 
acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and 
accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica 
from about 13 July 1995” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 166, para. 
297). 
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“BiH maybe does not have mosques like those in Istanbul, nor cathedrals like 
those in Rome, nor monasteries as they are in Russia, but it has all that in one 
place, side by side. All these diverse sacral objects, the extremely valuable 
movable treasures, stecci4 and the other cemeteries of all peoples and religions, 
that remained intact through centuries of existence, the towers, bridges, old 
medieval cities, urban and rural complexes of unique characteristic looks, make 
BiH special and distinctive on a European, and maybe even global scale.”5 
Under this gaze, the country’s built environment could be considered material proof 
that 
“regardless of all obstacles, various conflicts and particularly the effects of 
external factors, these [cultural/religious] communities existed, developed, built 
their own cultural identity, but also exercised mutual influence on one another, 
generating the specific spiritual and material culture that makes Bosnia and 
Herzegovina unique and special”.6 
This uniqueness of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized as particularly significant 
and highlighted with concern at the beginning of hostilities and against the 
background of the experience of destruction in Croatia (e.g. siege of Dubrovnik from 
October 1991), which prompted the drafting of various appeals to the international 
community to protect the heritage of the region.7 
The heterogeneity of the cultural landscape, in this sense, represented a material 
negation to essentialist constructions of culture and identity implied by the divisive 
projects of extreme nationalism. During the course of the conflict, built heritage was 
thus deliberately targeted for destruction, as part of violent campaigns of redefinition 
of the territorial organization and demographic composition of strategic areas. As the 
 
                                                     
4 Stecci (sing. Stecak) are monumental medieval tombstones typical of Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of 
Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. 
5 Appeal for the cultural-historical heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by the Institute for the 
protection of monuments of nature and culture of RBiH and sent to a meeting of the Sub-committee on the 
Architectural and Artistic Heritage of the Council of Europe held in Ljubljana on 24-26 April 1992. In 
Serdarevic, Mevlida, Pravna Zastita Kulturno-Historijskog Naslijeda BiH (Nastajanje, Ocuvanje, Destrukcija), 
(Sarajevo: Medunarodni Centar za Mir, 1997), 112, translation: author. 
6 Serdarevic, Pravna Zastita Kulturno-Historijskog Naslijeda BiH, 112, translation: author. 
7 Conscious of the danger looming over heritage, professionals and non-professionals alike participated in 
the rescue of heritage in the midst of war, through individual efforts and the setting up of organizations 
and committees which relocated movable items of heritage where possible, and gave voice to the 
destruction of heritage through informative material and appeals for help. On the case of Sarajevo see 
Serdarevic, Pravna Zastita Kulturno-Historijskog Naslijeda BiH. 
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rhetoric of war produced monolithic juxtaposed constructions of “Serbs(/Orthodox)”, 
“Croats(/Catholic)” and “Bosnjaks(/Muslim)” as distinct ethnies animated by 
reciprocal “ancient hatreds”, the implementation of this logic by violent means 
entailed the annihilation of the material evidence of their actual coexistence across 
centuries of history. In this context, cultural heritage was directly invested with 
meaning as symbol of the historical presence of the ethnic Other on a contested soil, 
and targeted for annihilation in a zero-sum model corresponding to the cleansing of 
both the people and the landmarks of their culture. This meant that items of heritage 
ranging from infrastructure (e.g. old bridges) to historic and religious buildings, busts, 
monuments, even books, were purposely targeted for destruction, with the intent of 
erasing the traces of the historical existence of the “enemy” group on territories 
claimed by others. The extent of targeting and destruction was such that it could 
hardly be considered a “collateral damage” of armed conflict: the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia recognized “seizure of, destruction, or willful 
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and 
sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and science” as amounting to war 
crimes in its Statute (Art.3d). Efforts to assess the actual extent of destruction of the 
cultural landscape after the end of the conflict produced various reports with partial 
data from different areas of the country, whose overall shared findings advanced the 
claim that “the entire heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina [was] endangered.”8 
The deliberate targeting of historic, cultural and religious buildings highlighted the 
negative connotations heritage can assume when appropriated by extreme 
nationalist discourses on identity and history/memory. Within such context, it appears 
 
                                                     
8 Mulalic-Handan, Mirela, “Implementation of Annex 8 of General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Bastina/Heritage III (2007): 26, emphasis added. For data on the destruction of 
cultural heritage during the conflict in BiH see Riedlmayer, Andras J., Destruction of Cultural Heritage in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities. Report to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2002); Riedlmayer, Andras J., “From the Ashes: The Past and 
Future of Bosnia’s Cultural Heritage,” in Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-
Ethnic States, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002): 98–135; 
Miscellaneous, “Pet Godina Rada Komisije Za Ocuvanje Nacionalnih spomenika/Five Years of the 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments,” Heritage (Bastina) II (2006): 23–73; Hadzimuhamedovic, 
Amra, “Reconstruct or Forget? European History and Bosnian Reality,” Heritage (Bastina) 38 (2006): 222–
244. Partial data are already revealing as to the proportions of destruction and its deliberate character: a 
survey prepared in 1995 by the Institute for the Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that “2771 properties of the architectural heritage had been destroyed or 
damaged: 713 of them totally destroyed and 554 set on fire and unusable” (quoted in Hadzimuhamedovic, 
“Reconstruct or forget,” 235). 
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clear that heritage items become military targets because of their functions in the 
articulation of a group's history and culture upon a territory that has become 
contested. 
The investment of heritage with symbolic meaning in the nationalist perspective 
radically transformed the perception of both the landscape and its history. Such gaze, 
in fact, concentrated on single items of heritage (religious buildings are perhaps the 
best example) overlooking their organization and development in time and space: a 
mosque or a church could be regarded as a cultural symbol pertaining uniquely to the 
“Other”, while its location at a few hundred meters from the place of worship of a 
different faith and the socio-historical context of its construction were altogether 
overlooked and forgotten. In this way, while war was raged against individual material 
objects as emblems of self-enclosed units, what was really being annihilated was the 
image of the centuries-long development of a pluralist and heterogeneous shared 
cultural space. Within this space, built heritage as a whole testified for the 
coexistence, interaction, communication, and ultimately co-participation of diverse 
groups to the cultural milieu of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout history.  
The violence unleashed on BiH’s territory and population thus highlighted that 
mixed areas were “both anomalous and threatening since they served as living 
disproof of the nationalist ideologies.”9 As these ideologies revolved around 
exclusivist understandings of ethnicity, they assigned strategic functions to the 
destruction of heritage as a core symbol of cultural identities. In this perspective, as 
remarked by Hayden, “conceptually, the violence of ethnic cleansing may be seen as 
deriving from the clash of a prescriptive model of culture (culture-as-ideology) with 
what exists on the ground (culture-as-lived) but is not in accordance with the 
prescription”.10  
After the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in late 1995, the survey of the 
conditions of its heritage was claimed to result in a “catalogue of ruins, and a warning 
to us all”.11  
The destructive processes directed against cultural heritage during the war, and 
the efforts required by the (enormous) tasks of reconstruction in its aftermaths, impel 
a reflection on the functions and meanings ascribed to heritage and monuments with 
regards to memory, culture and identity. 
 
                                                     
9 Hayden, “Imagined Communities and Real Victims,” 788. 
10 Ibid., 784. 
11 Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Kulturno Pamcenje. Blago Koje Nestaje / Cultural Memory. A 
Vanishing Treasure, (Sarajevo: 2004), 35, emphasis original.  
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1.3 Politics of memory, politics of heritage 
”Everything seems to indicate that the past is not 
preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the 
present.”12 
In defining collective memory, I first draw from the insights of Maurice Halbwachs 
(1877-1945), whose work highlighted the social dimension of remembering and the 
influence of the present on the ways collectives evoke their past(s). Starting from the 
assumption that "life as well as social thought is inconceivable without one or several 
systems of conventions,"13 Halbwachs straightforwardly asserted that “no memory is 
possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and 
retrieve their recollections.”14 This angle drew attention to the fundamental role of 
social frameworks and systems of conventions in the process of remembering. In this 
perspective, memory as referred to the first person plural is not a simple recollection 
of a common past carried out jointly by those who experienced it, but rather a 
(re)construction elaborated within – and with the aid of – social frameworks 
pertaining to the present of that collective, that is, within “implicit or explicit 
structure[s] of shared concerns, values, experiences, narratives”.15 In other words, 
“collective memories are based in a society and its inventory of signs and symbols”.16 
By conceptualising collective memory as inextricably entangled with the present 
values and concerns of a society, this perspective links it to that society's identity. In 
this view, memory is ancillary to the cohesion of any society, as memories “are at the 
same time models, examples, and elements of teaching. They express the general 
attitude of the group; they not only reproduce its history but also define its nature 
and its qualities and weaknesses".17 The relation between memory and identity is here 
somehow set on the primacy of identity, in that social frameworks are “instruments” 
 
                                                     
12 Halbwachs, Maurice, On Collective Memory, edited by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 39-40. 
13 Ibid., 172. 
14 Ibid., 43. 
15 Assmann, Aleida, “Transformations between History and Memory,” Social Research 75.1 (2008): 51-2. 
16 Kansteiner, Wolf, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” 
History and Theory 41.2 (2002): 188. 
17 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 59. 
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used to construct “an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the 
predominant thoughts of the society".18 
In more recent years, the reflection on this relationship was carried further to 
highlight the interrelatedness of memory and identity and the ways in which each of 
them concurs in the construction of the other. In this perspective, the core function of 
memory constructs is that of sustaining the definition of group identity while 
simultaneously providing a “historical” grounding to articulate the present 
legitimation of the group. As seen above, collective memory is crucial in providing a 
sense of continuity with the past, whose function is to underpin and reinforce the 
identity of the group of rememberers. At the same time, though, the elaboration of 
such memory is informed and guided by the identity assumed and endorsed by the 
group. Identity, in other words, cannot “precede” memory and inform its creation in a 
consequential way, because it is itself a construction, and one that uses memory to 
sustain itself: “the core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of 
sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is 
remembered is defined by the assumed identity”.19 As collectives do not “naturally” 
possess an identity but rather need to “imagine” one for themselves,20 the work of 
such imaginative construction becomes entangled with that of the formulation of a 
common past.  
This reciprocity and interdependence of memory and identity constructs has a 
crucial role in the emergence and development of national identities and in the 
establishment of nation-states, configured as unique entities with reference to both 
time and space. Narratives on the history of the nation are thus employed not only to 
strengthen the cohesion of the nation itself, but also to determine who belongs to it 
and where its physical as well as symbolical borders are to be set: “shared stories 
define the nature and boundaries of entire societies to whom the stories belong”.21 In 
other words, the formulation of a distinctive memory of the collective – the group's 
'own' memory, which recollects the tale of its unicity across time – concurs 
simultaneously in the definition of the collective to which that memory pertains.  
 
                                                     
18 Ibid., 40. 
19 Gillis, John R., “Introduction,” in Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity, edited by John R. Gillis 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3. 
20 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
21 Misztal, Barbara A., Theories of Social Remembering (Maidenhead, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
2003), 52. 
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Thinking of the nation-state as a realm where "memory is shared by people who 
have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard themselves as having a 
common history",22 the process of construction of an official (national) memory and 
that of construction and consolidation of group identity (the nation) typically emerge 
as intertwined and mutually constitutive. Memory and identity are in this way 
interweaved with each other in a mutual relationship. On the one hand, identity 
constructs depend on and avail themselves of particular formulations of memory, 
whereby the definition of the nation itself becomes indissolubly linked with the 
reconstruction of the past, as well as with the nation's projection onto the future: "to 
have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have 
performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the 
essential conditions for being a people".23 On the other hand, recollections of the past 
and memory constructs are affected and shaped by assumed identities that are not 
essential attributes of groups, but rather the result of (social and political) processes: 
“ethnicity and nation are not entities in the world but ways of seeing the world. 
[…] [T]hey are ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of 
construing sameness and difference, and of 'coding' and making sense of their 
actions. They are templates for representing and organizing social knowledge, 
frames for articulating social comparisons and explanations, and filters that 
shape what is noticed or unnoticed, relevant or irrelevant, remembered or 
forgotten”.24 
Memory constructs are in this way articulated through both remembrance and 
forgetting. In order to enhance a sense of common will in the present, the 
reconstruction of a suitable past of joint “deeds” and “glories” entails the erasure of 
that part of the past that might contradict or hinder the cohesion of the group, so 
that "forgetting [...] is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation".25 As scholars 
highlighted, oblivion concerns in the first place forgetting the fact that nations did not 
exist as such in the past.26 Moreover, because the recollection of the past contributes 
to the definition of the subject of remembering, forgetting also concerns the 
 
                                                     
22 Gillis, “Introduction,” 7. 
23 Renan, Ernest, “What Is a Nation?,” in Nation and Narration, edited by Homi K. Bhabha (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1990), 19.  
24 Brubaker, Rogers, Ethnicity without Groups (Harvard University Press, 2004), 81. 
25 Renan, “What Is a Nation?”, 11. 
26 See e.g. Renan, “What Is a Nation?” and Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence O Ranger, The Invention of 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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marginalisation or obliteration of accounts that reflect the experience of groups 
whose identity does not fit the national one. Like the process of construction of 
national identity, the work of construction of such “imagined” memory is “embedded 
in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is remembered (or 
forgotten), by whom, and for what end".27 Ultimately, “Identities and memories are 
not things we think about, but things we think with. As such they have no existence 
beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories”.28 
The “politics of memory” perspective highlights the political implications of 
memory and identity constructs and analyses the process of their formulation with a 
focus on power relations, arguing that 
“the history which became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of 
nation, state or movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular 
memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and 
institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so”.29 
The political project of the nation is thus sustained by both an imagined present and 
an “invented” past.30 
Within such project,  "collective memory [...] depends on transitions from history 
into memory that involve the framing of historical events in the shape of affectively 
charged narratives and mobilizing symbols".31 The goal appears to be accomplished 
through the production of public monuments and the creation of official ceremonies 
and commemorations. The erection of monuments serves the purpose of fixing 
particular narratives of past events onto the cultural landscape of the nation, where 
they function as symbols recalling significant events and figures of the national past, 
describing a “geography of belonging, an identity forged in a specified landscape, 
inseparable from it".32 In this way, monuments symbolically inscribe time onto space, 
forming a map of the nation's past onto its territory, and drawing from the stability of 
the spatial image a sense of being immutable in time. On this symbolic memory map, 
monuments “represent public statements about what the past has been, and how the 
 
                                                     
27 Gillis, “Introduction,” 3. 
28 Ibid., 5, emphasis original. 
29 Hobsbawm, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13. 
30 Cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition. 
31 Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” 67. 
32 Hodgkin, Katharine, and Susannah Radstone, Contested Pasts. The Politics of Memory (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 169. 
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present should acknowledge it; who should be remembered, who should be 
forgotten; which acts or events are foundational, which marginal; what gets 
respected, what neglected".33 
The shaping of “affectively charged narratives” around these landmarks of 
memory, in turn, is sustained by the performance of official ceremonies that 
periodically remind society of the particular meanings attached to them, rejoining 
memory and identity within the official commemorative calendar of the present.  
Commemorations prevent the monument from becoming invisible by articulating 
around it ritualized performances that inscribe it in master narratives on the memory 
and identity of the group, constructing the “story that a given community tells itself 
about itself".34 In this way, they "reconstruct history or 're-collect' or 're-member' it in 
the sense of practising bricolage, assembling fragments of the past into new 
patterns",35 in a way which reminds the group of its identity and becomes “a making 
sense of the past as a kind of collective autobiography".36 Furthermore, 
commemorative ceremonies emerge as practices for contestation and negotiation 
over the meanings ascribed to monuments as well as for the articulation of claims for 
the visibility of divergent accounts in the public space.37 
Since the Second World War, the role of memory engineered and established with 
the emergence and affirmation of modern nation states has been coupled with a 
discourse on “heritage” that extends beyond the boundaries of states, to address the 
international community of nations using a language that refers to a global “culture of 
humanity”. To a certain extent, 'heritage' has emerged within this discourse as a 
synonym for 'memory' and 'monuments', so that we can now say that 
“heritage is [...] the term that best denotes our inescapable dependence on the 
past. What we inherit is integral to our being. Without memory and tradition we 
could neither function now nor plan ahead. […] Heritage distills the past into 
 
                                                     
33 Ibid., 12-13. 
34 Burke, Peter, “Co-Memorations. Performing the Past,” in Performing the Past. Memory, History, and 
Identity in Modern Europe, edited by Karin Tilmans, Frank Van Vree, and Jay Winter (Amsterdam University 
Press, 2010), 108. 
35 Ibid., 106. 
36 Connerton, Paul, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 70. 
37 For a more detailed discussion of the functions of monuments and commemorations see chapter 3. 
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icons of identity, bonding us with precursors and progenitors, with our own 
earlier selves, and with our promised successors”.38 
This discourse converges with the politics of memory to the extent that it values 
monuments as ‘traces’ of the history of humankind, forming a “system of cultural 
references” that “bears witness of the past” and should be handed down to future 
generations,39 so that what was previously valued within the construction of memory 
and identity of individual nation-states can now be recognized to partake in the 
construction of memory and identity in a global perspective, that is, in the cultural 
diversity and richness of humanity. 
This understanding of heritage was elaborated through a series of international 
texts and conventions that took the moves from the UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict signed at The Hague in 
1954, and its assertion that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people 
makes its contribution to the culture of the world”.40 Establishing that “heritage 
should be passed on to future generations in its authentic state and in all its variety as 
an essential part of the memory of the human race”,41 this body of texts reviewed and 
defined the “variety” of heritage (tangible, intangible, natural, architectural, 
archaeological, and so forth) and came to present it broadly as “a group of resources 
inherited from the past which people identify [...] as a reflection and expression of 
their constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions”.42 
Heritage thus came to represent the link between memory and identity at different 
scales, encompassing the national one but not limited to it, and was explicitly 
endowed with significance in the construction of a shared cultural space of 
humankind. Addressing a global audience in place of a national one, the discourse on 
heritage has been articulated through the language of universal values and human 
rights (cfr. right to culture), thus apparently transcending the context of the nation as 
the primary frame of reference for both memory and identity, and the privileged 
 
                                                     
38 Lowenthal, David, “Identity, Heritage, and History,” in Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity, 
edited by John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 43. 
39 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, Granada, 1985, 
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40 UNESCO. Convention for the Protection of Culturel Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 
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41 Council of Europe. European Charter of the Architectural Heritage, 1975, Art.2. 
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arena of the politics of memory. Instead, this new universalistic “politics of heritage” 
is fostered by collective bodies as UNESCO and the Council of Europe in the interest of 
humanity's cultural achievements. This new tendency, nevertheless, cannot but 
solidly remain anchored to the nation for at least two reasons: first, its philosophy is 
strongly rooted on the classic understanding of the relationship between memory and 
identity that was forged by and within the nation-state; and second, its principal 
actors – the signatories of any convention and the subjects of any heritage policy – 
continue to be the “State Parties”, that is, nation-states, which are in this way 
implicitly assumed as the “unproblematic subject of traditional cultural expression”.43 
The universalism advocated by this new approach to heritage, thus, does not 
transcend either the particularism of the nation or the political implications of any 
discourse linking memory and identity, but rather contributes to create “a worldwide 
political economy in which notions of the right, the good and the true have jostled 
with national interests, power relationships and prestige".44 Within this context, 
"cultural property recognized as 'The Heritage' functions as symbolic capital for 
nation-states as well as smaller sub-national entities, [and] heritage has become 
integral to the cultural policy of display for nations, cities and regions alike".45 
These developments broaden the reflection on the construction of memory and 
identity by showing that “the plinth and the pedestal […] have become the key visual 
components of ideological and rhetorical urban topography”46 not only within the 
national dimension, but within an increasingly interconnected global context shaped 
by a “world of nations”47 through the definition of the common universal values of 
humanity. Accordingly, the study of the politics of memory within the national setting 
must encompass an analysis of the “politics of heritage” in the international arena, as 
the two inevitably intersect in the actual articulation of memory and identity in the 
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45 Ibid., 43, emphasis original. 
46 Gough, Paul, “Commemoration of War,” The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity, edited 
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47 Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism (Sage, 1995). 
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local context. The starting point of such a reflection is set in the trait that the two 
politics have in common: the key functions of monuments/heritage with regards to 
memory and identity and the values attached to them. 
As mentioned above, along with the selection and marking of important dates with 
official ceremonies and commemorations, 
"the visual features of the cultural landscape such as public buildings, 
monuments, plaques, plinths, graffiti, and street names [...] map selective 
interpretations of the past and present onto public spaces. As such, they 
articulate heritage and can be read as icons of identity and spatializations of 
history".48 
Insofar as it is assumed to embody the “traces of the past” on which the group's 
sense of sameness over time and belonging to place are developed, heritage 
constitutes a hub around which the construction of both memory and identity 
revolves. Built cultural heritage is particularly apt at establishing this multiple 
connection between time, space and identity because its items – public buildings, 
shrines, memorials and the like – provide tangible representation to narratives on the 
memory and identity of a given group, while at the same time anchoring them to 
territory in an identified cultural landscape. 
As is the case with memory, heritage is thus not just a simple reflection of the past 
as 'History', but more specifically of “that part of the past that we select in the 
present for contemporary purposes […] and choose to bequeath to a future”.49  
The gist of questions around monuments, commemorations and heritage hence 
lies in the process of selection of those items that provide collectives with a usable 
past to be exploited and deployed in the delineation and legitimisation of present 
identities. The investigation of such process in turn entails the identification of its 
main actors and the strategies they employ to achieve and maintain control over it, 
which has implications on the ability to control the cohesion of the collective whose 
“memory” is being displayed through the selected heritage.  
The theme of conflict is of singular importance here. The endowment of heritage 
with functions in relation to identity, and its involvement in the informed selection of 
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a usable past, arguably concur in exposing it to violence and making it a locus of 
conflict. As Hodgkin and Radstone recall, "the establishment of memorial sites, places 
where the past is not only preserved as fetish but also transmitted as signification, is 
inevitably a focus for struggle over meaning: whose monument is permitted, and 
what meanings may it convey?”.50 This potential of contestation or conflict over 
meaning inherent to virtually any monument51 intensifies when the 
monument/memorial encompasses narratives of past struggles, fights, and/or wars.  
The content of memories of conflict appears to have a peculiar grasp on 
constructions of identity, particularly when it is formulated in terms that foster 
feelings of belonging on the basis of the recollection of a shared suffering. By 
addressing and recalling individual experiences of trauma, monuments/heritage 
related to war have strong emotional bearings and prove able to arouse concern and 
involvement, commitment as well as contestation. When suffering has occurred in the 
context of violent conflict among groups – especially conflicts devised around cultural 
antagonism – memory constructs recalling past strives foster cohesion by identifying 
communities of victims and perpetrators, thus adding a moral element in the 
(re)construction or reiteration of the group's identity. This suggests that heritage 
constructed after violence (monuments and memorials to fighters, victims and/or 
events of the conflict) acquires enhanced efficacy in strengthening group affiliation 
from the combination of values/functions commonly ascribed to heritage during 
peacetime and the recollection of the strives endured during wartime.52 
This special aptness of monuments/heritage of war at calling upon the group's 
sense of affiliation is best disclosed in the aftermaths of conflicts of a foundational 
character (where a new state is created as a result of the clashes), and conflicts based 
on “culturalist explanations and justifications”,53 as in the case of “ethnic” conflicts. 
 
                                                     
50 Hodgkin and Radstone, Contested Pasts, 11. 
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52 See also Ashworth, Gregory J., “The Memorialization of Violence and Tragedy: Human Trauma as 
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1.4 Memorialisation of war in BiH 
This reflection on memory, identity, heritage and conflict in post-war BiH is 
multifaceted. Its starting point lays in the fact that the country resurfaced from war as 
a new (political) entity, within a region whose geopolitical configuration changed 
from that of a socialist federative project into a variety of (national) successor states. 
The exposure to armed conflict between 1992 and 1995 ravaged the country’s 
people and devastated its outlook and structure, constituting a milestone in its 
development as an autonomous subject within the regional and international arena. 
The end of clashes thus corresponded to a “new beginning” in the history of BiH, 
bringing about a change of regime that, differently from what happened in other 
settings, lasted over a period of protracted systematic and coordinated violence.  
The junction of regime change typically exposes the crucial functions assigned to 
official memory in the redefinition of the political identity of the state, for “all 
beginnings contain an element of recollection”,54 whereby the past is reinterpreted 
and adapted to suit narratives that sustain the new identity assumed by the polity. 
Across the caesura of regime change, policies of reconfiguration of the memorial 
landscape undertaken by the new regime show that monuments 
“invariably prove to be temporary constructs which may be changed or 
forgotten at any moment. The image of what one generation believed to be the 
realization of their forebears’ ideals [is] conceived by the succeeding generation 
to be no more than an illusion which should be replaced with the closest 
possible realization of their dreams, whatever the cost”.55 
At the same time, the new establishment will develop a more or less organized 
remembrance of the state’s “new beginning”, pairing the articulation of a suitable 
past with the creation of a heritage of the “new” era, to which monuments, 
memorials and commemorations will provide the appropriate representations and 
“traditions”.56 
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The experience of such change in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, appears 
particularly complex and multi-layered, for the framework in which it occurred is 
constituted by the entanglement of transition and regime change with a war in which 
(particular uses of) memory and identity constructs assumed a central role. 
This consideration prompted a specific interest in the ways in which the war is 
recollected within and by the newly established state of BiH as that succession of 
events that brought to its new foundation, and the motive for an investigation of the 
processes whereby such recollections are entwined with the (symbolic) 
representation of the polity and embedded in its public space through the 
construction of the memorial landscape. In this sense, the core aspect of 
memorialisation processes around which the reflection revolves is the mutually 
constitutive character of memory and identity constructs. 
The study identifies various planes and dimensions along which the construction of 
memories relates to the formulation of collective identities, ideally discerning two 
main areas of investigation: the entanglements between the legitimation of the 
political identity of the state and the delineation of ethno-cultural group identities; 
and the interplay between local experiences and global notions in the 
conceptualisation of cultural identities in more general terms. The memorialisation of 
the recent conflict appears pivotal because, in both areas, processes of construction 
of identity in post-Dayton BiH recall salient aspects of the war: the unfolding of 
coordinated violence along ethnic lines within the struggle that led to the 
establishment of an independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the central 
role assigned to cultural heritage as a signifier of memories and identities in both 
wartime systematic destruction and post-war reconstruction. Especially in relation to 
this second area, the reflection adopts an approach that identifies an international 
dimension intersecting with the local memorialisation processes in present-day BiH, 
and tries to integrate the “politics of memory” perspective with considerations on a 
global “politics of heritage” (see also below). 
One first level of investigation concerns the functions of memory constructs in the 
delineation of the identity of the collective as a political subject, i.e. the new (post-
socialist) state of BiH.  
The 1992-95 war constitutes a pivotal event in the emergence of this political 
subject, to the extent that it was caused by an irreconcilable political opposition over 
the fate of BiH during the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia, and resulted in the 
foundation of an independent state in the newly reconfigured region of the “Western 
Balkans.” In this sense, the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a new state 
committed to human rights and the rule of law, in line with the principles of 
established Western democracies, is directly linked to armed conflict, insofar as its 
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founding act (i.e. its Constitution) forms part of a peace treaty (the Dayton 
Agreement). 
This gaze thus explores recollections of the war’s causes and outcomes in relation 
to narratives on the emergence of the regime established at Dayton, focusing on the 
ways in which particular accounts of the conflict entangle with claims for or against 
the legitimacy of the new state as well as its institutional configuration as a power-
sharing system. Because post-war BiH was configured as multi-ethnic/multicultural 
country, based on ethnic principles of identification and representation and regulated 
by consociational mechanisms of power-sharing, questions regarding the identity and 
legitimation of the political entity of the state entangle with notions on the 
communities that comprise it. 
A related aspect of the reflection thus focuses on formulations of identity in terms 
of ethno-cultural groups (i.e. Serbs, Croats and Bosnjaks) at the sub-state level, and 
refers to the instrumentalisation of memory within the 1992-95 conflict and the 
ensuing experience of violence it entailed. 
Devised around essentialist and exclusivist reconstructions of the “history” and 
identity of discrete groups, the conflict disrupted personal as well as social relations, 
uprooting individuals and groups alike while forcefully unsettling their bonds to place 
through a destructive reconfiguration of the cultural landscape. The stabilisation of 
the new state in its aftermaths, on the other hand, will compel the overall collective of 
BiH to shape accounts of the recent past that recollect conflict to make sense of it, in 
a setting where ethno-cultural communities have been formalised as “constituent 
peoples”.57 In this perspective, the investigation focuses on the ways in which the 
conflict is recollected through symbolic dates and monuments to ask how 
memorialisation processes make sense of recent inter-ethnic violence within a newly 
established polity that presupposes multi-ethnic coexistence.  
The conflict, moreover, relying on rigid constructions of groups as “nations”, 
produced the space for the reiteration of exclusivist understandings of (ethno-
cultural) difference on the basis of first-hand experiences of intergroup violence. It is 
thus important to explore accounts of recent practices of aggression and 
victimisation along ethnic patterns in relation to attributions of guilt and blame, and 
investigate whether these entangle with the reification of incompatible group 
identities and/or partake in processes of so-called “reconciliation”. 
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The analytical divide between the identity of the state and that of its ethnic 
communities/‘constituent peoples’ draws attention to the implications of 
memorialisation with regard to articulations of identity in settings that differ from 
that of the nation-state. 
Whereas the new state emerged in late 1995 was configured as a multicultural, 
multinational, and multiconfessional one, its recent exposure to conflict highlighted 
and fostered the appeal of basic nation-state modes of identification, so that 
accounts that recollect it can be employed to symbolically sustain the overall 
collective identity of the country and/or group identities at the sub-state level.  
Memory constructs thus appear particularly relevant in post-war BiH at various 
levels, for the articulation of the country's identity as multicultural/multinational 
entails the (re)definition of its “constituent peoples” as discrete cultural/national 
communities, which in turn evokes the traumatic experience of the effects of 
essentialised identities within the extreme nationalist context of armed conflict. 
Within this framework, the research investigates processes of construction of 
memories of the recent conflict by asking what are the overall mechanisms regulating 
the erection of monuments and memorials, who are the main actors shaping the 
memorial landscape of BiH’s capital city, and how is the (more or less recent) past 
commemorated in public celebrations. Because of the complex interplay of identities 
at the state v. sub-state levels and the recent exposure to violence deployed along 
ethnic belonging/affiliation, the selection of specific events and the formulation the 
narratives in which these are embedded can assume different meanings for different 
collectives. How are thus these collectives symbolically evoked within recollections of 
the recent conflict, or: how does the construction of a remembrance of the war deal 
with identities that were previously purported as mutually exclusive, and how do 
memorialisation processes make sense of the events that led to the creation of the 
common state in which these groups now partake, simultaneously formulating its 
overall identity? 
These questions highlight the sensitivity of the interrelation of memories and 
identities, for if ‘modern memory’ stems from “an intense awareness of the 
conflicting representations of the past and the effort of each group to make its 
version the basis of national identity”,58 the memorialisation of war in today’s BiH 
might be as prone to perpetuating the conflict as it is to providing a closure for it. 
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The second aspect of this reflection concerns international conceptualisations on 
cultural identity, and their intersections with memory policies centred on heritage in 
post-war BiH. 
One defining characteristic of the 1992-95 war was that it entailed a parallel war 
against heritage, aiming at the destruction of the traces of particular (ethno-cultural) 
communities from the country’s landscape. In response to this, the Dayton 
Agreement established a Commission to Preserve National Monuments (Annex 8 of 
the GFAP), endowed with tasks of recognition and rehabilitation of the country’s 
cultural heritage (cf. Chapter four). 
This draws attention to the international involvement in BiH’s post-war 
reconstruction59 and discloses an international dimension in processes of cultural 
heritage rehabilitation, which appear informed by the international heritage doctrine 
delineated through UNESCO and CoE’s documents. 
If we look at the 1954 Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict as a founding document, the central features of this current 
trend of valorisation of cultural heritage appear to be its international scope and its 
reference to armed conflict: confronted with the destruction brought about by the 
Second World War, different European states gathered to draft an agreement based 
on the recognition of the value of (tangible) cultural property. The very essence of 
such agreement was that its scope extend beyond the borders of individual states, to 
establish a set of common values that would be shared internationally, and respected 
even in the event of conflict among the signatory states. Eventually, and especially 
with newer instruments like the World Heritage List, this heritage doctrine has 
become a global phenomenon. This international trend, moreover, entailed the 
establishment of a shared notion of heritage. Initially defined as ‘cultural property’ and 
connected to a specific national setting, this notion evolved into a conceptualisation 
of (tangible and intangible) heritage as a richness pertaining to humankind but also 
tightly connected to groups’ cultures (and thus identities), within a framework that 
simultaneously emphasises diversity and cherishes universal human rights. 
In a sense, Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes the first application of this 
international philosophy to a situation of destruction of built cultural heritage that 
parallels the one experienced with WWII. 
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During the 1992-95 conflict, heritage assumed a central role in both the violent 
aggression of the “Other” and the volitional resistance to “chaos and dissolution”.60 
In both practices, the underlying features of heritage with regards to place, memory, 
and identity assumed significance within the framework of broader 
conceptualizations of culture and difference. (Built) heritage seen as a signifier of 
memory and identity was transformed into a military target by essentialist 
constructions of the “nation” (i.e. ethnie) that focused an exclusivist gaze on its 
individual items, whereas approaches that saw heritage as an expression of the 
relations within a pluralist setting across its shared history identified it as a common 
good to be protected. While both attitudes maintained the nexus place-identity-
heritage as central in the understanding of heritage's value, the ways in which they 
built upon this nexus differed radically, drawing once more attention to the notion of 
construction as pivotal in all discourses on memory and identity. 
The reconstruction of cultural heritage in the aftermaths of such deliberate 
destruction forms part of new memory policies in BiH in a particular way. Although it 
does not amount to the erection of new monuments dedicated to the 1992-95 war, 
the systematization of mechanisms and procedures for heritage reconstruction 
responds directly to one of the effects of the war through the rehabilitation (and thus 
the reconfiguration) of the country’s memorial landscape. Because heritage was 
deliberately targeted during the conflict as a symbol of particular (ethnic) identities 
within practices of aggression and victimisation, its reconstruction will have 
implications on the (re)definition of the identity of the country in a historical 
perspective as well as on the interplay between such overall identity and the 
recollection of (distinct) groups on its territories. 
This aspect of the research thus investigates the framework, regulation and 
institutions of heritage policies in post-war BiH and the entanglement of the process 
of reconstruction and recognition of built cultural heritage with regards to heritage’s 
functions as a marker of identities. The analysis focuses on the notions of heritage, 
culture and identity delineated within the international heritage doctrine in relation to 
the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ask how the conceptualisation of a 
global (cultural) identity of humankind intersects with a setting characterised by the 
conflictual relationship between group and state identities.  
To a certain extent, the international heritage doctrine still contains contradictory 
approaches to culture and identity, so that the grip of nationalism on the delineation 
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of collective identities does not appear to be out-fashioned by multiculturalist 
discourses, nor by the conceptualization of a global cultural identity of humankind. 
This reminds us of the “banality” of nationalism as a philosophy and politics of 
identity, whereby “not only is the nation imagined as an integral whole, but so is the 
world”,61 so that “to this day, 'the global political order' continues to be based upon 
the assumption of sovereign nation-states existing in mutual recognition”.62  
The multifaceted relationships between identities at the levels of the ‘state’ and/or 
‘nation’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the recent exposure to a “culturalist” war, 
nevertheless, provide the terrain for further analyses of this international approach to 
heritage and its effects. In this sense, what are the concrete applications of UNESCO 
and CoE universalist understandings of culture in the context of heritage 
reconstruction in BiH, and how does this process deal with particularistic accounts 
and recollections? Does the promotion of “cultural diversity” concur in the 
establishment of an environment where divisive understandings of difference can be 
overcome? 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of four parts. The first and last parts present respectively the 
introduction (with presentation and theoretical contextualisation of the topic) and 
the conclusive remarks (with the outcomes and final considerations) of the study. 
Part II presents the premises and setting of the research and is composed of two 
chapters. Chapter two delineates the research as a case study and recollects some 
aspects of the recent experience of conflict in the city of Sarajevo, linking it to the 
notion of urbicide63 and the insights it offers to studies on war, heritage and the 
(destruction of the) built environment. Chapter three provides an overview of 
fieldwork activities and their methodological framework, with a discussion of the 
concepts and questions employed in the analysis of Sarajevo’s memorial landscape 
and some considerations on participant observation and related issues concerning 
subjectivity, validity and emotions in qualitative research. 
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Part III is composed of four chapters, each investigating and analysing a specific 
topic involved in processes of memorialization and thus focusing on a particular angle. 
Chapter four concentrates on the current formal/legal system of heritage care and 
management in BiH. It sketches a map of the bodies and institutions dedicated to 
heritage at various administrative leves (municipal, cantonal, entity and state) and the 
laws and documents that establish their functions and tasks. The chapter specifically 
focuses on two institutions: the Commission to Preserve National Monuments (in 
charge of heritage at the state level) and the Fund for the Protection and 
Maintenance of Cemeteries of Shahids and Killed Combatants, Memorial Centres and 
Monuments of the Victims of Genocide (particularly active in the Sarajevo Canton), 
with a comparison of their mandates and the principles underlying their work in the 
(re)construction of monuments and heritage in the city and beyond. Chapter five 
concentrates on two memorial complexes dedicated to armed conflict in the city of 
Sarajevo (Vraca Memorial Park for WWII and the Kovaci Shahid Memorial Cemetery 
for the 1992-1995 conflict), analyzing their structures, outlooks, messages and location 
within the city to detect the ways in which they recollect the experience of war. 
Chapter six analyses commemorative ceremonies, focusing on the performative 
aspects of memorialization processes and on symbolic dates of the official calendar 
marking anniversaries of local urban significance (e.g. April 6th, Day of the City of 
Sarajevo), and of national import (e.g. November 25th, Day of Statehood, and March 1st 
Day of Independence). Chapter seven further investigates memorialization processes 
by concentrating on contested performances (e.g. May 3rd, commemoration of the 
Dobrovoljacka Street incident in 1992) and alternative models of remembering (e.g. 
Museum of the Siege of Sarajevo, virtual and interactive). 
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Figure 1: map of demographic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the 
census of 1991. Source: Office of the High Representative for BiH, www.ohr.int. 
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Figure 2: map of demographic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. Source: 
Office of the High Representative for BiH, www.ohr.int. 
  29 
Part II 
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 2 Premises, setting and design of the 
research 
2.1 Sarajevo as case study 
"Sarajevo is the scene of a crime, a rape and 
devastation. It is an affront to humanity and 
rationality"1 
Barely two decades ago, the streets and squares of besieged Sarajevo became 
abruptly visible worldwide through the snapshots and footage broadcasted by local 
and international media, turning the city into an emblem of “the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”. Images of its citizens enduring and resisting an unjust and uneven 
struggle for survival, its crossroads occupied by containers to provide some shelter 
from the sniping, its skyscrapers and apartment blocks along with cultural 
monuments reduced to relics, and its Library in flames, populated the news in many 
(European) countries for almost four interminable years. Once the war came to an 
end, a yearning to fix such extreme experience and preserve it from oblivion surfaced 
through the inscription of mementos in the city landscape, so that, less than two 
years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in late 1995, a variety of 
markers were scattered across the city: "the crimson 'roses of Sarajevo' embedded in 
the sidewalk, the commemorative plaques on the facades of many buildings, and 
scores of newly renamed streets reminded passersby of the war".2 With time passing, 
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Sarajevo has come to be considered one of the world's “contested cities”, a place on 
which "history weighs down hard and heavy”.3 Research on urban policies in conflict 
settings has incorporated it in the range of urban centres "characterised by deep-
rooted and often historically based nationalistic group conflict [...] which can 
eventually tear a society and the city apart".4 As such, Sarajevo is seen as sharing with 
places like Jerusalem, Nicosia and Johannesburg “a common sorrow of tormented 
pasts and unpredictable, turbulent futures", prompting reflection on the assertion 
that, "while history weighs heavily and must assuredly be accounted for in contested 
cities, it must also assuredly not be used as an armament".5 
As stated in the introduction, this research aims at exploring the process of 
creation of memories of war through signs, markers and performances displayed in 
public spaces, at reading and interpreting these markers as parts of an account of 
what happened, and at investigating processes of construction and organisation of 
such recollection(s).  
The great proliferation and heterogeneity of markers and commemorations related 
to war throughout BiH render surveys and statistical approaches to memorialisation 
practices/processes both overwhelming and of difficult interpretation. Looking for 
plaques, statues, monuments or memorials, and tracing back streets, buildings and 
places known from previous readings, the news or (current) war crimes trials, an 
interested eye soon begins seizing “memory signs” all over. 
The memorial landscape related to conflict in BiH and Sarajevo includes 
monuments referring to two distinct wars (World War II and the recent conflict of 
dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia during the 1990s), erected to honour fighters and 
victims, remembering both victories and defeats, individual episodes and overall 
accounts, the local protagonists and sometimes international partakers of the 
vicissitudes of conflict – all of this looming out of a landscape that embodies in its 
outline the heritage left by a variety of traditions through centuries of intermingling. 
Within this variegated panorama, monuments dedicated to WWII were erected 
both during the period of Socialist Yugoslavia and in recent times, sometimes (but not 
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5 Bollens, “City and Soul,” 186. 
  33 
always) as replicas of previously existing monuments (presumably destroyed). Many 
are damaged or in decay, exposing signs that suggest neglect, vandalism, or 
deliberate assault, but hardly allowing to discern between the three with simple 
observation.6 Acts of vandalism and intentional attacks against monuments were 
perpetrated both during wartime and in peaceful times between the two wars or in 
the past fifteen years. Similarly, neglect and decay do not necessarily imply a current 
lack of interest in the legacy of the Socialist period, as in some cases carelessness or 
disrespect started soon after the monuments’ erection.7 In the wake of vandalisation 
some monuments are repaired, others not; others, still, are vandalised again over 
prompt restoration.  
In some places, monuments referring to WWII and to the 1992-95 war lie aside, 
presenting inscriptions that use a similar language to refer to the two conflicts, as if 
establishing some sort of (more or less explicit) continuity among them. Monuments 
recalling the more recent conflict, on the other hand, often convey very different 
messages in locations apart from each other; they refer to the conflict through the 
use of different epithets, mark different events of the conflict as memorable, and 
infer divergent accounts of the conflict in different locations of the country.  
The manifold strategies and patterns through which the 1992-95 conflict was led on 
the country's multifaceted territories, and the lack of consensus over its causes, 
circumstances, episodes and consequences (in political as well as moral terms) 
produce a discordant panorama of “memory marks”, confronting the researcher with 
a puzzling portrait of memorialisation.  
While these markers might sometimes seem to diversify the memorial geography 
of the country along detectable patterns (corresponding to groups' affiliations and 
their concentration on the territory), they also multiply the victims whose memory is 
honoured and the episodes and figures of the conflict deemed worth of 
 
                                                     
6 I make a distinction here between vandalisation and deliberate assault to differentiate practices like 
writing and drawings words/symbols on the surface of monuments (graffiti) from the removal of parts of 
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parts of the monument or of its structure suggesting an “attack” with the aid of some utensil or tool.  
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Rodoljubima, Kupusom, Svinjama i Varvarima: Spomenici i Grobovi NOR-a 1947-1965. Godine,” in 60 Godina 
Od Završetka Drugog Svjetskog Rata: Kako Se Sjećati 1945. Godine: Zbornik Radova (Sarajevo: Institut za 
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commemoration. They even multiply the conflict itself, alternately designated as 
Patriotic War of Liberation, Defense-Liberation War, and Homeland War.8 
As a result, BiH's memorial landscape related to war appears so exceedingly “rich” 
of signs and markers that an interested eye soon begins also wondering whether 
“empty” spots might in fact conceal just as many events, places and persons that 
simply went unmarked. 
Together with the complexity of conveying the versatility of lived experience into 
(more or less) fixed landmarks and ritualised ceremonies and the hindering effects of 
contestation over both lived experience and the ways of making sense of it entailed in 
memorialisation, proximity in time makes the construction of a “memory” of the last 
conflict a truly ongoing process, whose outcomes are not yet nor entirely settled and 
crystallised but rather still subject to change and variation.  
The variety and apparent inconsistency of BiH's memorial landscape as grasped 
through this first gaze have two related effects: they impel a delimitation of the range 
of objects/phenomena to take into account in the research and call for an 
investigation focused as much on processes of memorialisation as on the contexts in 
which they take place. This perspective questions the feasibility and pertinence of a 
quest for a comprehensive review and record of memory “sites” and practices in 
today's BiH in favour of the “detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of 
events or conditions, and their relationships"9 typical of case study approach.10 
Adopting a multidisciplinary stance and mixed methods of investigation pertaining to 
qualitative research,11 this study was carried out residing in Sarajevo between 2010 
 
                                                     
8 The official definition of the 1992-95 war in Republika Srpska is “Patriotic War of Liberation” (Odbrambeno-
otazbinski rat) on documents published by the Ministry of Labour, War Veterans and Disabled Persons's 
Protection (see www.vladars.net). In the Federation of BiH, the Croatian language version of the website of 
the Ministry for Veteran and Invalid Affairs names the war “Homeland War” (Domovinski rat), and the 
Bosnian language version “Defense-Liberation War” (Odbranbeno-oslobodilacki rat) (see 
www.fmbi.gov.ba). 
9 Zainal, Zaidah, “Case Study as a Research Method,” Jurnal Kemanusiaan 9 (2007), 2.  
10 Yin, Robert K, Case Study Research. Design and Methods (Sage Publications, 2003); Stake, Robert E, “The 
Case Study Method in Social Inquiry,” Educational Researcher 7, no. 2 (1978); Stake, Robert E., “Qualitative 
Case Studies,” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln 
(Sage Publications, 2005). 
11 Merriam, Sharan B., “Introduction to Qualitative Research,” in Qualitative Research in Practice: Examples 
for Discussion and Analysis, edited by Jossey-Bass  (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002); Flick, Uwe, 
“Qualitative Research - State of the Art,” Social Science Information 41, no. 1 (2002). 
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and 2012 to follow ongoing processes and practices constructing a “memory” of war 
in the city.12 
Following the standard definition of case study, reflection on memorialisation of 
conflict in today's BiH, and the challenges it poses, have been approached as an 
“empirical inquiry that […] investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, [where] the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident”.13 Sarajevo was thus chosen as the research's focus and limit, and the 
angle to open up a reflection on processes and policies of memorialisation of conflict 
in today's Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The research accordingly aims at producing a “detailed examination of a solitary 
exemplar",14 an in-depth analysis in which monuments and commemorations 
individuated in the city of Sarajevo are examined and interpreted within their specific 
context. In this sense, setting the limits enhances the quest for a deeper insight, it 
enables the researcher to “capture 'reality' in a greater detail and […] analyze a 
greater number of variables”15 on the phenomena occurring within the “bounded 
system” constituted by the case selected.16 The “boundaries” of the case are 
furthermore important in keeping from generalisations, as the research is not meant 
to extend its assessments and considerations to the whole of BiH in uncritical or 
homogeneous ways, nor to provide universal principles applicable to a wide range of 
cases worldwide.17 On the contrary, this study attempts at producing a thick 
description18 able to illustrate the case properly and to capture its unique 
characteristics, in the belief that the study of Sarajevo can disclose some features 
relevant to the understanding of processes of memorialisation and enrich reflections 
 
                                                     
12 For a discussion of the methodologies and activities of the research see chapter 3. 
13 Yin, Case Study Research, 13. 
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Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 4 (2006): 797. 
15 Ibid., 801. 
16 Stake, “The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry”; Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies”; Merriam, 
“Introduction to Qualitative Research”; Flyvbjerg, Bent, “Case Study,” in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011).  
17 On case study method, validity and generalisation see Flyvbjerg, “Case Study”; Ruddin, “You can 
generalize stupid!”; Yin, “Case Study Research” and “The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1981); and particularly Stake “The Case Study Method” and “Qualitative Case 
Studies”. 
18 Geertz, Clifford, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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on the topic as well as theorisations on the “politics” of both memory and heritage 
with the peculiarities emerging from the city's case.  
In this perspective, the accent is put on the selection of the case under study.19 
The choice of the city of Sarajevo as the setting of a research on memory, conflict 
and identity is first of all grounded on two interrelated motives: the city's specific 
experience of armed conflict in the recent past, and its role as national capital of the 
newly fashioned independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the end of the 
war in 1995. Memory marks (monuments and memorials) and performances 
(commemorations and celebrations) throughout the city both incorporate and reflect 
the legacies of its local individual experience of war and symbolically hint at 
recollections of the broader conflict that dissolved Yugoslavia and re-created BiH as 
an independent state. At this juncture, Sarajevo thus offers a peculiar angle for 
reflection, and a privileged ground to frame observation of processes of 
memorialisation to detect both its distinctive contextual attributes and its far-
reaching implications and projections.  
The next sections aim at providing a factual background and a conceptual 
contextualisation of the research. Recalling the recent experience of conflict in 1992-
95, section 2.2 presents an overview of some features of the siege of Sarajevo as a 
premise to sketch the setting of the investigation, and to provide a basis for the 
analysis of the city's monuments and commemorations in later chapters. Following, 
drawing from the impact of war and the siege on the urban environment, culture and 
life, section 2.3 introduces the concept of urbicide as a valuable and appropriate tool 
of analysis and lens of interpretation bearing insightful implications on reflections on 
war, memory and heritage. Finally, section 2.4 considers the role of the city as capital 
of the newly (re)fashioned state, and recollects the angle offered by the case study of 
Sarajevo in light of the outlined premises and concepts.  
2.2 War and Sarajevo 
Armed conflict in the early 1990s unleashed over Sarajevo in the scheme of a siege, 
severing its contacts with the outside world and turning the city into a bounded, 
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confined and enclosed space for four years. Between 1992 and 1995, contingents of 
the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Bosnian Serb forces of the newly proclaimed 
Republika Srpska20 encircled Sarajevo precluding movement and communications 
through a blockade that isolated the city almost completely, disrupting water and 
power supplies, and reducing the availability of food to the uncertain and intermittent 
distribution of humanitarian aid. From positions on the surroundings of the city, 
mortars and snipers targeted the population daily with no discernible criteria, 
disrupting all features of everyday life and reducing it to a struggle for survival, while 
conducting a campaign of terror on people of all ages.21 
As throughout BiH the war unfolded in patterns aimed at “cleansing” and 
partitioning the country, framed on revisited “ethnic” identities and the demarcation 
of their distinct and incommensurable “cultures”, the siege of Sarajevo clearly 
became a direct attack against the city's mixed character, its pluralistic identity and its 
existence and life habits as evidence of a (cultural) history of entanglements and 
hybridity: 
"[a] prime aim of the 1992-95 war was to purge the persons, artifacts, and 
records that attest to the region's crazy-quilt pattern of religions and ethnicities 
and to erase the biological and cultural results of their mergers. [...] In besieged 
Sarajevo, armed aggressors bombed centuries-old cultural landmarks and 
 
                                                     
20 The JNA responded to the government of Yugoslavia when the conflict broke out in BiH. Although it 
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Woodward, Balkan Tragedy). In April 1992 the federal government ordered the JNA to withdraw from BiH, 
but many JNA soldiers and most of its heavy weapons remained on the territory and gathered into the army 
of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske,VRS). On the ethnic background of forces besieging Sarajevo, 
King remarks that "to imply that all of the irregulars in support of the Bosnian Serbs at Sarajevo were 
Bosnian Serbs under Karadzic's control is an oversimplification. While most of the irregulars were probably 
Bosnian Serbs, some were Serbians, Montenegrins, and even Croatian Serbs who were fighting for the 
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Kansas: U.S. Army Command And General Staff College Press, 2003), 250. 
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incinerated one-of-a-kind manuscripts in their attempt to blot out the city's 
vibrant history of diversity and overlaps".22 
This attack was not only aimed at military or strategic targets, nor directly at the 
conquest of the capital, but rather showed that in the frame of warfare in BiH, (the 
siege of) Sarajevo had acquired pivotal importance for its symbolic and political value 
and bearings. In his analysis of urban operations during the siege of Sarajevo, King 
asserts that "Mladic [Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska in BiH] was clearly 
more concerned with destroying historic, cultural, and political targets than he was 
with striking at the enemy’s military forces".23 
The destruction of Sarajevo's urban environment and the targeting of its 
inhabitants were thus neither “collateral damage” nor a purely military strategy, but 
were carried out as an assault in its own right: 
"as the factions realized they were unable or unwilling to pay the price for the 
complete capture of the city, they also discovered that they could still use the 
battle for the city for political gain. This realization spawned a wide variety of 
tactical techniques that contributed little to capturing or relieving the capital 
but was designed to elicit political dividends".24 
That this was the case was indicated also by the fact that "the shelling covered a wide 
variety of buildings – housing, public institutions, cultural monuments, utility buildings 
– and open spaces".25 
Transforming the city into a confined space physically separated from the outside 
world by a fire line that ran all around it and prevented transit, the blockade redefined 
the urban spaces in terms of security and survival. While virtually every location in the 
city from which one could glimpse at the surrounding hillsides became a spot where 
his/her life was under threat of the snipers' fire,26 the significance and perception of 
streets, squares and neighbourhoods – of the built environment as well as open 
spaces – was radically overturned. While subverting the dwellers' perceptions of 
security and survival (indeed, of life and death), this attack also aimed at subverting 
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24 Ibid., 235. 
25 Coward, Urbicide, 22. 
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the “everyday practices of Sarajevans' 'common life'",27 seeking to erase the built 
environment as “evidence of a successfully shared past”.28 
“Common life” and “shared past” transposed onto the urban fabric of the capital 
in the fact that "before the siege, the distribution of the ethnic groups throughout 
Sarajevo was so mixed that almost no sector, except for the old city (Bascarsija), 
could claim a majority of one faction".29 As the literature on BiH and Yugoslavia amply 
reports, in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo, no single ethnic group 
comprised the absolute majority of the population before the war started. The 
“groups” were so distributed on the territory (and within the city) that no clear 
distinction could be traced to demarcate separate areas of settlement for each of 
them (which then heinously stood at the basis of the “cleansing” campaigns 
necessary to pursue partition). In Sarajevo, this entanglement was further testified by 
the fact that the city presented a high rate of so-called “mixed” marriages in Socialist 
Yugoslavia, taken to be “intermarriages” between members of different ethnic 
groups, whose offsprings would then be of “mixed” background.30 Similarly, the 
relatively high percentage of people declaring themselves “Jugoslaveni” (Yugoslav) in 
the pre-war census of 1991 or falling in its category of “Others” indicate that “ethnic” 
affiliation was not the only mode of identification adopted and that the cultural 
identity of the city was far more variegated than the reduction to a clash between 
three main groups usually suggests.31 These figures not only stand for the historical 
“co-presence” or “coexistence” of a variety of “groups” in the city of Sarajevo, but 
also more precisely reveal the interaction among such groups and the shared 
character of its urban spaces, and ultimately testify for the pluralism and hybridity of 
the city. The encirclement of Sarajevo with the siege and its confinement as a 
bounded space could only partially alter the city's heterogeneity and pluralism; 
indeed, it could not entirely homogenise the city's population, but rather served to 
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coerce it into defining identity along categories that the war itself was construing 
through violence: 
"Sarajevans had to reconcile their own lived experiences as members of 
ethnocultural groups in a multicultural city with the mutually exclusive, even 
hostile constructions of ethnonational identity that political leaders formulated 
and the war increasingly forced upon them. Whatever position they chose, it 
was both existentially unstable and morally charged".32 
The siege thus did not only inflict suffering, death and material destruction over a 
forcefully bounded space. It exerted coercion over established perceptions of identity 
at a collective level, trying to erase the city's pluralism and its inherent modes of 
definition of and relationship to difference. In this context, the total subversion of 
“normal life” and the lengthy exposure to violence had further, more profound 
repercussions: 
"the experience of chaos that was characteristic of Sarajevans' struggle to 
recreate normality during the siege [...] was a typical limit situation, resembling 
the Holocaust and other instances of massive political violence. In limit 
situations the scale of destruction makes life conditions unrecognizable and 
incomprehensible: people feel powerless in the face of hostile forces; their 
survival or death is random; and the conditions of life are no longer morally 
recognizable as humane. […] This type of destruction surpasses anything that 
can easily be documented or communicated. While material destruction and 
mass killing can be caught on film or summarized in statistics, the destruction of 
cultural meanings is hard to express, as the very creation of meaning becomes 
difficult".33 
Salient features of this recent experience of war seem meaningful premises to the 
study of memorialisation in that they infer that such experience had a double import 
and an ambivalent legacy, blending together material destruction and the disruption 
of “ways of life” in intricate ways. 
At one level, the violent enclosure of the city in the siege constituted a unique 
experience: it left a unique memory of war that somehow adds to the city's identity, 
making it known as the place that endured the longest siege of the twentieth century. 
At the same time, through the annihilation of life and the urban built environment, 
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the siege also dismantled ways of making meaning of self and other, heterogeneity, 
hybridity, community, sharing and relationality. 
These considerations thus highlight two fundamental aspects related to the 
endurance of the siege: while on the one hand this experience of war had a profound 
impact on the individual outline and identity of the city, on the other hand it disrupted 
broader conceptions and ways of constructing (cultural) meaning. This dualism seems 
embedded in a singular process of destruction whereby the encirclement of the urban 
space and its material destruction bear implications on ways of understanding identity 
and pluralism in more general and abstract terms.  
When confronted with the construction of a memory of war against this particular 
background, thus, one lens is constituted by questions concerning memorialisation as 
a way of making sense of such experience in all its complexity, entailing this dualism. 
The concept of urbicide offers one articulation of this connection and bridges the 
material and symbolic aspects of such destruction. 
2.3 Urbicide 
"The widespread destruction of urban fabric is the 
destruction of a common, shared space. Insofar as 
the dynamic of ethnic cleansing is that of the 
carving out of separate, ethnically homogeneous 
and self-determining territorial entities, it 
comprises a denial of common spaces through a 
destruction of that which attests to a record of 
sharing spaces - the heterogeneity of cultural 
heritage and the intermingling of civilian bodies".34 
In his writing on urbicide, Coward argues for a radical reassessment of the 
implications of the destruction of the built environment as a form of political violence 
in its own right. To this aim, he advances the term urbicide to refer “both to the 
destruction of the built environment that comprises the fabric of the urban as well as 
to the destruction of the way of life specific to such material conditions".35 
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35 Coward, Urbicide, 38. 
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The notion of urbicide provides further analytical tools to articulate more 
thoroughly reflections on the destruction of the built environment and expand on the 
implications entailed in this form of violence.  
Firstly, it redirects the focus on some facets of the destruction of the built 
environment that are usually regarded as corollary to war, the eradication of rival 
groups/people(s), or the elimination of those elements in the landscape that 
symbolically represent the culture of the “Other”. This perspective helps elaborate on 
the destruction of those elements of the built environment that are not usually 
classified as pertaining to the cultural heritage, the buildings and spaces that are not 
bestowed with symbolic significance but still make part of the environment in which 
lives are lived, constituting the setting in which pluralism is enacted in common life. 
This observation is useful in the analysis of war in Sarajevo, as it draws attention to 
the fact that violence was not only directed against historic and cultural buildings as 
symbols of centuries-old pluralism, but rather entailed an attack against the built 
environment more generally, including the “mundane” buildings and the open spaces 
of the city. 
Secondly, the theorisation of urbicide highlights the fact that analyses of conflict 
and of the destruction of the built environment are often based on an 
anthropocentric view that focuses crucially on people, downplaying other factors. In 
the framework of a conflict motivated through the delineation of distinct 
incommensurable cultural identities, the focus on buildings of symbolic significance is 
part of an interpretation that reads their destruction as an assault on the identity of 
the “other” group(s), by means of the annihilation of the material landmarks 
anchoring such identity to territory both to testify to the group's historical presence 
and enable its existence in the future. 
Within this perspective, destruction of the built environment is thus mainly seen as 
contingent and instrumental to the violence perpetrated against people. While such 
readings are not incorrect, Coward remarks that "the violence against the 
architecture of Bosnia was disproportionate to the task of killing the people of 
Bosnia",36 and reemphasises that “the widespread destruction of urban fabric is the 
destruction of a common, shared space”.37 
Along this view, built environment is not merely a frame or “background” to the 
lives of individuals and communities, but rather a constitutive element of the spatiality 
of existence. Within this reconceptualisation, Coward infers that “[p]lace [...] consists 
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of the references a specific locus makes to other bodies/things”,38 and accordingly 
treats spatiality as a "network of relations constituted through a worldly engagement 
with (built) things".39 This understanding of spatiality posits buildings as points of 
reference from which “the world, as a series of significations and relations, unfolds".40 
In this way, Coward conceptualises buildings as “complex relational network[s]”,41 
and sees them as “locales”, or places that constitute the built environment as 
essentially public, contending that “the town is not a private map, but a public 
horizon that makes the locations of all the places within it [...] available to all".42 And 
since buildings are public and (at least in principle) available to all, the built 
environment also constitutes a space that is fundamentally shared and 
heterogeneous: “every relational network is predicated on nodes/buildings that, in 
being available to all, always offer the possibility that there will be an other that also 
constitutes their Being-in-the-world around the same object”.43 
The core insight of this conceptualisation is its understanding of the built 
environment as “the material substrate that is the condition of possibility of plurality 
or heterogeneity",44 and the theorisation of urbicide as “the destruction of buildings 
not for what they individually represent (military target, cultural heritage, conceptual 
metaphor) but as that which is the condition of possibility of heterogeneous 
existence".45 
This view balances the above mentioned anthropocentrism and complements it 
with a reassessment of the built environment as the context of human existence and 
action, reasserting that "sharing a common space [...] can only be achieved if a 
common, shared space exists".46 With the identification of alterity and relationality as 
features inherent to the built environment, urbicide is defined as "the destruction of 
the urban insofar as it is the arena in which an encounter with difference occurs".47 
Destruction of the built environment is thus seen as a form of political violence per 
se, complementing the violence perpetrated against people through the annihilation 
 
                                                     
38 Coward, Urbicide, 56. 
39 Ibid., 70. 
40 Ibid., 67. 
41 Ibid., 68. 
42 Ibid., 61. 
43 Ibid., 124. 
44 Ibid., 48. 
45 Ibid., 39. 
46 Coward, “Urbicide in Bosnia,” 158. 
47 Ibid., 158. 
 44 
of the milieu that enables life in common. Redirecting the focus on the built 
environment as such milieu, this perspective reinscribes “mundane” buildings in the 
analysis and contends that 
"[t]o destroy a building is [...] to destroy that which comprises the condition of 
possibility of a community in the context of which individuated modes of 
existence are possible. This assault on community is one that is intended to 
reshape individual identity from one that exists in a state of plurality to one for 
whom homogeneity is the norm”.48 
The deliberate targeting of the built environment during the conflict in BiH is 
accordingly read in this key as a violent practice through which "ethnic nationalist 
groups attempt[ed] to secure their identity through the destruction of the traces of 
alterity inherent to the locales constituted by buildings”.49  
Sarajevo's experience of war in the recent past similarly elicits juxtaposition to the 
concept of urbicide. In this light, the shelling of the built environment was central in 
the siege because “buildings constitute the condition of possibility for [...] sharing 
precisely by holding open the possibility of others existing in the same spaces and 
places that they constitute”.50 The siege of Sarajevo thus represents an exertion of 
violence that “comprises a disavowal of heterogeneity, a covering-over of a 
fundamental existential plurality, by political subjectivities predicated on concepts of 
homogeneity and purity”.51 Recollecting Macek's definition of “limit situation”52 and 
her account of the “destruction of cultural meanings” entailed in the war to the 
definition and conceptualisation of urbicide, the siege parallels “an attempt to 
ungather the world".53 
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2.4 In and beyond Sarajevo 
The endurance of armed conflict barely two decades ago makes the process of 
memorialisation a truly contemporary, ongoing phenomenon. The fact that the 
conflict was culturalist in its justifications and foundational in its outcome has 
arguably crucial bearings that concern both identity and memory. The “culturalist” 
attribute refers to the fact that the war was fought around and in name of supposedly 
distinct cultural identities, forcing ethnonationalist projections of homogeneous 
essentialised purity, by means of extreme violence, upon a centuries-long reality of 
entanglement and pluralism. Some key features of the experience of Sarajevo further 
uncover the ways in which the siege entailed an attack on “culture” in broad terms: 
the encirclement and deliberate targeting of the urban population and built 
environment brought about the disruption of cultural meanings54 and pursued an 
annihilation of the possibility of heterogeneity and alterity.55 
The “foundational” character of the war, on the other hand, refers to the 
aspirations and consequences the conflict had on the future of the country, and more 
specifically to the fact that the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in late 1995 between 
the warring factions gave rise to a new independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
newly fashioned state embodies both continuity and rupture with the past: while its 
geopolitical boundaries coincide with those of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the state is now subdivided in two Entities (the FBiH and the RS) and 
one self-governing District (the Brcko District). One of the Entities is further 
fragmented into ten political-administrative Cantons (the FBiH).56 The geo-”ethnic” 
composition of the country has substantially changed turning the country into a 
patchwork of recognisable areas of predominance (see maps in chapter 1). Sarajevo 
has become the capital city of both one of the two Entities (the predominantly Croat-
Muslim FBiH) and the overall State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The crucial symbolic value attributed to Sarajevo during the conflict somehow has a 
counterpart in the post-war role of the city as capital of the new state.  
National capitals are usually bestowed with meanings and connotations that reach 
beyond their identity as specific urban localities. Hosting the seats of national 
institutions – legal, political, administrative and cultural – they come to embody the 
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geographical place where issues concerning the whole country are tackled by 
decision-making agencies. Capital cities “act as gateways to their country” and “have 
a key role in presenting a nation to the rest of the world and to itself”, to international 
visitors as well as local residents.57 They do so by emerging as the location of 
trademarks that have a symbolic value in relation to the nation: “particular places, 
monuments, buildings, ceremonies and events which resonate with a shared sense of 
belonging”.58 As Parkinson remarks, "in their public art, their public iconography, their 
public spaces and the built environment more generally, capital cities represent 
nations and people".59 
Capitals provide the canvas for the portrayal of the state's identity, the urban 
landscape onto which symbols evoking narratives on the nation's memory and 
identity are inscribed for tourists and dwellers alike, and displayed as “heritage”. But 
because such “narratives” are created in and through (politically charged) processes 
that reduce and transfigure the versatility of lived experience and of a multitude of 
voices60 into signs and symbols, the urban heritage topography hints at much more: 
"capital cities are, by design, by usage or both, symbols of national institutions, 
values, myths and norms – they contain such symbols and they are, in their own 
right, such symbols. But they are also symbols of who constitutes the nation, 
who is recognised as being a part of the demos and who is not. This is partly on 
the basis of who gets depicted in dignified, formal settings [...]; but is also on 
the basis of whose story lines and memories are given physical anchor points in 
the very fabric of the city itself".61 
As mentioned above, in the post-war configuration of the state of BiH, Sarajevo has 
become a “double” capital, in that it is the political-administrative centre of both the 
FBiH and the overall state. Moreover, the city hosts the seats of international agencies 
of various kinds: military missions (EUFOR [European Union Force Althea] since 2004); 
offices of intergovernmental and international organisations (UNDP [United Nations 
Development Programme] since 1996, CoE [Council of Europe] since 1996); and the 
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Office for the High Representative (OHR), created with the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and constituting a real decision-making force in the country.62 
The sole fact that the city is populated with the offices of agencies dedicated to 
post-war security and stabilisation, the implementation of the Peace Accords, 
reconstruction and development, the establishment of democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law, and the compliance with European standards and mechanisms, 
metaphorically construct Sarajevo as symbol not only of the state of BiH, but more 
specifically of a country engaged in post-war recovery, reconstruction and 
stabilisation, and on the path to becoming (sooner or later) a member of the 
European Union. 
The symbolic function extends to contested cities as well: as Bollens remarks, these 
cities are "focal point[s] or magnet[s] for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict" or 
become “platform[s] for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims involving 
areas outside the urban region".63 
The multifaceted character of the city is caught in both its symbolic and practical 
aspects by Markowitz when she programmatically states that 
"envisioning Sarajevo as a Bosnian kaleidoscope situates the city in its cultural 
legacies and shows how its people resist and comply with an urbanism that 
provides the conditions for blurring boundaries and forging overlapping 
belongings, while also enabling the entrenchment of state practices that 
demand unequivocal national distinctions and unwavering loyalties".64 
This intermingling of various layers and elements in the fabric of the city complements 
the choice of Sarajevo as the setting of a case study research. In this perspective, the 
insights such a research can offer stem from the aptness of the capital to constitute 
that setting where recollections of the individual local identity entangle with 
representations of the national one. Concurrently, the study is concerned with 
detecting, exploring and analysing the ways in which memorialisation of armed 
conflict in the urban landscape of the capital comprise both the city's specific account 
of war (i.e. the siege) and narratives on the overall conflict that ravaged the country 
as a whole and led to its emergence as an independent actor. 
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In this framework, investigation and analysis of the case of Sarajevo rely on the 
assumption that "changing power relationships and roles [...] intersect with place and 
its cultural and historical attributes to form a site of representation which signifies 
both 'the site to be represented [...], and the site (geographical, cultural, political, 
theoretical viewpoint) from which that representation emanates'".65 
The significance and the insights that a case study research on Sarajevo can offer, 
in conclusion, rest on the multifaceted character of the city, its role as capital and 
symbol, and the fact that what is carved and performed in and onto the urban 
landscape has far-reaching implications well beyond the city's district. 
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 3 Observing, participating, living 
Sarajevo 
3.1 Introduction 
This research was carried out residing in Sarajevo between 2010 and late 2012. 
Activities “in the field” and the more general work of research and analysis of the 
collected materials were intermingled for the duration of research, which entailed 
document analysis as well as participant observation and ethnographic methods, 
including informal conversations with some subjects related in various ways 
(institutional, professional or personal) to monuments and heritage. 
Materials deemed relevant as data encompassed a variety of documents and 
sources. Ideally, the first steps to move towards a reflection on monuments and 
memorialisation was to outline a view of the legal and institutional frames regulating 
the management, construction and reconstruction of monuments and heritage within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and, accordingly, its administrative and institutional units at 
various scales: the national, entity, cantonal and municipal levels (cf. Chapter four 
“Legal/formal system of heritage care in BiH”). This was done through collection and 
review of official documents: legislations concerning culture and monuments and 
those related to the bodies and institutions concerned with monuments and heritage; 
regulations, policies, instructions useful to understand such institutional panorama 
and the functioning, tasks and responsibilities of relevant bodies; lists of 
monuments/heritage items and other publications on heritage (thematic publications, 
reports issued by the above mentioned bodies...); technical documentation on 
specific monuments collected at the institutions in charge. Faced with and guided by 
the entanglements of the categories (and fates) of “monument” and “heritage” - 
which in turn point out the areas of encounter of local and international/global 
systems, practices and principles – I examined official documents produced by 
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international bodies and intergovernmental organizations like UNESCO and the 
Council of Europe, regarding the assessment and management of cultural heritage in 
BiH and/or the region of SouthEastern Europe, and the documentation pertaining to 
ongoing programmes carried out in the frame of the activities of such organizations. I 
additionally collected and reviewed touristic publications (leaflets; guides of the city 
and the country) to analyse the presentation of historical sites and monuments as 
well as cultural national heritage to foreigners and locals.  
Maintaining the focus on such variety of sources and types of documents aimed at 
integrating in the study of memorialisation processes different levels of analysis: the 
legal and institutional frameworks pertaining to heritage/monuments both locally and 
internationally (and their intersections); the publicly stated principles and ideals 
informing ongoing programmes, local policies and joint supranational projects; and 
the main features of presentation of the memorial/historic landscape in touristic 
terms.  
Part of this body of documents was available in English language, either because 
English was (among) the original language(s) in which the documents were issued (as 
is the case for UNESCO or CoE literature), or because documents were issued 
together with their related English versions by local institutions. Documents and 
sources in the local language (Serb/Croat/Bosnian language) were accessible to me 
thanks to my previous attendance to the first-year classes of Serb/Croat/Bosnian 
language at Ghent University and an additional intensive intermediate-level course 
attended in Sarajevo in the summer of 2010. The permanence in Sarajevo allowed me 
to improve constantly my fluency in understanding, conversation as well as reception 
(written and oral) of the language through everyday practice in both personal life and 
the carrying out of my work, so that I could avail myself of sources in the local 
language in a wide range of situations. This granted me access to and understanding 
of (public) speeches and conversations, television broadcastings, news, and written 
texts (printed media, laws, websites of institutions, reports, academic literature).  
I reviewed the printed press and media coverage of arguments related to 
monuments and heritage, as well as those related to commemorations and 
celebrations, lending a gaze on (the massive) press/media coverage of arguments 
related to the recent conflict, especially articles (columns, reportages...) published in 
occasion of anniversaries. Being “in the field” for a prolonged period of time also 
allowed me to follow other media, like television or weekly magazines, reporting or 
expanding on issues and events relating especially to the memory of the recent 
conflict, through news programmes, documentaries and the like. These additional 
sources did of course not become the core of my research, but provided material 
tangential to the topic of my study, widening my perspective.  
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A central part of the research was dedicated to field activities, that could have 
taken place nowhere else but in the city itself. First, tours and observations of the 
monuments, memorials, plaques, and possibly any site significant for the process of 
memorialisation of the recent conflict of the city constituted the basis of getting 
acquainted to its memorial landscape. Second, attendance to commemorations and 
public ceremonies held on symbolic dates was central to the research, to document 
the performative aspects of memorialisation, observe its ritualization and note 
eventual speeches that integrate nonverbal practices related to memory. The 
activities of observation and attendance to commemorations will be presented in 
more detail in the following sections. Additionally, being based in Sarajevo gave me 
the opportunity to attend a number of unforeseen public events related to the 
memory of the recent conflict. These range from open discussions (organized by 
University bodies and/or professors, civic organizations...) about topics related to 
culture and memory; to conferences held at the University of Sarajevo, presentations 
of new publications, street gatherings and demonstrations on occasion of events 
related to the recent conflict (as for instance the arrest of General Ratko Mladic in 
2011), or demonstrative actions envisioned as part of civic activism relating to the 
memory of the conflict (e.g. “actions” to re-establish the Sarajevo Roses by youth 
groups in 2010 and 2011). While observation and analysis focus concentration on 
official ceremonies and commemorations, the opportunities to attend (sometimes 
unexpectedly) such range of activities and events hopefully adds to a “thicker” 
description of the case study of Sarajevo. 
Being based on the collection and analysis of different kinds of data, the research 
relied on what has been variously referred to as mixed-method approach,1 “do-it-
yourself” methodology,2 or “hybridization of methodological procedures”.3 Analysis 
of documents and interpretation of the material landscape have been approached 
with an angle based on cultural studies, with a focus on the assumption that "culture 
always has both sense-making and power-bearing functions".4 Methods and 
approaches have been selected and combined according to pragmatic research 
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needs, in a process that has been fundamentally inductive,5 and a central part of the 
work was carried out through participant observation and ethnographic methods.6 
Mixing different approaches can be at times overwhelming as it produces massive 
sets of data, but it allows for additional knowledge gained through the variety of 
insights that such different approaches and materials can yield. The interweaving of 
various methods and materials could help construct a view of the topic from different 
angles, thus shaping the analysis in a more nuanced way. I will expand more on the 
activities of research and the guidelines I used for analysis in the next sections, where 
I artificially divide the research process into three strands, although they were actually 
blended together for the whole research period. 
First, I present the activity of observation, focused on monuments and memorials 
across the city. In section 3.2 I focus on landscape and on the materiality and spatiality 
of memory, and I outline three approaches to landscape as text, theatre, and arena. In 
section 3.3, I present the activities of attendance and participation to 
commemorations, and expand more on the premises as well as activities of 
conducting participant observation/ethnography during public performances. Finally, 
in section 3.4 I briefly discuss some issues related to the carrying out of fieldwork 
itself, like issues of subjectivity, emotions and validity. 
3.2 Observing the landscape – on the spatiality of memory 
One central part of research activities was constituted by observation of the memorial 
landscape of Sarajevo, within a perspective that recognizes the important function(s) 
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of landscapes in the construction/production/negotiation of social identities and 
memories. Landscapes have a distinct role in reproducing ideologies or narratives that 
legitimate specific social relations or identities.7 Constituting the environment of 
everyday life as well as the stage for public events, “as the taken-for-granted 
backdrop to day-to-day interactions”, landscapes both naturalize and reify, or “set in 
stone”, existing social relations and identities.8 
In the nationalist project, whereby territory has a pivotal role, such functions of 
landscapes are heightened9 in that "nationalist memory describes a geography of 
belonging, an identity forged in a specified landscape, inseparable from it".10 In this 
perspective, monuments and memorials are sites within broader material landscapes 
that are constructed as “stages to display a distinctive national past and articulate an 
exclusive understanding of a cultural-political community”.11 Because of such 
functions, (memorial) landscapes also play a role in the establishment and 
legitimation of new political and social orders following political and social change,12 
and they are endowed with functions in the reorientation of (cultural) meanings 
entailed in it.13 Finally, cultural landscapes do not only serve the purposes of reflecting 
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and legitimating the normative social order, but can provide the space for 
contestation and negotiation of such order, becoming the stages from which claims 
to alternative arrangements can be advanced.14  
This draws attention to the spatiality and materiality of memory. The construction 
of public memory involves an entanglement of both time and space, interweaving 
them in public sculptures and monumental architecture.15 Memory recollected and 
reconstructed takes up a shape in the monument and the memorial, and eventually 
unfolds across the urban space constructing the city-as-text.16 All this leads to lend a 
gaze onto monuments and memorials as material culture, and conduct observation of 
their materiality, location, shape.17 A first step of the research thus involves 
observation of monuments and memorials as material culture, and their analysis as 
interpretation of “mute evidence”18 whose meanings “often remain tacit and 
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implicit”.19 In this view, space and material culture are seen as a source of qualitative 
research data: material culture “refers to the corporeal, tangible object[s] 
constructed by humans […] that are used, lived in, displayed and experienced”.20  
Hodder proposes two approaches by which material culture can be interpreted, 
based on two categories: (a) material culture that is “designed specifically to be 
communicative and representational”, whose “meaning might be organized in ways 
similar to language”;21 and (b) material culture that is embedded in a set of practices 
and whose meanings can only be deciphered “through practice and evocation – 
through the networking, interconnection, and mutual implication of material and 
nonmaterial”.22 Memorial landscapes comprise both: they are constituted by 
monuments, plaques, memorials and other commemorative signs that are 
“permanently there”, fixed in stone and inscribed in the urban landscape so that they 
can be “read” (also literally, as they often have a written text/inscription) at any time, 
but they are also the “theatre” of ceremonies and commemorations, performative 
practices that take place on specific symbolic occasions and in more or less formalised 
rituals: “the two types of material symbolism – the representational and the evocative 
or implicative – often work in close relation to each other”.23 Material culture thus 
constitutes a source of qualitative research data in that it “is a pervading facet of 
human life. It is both a manifestation and influence on our cultures, social structures, 
sense of agency, identity and power structures”.24 
In light of the considerations on the constructed nature as well as roles/functions 
of landscapes reported above, I draw consistently from the field of geography 
(cultural, human, political) and borrow from recent work a set of analytical questions 
to guide observation and analysis. Starting from the theoretical understanding of 
“collective memory as a socio-spatially mediated political process” (cf. Chapter one), I 
regard memorial landscapes as “open-ended symbolic systems”.25 One aspect of the 
research is thus constituted by careful observation of monuments and memorials as 
artefacts that constitute part of the larger cultural landscape. Dwyer and Alderman 
propose three conceptual lenses in the study of memorial landscapes, which I use 
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here to guide my analysis of the case of Sarajevo. In their article about memorial 
landscapes, the authors list three metaphors that “geographers have used to explore 
the socio-spatial relations that are co-constitutive with memorial landscapes”: those 
of “text”, “arena”, and “performance”.26 In my analysis, I re-order them and rename 
one of them to suit best my purposes, and present them as the approaches to 
landscape as text, theatre, and arena.  
The first metaphor focuses on the content and form of memorials and monuments, 
to detect which stories have been given voice or silenced within the memorial 
landscape and on specific memorial sites. I use it to concentrate on the shape and 
structure of monuments across Sarajevo as well as on their location in the urban 
space (cf. Chapter five “Memory carved in Sarajevo”). Questions pertaining to this 
approach investigate the material outlook and structure of memorials to grasp their 
“plot”, their environments, and the organization of the memorial's space to reflect 
and elaborate on the spatial context in which individual memorials are located, 
detecting information about the institutions promoting them and the audiences 
“consuming” them (in the broader sense of emerging as the active recipients of the 
memorial's message, using it or availing themselves of it, also eventually to promote 
divergent messages). This part of the work strongly relies on observation of the sites 
under study, visits to them repeated over time both on occasions of public 
commemorations/celebrations and on “average” days (i.e. days not endowed with 
symbolic significance on the official calendar), and photographs of the memorials 
taken on such visits, integrated where possible with leaflets, prospects of 
construction plans and technical documentation collected at the relevant institutions.  
The analogy of the memorial to a text raises various questions: (a) it focuses on the 
memorial's “plot” to recollect the story it conveys and possibly discern its message(s), 
with an eye on the interrelation between content and form;27 (b) it observes the 
context of the memorial in terms of the urban landscape in which it is located 
(environments, neighbourhood, accessibility, publicity) and thus investigates the 
wider cultural landscape to which it partakes; (c) it draws attention to the issue of 
“authorship” (and “consumption”), with regards to the actors/institutions involved in 
the creation of the memorial as well as the audiences involved in its fruition, exploring 
its “open-ended” character and the potential divergent “readings” of memorials (see 
more below on the metaphors of theatre and arena); (d) it explores eventual changes 
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and evolutions in the memorials' meaning(s), its susceptibility to “over-writing” or 
erasure as can be subsumed by the concept of 'symbolic accretion'.28 Within this 
approach, the works of Azaryahu and Foote (2008) and Wagner-Pacifici (1996) 
provide useful insights and analytical tools to explore the relationship between 
content and form of memorial landscapes, to investigate the spatial representation of 
memory and identify various kinds of strategies used to produce a “spatial 
configuration of history”.29  
The second metaphor – that of theatre – underlines the performative practices 
undertaken on and around monuments and memorials, “recogniz[ing] the important 
role that bodily enactments, commemorative rituals, and cultural displays occupy in 
constituting and bringing meaning to memorials”.30 This approach complements the 
metaphor of the monument as text by focusing on the fact that memorials come to 
serve, both literally and figuratively, as stages in many senses (this is why I substituted 
the word “performance” used by Dwyer and Alderman to adopt the image of the 
“theatre”).  
The primary kind of performance that is often carried out on memorial sites is that 
of the public or official commemoration of anniversaries or symbolic dates, but it is 
not the only one. By virtue of the symbolic significance bestowed upon them, 
memorial landscapes also become the stages for demonstrations or, inversely, 
contestation leads to the emergence of specific sites as locations for memory 
performances, practices that strive to attain recognition of divergent accounts of past 
events (cf. Chapter seven “Other memories/memories of the Other(s)”). Re-evaluated 
as items of cultural (national) heritage, memorial sites are increasingly displayed as 
emblems of a local history, culture or identity to local people and tourists alike, which 
adds to their function of stages the dimensions related to heritage and tourisms, the 
latter being often under-analyzed in reflections on memory.31 The performative 
practices carried out on and around monuments can thus further enrich and shed light 
on the ongoing interpretation of monuments and memorials, providing additional 
material for reflection on questions regarding attendance to and behaviour at sites of 
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memory, the degree of formalisation of (official) performative practices as well as 
detection of forms of activism and/or contestation. 
The third approach presented in the work of Dwyer and Alderman relies on the 
metaphor of memorial landscape as arena. It points openly at memory as a process, 
highlighting its dynamic character and hinting at the political debates and struggles 
that often mark the representation of the past through the landscape. As in critical 
place name studies, 
“the metaphor of ‘cultural arena’ focuses on the capacity of [landscapes] to 
serve as sites of contest, debate, and negotiation as social groups compete for 
the right to name and [...] ‘the power to define the meanings that are to be read 
into and out of the landscape’”.32 
This metaphor encompasses the complexity of memory processes reminding that 
“historical representation is not only a product of social power but also a tool or 
resource for achieving it”.33 The approach thus lays down a further set of questions 
around monuments and memorials, with the tasks of investigating power 
relationships that emerge, evolve and get transformed in and through 
memorialisation, and its entanglements with the formulation and/or consolidation of 
social identities. This gaze looks for what Holyfield and Beacham have defined 
memory brokers: 
“individuals or groups who appropriate or reappropriate historical knowledge in 
a given cultural context. Memory brokers may be official historical and political 
figures or unofficial eyewitnesses to events. They may also arise from groups 
historically marginalized from the official history".34 
This perspective yields questions about the subject(s) of memory and the eventual 
social inequalities interweaved in the construction of public monuments/memorials: 
inquiring into the competition among different actors to foster different conceptions 
of the past, memorials emerge as sites of negotiation over the right to decide 
what/whose past is commemorated and given public visibility. Such perspective of 
observation includes reflection on regime change and periods of transition from one 
political arrangement to another as significant circumstances of processes of 
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memorialisation, focusing on the political struggles inherent in reinventing (national) 
histories and traditions. Finally, the arena metaphor is useful to explore the above 
mentioned issues in relation to the memory of atrocity and violence, around which 
controversy is heightened not only by intense emotional charge, but furthermore by 
implications on group identities and self-perceptions loaded with the moral categories 
of victims, perpetrators, heroes.35 
Indeed, the metaphors of text, theatre, and arena are not to be parted and applied 
independently from one another; in fact, it is not thinkable to separate them neatly 
into three discrete approaches. Nevertheless, it is useful to conceive each of them 
with its own strand of questions in order to “multiply the analytic moments that can 
be brought to bear on a memorial scene”,36 as they all contribute to the observation 
at the core of the research. 
3.3 Participating in commemorations – performative 
aspects of memory 
As highlighted above, the metaphor of landscape as text concentrates on the 
construction of the monument as “a physical object that arrests the effects of time”,37 
endowed with meaning(s) and symbolic functions and embedded in the wider 
cityscape. Through this lens, monuments present two attributes that place them at 
the basis of the study of memory constructions: they become a (supposedly) 
permanent and immutable part of the landscape, and they act within it as symbolic 
landmarks with the capacity to evoke particular recollections of historic events. To be 
sure, these two traits per se cannot provide guarantees against habitual indifference 
consigning the monument to invisibility, nor can they confer to public symbols the 
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power to univocally instil their ascribed meanings onto society. But the sense of fixity 
and immutability conveyed by monuments and landscapes contributes to their 
perception as a “taken-for-granted” background that is often “read uncritically in 
everyday life by persons acting in and through the landscape”.38 Hence their power to 
reify memory constructions, as well as social identities and relations. In this sense, 
monuments throughout the cityscape function like flags in Billig's Banal Nationalism: 
like the “unwaved flags […] providing banal reminders of nationhood”,39 they “turn 
background space into homeland space”.40 Whereas monuments act as 'silent 
reminders' in the background of everyday routines for most of the calendric year, 
they are periodically “waved” (likewise – and often together with – flags) in and 
through public and official performances that serve to “reactivate individual 
memories and enhance collective participation”.41 As occasions of reactivation and 
performance of the meanings ascribed to the memorial landscape and of particular 
memory narratives, commemorative ceremonies are “acts of transfer that make 
remembering in common possible”.42 
Public/official ritual practices on and around memorial sites are thus of pivotal 
importance in the formation, transmission and sustainment of both memory and 
identity constructs. 
On the one hand, this perspective looks at collective memory as “something – or 
rather many things – we do”, rather than “something – or many things – we have”,43 
focusing attention on the ways in which the past is performed.44 In this light, 
commemorative ceremonies constitute situations of collective performance through 
which meanings are ascribed and articulated onto specific monuments/memorial sites 
with periodic cadency. As “the performative act rehearses and recharges the emotion 
which gave the initial memory or story imbedded in it its sticking power, its resistance 
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to erasure or oblivion”,45 commemorative ceremonies serve to periodically 
(re)activate the significance of particular memory constructs while enhancing the 
symbolic and evocative functions of the memorial landscape for the rest of the 
calendric year.  
At the same time, “represent[ing] a story that a given community tells itself about 
itself”, commemorations emerge as “performances of consensus”,46 public practices 
that interweave collective remembrance and identity as mutual constructs, whereby 
groups are not “substantial entities” but “collective cultural representations”.47 As 
"to enact a rite is always, in some sense, to assent to its meaning",48 it is in virtue of 
their performative character that commemorations both demand and underpin 
collective participation and identification. This perspective emphasises the 
performativity of identity, regarding groups as “symbolic processes that emerge and 
dissolve in particular contexts of action”,49 of which commemorative ceremonies are 
one kind. With these entwined functions in the construction and performance of 
collective remembrance and collective identification, commemorative ceremonies are 
one kind of cultural performances: "repeated and significant actions that are deemed 
by custom or authority to be appropriate for a particular occasion, thereby giving a 
sense of unity to the participants and to their actions".50 
Research on public commemorative performances was carried out in Sarajevo from 
early 2010 to the fall of 2012 relying on ethnography and participant observation. 
Beyond controversies, overlaps or lack of clarity surrounding the two terms,51 I refer 
to the use of ethnography as “relying on participation and the sharing of 
contemporary cultural phenomena”,52 with the aim of grasping “human meanings 
and interactions […] from the perspective of people who are insiders or members of 
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particular situations or settings”.53 Accordingly, the research has been based on the 
assumption that immersion in the everyday life of Sarajevo would offer the best 
strategy for gaining insights into the processes under study, by providing the 
opportunity to experience firsthand interaction with the cultural milieu and the 
people as well as observe/participate to public and social events over an extended 
period of time. Prolonged permanence in “the field” was the key to participate, 
“overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives [...], watching what happens, listening to 
what is said [...]; in fact collecting whatever data are available” on the creation of the 
memory of conflict.54 The study of public/official commemorations also appropriately 
matched the “minimal conditions” for participant observation of a phenomenon 
“sufficiently limited in size and location”, in that commemorative ceremonies 
presented relatively easy accessibility in virtue of their public character and occurred 
in “everyday life settings”.55 
Being constructed as “front stages” and “performative settings”,56 monuments 
and memorial sites constituted a particularly apt environment for the observation of 
commemorative ceremonies as social events/practices that concur in the construction 
of memories and identities. My basic aim in observing commemorative ceremonies 
was to attend to their open character and elicit the meanings and messages (both 
implicit and explicit) that these performances construct around monuments and 
convey to the wider public. Participant observation was thus employed to investigate 
how performative and nonverbal rituals and practices contribute to (a) the 
articulation of official accounts of past events and the construction of the groups 
envisioned as subjects of such accounts, as well as (b) the contestation of official 
narratives to claim both public space and public recognition as subjects of divergent 
memory accounts.  
I considered the “ethnographic context” of my activities of participant observation 
during commemorations as a “closed field”, where “the researcher and the research 
population conjointly exist within a discrete, temporal and spatial setting as co-actors 
in a drama whose bounds are set by the span of the event in which they are 
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participating”.57 However, I pursued an “unobtrusive” approach and did not come to 
actively develop relations from the observation of commemorations. In this sense, my 
role as a researcher in the field was never strictly defined, but rather ideally fluctuated 
between the “complete observer” and the “observer-as-participant”, whereby the 
“researcher [is] present on the scene but […] does not participate or interact with 
insiders to any great extent”, s/he can “remain […] detached from the group” and 
gathers data “eavesdropping, [...] videotaping, audio-taping or photographing 
insiders”,58 more or less overtly.  
I conducted observation chiefly on symbolic dates of the official calendar, 
attending the ceremonies organized by institutions and authorities at various 
administrative levels, taking photographs and participating to the events as part of 
the public; I occasionally sketched brief notes during the events but mostly wrote my 
notes afterwards. I did the same thing for commemorations organized by alternative 
groups as well as events and demonstrations related in some way to the recent 
conflict and thus indirectly to the memorialisation of it. I focused my attention 
particularly – though not exclusively – on celebrations related to the history of the city 
of Sarajevo (e.g. April, 6th, Day of the City of Sarajevo), commemorations of events of 
crucial importance in the recent conflict (e.g. March, 1st, marking the anniversary of 
the referendum for independence held on 1992; May, 3rd, date of a still controversial 
incident at the beginning of the blockade of Sarajevo in 1992), and ceremonies of 
state-level significance (e.g. November 25th, Day of Statehood), which constituted the 
core of my research interest, and additionally observed events beyond Sarajevo (e.g. 
commemoration/burial at Srebrenica-Potocari in 2010). 
My activities of observation thus followed the cyclical repetition of official 
commemorations for a time span of over two years, during which I could get 
acquainted with the formalised rituals of the ceremonies, and get to discern their 
patterns and detect variations. Over this period of time, as mentioned above, I had 
the opportunity to observe a wide range of events/gatherings, and sometimes 
witness unforeseen demonstrations (for instance those promptly organized in 
response to the arrests of Ejup Ganic in 2010 and Jovan Divjak in 2011 over alleged war 
crimes, and the arrest of Ratko Mladic in 2011). Furthermore, during my research stay I 
could observe the emergence of a new controversial commemoration in the centre of 
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the city (commemoration at Dobrovoljacka Street on May, 3rd, organized for the first 
time in 2010, observed in 2011 and 2012), and attend the ceremonies organized for the 
20th anniversary of the beginning of the conflict in 1992, corresponding to the Day of 
the City of Sarajevo and linking together a variety of anniversaries, ceremonies and 
events.  
The prolonged permanence in Sarajevo and the protracted activities of observation 
constituted an experience in their own right. As mentioned above, I approached the 
activities of observation with no strict definition of my role as researcher in the field, 
and with no predetermined expectations concerning the events I wanted to study or 
my relations to the setting, the subjects and the theme of the research. Over the 
course of time, though, both “the field” and I as an “observer” underwent changes 
and developments, which inspired further reflections centred on the relationship 
between myself as a researcher and the field of research. 
One basic insight into this relation was constituted by the growing consciousness 
of the fact that it was not possible to neatly separate or distance myself from “the 
field”. Rather, it was in the very nature of the events I was observing (public cultural 
performances of display seeking additional visibility through the press and media) to 
cast me as part of the audience.59 Furthermore, my actions as a researcher – the 
activities of my observation – constituted a kind of involvement that could be 
perceived externally by other participants and bystanders, and constructed me as one 
participant to the ongoing performances.  
My stance in observing commemorative ceremonies was “open-ended”, as I did 
not seek to specify or clarify to other people either my identity as researcher or the 
precise topic of my interest. Since the early phases of observation, I approached 
commemorations as a bystander whose degree of involvement/participation was not 
clearly defined. The public character of these events allowed me to attend, listen and 
observe, and document taking photographs – more or less as anybody else could do – 
giving the impression that I could be in the field in plain visibility and still remain 
unnoticed. With time, and especially with the cyclical repetition of commemorations 
marking significant dates of the official calendar, I noticed that the choice of leaving 
my role and intents somehow “undefined” allowed for those people whom I 
regarded as “the field” to assign me a role and/or question my activities. This also 
allowed me to experience firsthand an interactive relation with the environment of 
my fieldwork, reflect on my own presence and work as constituting me as an 
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“involved actor”, and bear in mind that “the setting in which an ethnographic work 
takes place is not a passive object or a 'container'”.60 The reactions of other people to 
my presence at events and commemorations thus enriched my observations and 
widened my perspective through comments and questions that included me back into 
the setting of my own fieldwork. On one occasion, for instance, I was spotted during a 
demonstration and directly questioned as to what I was doing, why and for whom: 
“The crowd remained approximately half an hour in front of the British 
Embassy. When it started to move on, I stepped onto a stone fence to take 
some photographs. From the other side of the street a lady came in my direction 
loudly asking 'for whom are you taking pictures?' [za koga to slikate?]. She 
repeated the question two or three times coming towards me. I answered I was 
photographing for myself. She looked at me seriously and asked 'but do you 
understand?' [ma razumijete?]. I said I did, I knew what was going on. I said I was 
foreigner and […] I was taking pictures to enhance my understanding. The 
woman kept looking at me in silence, with an air of mistrust. A younger guy, 
who assisted to the scene, approached us and asked where I was from. I 
answered I am Italian. He did not reply. Instead he explained me: 'what is going 
on is that the Serbs and the British are fascists'. Now I 'understood'”.61 
Such kind of interactions enhanced my perceptions of fieldwork providing me hints on 
how my presence and actions could be seen and interpreted at specific events, and 
primarily reminding me that, although the events were public and accessible to 
everyone, my figure was sometimes being noticed and singled out. The periodic 
repetition of commemorations and my renewed attendance to them provided 
opportunities for more interactions and somehow gave me the impression that I 
came to be perceived by some as a “habitual stranger”. Like some other participants 
(for instance photo-journalists), I was “returning” to commemorations and I was 
performing “patterned” actions (e.g. documenting with photographs), which made 
me a “recognisable” presence in the field. Yet, with no press accreditation and a 
different equipment and attitude, it was clear that I was not a photo-journalist, 
especially to those who were. 
I thus came to experience firsthand that “the field” cannot be observed like an 
illustration or a motion picture, but rather concretely becomes a setting in which roles 
and identities are constructed and conveyed through performance, more or less 
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voluntarily or definitely. This setting gradually emerged with the reiteration of 
fieldwork at various events and gatherings, the progressive acquaintance with the 
context and the acquisition of a “routine” of participant observation – with the 
occurrence of variation and unexpected developments. 
The reactions of participants to my presence and activities, in particular, prompted 
my reflections on the accessibility of the field, helped me refine the notion of 
unobtrusive observation as distinct from an ideal virtual invisibility, and tested my 
understanding of issues regarding the distance I could actually keep from the setting 
of my research. One mainstay of such reflections was constituted by learning through 
experience that “in the process of field access the field constitutes itself and is 
simultaneously experienced by both the actors and the observers as a social unit, that 
is, as a communicative context”.62 
3.4 Field research as process 
This process of evolution of the relation with the field and its participants was parallel 
to a development of my own perception of my attitude and feelings towards the topic 
of my research. The second crucial insight I gained from fieldwork regarded my 
understanding and perception of the nature and nuances of the “participation” 
involved in my activities. As I predominantly focused my interest on the observation 
of commemorations (their settings, performances and participants), my presence at 
such events did not entail participation in the sense of assent or endorsement of the 
events' meanings, messages and/or intents: "unlike tourists and visitors I ([told] 
myself that I) did not travel to the site for pleasure and sightseeing or for paying 
respect to national commemoration".63 While I maintained a certain degree of 
detachment from the commemorations, though, it became more and more evident 
that my activities of observation were, in their performativity, also a kind of 
participation. The practice of fieldwork prompted me further to reflect on the kind of 
participation I was feeling and experiencing at a more “inner” level – in terms of 
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personal involvement with the themes and subjects of my research – and on the 
implications it would have on issues of objectivity and validity of my work. 
Reflections on the theme of objectivity have long characterised the development 
of ethnographic methods and ethnography, generating thorough discussion on its 
role as both a model to tend to and a criterion for evaluating validity. On the 
background of a “continuing tension between attraction to and rejection of the 
model of the natural sciences”,64 ethnography elaborated and proposed methods 
that put emphasis on experiential approach to research and on gaining access into the 
society under study with varying degrees of involvement.65 In this sense, “both 
ethnography and participant observation have been claimed to represent a uniquely 
humanistic and interpretive approach, as opposed to supposedly 'scientific' and 
'positivist' positions”.66  
The assumption that in qualitative and ethnographic studies “the researcher is the 
primary instrument for data collection and data analysis”67 has three interrelated 
implications that are relevant to reflections pertaining to the notion of 
objectivity/subjectivity. First and foremost, it draws attention to the fact that, from 
design to implementation, research is inevitably influenced and shaped by the 
individual who is carrying it out: researchers “set up the situation, choose audio or 
video or notes to record, when to turn the recorder on and off, choose what to 
transcribe, what to include in scholarly texts for what audiences to read”.68 In this 
sense, all phases of the research – from the gathering of data to their analysis – are 
subjective. Pictures aptly exemplify this notion, as they concretely reproduce the 
researcher's gaze on settings, environments and situations. As Crowe puts it, 
"photographers not only document but “capture” images — composing information 
rather than documenting reality".69 Below I reproduce two examples of photographs 
taken during research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that exemplify variation in the 
(subjective) representation of the places I observed and hint at the reflection on 
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subjectivity (and the choices and selections) that were entailed in the research 
process. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery, picture taken to document 
research, showing a view of the cemetery with the latest burials in the 
foreground, the round memorial with names inscriptions on the right, and 
tombstones of older burials in the background. Photo taken by author, July 
2010. 
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Figure 4: Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery, personal memento. The focus on 
the fountain against the field of graves in the background denotes an 
atmosphere of emptiness and abandonment after the annual commemoration 
and burial. Photo taken by author, July 2010. 
 
A second implication of this perspective on subjectivity is directed towards 
reinscribing the researcher into the field and setting of the research by considering 
that “when ethnographers are present at cultural performances, they (and the 
experience, education, and memories that brought them to this point) become part 
of the performance and influence perceptions of it”.70 As the “human instrument in 
qualitative research”,71 the researcher/ethnographer thus is influenced, in the course 
of her research, by a variety of elements which include her own “individual, cultural, 
social and existential assumptions” and experiences.72 In my case, this perspective 
encouraged me to reckon that my own memories of the news broadcastings of the 
conflict of dissolution of Yugoslavia in my home country (Italy) and a three-years 
experience of personal involvement in humanitarian activities in Croatia (1992 to 1995) 
through which I got to meet many people who had fled mainly (but not only) from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, did indeed contribute to my interest in the topic of the 
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memorialisation of war, enriching it with a personal yearning to grasp what happened 
and how to make sense of it. The fact of having personal experiences and memories 
related in varying ways to the recent conflict fostered my reflection on the notion that 
“the scientific observer is part and parcel of the setting, context, and culture he or she 
is trying to understand or represent”.73 
The third and final aspect of considerations on subjectivity and on the personal 
involvement/participation to the situations observed in fieldwork concerns emotions. 
The notion of participant observation as entailing “simultaneous emotional 
involvement and objective detachment”74 is sometimes hard to grasp and/or translate 
into practice and often complicated by a (more or less explicit) “positivist ideal of 
feeling little” as underlying principle of legitimation of the research.75 As happened 
with the development of interactions and relations to/with the field, the recognition 
of emotions and their incorporation into my reflection on research emerged through 
the process and practice of fieldwork itself. As I idealistically privileged the pursue of 
“detached” observation of commemorative events, I tended to annotate more 
personal considerations and impressions aside from the reports of my observations, 
in a space I considered complementary but somehow separated. On some occasions, 
the emotional response elicited by the events I was attending was so intense that, 
instead of trying to disengage from it, I integrated it into choices of observation and 
documentation: 
“I cannot sleep these days, when I close my eyes I always fall into a troubled 
sleep. Time seems too short and the things I want to “observe” are too 
many”.76 
“When we get to the place a long chain of people unfolds from the base [the 
former UN Dutch base] on our left to the entrance of the memorial and 
cemetery across the street. They stand one in front of each other passing the 
coffins from hand to hand. If anyone leaves the chain, they are immediately 
replaced by someone else. […] It is impressive to watch this snake of people 
hand over the coffins covered in green drapes from hands to hands. Sometimes 
the coffin is carried all the way by the same three or four people, and all those 
forming the chain touch it with their hands as it passes them. [...] It touches me 
profoundly to realise that this process is not carried out by some kind of 
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officials: these people are the participants to the march who just arrived, they 
walked more than a hundred kilometres in three days to 'return' to Srebrenica 
and recover these bodies. All around us […] a constant flux of people moves 
restlessly, while journalists and photographers take endless pictures. I am 
petrified and stunned, I think I cannot succeed in photographing this scene and I 
decide not to do it”.77 
Reporting a comparable episode, Hedican defines such situation as “probably one of 
those classic fieldwork dilemmas, to get involved or not”.78 However, the “dilemma” 
never seems plainly reducible to choosing one or the other option, as if operating a 
dissociation between our objective effort and our subjective self. On the contrary, if 
the observer/ethnographer is the main instrument of the research and her subjectivity 
is implicated in the ways mentioned above, then the practice of fieldwork necessarily 
encompasses emotions in various ways. As the excerpts of notes reported above 
highlight, the situations we encounter during fieldwork stimulate in the observer a 
variety of (more or less intense) emotions, and sometimes influence choices of 
observation, in ways that we come to look at with suspicion in the expectation that 
the researcher can (and should) be unemotional insomuch as s/he is professional.79 
However, extended involvement in the field and/or particularly suggestive fieldwork 
situations can bring emotions to the foreground, and thus prompt deeper reflection 
on the process of research itself. In this perspective, emotions are part of the research 
process inasmuch as they constitute an aspect of our cognitive faculties,80 and their 
incorporation into reflection and analysis “offers a tool with which to enhance our 
understanding of our experiences in the field and of the data we thus obtain”.81 In my 
experience, recognition and “observation” of the emotions provoked in me by 
commemorations and other events constituted a process that unfolded gradually. The 
exploration of this personal aspect of fieldwork activities was useful to detect my own 
tendency to keep distances and downplay involvement, question my notions of 
subjectivity/objectivity and enhance my perceptions as a participant observer by 
keeping me in contact with dimensions of lived experience that risk remaining in the 
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background of highly formalised rituals of official celebrations. Coping with the 
emergence of emotions during fieldwork was thus also a way to avoid 
oversimplification and estrangement from the events of the recent history of Sarajevo 
and their recollections, and engage in a thicker and more complex relation with the 
multifaceted processes of memorialisation of conflict. 
Awareness of the subjective aspects of the research postulates that “researchers 
are not just situated on the margins of the community life that is studied; they are also 
an integral component of the knowledge that is gained and processed",82 and is thus 
also pertinent to the ways we screen our results and envision the validation of our 
work. This perspective highlights that in the observation of commemorative 
ceremonies and cultural performances "what we call our data are really our own 
constructions of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are 
up to".83 Validation accordingly focuses on the descriptive and interpretive aspects of 
a work that addresses “process[es] of meaning and interpretation”,84 and 
corresponds to an effort to render factual accuracy of the events observed and grasp 
the meanings attached to them.85 As the endeavour is that of “guessing at meanings, 
assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better 
guesses”,86 the research relies on the gathering of different data and results in order 
to draw thicker descriptions of the phenomenon under study and hence involve the 
reader in the assessment of the clarity and plausibility of the researcher's account.87 
 
                                                     
82 Hedican, “Understanding Emotional Experience in Fieldwork,”23. 
83 Geertz, “Thick Description,” 9. 
84 Hedican, “Understanding Emotional Experience in Fieldwork,”18. 
85 Baker, “Observation: A Complex Research Method.” 
86 Geertz, “Thick Description,” 20. 
87 Luders, “Field Observation and Ethnography.” 
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 4 Formal/legal system of heritage care 
in BiH* 
In the area of BiH, various civilization circles 
circulated and mixed, and three religions coexisted 
with enviable levels of tolerance and convergence, 
without assimilationist pretences of integration 
and creation of a unified cultural norm that would 
have obliterated the diversity and specificity of 
each cultural individuality.1 
 
For this today in BiH – and not only when talking 
about its cultural heritage – the key issue is the 
creation of such social climate in which it will be 
possible […] to realize a productive relation 
between past, present and future, with cultural 
heritage as a common good and [with] a human 
model of affiliation to cultural heritage as part not 
only of past but also of future identity.2 
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is partly based on the article “The international heritage doctrine and the management of 
heritage in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: the case of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments”, International Journal of Heritage Studies, 2014, 20(1):54-71. 
1 Council of Ministers of BiH, Ministry for Civil Affairs, “Strategija Kulturne Politike U BiH” (Sarajevo, 2008), 
7, translation: author. 
2 Ibid., 12, traslation: author. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Peace Accords signed at Dayton in 1995 configured BiH as a decentralised state 
composed of two largely autonomous Entities – Republika Srpska (RS), covering 49% 
of the state territory and inhabited predominantly by Bosnian Serbs, and the 
Federation of BiH (FBiH), covering the remaining 51% and comprising a majority of 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Bosnjaks). Additionally, the Federation was 
configured as a decentralised political entity composed of 10 Cantons with their own 
governments, and a 1999 arbitration established the area of the city of Brcko as a self-
governing District under the direct sovereignty of the state3. The state top 
institutional level is composed of a three-member Presidency serving a term of four 
years, and a bicameral parliamentary assembly with limited powers and functions4. 
The system of government and administration is thus regulated by 14 constitutions 
(corresponding to as many governments and parliaments and 180 ministries),5 and 
organised into a variety of competencies and responsibilities at different levels: the 
overall state of BiH, the Entities and the self-governing District, the (FBiH) Cantons, 
the Municipalities and Cities (see figure 5).  
 
                                                     
3 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH resulted from internationally brokered negotiations 
held at Dayton (Ohio) in the fall of 1995 between the President of BiH Alija Izetbegovic, the President of 
Croatia Franjo Tudjman and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic. Its 
signature was witnessed by the President of France, the President of the U.S., the UK Prime Minister, the 
German Chancellor and the Russian Prime Minister and a European Union Special Negotiator. Annex 4 
entailed the Constitution of BiH. 
4 The competencies of the state of BiH mainly concern foreign policy and foreign trade policy, monetary and 
customs policies, immigration, refugees and asylum policies, international and inter-Entity criminal law 
enforcement, communication and transportation facilities at inter-Entity and international level. The current 
state-level ministries are those of: Foreign Affairs; Security; Defence; Finance and Treasury; Justice, Foreign 
Trade and Economic Relations; Communications and Transports; Human Rights and Refugees; Civil Affairs 
(http://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/; OHR 2002 Decision enacting the Law on the Council of Ministers of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2003 Law on Ministries and other bodies of administration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH 5/03). The Presidency is composed of a Bosnjak, a Croat and a Serb 
member, with chairmanship rotating every eight months, as established in Art. V of the Constitution of BiH 
(Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
5 Boskovic, Natasa, “Happy Holidays for Whom: Ethnic Diversity and Politics of Regulation of Public Holidays 
in BiH,” in State or Nation? The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by Eldar 
Sarajlic and Marko Davor (Sarajevo: Centar za interdisciplinarne post-diplomske studije/Center for 
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, 2011). 
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As observed by Bose, the Constitution of BiH entails the main features of a 
'consociational' or group-based power-sharing system: “allocation of seats in a way 
that takes account of group membership, […] veto rights for representatives of 
national segments, […] central decisionmaking by grand coalition between 
representatives of the segments”, and “segmental autonomy”.6 Within this system, 
representation in the organs of government and decision-making processes at all 
levels rely on mechanisms of checks and balances of the powers and rights of the 
three constituent peoples of BiH, i.e. “Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs”7. Although the 
'ethnic principle' was meant as a tool to ensure that each constituent people have 
their voice in decision-making processes and that their rights are protected, it also 
renders governing processes particularly complex and prone to stalemates or 
deadlocks, with the possibility of veto procedures when issues under discussion in the 
Parliament(s) are considered “destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or 
Serb people”, thus in some instances hindering the process of decision-making itself8. 
The ethnic principle has a further effect: in determining the persistence of ethnicity as 
a key feature of political representation and power sharing, it implies the 
marginalization and discrimination of minority groups and critically limits alternative 
models of (self) identification9. 
 
                                                     
6 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 63-4. 
7 cf. Constitution of BiH, Art. IV on the Parliamentary Assembly and Art. V on the Presidency. The 
Constitution of FBiH and the Constitution of RS similarly regulate representation of the constituent peoples 
in the articles pertaining to the composition of their structures of government. 
8 Art. IV(3)e and Art. V(2)d of the Constitution of BiH, Annex 4 of the GFAP. The Constitutions of RS and 
FBiH also contain provisions for the protection of national interests of the constituent peoples, as well as 
mechanisms for such protection at the Cantonal level (Constitution of FBiH). The OHR Agreement on the 
Implementation of the Constituents' Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
2002 dealt specifically with the protection of vital interests in the bodies of government and administration 
of BiH. Art. 4 provided the definition of vital interest as: “exercise of the rights of constituent peoples to be 
adequately represented in legislative; executive and judicial bodies; identity of one constituent people; 
constitutional amendments; organisation of public authorities; equal rights of constituent peoples in the 
process of decisionmaking; education, religion, language, promotion of culture, tradition and cultural 
heritage; territorial organisation; public information system; and other issues treated as of vital national 
interest if so claimed by 2/3 of one of the caucuses of the constituent peoples in the House of Peoples or 
Council of Peoples”. 
9 In December 2009 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled over the case Sejdic 
and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (27996/06 and 34836/06) establishing that the Constitution of BiH 
presents discriminatory traits against minorities, such as Roma and Jews, that do not enjoy the same 
representation rights as the three recognised “constituent peoples”, nor mechanisms for the protection of 
vital interests. The ineligibility of representatives of minority groups other than the three constituent 
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A further level of power is constituted by the figure of the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and his Office (OHR). Established in the framework of the 
Dayton Agreement, the High Representative represents an ad hoc international 
institution in charge of supervising the implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace 
Agreement. The HR receives political guidance from the Steering Board of the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC), and since 1997 has the power to “remove from office 
public officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and 
to impose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do 
so”.10 As shall be seen below, the OHR resorted to such powers repeatedly also in the 
realm of heritage and state/national symbols. 
Within this context, the legislative and institutional system for heritage care in 
today's BiH is a composite set of legal provisions and technical bodies belonging to 
different governmental/administrative levels, that still lacks both a coherent 
overarching perspective/strategy at its top and comprehensive organisational 
principles for the regulation of tasks and responsibilities.  
In a short formula, the Strategy for Cultural Politics in BiH drafted for the Council of 
Ministers in 2008 defined the legislative and institutional situation related to heritage 
care as one of “flimsy efficiency”.11 At least in part, such condition is a direct 
consequence of the endurance of four years of armed conflict, whereby the usual 
roles and activities of state institutions were suspended or reduced to emergency 
functions while cultural heritage was systematically damaged and destroyed, so that 
once the conflict was halted the country found itself with minimised institutional 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
peoples to the Presidency of BiH was found by the Judgement to violate Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (full text of the Judgement available at www.echr.coe.int. See also 
Human Rights Watch 2012, “Second class citizens. Discrimination against Roma, Jews and other national 
minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). 
10 See www.ohr.int, “Mandate of the OHR.” The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council 
comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of 
the European Union, the European Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
represented by Turkey. The OHR was initially meant to work for a limited period of time but as of 2013 it is 
still operative. The decision to grant additional powers to the HR was adopted by the PIC Steering Board at 
a conference held in Bonn in 1997. The so-called “Bonn powers” have raised criticisms concerning the lack 
of accountability of the OHR (which is only responsible to the PIC) and the lack of appeal to his decisions 
(which have immediate effect). See Peter, Mateja, “The Shifting Contours of International State-Building 
Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in State or Nation? The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, edited by Eldar Sarajlic and Marko Davor (Sarajevo: Centar za interdisciplinarne post-
diplomske studije/Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, 2011). 
11 Council of Ministers of BiH, “Strategija Kulturne Politike,” 12, translation: author. 
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capacities to face overwhelming tasks of reconstruction. Despite great progress was 
made in reconstruction and protection efforts in subsequent years, the Strategy still 
highlighted in 2008 that 
“some institutions in the field of heritage protection have lost status, budget 
and documentation, and in some there is an observable lack of experts. Human 
resources, financial and organizational conditions for the performance of the 
basic activities of the institutions in the field of heritage protection are 
substantially difficult and limited".12 
Embedded in the intricate institutional setting of post-Dayton BiH, the field of 
heritage shares its complexity. In the context of a decentralised system, matters 
pertaining to heritage are regulated and administered at Entity and lower levels with 
specific laws, ministries and institutes. At the state level, BiH does not have a distinct 
ministry responsible of/for culture and/or heritage, but a Ministry for Civil Affairs with 
functions of coordination and harmonisation of Entity plans and definition of 
international strategies in various fields, including culture. The lack of a legal 
framework of state-wide scope concerning heritage, nevertheless, renders the 
functioning of such decentralised system extremely complex and hinders its 
efficiency. 
A second fundamental trait of the system of heritage care is that of fragmentation. 
The absence of a unified perspective and the limited mechanisms of coordination 
allow for a high degree of autonomy of the governmental units that compose the 
overall structure of BiH (i.e. the Entities). While this is partly inherent to a 
decentralised system, fragmentation is heightened by a disparity between the two 
Entities, whereby Republika Srpska has a centralised structure of government and the 
Federation of BiH is composed of ten strongly autonomous Cantons. This results in an 
institutional geography characterised by parallelisms and overlaps of tasks and 
responsibilities across different administrative levels. Furthermore, the centrality of 
ethnicity in the administrative-institutional configuration and functioning mechanisms 
established with the Dayton Agreement creates an environment where fragmentation 
can easily be turned into (ethnicised) political antagonism. Within this context, the 
management of heritage is particularly sensitive because it conveys notions on 
memory and identity that can be used to challenge or re-assess (more or less directly 
and explicitly) interpretations of past conflicts as well as the definition of the polity 
and the legitimacy of current arrangements concerning its structure. In other words, 
 
                                                     
12 Ibid., translation: author. 
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gaps in the coherence and coordination of the system of heritage management risk 
being instrumentalised to the ends of segregation and exclusivism, while “the 
question of whether reconciliation can best be achieved through the establishment of 
a shared narrative of the war or through the recognition of divergent war memories 
becomes a very practical and puzzling one”.13 
The third crucial feature of BiH's heritage system is constituted by an international 
ascendancy over it, which is at the basis of the creation of the most important body in 
charge of heritage at the state level – the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments. Since the establishment of peace with the Dayton Agreement, notions 
and principles on the functions and meanings of heritage in relation to reconciliation 
and post-conflict reconstruction have influenced heritage management in BiH not 
only through the ratification of the most important international (i.e. UNESCO and 
CoE) conventions but also through joint programmes and the direct intervention of 
international actors. It is thus worth analysing the ways in which international 
principles and programmes concerning heritage affected and combined with BiH's 
specific context, its background history of heritage management and its present 
characteristics as a post-conflict multicultural and transitional setting. 
4.2 The system of heritage care 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has no ministry specifically dedicated to culture at the level of 
the state, and no overall national law regulating matters on culture or heritage. As 
mentioned above, the Ministry for Civil Affairs of BiH covers – aside its primary tasks – 
functions of coordination and harmonisation of entity plans and definition of 
international strategies in various fields, including culture. The institution concretely 
responsible for heritage at the state level is the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments, which is somehow atypical, as it was created through one Annex of the 
Dayton Agreement (Annex 8) and responds to the Presidency of BiH. The 
Commission, however, primarily deals with the designation of cultural property as 
'national monument' and international cooperation in the field of heritage, and has no 
power for the implementation of its deliberations (see below). 
 
                                                     
13 Bougarel, Xavier, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings, eds. The New Bosnian Mosaic. Identities, Memories and 
Moral Claims in a Post-War Society (Ashgate, 2007), 25. 
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At Entity level, matters pertaining to culture and heritage are regulated by specific 
ministries/departments and institutes: Republika Srpska has its own Ministry for 
Education and Culture with a department for the protection of cultural heritage and a 
Republican Institute for the protection of cultural-historical and natural heritage, and 
the Federation of BiH has its own Ministry of Culture and Sport, with a section for 
cultural-historical heritage and culture and an Institute for the Protection of 
Monuments. Brcko District administers matters pertaining to heritage through its 
Commission to Preserve Heritage under the Department of Spatial Planning and 
Proprietary Rights.  
The Entity institutes are the successors of bodies operative in the mid-1970s in the 
Socialist Republic of BiH within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation: the FBiH 
Institute derives from the Provincial Institute for the Protection of Cultural 
Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the RS Institute was previously a regional 
body established in 197614. They have their seats respectively in Sarajevo and 
Banjaluka. The Entity institutes collect documentation and conduct research on 
heritage and provide technical and expert supervision to works of reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, restoration and conservation; they participate in the implementation of 
the decisions of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments, assess the value 
and conditions of heritage sites and draft projects for the protection of heritage at 
Entity level (i.e. subject to the approval of the respective Entity Ministries of 
competence, and upon funding supplied by the Entity Governments). Professionals 
from the institutes are furthermore involved in the drafting of laws concerning 
heritage (see below). These bodies thus provide the expertise for supervision of 
actual works of (re)construction, rehabilitation and preservation on specific sites 
within the area of responsibility of each Entity. The mandates of the institutes require 
them to cooperate with each other and with higher levels of administration (i.e. the 
state-level Commission to Preserve National Monuments and Ministries of 
pertinence), as well as with eventual subjects involved in specific projects (both local 
 
                                                     
14 See Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Report on Assessment of the architectural and 
archaeological heritage, AT03 132 rev., Sarajevo, March 2010, available at http://kons.gov.ba, and the 
website of the RS Institute, http://nasljedje.org. On the basis of the 1945 Law on the Protection of Cultural 
Monuments, there were various institutions in charge of cultural properties: the Provincial/Republic 
Institute of SR BiH in Sarajevo; another municipal Institute in Sarajevo (competent for the area of the city); 
and regional Institutes in Mostar, Banjaluka and Tuzla. Their dates of foundation vary due to 
reorganizations of the administrative structures in the 1970s and 1980s (Serdarevic, Pravna Zastita). 
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and international)15. Additionally, following the overall governmental/administrative 
structure of BiH, some of the Cantons comprising the Federation have their own 
institutes for the protection of heritage, with tasks similar to those of the Entity 
Institutes, but specifically within the area of the Canton. Finally, three ad hoc bodies 
have been created in recent years in relation to world heritage sites in BiH: the Stari 
Grad (Old City) Agency in Mostar (2005), the Agency for the Cultural, Historical and 
Natural Heritage and the Development of the Tourism Potential of the Town of Jaice 
(2007), and the Commission for the Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic Bridge in Visegrad 
(2007).16 Figure 6 presents an overview of the bodies in charge of heritage protection 
and care at the various administrative levels of BiH. 
This complex geography of bodies and institutes in charge of heritage care and 
protection is regulated by a variety of laws at different levels. At national level, Annex 
8 of the Dayton Agreement constitutes the legal instrument establishing the 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments and regulating its composition, 
mandate and tasks. In the Entities, matters pertaining to heritage protection are 
regulated through the RS Law on Cultural Property (1995, with amendments of 2008) 
and the FBiH Law on the Protection and Use of Cultural-Historical and Natural 
Heritage (1985, amended in 1987, 1993 and 1994), complemented with laws regulating 
the implementation of the decisions of the state-level Commission (see below) and 
provisions contained in the Laws on urban and physical planning.17 Additional 
provisions regarding particular issues can be found in laws on the protection of nature 
and the environment and criminal codes. Within the FBiH, five Cantons follow the 
Laws in force at the Entity level (Canton 10; Central Bosnia Canton [SBK]; Bosnjan 
Podrinje Canton [BPK]; Tuzla Canton [TK] and Posavina Canton [PK]), while the other 
five Cantons have promulgated their own legal documents governing heritage care 
and protection. The body of international conventions on heritage ratified by BiH 
constitutes an additional repository of regulations. Appendix one provides an 
 
                                                     
15 See Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Report on Assessment of the architectural and 
archaeological heritage, AT03 132 rev., Sarajevo, March 2010, available at http://kons.gov.ba, the websites of 
the RS Institute (http://nasljedje.org) and the FbiH Ministry of Culture and Sport (www.fmks.gov.ba). 
16 The Old Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar and the Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic Bridge in Visegrad have 
been inscribed in the UNESCO World Heritage List respectively in 2005 and 2007. The natural and 
architectural ensemble of Jaice has been submitted to the UNESCO Tentative List in 2006. See 
http://whc.unesco.org. At the state level there is also a National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO, 
established in 2009 as a consultive body of the Council of Ministers of BiH. 
17 The Entity ministries for regional planning and land use are he authorities in charge of issuing permits for 
investigative activities, protection, conservation, restoration and rehabilitation of national monuments. 
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overview of the legal documents concerned with heritage at all levels. Appendix two 
provides a list of international documents ratified by BiH. 
Whereas this web of provisions might determine a far-reaching and detailed 
regulation of heritage protection at all levels, it appears to create a legal environment 
characterised by complexity, overlaps and lack of coherence: it has been noted that 
“there are already a great many laws governing heritage protection at various 
levels – cantonal, entity and national. These laws are neither mutually 
compatible nor are they in compliance with the recommendations of 
international conventions”.18 
Two main attempts at drafting an overall law on heritage at state level were 
undertaken in recent years, but did not result in the adoption of a new law. In 2004, a 
working group formed by members of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments, the Ministry for Civil Affairs of BiH and representatives of the Entity and 
Brcko District ministries in charge of heritage and physical planning, with the technical 
aid of experts of the Council of Europe, elaborated a draft that was presented to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH but did not enter the parliamentary procedures for 
adoption. A second attempt was made in 2008, upon the proposal of the Ministry for 
Civil Affairs and with the collaboration of the Entity and Brcko District ministries for 
the protection of heritage and physical planning, resulting in a Draft Law on Cultural 
Properties of Bosnia and Herzegovina.19 
The Draft Law envisioned the establishment of a Commission for Cultural 
Properties as a permanent body of the Ministry for Civil Affairs (Art. 6d). Such 
Commission would be composed of five members (two from the FBiH Ministry for 
Culture and Sport; two from the RS Ministry for Education and Culture, and one from 
the Ministry for Civil Affairs of BiH), and would be accountable to the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and the Council of Ministers of BiH (Art. 87). The Commission's decisions on 
the designation of cultural properties would be submitted to the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs for approval, and forwarded to the Council of Ministers of BiH in case of 
disagreements (Art. 13(5)). The Draft Law did not establish new criteria for the 
designation of cultural properties, but provided that the Commission should propose 
the criteria to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which in turn would submit them to the 
Council of Ministers for adoption (Art.16(1) and (2)). Properties might be declared to 
 
                                                     
18 Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Report on Assessment of the architectural and 
archaeological heritage, AT03 132 rev., Sarajevo, March 2010, available at http://kons.gov.ba. 
19  Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH, Nacrt Zakona o Kulturnim Dobrima BiH, www.mcp.gov.ba. 
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have 'local significance' by the competent local (i.e. Entity, Cantonal) authorities in 
charge of heritage, on the basis of criteria established by the same authorities (Art. 
18). 
Apparently, the Draft Law did not foresee crucial changes in the structure of 
heritage care, which would remain a decentralised system based on the cooperation 
of institutions at various levels of government. Sensitive aspects such as the definition 
of criteria for the designation of cultural properties were not tackled directly by the 
draft, but delegated to the still-to-establish Commission for Cultural Properties, with 
the requirement of approval by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Council of 
Ministers. This provision would constitute a setback with respect to the present 
situation in that it would significantly postpone in time the establishment of new 
criteria, and open up a discussion on their definition that might generate frictions 
among the actors involved. Moreover, the new Commission would have more limited 
powers because of its subordination and dependence on the approval of the central 
organs of government on the designation of cultural properties. 
In 2008 the Government of Republika Srpska issued a Resolution declaring that it 
did not support the adoption of the Law on Cultural Properties of BiH on the ground 
of the 'absence of a constitutional basis', and as of 2010 the Draft Law had not yet 
been presented to the Parliament for enactment.20 The lack of support on the part of 
the RS structure of government and the claim of a lack of constitutional basis for the 
state-level law on cultural heritage show the absence of willingness to cooperate and 
partake in the delineation of a shared cultural milieu and convey a notion of culture as 
a realm to be developed and managed at the level of the Entities, that are in this way 
implicitly understood as consistent cultural communities in contrast to the overall 
state. The adoption of a national law on matters regarding heritage appears thus 
fundamentally hindered by efforts at maintaining privileged control over this field at 
the lower levels of Entity (and Canton) and the reluctance to adhere to a common 
framework. The lack of consensus over provisions regarding culture and heritage not 
only characterises state institutions but is also reproduced at lower administrative 
levels on the basis of ethnic affiliation and with particular intensity over matters 
 
                                                     
20 The Resolution was preceded by an Opinion issued by the Secretariat for the Legislature of RS similarly 
pointing to a lack of constitutional basis for the enactment of a law governing culture and the protection of 
cultural properties. Information reported in Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Report on 
Assessment of the architectural and archaeological heritage, AT03 132 rev., Sarajevo, March 2010, available 
at http://kons.gov.ba. 
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related to the recent conflict, putting heritage management at the centre of cultural 
policies marked by dissent and contestation. 
An example of such complications is provided by the heated debates over a Law on 
Monuments drafted in RS in July 2011 and discussed in the Entity Parliament in 
November, which resulted in a stalemate because of the strong opposition of the 
Croat and Bosnjak Clubs within the Assembly, on the basis of their claim that the new 
law neglects the identity of these two groups in favour of the Serb population of RS, 
especially in relation to its provisions on the erection of monuments to civilian victims 
of the last conflict. More specifically, the Club of Croat delegates of the Council of 
Peoples of RS initiated the procedure of protection of vital national interest on 14 
November 2011, disclosing a preoccupation with the legal status of monuments to 
people belonging to the Croat and other constitutive peoples of RS if the new law on 
monuments were adopted. On 25 November, the Club of Bosnjak delegates initiated 
the same procedure proposing one amendment and lamenting the lack of provisions 
on monuments to civilian victims, while highlighting the general discrepancy of views 
about the last conflict between peoples of different ‘nationality’ (i.e. ethnicity).21 
A Report prepared by the Commission to Preserve National Monuments in 2010 in 
the framework of the Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South 
East Europe stated that "the absence of state-level legislation governing heritage 
protection is one of the reasons for the non-systematic and non-synchronised process 
of protection", and noted further that "the absence of political will to harmonize 
views on the heritage protection system is what is preventing such a law from being 
enacted".22 Even more to the point, the Strategy for Cultural Politics in BiH adopted by 
the Council of Ministers in 2008 highlighted that 
 
                                                     
21 Zakon o spomenicima i spomen-obiljezjima oslobodilackih ratova RS (Law on Monuments of the 
Liberation Wars). Odluka o Pokretanju zastite vitalnog interesa Hrvatskog Naroda, 14 November 2011 and 
Odluka o Pokretanju postupka zastite vitalnog interesa Bosnjackog Naroda 25 November 2011, available at 
the website of the Council of Peoples of RS: http://vijecenarodars.net/. The House/Council of Peoples in 
each entity and at the state level of BiH are organised in Clubs of delegates from each constituent people 
and provide an additional mechanism for the protection of the interests of constituent peoples in law-
making procedures. The Clubs can declare a law to be harmful to the vital national interest of one of the 
constituent peoples and initiate a procedure of revision or amendment of the law in question. (For details 
on the procedure in the Council of Peoples of RS, see the website of the Council of Peoples of RS: 
http://vijecenarodars.net/). 
22 Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Report on Assessment of the architectural and 
archaeological heritage, AT03 132 rev., Sarajevo, March 2010, section "Weaknesses in heritage 
management", available at http://kons.gov.ba. 
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"the question of how to reconcile national and cultural belonging reflects itself 
directly onto the field of cultural heritage. [...] In BiH, two crucial issues arise 
with regards to institution-building and the elimination of the dualism between 
state and nation, that only in ideal cases are identical and coincide with the 
state's borders".23 
The adoption of a state-level law on cultural heritage was thus identified as pivotal 
step in a process of reform committed to contrast a situation marked by a substantial 
marginalisation of culture, lack of legal and institutional coherence, parallelisms and 
overlaps, reluctance to cooperate and lack of support from the highest governing 
structures.24 
4.3 The Commission to Preserve National Monuments 
The Commission to Preserve National Monuments is the institution responsible for 
heritage protection at the state level of BiH. It was established in the framework of 
the Peace Agreement halting the war in 1995 with Annex 8, signed by the Republic of 
 
                                                     
23 Council of Ministers of BiH, “Strategija Kulturne Politike”, 12, emphasis original, translation: author. 
24 The marginalisation of culture at the state level of BiH became increasingly evident in recent years. The 
crisis concerns seven institutions “of national relevance” that were previously (within Socialist Yugoslavia) 
under the responsibility of the Republic of BiH: the National Museum; the National Gallery; the Historical 
Museum; the National Film Archive; the National and University Library; the Museum of Literature and 
Theatre; the National Library for Blind and Partially Sighted People. These institutions have been forced to 
close doors to visitors and suspend their activities in recent years, either permanently or for long periods. 
The National Museum of BiH, for instance, was forced to close doors to visitors a first time in 2004 and 
again in October 2012, when the Commission to Preserve National Monuments launched an “alarmed 
appeal to everyone to halt in a responsible way the destruction of Bosnian-Herzegovinian heritage through 
the suffocation of its institutions” (Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Saopstenje za javnost - 
Reagovanje Komisije za ocuvanje nacionalnih spomenika na zatvaranje Zemaljskog Muzeja Bosne I 
Hercegovine, 09.10.2012, http://kons.gov.ba). The critical conditions of these institutions are mainly due to 
lack of funds and to their unresolved status within the post-Dayton structure of the country, whereby it has 
not been determined clearly to which level of government/administration these institution belong. This 
appears all the more striking if one considers that the National Museum of BiH is included in the Preliminary 
List of National Monuments drafted by the Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and the buildings 
of the Historical Museum, the National Film Archive and the Museum of Literature and Theatre have been 
declared national monuments. The platform www.cultureshutdown.net was created in response to this 
situation and provides updated informations. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika 
Srpska. Its primary tasks and principles were established through Annex 8 of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and the 2001 Presidency of BiH 
Decision on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments (with amendments in 
2002).25 According to these founding documents, the Commission "shall receive and 
decide on petitions for the designation of property having cultural, historic, religious 
or ethnic importance as National Monuments".26 Art. VI of Annex 8 accorded eligibility 
as national monument to "movable or immovable property of great importance to a 
group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic heritage, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history; archaeological sites; groups of buildings; as 
well as cemeteries". 
The Commission's staff is appointed by the Presidency of BiH,27 and consists of five 
members "generally representative of the ethnic groups comprising Bosnia and 
Herzegovina".28 
Petitions for the designation of a national monument might be submitted to the 
Commission by "any Party or any concerned person in Bosnia and Herzegovina",29 and 
will receive a decision approved by a majority of the Commission's members, 
containing a detailed explanation of the basis for the decision.30 Aside the petition 
system, given the legacy of wartime destruction of heritage against which the 
Commission was created, its activities entailed since the beginning also the drafting of 
a List of Endangered Monuments requiring “emergency protection measures [...] to 
prevent them being completely destroyed”,31 and a Provisional List of National 
Monuments, on which it can independently issue decisions of designation. 
The decisions of the Commission are final and binding,32 and their enforcement is 
responsibility of the Entity/cantonal governments and ministries in charge of culture 
and spatial planning, according to the location of the designated monument. The 
 
                                                     
25 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 8, Agreement on 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments, www.ohr.int; Presidency of BiH 2001, Decision on 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments; Presidency of BiH 2002, Decision on Amendments to the 
Decision on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments; Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
nos. 1/02 and 10/02. 
26 GFAP, Annex 8, Art. IV; Presidency of BiH, Decision on the Commission, Art. 4. 
27 Presidency of BiH, Decision on the Commission, Art.  5. 
28 GFAP, Annex 8, Art. III(1); Presidency of BiH, Decision on the Commission, Art. 6. 
29 GFAP, Annex 8, Art.  V(1). 
30 GFAP, Annex 8, Art.  V (4). 
31 Website of the Commission, “Heritage at risk”, http://kons.gov.ba. 
32 GFAP, Annex 8, Art.  V (4). 
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Entities are thus required to "take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, 
administrative and financial measures necessary for the protection, conservation, 
presentation and rehabilitation of the property" designated.33  
The adoption of Law(s) on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Commission 
to Preserve National Monuments in the Entities required the intervention of the OHR, 
which imposed the Law in RS and decreed amendments to the bill of FBiH, while 
Brcko District approved the act with regular procedure.34 
The Commission issued its Criteria for the Designation of Properties as National 
Monuments in 2002 and 2003.35 The criteria defined the kind of properties eligible for 
legal protection (movable and immovable cultural properties), and listed the grounds 
for assessing the technical, aesthetic, artistic and architectural value of properties, 
including attributes of documentary or scientific/educational value, uniqueness/rarity, 
authenticity, integrity and landscape value.  
Two sections of the Criteria seem worth mentioning in particular, as they hint at a 
broader conceptualisation of the significance of heritage: the "historic value" 
concerns the "association of a building, or group or place to a historic figure in the 
history or a significant event in the history" (Art. II-B), and the "symbolic value" 
involves "significance for the identity of a group of people" (Art. II-E-v).36 These two 
definitions link heritage on the one hand to the formulation of memory/memories 
(through the designation of significant historical figures, places and events) and on 
the other hand to the definition of identity/identities, thus pointing to two aspects 
 
                                                     
33 GFAP, Annex 8, Art.  V (5). 
34 Law on Implementation of the Decision of the Annex 8 Commission to reserve National Monuments, 
Brcko District 2001; Law on the Protection of Properties Designated as National Monuments of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Decision of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments, FBiH 2002 and Decision 
Amending the Federation Law on Preservation of Assets Declared National Monuments of BiH under 
Decisions of the Commission for Protection of National Monuments, OHR 2002; Decision Imposing the RS 
Law on Implementation of Decisions of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments established 
under Annex 8 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, OHR 2002. Laws published in the Official Gazette of Brcko 
District no. 2/02, Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 2/02 and 27/02, and 
Official Gazette of Republika Srpska no. 9/02. 
35 Criteria to Designate the Properties as National Monuments, Sept. 2002 and Decision on Amendments to 
the Criteria for Designating Properties as National Monuments, May 2003. Published in the Official Gazette 
of BiH nos. 33/02 and 15/03. http://kons.gov.ba. 
36 Criteria to Designate the Properties as National Monuments, Sept. 2002 and Decision on Amendments to 
the Criteria for Designating Properties as National Monuments, May 2003. http://kons.gov.ba. 
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that are linked to heritage's role and function in society in all main international texts 
and conventions regulating its protection and preservation.37 
References to history/memory and identity have been central in the development 
of the conceptualisation of heritage throughout this body of documents. To make 
some examples, the Granada Convention for the Protection of the Architectural 
Heritage of Europe emphasised the value of heritage as "inestimable witness to our 
past" and as a "system of cultural references" to bequeath to future generations 
(Preamble); and the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological 
Heritage identified it as a "source of [...] collective memory" (Art. 1 par. 1), stressing its 
"value [...] for understanding the past" (Art. 9 par. i). The Declaration Concerning the 
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage appreciated heritage as "an important 
component of the cultural identity of communities, groups and individuals" 
(Preamble), and finally the Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage 
for Society defined cultural heritage as "a group of resources inherited from the past 
which people identify [...] as a reflection and expression of their constantly evolving 
values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions" (Art. 2 par. a).38  
The Commission to Preserve National Monuments presents a series of traits that 
characterise it as a hybrid local/international institution.39 First and foremost, it was 
established in the framework of an internationally brokered peace agreement. The 
 
                                                     
37 The categorisation of cultural properties in the Socialist period was regulated through the Laws on the 
protection and use of cultural-historical and natural heritage of 1978 and 1985. According to these legal 
texts, properties were subdivided in 3 categories: (1) properties of exceptional significance for the history 
and culture of national and nationalities of Yugoslavia and properties from the World Heritage List in 
Yugoslavia; (2) properties of great significance for the history and culture of the national and nationalities 
of Yugoslavia, i.e. for the history and culture of the nations and nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (3) 
all remaining significant properties (Art. 14 of the 1985 Law). Articles 20 to 28 then further defined 
properties of cultural-historical and natural heritage as “cultural monuments”; “monumental ensembles”; 
“archaeological sites”; “monuments-markers”; “properties of cultural-historical heritage”, and various 
natural sites of significance. (Parliamentary Assembly of SR BiH, 1985, Law on the protection and use of 
cultural-historical and natural heritage. See also Serdarevic, Pravna Zastita). 
38 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, Granada, 1985; 
Council of Europe. European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, revised, Valletta, 
1992; UNESCO. Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Paris, 2003; Council 
of Europe. Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, Faro, 2005. See also 
chapter one. 
39 Here and elsewhere in the chapter I use the term “local” to refer to the context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I choose this term to avoid the term “national”, which would be ambiguous because BiH does 
not configure as a nation-state and because of common identification of ethnic with national identity within 
the state of BiH. I also avoid “state” because of the weakness of state structures and authorities within BiH. 
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circumstances of its creation reflect, on the one hand, the experience of wanton 
destruction of heritage that characterised the 1992-1995 war, and, on the other hand, 
the growing concern for (and valorisation of) heritage on the part of both the 
international community and the local communities whose representatives were 
signing the Agreement.40 Hadzimuhamedovic emphasises that the creation of such 
institution by treaty was an unprecedented affirmation of the principle that 
"destroyed heritage is to be reconstituted",41 and entailed an unparalleled recognition 
of the social value of heritage in the establishment of peace and post-war 
reconstruction.42 The establishment of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments within the Dayton Peace Agreement represents in this sense a concrete 
application of the international philosophy on heritage preservation whose 
delineation took the moves from the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of 
Heritage in the Event of Armed Conflict.  
Several aspects of the creation of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments reflect the overall international approach to the 1992-1995 conflict in BiH 
and the role 'culture' and 'ethnicity' played in it – and the current international 
conceptualisation of heritage's meanings and functions in society, with a special 
concern for multicultural post-conflict societies. To begin with, the Commission shares 
the same principles of balanced ethnic representation and power-sharing that 
permeate the treaty signed at Dayton: its staff reproduces the ethnic composition of 
BiH as all other organs of government, whereby 'ethnic composition' refers essentially 
to the three constituent peoples identified in the Constitution of BiH.43 Moreover, for 
the first five-year term of the Commission's work, two of its five members were 
directly appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO, which designated one of them 
as Chairman.44 In 1995 the other members were appointed by FBiH (two members) 
and RS (one member). The Commission continues to have two internationals among 
its members today). This "international element" within the Commission echoes the 
 
                                                     
40 I refer here to those associations, individuals and in general segments of the local society whose 
concernment for heritage was concretely expressed in efforts for its safeguard and/or voiced through 
appeals launched abroad during the conflict, see Serdarevic, Pravna Zastita, and chapter one. 
41 Hadzimuhamedovic, “Reconstruct or Forget?”, 237. 
42 Hadzimuhamedovic, “Nasljede U Miru”, 30. 
43 All legal text on the composition of the Commission reproduce the ethnic principle with the same 
formula. See Rules of Procedure for the work of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments 2002, 
Art. VI; Decision of BiH Presidency on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments 2001, Art. VI. 
44 GFAP, Annex 8, Art.  II(1). 
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international presence and supervision of the country as a whole, albeit with the due 
differences.45 
The care/protection of heritage was also loaded with symbolic meaning through 
the positioning of the Annex establishing the Commission after Annex 7 on the Return 
of Refugees and Displaced Persons. This simple aspect implicitly subsumes a whole 
set of notions on heritage that are in direct relation with the international doctrine 
elaborated through UNESCO and CoE conventions since the Second World War. To be 
relevant for the return of displaced persons to their hometowns, heritage has to be 
conceptualised as a salient element of a group's cultural identity46 and of its rights to 
culture47, including rights of expression48 and democratic participation in the culture 
of the state where it belongs49. Moreover, a link has to be established between (built) 
cultural heritage and the territory where it lays, to implicitly connect a cultural 
community to a territory of belonging. The positioning of the Annex creating the 
Commission highlights this link between heritage and the territorial dimension of the 
cultural identity of groups, hinting at the relevance of the process of heritage 
reconstruction in relation to “identity formation and the re-creation of physical and 
psychological landscapes”.50 This link was explicitly stated when the High 
Representative imposed on RS the Law on the implementation of the decisions of the 
Commission, stating that 
“the proper protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the 
designated National Monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of utmost 
importance for the reconciliation process throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as well as for the return of displaced persons and refugees into their pre-war 
places of residence”.51 
 
                                                     
45 This is to say that there is no such power as the Office of the High Representative within the Commission, 
but the initial appointment of two members by the Director-General of UNESCO nevertheless represents a 
direct involvement of international actors in BiH in the realm of heritage protection. 
46 UNESCO Declaration on the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 2003. 
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; CoE Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for 
Society, Faro, 2005. 
48 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005. 
49 The 1954 CoE European Cultural Convention, at the basis of all subsequent conventions in the realm of 
culture/heritage, explicitly referred to the ‘national’ contribution of each state to a European culture. For a 
discussion of culture, nation, and state see the conclusions below. 
50 Viejo-Rose, “Destruction and Reconstruction of Heritage”, 54. 
51 Decision imposing the RS Law on Implementation of Decisions of the Commission, Office of the High 
Representative for BiH, 2002, Preamble. 
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The international ascendancy on the management and care of heritage in BiH is not 
just a matter of symbolic messages, but concerns direct involvement of international 
subjects (from NGOs to supranational organisations as the Council of Europe) through 
cooperation in the performance of ad hoc projects. Global processes of heritage 
valorisation and preservation ascribe to heritage rehabilitation a crucial role in post-
war settings, which is translated into practice through the implementation of 
reconstruction and development projects or aid programmes. The Regional 
programme on Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe launched by the 
Council of Europe in 2003, for instance, promotes a process of rehabilitation of 
heritage whose 
“purpose is to preserve a certain lifestyle that could help convince inhabitants 
to remain in (or return to) their villages, making sure that affected regions do 
not face post-conflict trauma with progressive impoverishment or even 
abandonment. Reconstruction and development is therefore a priority in 
conflict areas, not only for accommodating the inhabitants and ensuring the 
right conditions for the return of displaced persons, but also for preserving the 
spirit of the communities”.52 
4.4 One more institute in Sarajevo: the Fond Memorijala 
Being the capital city of both BiH and the Federation of BiH, and the administrative 
centre of the Canton, Sarajevo hosts a number of institutes dedicated to heritage care 
and preservation: the state-level Commission to Preserve National Monuments, the 
(Entity-level) Federal Institute for the Protection of Monuments, and the Cantonal 
Institute for the Protection of the Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo 
all have their seats in the city. 
One more body deserves to be mentioned in relation to heritage management in 
Sarajevo: the Sarajevo Canton Fund for the Protection and Maintenance of 
Cemeteries of Shahids and Killed Combatants, Memorial Centres, and Monuments of 
the Victims of Genocide – the Fond Memorijala (hereinafter: the Fund). The Fund was 
established in 1997 by means of a Decision of the Parliament of Sarajevo Canton, and 
 
                                                     
52 Council of Europe, “The Role of Culture and Cultural Heritage in Conflict Prevention, Transformation, 
Resolution and Post-Conflict Action: The Council of Europe Approach,” AT(2010)397 rev.1 (2011), 4. 
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nowadays is one organisation under the Cantonal Ministry for Veteran Affairs. The 
Fund drafts reports on its work on a yearly basis and submits them to the Government 
of Sarajevo Canton for approval. The basic competency of the Fund is to raise nisan 
gravestones to the Shahids and fighters killed during the “aggression” of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and to collect funds for its purposes, which entail various activities 
ranging from erecting nisan gravestones and cemeteries, to constructing 
monuments/memorials, organising commemorations, collaborating with primary and 
secondary schools, collecting information and publishing material on the recent 
conflict, raising awareness.53 The Fund’s vision is one centred on the victims and 
fighters of the recent armed conflict, and is primarily devoted to “rescuing” the war 
experience from oblivion and against competing accounts, with the aim of warning 
future generations against the horrors of genocide in a “never again” imperative: 
“building just a mezarje or cemetery where Shahids and killed fighters are 
buried is the easiest part of the work that we need to accomplish, but the key 
reason for its construction is not an end in itself. The aim is to turn sacred places 
into a constant warning to future generations on the evil that was done to us, so 
that never again and to nobody shall happen genocide, rape, and ethnic 
cleansing”.54 
The central project of the Fund concerns the construction of a memorial cemetery in a 
neighbourhood of the historic centre of Sarajevo city, the Kovaci neighbourhood. 
Though still under construction, the cemetery-memorial is already functioning and 
hosts various relevant commemorations taking place in Sarajevo.55 The scope of the 
activities of the Fund, nevertheless, extends beyond the area of Sarajevo Canton, to 
the Federation and the whole of the state of BiH, “wherever on Bosnian land lay 
 
                                                     
53 Nisan is the Islamic gravestone in BiH. Shahid literally means Witness of the Truth and is used in Islamic 
tradition to refer to martyrs, or those fighters who fell in combat. The term “aggression” is here put 
between inverted comas because it corresponds to a specific account of the 1992-95 conflict according to 
which the war consisted in a military aggression agains BiH on the part of Serbs, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro 
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), pursuing the idea of a Greater Serbia and entailing genocide against 
Bosnjaks (Muslims of BiH). This account has been juxtaposed to the “civil war” explanation, that sees the 
1992-95 conflict as an internal conflict among the peoples of BiH. 
54 Website of the Fond Memorijala, Introduction, translation: author, www.dasenezaboravi.org. 
55 Sehidsko Spomen Mezarje Kovaci (Shahid memorial cemetery Kovaci). As of 2012, the completed parts 
are: the cemetery of the members of the First Corpus of the Army of the Republic of BiH; the mausoleum of 
first President of independent BiH Alija Izetbegovic; the Museum on the life of Alija Izetbegovic; the central 
nisan-monument. For a presentation of the construction plans and an analysis of the memorial-cemetery 
see chapter five. For a discussion of celebrations of significant dates see chapter six. 
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shahids and killed fighters”,56 including the territory of RS, “because the State of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not defended only in Sarajevo, Mostar or Bihac”.57 The 
work of the Fund beyond the area of Sarajevo Canton is specifically concerned with 
the creation of a memorial landscape commemorating the victimisation and (armed) 
resistance of the Army of RBiH (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) during the 1992-
95 conflict, in such a way that it will become stylistically homogeneous and 
recognisable throughout the territory of BiH: 
“through architectonic unification we tried to impress a mark of those times 
when the defenders of the State have been killed, so that through the whole of 
BiH one will recognise the unique grave marks, gatehouses, and tombstones of 
the veterans – of those who have defended the survival of honour, wealth, 
dignity, the country and their own faith and freedom”.58 
In this sense, though the primary concern of the Fund regards the construction of 
new monuments, the long-term aim of its work is also that of enriching the built 
cultural heritage of BiH with memorials and monuments that are considered part of 
its (recent) history and (future) identity: “we especially drafted and realised projects 
through which we wish to attain the establishment of the sacrifice endured by the 
defenders of the Army of RBiH between 1992 and 1995 in the system of social values 
of the new Bosnian state”.59 
In 2008 the Fund submitted to the Government of the Canton a report on the 
conditions of monuments from the period 1941-45 within the area of the Canton. Its 
introductory remark stated that “during the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
not even these monuments were spared from Serb-Chetnik destruction”, and was 
followed by a detailed list of the National Liberation Struggle (Narodno-oslobodilacka 
Borba – NOB) monuments with photographic documentation and written 
descriptions of their conditions. As a result, the Government of Sarajevo Canton 
endowed the Fund with tasks of restoration, maintenance and protection of all 
Socialist monuments in the area of the Canton, including Spomen-Park Vraca in the 
outskirts of the city, which had been declared national monument by the Commission 
 
                                                     
56 Website of the Fond Memorijala, Introduction, translation: author. 
57 Website of the Fond Memorijala, section on Projects in BiH, translation: author. 
58 Website of the Fond Memorijala, Introduction, translation: author. 
59 Ibid., translation: author. 
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in 2005.60 These new tasks reinforced the role of the Fund, which expanded the scope 
of its activities to include works on existing monuments, and thus further entangled 
functions of erection of new monuments with the care of cultural heritage. 
4.5 Working with heritage 
“In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a tendency to 
raise monuments in memory of events and 
personalities of the armed conflicts of 1992-1995. It 
is a commonly known fact that in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bosnjaks and Croats characterise the 
events of the period 1992-1995 differently from 
Serbs, and this is the source of controversy in the 
regulation of this area. This process is politicised 
and in many cases represents an exclusivist national 
gaze on the events of the past”.61 
 
Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina derives from a mixed local/international 
response to the armed conflict that marked the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. 
The international community played a prominent role as mediator in the drafting and 
ratification of the Peace Agreement signed at Dayton, that resolved the military 
ceasefire and territorial settlements of the peace and determined the configuration of 
the country along a consociational model of power-sharing. In addition, the Peace 
Agreement established an international supervision of BiH that was later endowed 
with enhanced powers to intervene in the political life of the country (the OHR) to 
such extent that BiH has been often defined as an international protectorate. Against 
the background of devastation of almost four years of armed conflict, the 
(re)construction of BiH presented a series of challenges: 
 
                                                     
60 For a discussion and analysis of this Socialist monument see chapter five. The decision and report form 
part of Doc. no. 02-05-11946-4/08 approved on 16.04.2008 by the Government of Sarajevo Canton, 
www.ks.gov.ba. 
61 Decision on the initiation of the procedure of protection of vital national interest of the Bosnjak People 
on the Law on Monuments of the Liberation Wars of RS, 25 November 2011. 
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“a difficult transition from socialism to democracy and the consequent 
problems in transformation of the social, political and economic spheres, ethnic 
diversity and ethnic conflict, revival of religion, low trust in institutions and an 
underdeveloped civil society”.62 
Examining the role of the international community and the failures of state building in 
BiH, a recent publication identified one of the main reasons for such failures in the 
“conceptual tension between the notions of nation and state”,63 and highlighted that 
“the inconsistency of the EU and international community approach, […] 
requiring at the same time functional centralization while respecting the 
consociational and group-based disintegrative features, indicates that even the 
representatives of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina have no tools to face the 
categorical and normative challenge posed by the underlining nation-state 
structure of the prevailing political logic of our time”.64 
Against this background, the institutional and legal system of heritage care and 
management is – as anticipated in the introduction – mainly characterised by 
complexity, fragmentation and overlaps. The regulation of matters regarding heritage 
preservation and protection is scattered across a great variety of legal texts that 
pertain to different levels of government and have not been adequately harmonised, 
corresponding to (almost) as many administrative institutions. Efforts at achieving 
harmonisation are predominantly encouraged by international standards, principles 
and actors, and are often hindered or restrained by local political actors or visions that 
privilege narrower (ethnic) definitions of cultural or “national” community. 
While on the one hand BiH’s system of heritage care is impaired by the absence of a 
definite unified/common local (i.e. state) subject to guide it and support it from the 
top, on the other hand it is influenced by the international doctrine on the role and 
functions of heritage. The main institutional subject of heritage protection is the 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments, which was established by international 
will and in line with the international doctrine on heritage. Being the central (national) 
institution concerned with heritage at the State level, and through its role of 
 
                                                     
62 Sarajlic, Eldar, “Between State and Nation: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Challenge of Political 
Analysis,” in State or Nation? The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by Eldar 
Sarajlic and Marko Davor (Sarajevo: Centar za interdisciplinarne post-diplomske studije/Center for 
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, 2011), 9. 
63 Ibid., 11. 
64 Ibid., 13. 
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coordination of international cooperation in the field of heritage, the Commission 
represents a junction between international and local approaches and a channel 
through which internationally agreed-upon notions and principles on heritage find 
their implementation in BiH, mingling with the local context.  
As from its website, the Commission designated until today 714 national 
monuments in the territory of BiH, and drafted a Provisional List comprising 446 
items. An overview of the items declared national monuments until now reveals two 
features of the work of the Commission. First, religious buildings or 
historical/architectural properties that might be associated with specific ethnic groups 
have been designated in “balanced” proportions, i.e. properties that can be assumed 
to represent each of the three constituent peoples of BiH have been evenly 
designated. This suggests that the efforts of the Commission are dedicated to 
positively build upon the ethnic principle informing the Dayton Agreement, and to 
reconstruct the heritage of BiH in its entirety and heterogeneity. As the work of the 
Commission until now has mainly been dedicated to the decision over petitions and 
the identification of endangered monuments, it could be argued that its primary 
function concerns the reconstruction of the heritage damaged and/or destroyed 
during the hostilities – that is, the re-creation of the cultural landscape of BiH as it was 
until the early 1990s. This impression is strengthened if we look at the national 
monuments designated until now by the Commission in the city of Sarajevo: among 
the 102 declared items, there are no monuments dedicated to the last conflict, 
although many markers have been built or are under construction. This consideration 
highlights a second feature of the work of the Commission: as in the case of Sarajevo, 
monuments purposely erected to mark historical event/features (spomen-obiljezja, or 
“monument-markers”) represent a tiny minority of the decisions of the Commission 
throughout BiH, which by and large entail religious and historical buildings, bridges, 
tombstones, archaeological sites, and architectural or landscape ensembles, as well as 
movable properties. On the one hand, the striking rarity of such monuments within 
the list of declared national monuments derives from a programmatic choice on the 
criteria of designation, whereby the “time frame” has been limited to “properties 
arisen from the prehistoric times up to 1960”.65 Nevertheless, this choice confirms the 
 
                                                     
65 The limitation of the time frame was part of the Amendments to the Criteria to Designate the Properties 
as National Monuments issued by the Commission in 2003. An “Elucidation” explained that the time frame 
had been restricted because the Commission had “received a large number of petitions to designate 
properties as national monuments, more of which relate[d] to buildings constructed since the war than to 
those that are part of the important, very old and endangered heritage”. The limitation of time frame 
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impression that the Commission’s primary task concerns the reconstruction of the 
heritage landscape of BiH to its pre-war conditions and outlook as much as possible. 
Emphasised through the symbolic positioning of the Annexes, the creation of the 
Commission was directly linked to the re-creation of the geo-ethnic composition of 
the country through the reconstruction of heritage, endowed with values and 
functions in relation to so-called reconciliation. Together with the return of refugees 
and displaced persons, set by the Dayton Agreement as one main goal of post-war 
recovery, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country in terms of its heritage 
thus looks like an effort to ‘undo’ what has been ‘done’ by the conflict, or reverse the 
result of events to create an independent BiH maintaining its (population and) 
heritage configuration(s) intact to match the pre-war situation. 
The establishment of the Fond Memorijala in Sarajevo represents another aspect of 
the politics of memory in BiH, that of the erection of new monuments and memorial 
sites and the construction of accounts (memories) of the recent conflict. The main 
construction project of the Fund – the cemetery-memorial complex at Kovaci – will 
present (once construction is completed) an articulated narrative on the armed 
conflict from which the country emerged as an independent state in the very near 
past, thus a narrative on the foundation of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. As 
emerges from the material published by the Fund, the principles underlying its work 
have a clear political subject – the (Bosnjak) nation victimised through genocide and 
the (Bosnian) nation courageously defended and established by the Army of RBiH. 
The work of the Fund thus recollects the memory of a community and marks the 
territories of its victimisation through the erection of tombstones and monuments as 
symbols against oblivion and messages to future generations. Moreover, by 
undertaking tasks of construction of new monuments and maintenance/protection of 
Socialist monuments, the Fund fills a gap in the work of the Commission, whose 
attention – as seen above – is directed towards heritage erected up to 1960. On the 
one hand, this “complementarity” of the tasks of the Commission and Fund suggests 
a neat differentiation between “heritage” and “monuments”, with the latter 
pertaining to the construction of “sites of memory […] as static and permanent 
reminders of the past concretized in the present, […] to represent hegemonic values 
that cultivate notions of national identity and frame ideas and histories of the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
would not prevent strictly the designation in “cases where the building in question is an outstandingly 
valuable work of contemporary art or architecture”. For these reasons, Socialist monuments designated as 
national monuments are very few, for instance: Spomen-Park Vraca in Sarajevo, the Partisan Cemetery in 
Mostar, the memorial complex on the Battle on the Neretva in Jablanica. 
  99 
nation”.66 On the other hand, nevertheless, this distinction appears inconsistent, in 
part because the Fund is in recent years expanding the scope of its activities to 
include the maintenance and protection of already existing monuments (those from 
the period 1941-45), including one item designated as national monument by the 
Commission. Furthermore, the distinction is not fully coherent because the 
reconstruction of heritage is also committed to the “fram[ing of] ideas and histories 
of the nation” and of national identity, albeit with a different content: one that 
promotes an understanding of BiH as a multiethnic society and endeavours the 
reconstruction of a heritage landscape that reproduces its history of multiculturalism 
(by rehabilitating the heritage of each community with equality of esteem).  
Similarly to the overall situation of BiH, the realm of heritage care and management 
appears characterised by an international ascendancy and riddled by the tension 
between state and nation. This tension is well exemplified by the difficulties in 
reaching agreement over a law on heritage at the state level and the absence of legal 
regulation and administrative bodies of state-wide scope in charge of culture. The 
“lack of constitutional basis” invoked by the RS government against the national law 
on heritage further suggests that heritage – and culture – are not regarded as realms 
of concern of the overall state of BiH, but rather as areas to be managed at the lower 
levels of the Entities. This in turn implies that nation-states models of identification 
and political legitimisation are applied to the (ethnic) communities (and associated 
Entities or Cantons) comprising the state of BiH – but denied or considered 
inapplicable to the state as a whole, thus “clashing” with it at least to some extent. 
The local context of BiH is thus marked by dissent over which heritage should be 
recollected, rehabilitated and valorised and by which ethno-political subject. This 
dissent is reflected in the lack of a unified politics of memory at the common level of 
the state; an ambiguous divide between heritage preservation/reconstruction on the 
one hand and the erection of new monuments to the recent war on the other; and 
the development of parallel policies around heritage/monuments at various levels (i.e. 
State, entity, canton) which endorse specific notions on heritage and foster particular 
accounts of the past. 
As highlighted above, the principles of power-sharing established in the 
Constitution of BiH at Dayton do not resolve such situation, but rather complicate it 
with mechanisms that allow groups to block decision-making procedures that are 
considered harmful to their “vital interests”, which include “identity of one 
 
                                                     
66 McDowell, “Heritage, Memory and Identity,” 45. 
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constituent people” and “education, religion, language, promotion of culture, 
tradition and cultural heritage”.67 
As consensual agreement of the constituent groups over matters concerning 
culture is apparently lacking, the collective commitment of the state is often 
complemented with the coercive intervention of the international community, as 
suggested by the fact that the laws on the implementation of the decisions of the 
Commission had to be imposed and/or amended by the High Representative in both 
entities. These instances were not isolated cases, but rather expressions of a pattern 
that specifically regards the overall state of BiH. Thus in 1998, deploring that 
“Delegates [of the Parliamentary Assembly] have shown themselves lacking in the 
courage to take a binding decision on the important and sensitive issue of a common 
flag for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, High Representative Carlos Westendorp adopted 
the Decision Imposing the Law on the Flag of BiH, following a voting procedure in the 
House of Representatives during which the proposed flag obtained 16 votes, 16 
abstentions and 1 vote against.68 A year later, in June 1999, a similar fate characterised 
the selection of a national anthem, finalised by the High Representative with a 
Decision Imposing the Law on the National Anthem of BiH. 
4.6 Conclusions 
History and culture are inextricably linked to each 
other. [...] The cultural-historical capital of BiH is 
heterogeneous in the best meaning of the word, 
encompassing cultural properties emerged in a 
wide span [of time] from prehistorical and ancient 
to medieval, Ottoman and modern times. Thanks to 
the geographic position of BiH, four great cultural-
civilizational "laboratories" partook in its 
emergence: the Mediterranean, the 
 
                                                     
67 OHR 2002 Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituents' Peoples Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Art. 4. 
68 The abstentions came from the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) and the HDZ (Croatian Democratic 
Union). See Decision Imposing the Law on the Flag of BiH, OHR, 3/02/1998. The Decision had to be followed 
two months later by an additional Decision on the Flying of the Flag of BiH (2/04/1998), addressed to the 
three members of the Presidency after a meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters was 
postponed because of a failure to observe the Law on the Flag of BiH. www.ohr.int. 
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Mitteleuropean, the Bizantyne and the 
Oriental/Islamic. This is one of the crucial facts that 
contributed to the course and contents of the 
cultural development of BiH and to the richness of 
the shape of its cultural-historical heritage”.69 
The consociational arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina apparently corresponds 
to a ‘pillar’ model of pluralist society. In their analysis of the roles of heritage in 
several types of pluralist settings, Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge remind that this 
model conceives of society as “consisting of distinctive cultural groups, each existing 
within its own self-contained […] pillar”, and sees “no necessity for cultural or social 
interactions between the pillars”, which are connected by a loose state 
superstructure with the task of imposing a minimal uniformity.70 Accordingly, heritage 
in such settings is created, managed, and consumed by and within the groups 
constituting the pillars, while the state overarching function is primarily that of 
“maintaining an equality of provision”.71 The “only collective commitment” of this 
system is thus provided by the state, “operating through consensual agreement of its 
constituent parts”.72 As the authors remark, in such models “[t]here is an inherent 
tension between the separation of society into mutually exclusive parts and the 
maintenance of an overall parity of esteem”.73 
As seen above, the functioning of the overall state structures in this consociational 
model in BiH is hindered by a lack of will to cooperate on the part of the “pillars” and 
the inherent complexities of power-sharing mechanisms, and the state’s functions (or 
rather its failures) are thus often supplemented with international intervention. 
International influence is channelled along a spectrum of situations and with a variety 
of tools, from the ratification of legal texts and conventions in the realm of heritage 
to participation in joint projects and activities, international cooperation, as well as 
steps on the path to European Union accession and the more direct imposition of 
laws and decisions on the part of the OHR. The drafting of a law on heritage at the 
state level in 2004, for instance, was carried out jointly with experts from the Council 
of Europe, and the approval of such legal text is in fact included in the goals of the 
Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe launched 
by the CoE in 2003 – within the “institutional capacity building plan” (ICBP) of the 
 
                                                     
69 Council of Ministers of BiH, “Strategija Kulturne Politike,” 5-6, translation: author.  
70 Ashworth et al., Pluralising Pasts, 164. 
71 Ibid., 84. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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Programme. In 2010, the BiH Commission was awarded the Europa Nostra prize for 
Dedicated Service on the ground that 
“by incorporating cultural heritage into the process of reconciliation and 
rebuilding civic trust, the Commission has been crucially important in building 
sustainable peace in Bosnia Herzegovina. The approach they are using within 
the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement is an example to all European 
countries or regions where heritage is affected by conflict”.74 
Notions on reconciliation and inter-cultural dialogue are at the basis of international 
approaches to post-conflict settings, especially where conflicts entailed the violent 
juxtaposition of cultural communities, and particularly in the case of BiH, where 
armed conflict purposely targeted built cultural heritage. To some extent, 
nevertheless, the “the underlining nation-state structure of the prevailing political 
logic of our time”75 permeates the international doctrine of heritage and challenges 
its own principles on cultural diversity and inter-cultural dialogue. Several aspects of 
the international doctrine on heritage appear ambiguous if looked at through the 
prism of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the notions of “culture” and 
“nation”/“people”. 
The ways in which notions of culture and heritage drafted by intergovernmental 
organisations mainly composed of nation-states apply to the multicultural 
consociational context of BiH and its typically sub-national scale of reference for 
cultural/”national” identification is far from straightforward and unproblematic. The 
founding texts of this doctrine started from an outright national perspective on 
culture and heritage: the 1954 CoE European Cultural Convention required each 
Contracting Party to “safeguard and to encourage the development of its national 
contribution to the common cultural heritage of Europe”,76 and the 1954 Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict relied on 
“national […] measures” for the organisation of heritage protection in times of peace 
as an essential precondition for its national and international safeguard in times of 
 
                                                     
74 Europa Nostra was founded by a group of heritage NGOs in 1963 and had grown into a movement that 
represents various governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations as well as 
individual members (including UNESCO and the CoE) for the safeguarding of Europe’s cultural heritage and 
landscapes. See www.europanostra.org. 
75 Sarajlic, “Between State and Nation,” 13. 
76 Council of Europe, European Cultural Convention, 1954, Art. 1, emphasis added. 
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war.77 These early documents alternated the terms “nation” and “people” in 
unspecified ways (cf. e.g. “damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people 
makes its contribution to the culture of the world”, 1954 Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property, Preamble). During the course of the past fifty years, 
and with the formulation and emergence of notions as that of “intangible heritage”, 
the terminology of UNESCO and CoE conventions and declarations has undergone 
significant changes and progressively incorporated the idea of cultural communities at 
levels different from that of the state/nation, bringing the focus on the “peoples and 
human values at the centre of an enlarged and cross-disciplinary concept of cultural 
heritage”.78 Yet, the “High Contracting Parties” of conventions and declarations – 
thus the central actors committed to the subscription and ratification of their 
underlying principles – are always the States, which are in this way implicitly re-
affirmed as the “unproblematic subject[s] of traditional cultural expression”, in line 
with a specific understanding of the role of culture in the construction and 
reproduction of nationhood and/or national identity.79 For States to be the central 
actors of the drafting, regulation and implementation of cultural and heritage policies, 
there has to be a minimum level of understanding and agreement upon common 
principles and around a common framework of identification (i.e. the legitimacy of the 
state itself and its scope and structure). As the example of BiH demonstrates, this is 
not always the case. In BiH, conflicting views attached to heritage and culture are 
politicized and ethnicised within the construction of community identities at the sub-
state level, while the administrative/institutional/political overall framework – the 
State – is weak and fragmented to the point of inefficiency.  
While moving away from the centrality of the “nation”, the newest notions 
formulated within the body of international heritage conventions do not 
automatically resolve the issue of the subject of collective cultural identification. So, 
for instance, the 2005 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for 
Society introduced the concept of heritage community as “consist[ing] of people who 
 
                                                     
77 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict, 1954, 
Preamble. 
78 Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, Faro 2005, 
Preamble. 
79 Albro, Robert, “The Challenges of Asserting, Promoting, and Performing Cultural Heritage,” Theorizing 
cultural heritage 1, no. 1 (2005), 6. See also Albro, Robert, “Managing Culture at Diversity’s Expense? 
Thoughts on UNESCO's Newest Cultural Policy Instrument,” The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and 
Society 35, no. 3 (2005). 
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value specific aspects of cultural heritage which they wish, within the framework of 
public action, to sustain and transmit to future generations” (Art. 2(b)), with cultural 
heritage defined as “a group of resources inherited from the past which people 
identify [...] as a reflection and expression of their constantly evolving values, beliefs, 
knowledge and traditions” (Article 2(a)). The Fond Memorijala in Sarajevo might well 
fit such definition of heritage community, notwithstanding the fact that its work 
explicitly aims at fostering a specific account of the recent war as the “true” one 
against a background of competing accounts and within a context of dissent and 
conflictuality attached to memories and identities. The “never again” imperative 
against genocide promoted by the work of the Fund may intuitively and logically 
belong to the “common heritage of Europe”, and it formally conforms to the latter’s 
definition as consisting of “all forms of cultural heritage in Europe which together 
constitute a shared source of remembrance, understanding, identity, cohesion and 
creativity”, and “the ideals, principles and values, derived from the experience gained 
through progress and past conflicts, which foster the development of a peaceful and 
stable society”.80 But the political implications of the endorsement of the Fund’s 
vision within the local context of BiH – entailing the ongoing debate on terminology 
concerning “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”, negationist stances and lack of 
agreement over episodes as the massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995 as well as 
practices like the setting up of detention camps, and in general any assessment of 
guilt and blame and in large part the definition of victims and perpetrators with 
regards to the 1992-95 conflict – risk going overlooked. Moreover, this opens up the 
possibility for similar institutions – potentially fostering opposite visions/accounts – to 
define themselves as heritage communities, crucially “valuing [other] specific aspects 
of cultural heritage which they wish […] to sustain and transmit to future 
generations”. 
Finally, the very concept of culture at the basis of international conventions and 
declarations becomes opaque. The recent developments in the conceptualization of 
intangible heritage and the valorization of cultural diversity partly expose it to 
questioning, with vagueness over the definition of culture as ‘way of life’, ‘tradition’ 
and ‘artistic expression’81. If culture is understood as a ‘way of life’, a fundamental 
 
                                                     
80 Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, Faro 2005, Art. 
3(a) and 3(b). 
81 “Culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, 
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problem arises as to which cultures one should protect and preserve. The ‘way of 
life’/‘tradition’ definition without further specification, moreover, places the concept 
of culture in ambiguous relation with the construction of ethnic identities. Moreover, 
the valorisation and pursuit of intercultural dialogue and mutual tolerance implies an 
“archipelago vision of culture” where "cultures [are] bounded and unique. Cultures 
need to talk to each other and tolerate each others, as it were, but they remain 
bounded cultures nonetheless".82 The clear definition of these concepts is relevant in 
practical terms as different approaches determine different policy consequences, in a 
“spectrum that runs from an entrenchment of mutual solitudes, to a mere 
tolerant acceptance of the existence of diversity, through a mutual respect for 
and understanding of such differences, to an active, if selective, participation in 
the possibilities that such diversity may offer”.83 
Furthermore, the conceptualisation of such environment of diversity – and most 
importantly of the ‘units’ that comprise it and that exist in mutual tolerance and/or 
dialogue – has crucial implications on notions of hybridity and modernity, and has the 
power to either include or exclude “the millions of mixed neither-nor or both-and 
individuals inhabiting both global megacities and rural outposts in many countries”84 
that partake in the shared cultural richness of mankind. Conceptualisations of culture 
interweave with approaches to pluralism in society and the theorisation of 
multicultural arrangements. Some stances postulate that coexistence in a 
multicultural/multinational society requires some degree of separation among its 
(constituent) parts, high levels of autonomy, and the drawing of territorial and non-
territorial boundaries.85 Other stances, though, propose an understanding of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”, UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity,  
2001, Preamble. 
82 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, “Between Universalism and Relativism: A Critique of the UNESCO Concepts of 
Culture,” Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, edited by Jane Cowan, Marie-Benedicte 
Dembour, and Richard Wilson (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 134. 
83 Ashworth et al., Pluralising Pasts, 15-6. 
84 Eriksen, “Between Universalism and Relativism,” 135. 
85 E.g. Resnick, Philip, “Accommodating National Differences within Multinational States,” in Democracy, 
Nationalism and Multiculturalism, edited by Ramon Maiz and Ferran Requejo (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 
Kymlicka, Will, “Federalism and Secession: East and West,” in Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, 
edited by Ramon Maiz and Ferran Requejo (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 
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“intercultural dialogue not as a way of coping with the fact of cultural diversity, 
but rather to exploit the value of cultural diversity and to reap its ontological, 
epistemological, moral and other benefits”.86 
Such views start from the assumption that “the threat to the social fabric comes not 
from the challenge posed by seemingly alien traditions but from the refusal to engage 
in discussion, the unwillingness to contemplate change and the misperception of 
what culture is”.87 Accordingly, culture is not seen as a fixed set of values, beliefs or 
traditions pertaining exclusively or primarily to a particular community, but rather as 
the 
“process of the constant adaptation of people to historical circumstances which 
requires them, as a condition of their own survival, to engage sympathetically 
with new ways of understanding the world and responding to it”.88 
 
                                                     
86 Parekh, Bhikhu, “Dialogue between Cultures,” in Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism, esited by 
Ramon Maiz and Ferran Requejo (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 16. 
87 Watson, C. W., Multiculturalism (Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 43. 
88 Ibid., 109. 
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Appendix one: List of legal documents containing provisions on heritage at 
various administrative levels of BiH.  
STATE 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton 
Peace Agreement), Annex 8 – Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments; 1995 
The Decision of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments, 2001 (Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH] Official Gazette, 
nos. 1/02 and 10/02) 
The Rules on the Activities of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments with 
respect to International Co-operation, 2002 (Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, 
no. 29/02) 
The Criteria for the Designation of Property as National Monuments, 2002/2003 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, nos. 33/02 and 15/03; Official Gazette of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [FBiH], no. 59/02; Official Gazette of Republika 
Srpska [RS], no. 79/02) 
 
ENTITY  
Federation of BiH (FBiH) 
The Law on the Implementation of Decisions of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments Established Pursuant to Annex 8 of the Dayton Agreement, 2002, 
adopted by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 2/02, 27/02, 6/04 and 51/07) 
Law on the Protection and Preservation of the Cultural, Historical and Natural 
Heritage, of 1985, as amended in 1987, 1993 and 1994, in force and implemented in the 
Cantons that do not have their own laws: Posavina Canton (PK), Tuzla Canton (TK), 
Bosnia-Podrinje Canton (BPK), Central Bosnia Canton (SBK) and Canton 10 (Livno) 
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Regional Planning and Land Use, 
(Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 2/05 and 72/07) 
The Criminal Code of the Federation of BiH, Articles 321 and 322 (Official Gazette of 
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the Federation of BiH nos. 36/03, 37/03, 21/04, 18/05) 
The Law on the Protection of Nature (Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina no. 33/03) 
The Law on the Protection of the Environment (Official Gazette of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 33/03) 
The Law on Inspection in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 69/05) 
 
Republika Srpska (RS) 
The Law on the Implementation of Decisions of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments Established Pursuant to Annex 8 of the Dayton Agreement, 2002, 
adopted by the Republika Srpska (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska nos. 9/02 and 
64/08) 
Law on Cultural Property, 1995 (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska no. 11/95) and the 
Law on Amendments to the Law on Cultural Property (Official Gazette of Republika 
Srpska no. 103/08) 
The Republika Srpska Law on Regional Planning, consolidated text (Official Gazette of 
Republika Srpska, nos. 84/02, 55/02, 14/03, 112/06 and 53/07) 
The Criminal Code of Republika Srpska, Articles 253 and 254 (Official Gazette of 
Republika Srpska no. 49/03) 
The Law on the Protection of Nature (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska no. 50/02) 
The Law on the Protection of the Environment (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 
no. 53/02) 
 
BRCKO DISTRICT 
The Law on the Implementation of Decisions of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments Established Pursuant to Appendix 8 of the Dayton Agreement, 2002, 
adopted by the District of Brcko (Official Gazette of Brcko District, nos. 2/02 and 
19/07) 
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The Law on Regional Planning (Official Gazette of Brcko District no. 9/03. 23/03, 15/04) 
The Criminal Code of Brcko District BiH (Official Gazette of Brcko District nos. 10/03 
and 45/04) 
The Law on the Protection of Nature (Official Gazette of Brcko District no. 24/04) 
The Law on the Protection of the Environment (Official Gazette of Brcko District no. 
24/04) 
 
CANTONS 
Sarajevo Canton  
Law on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage (Official Gazette of Sarajevo Canton 
no. 2/00) 
West Herzegovina Canton  
Law on the Protection and Use of the Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage (Official 
Gazette of West Herzegovina Canton no. 6/99) 
Zenica-Doboj Canton  
Law on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage (Official Gazette of Zenica Doboj 
Canton no. 2/00) 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton  
Law on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage in Herzegovina Neretva Canton 
(Official Gazette of Herzegovina Neretva Canton no. 2/06); 
Law on Building Permits Beyond the Boundaries of National Monuments or Interim 
Boundaries and Implementation of Protection measures (Official Gazette of 
Herzegovina Neretva Canton no. 5/08) 
Una-Sana Canton  
Law on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage (Official Gazette of Una Sana Canton 
no. 3/04) 
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Appendix two: List of International Conventions on Heritage ratified by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
European Cultural Convention (Council of Europe, Paris, 
1954) 
Ratification/accession: 
29/12/1994.  
Entry into force: 
29/12/1994 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (UNESCO, The Hague, 1954) 
Succession 12/07/1993 
European Convention on the Protection of the 
Archaeological Heritage (Council of Europe, London, 
1969) 
Succession 29/12/1994 
Entry into force: 
30/3/1995 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (UNESCO, Paris, 1970) 
Succession 12/07/1993 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO, Paris, 1972) 
Succession 12/07/1993 
Convention for the Protection of the Architectural 
Heritage of Europe (Council of Europe, Granada, 1985) 
Ratification/accession: 
29/12/1994.  
Entry into force: 
1/4/1995 
European Convention on the Protection of the 
Archaeological Heritage, revised (Council of Europe, 
Valletta, 1992) 
Signature: 15/10/2008. 
Ratification/accession: 
14/12/2010.  
Entry into force: 
15/6/2011 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (UNESCO, Paris, 2001) 
Ratified: 22/04/2009 
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Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, Paris, 2003) 
Ratified: 23/02/2009 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, Paris, 2005) 
Ratified 2008/2009 
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage 
for Society (Council of Europe, Faro, 2005). 
Signature: 15/10/2008. 
Ratification/accession: 
30/4/2009.  
Entry into force: 
1/6/2011. 
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Figure 5: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Entities and Cantons. Source: Agencija za 
Statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, 'BiH ubrojevima 2011', adapted by author. 
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Figure 6: Overview of the bodies in charge of heritage in BiH at various administrative 
levels. Parentheses indicate the political body/ministry of reference for each 
institute. Although Brcko District is not a discrete entity, it manages its own 
heritage autonomously. Due to the absence of uniform legal provisions 
clarifying competencies and responsibilities in the field of heritage, no 
connectors have been inserted in the figure, which is thus not to be read as a 
hierarchical scheme. Created by author. 
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 5 Memory carved in Sarajevo* 
“The street Tamina was born on was called 
Schwerin. That was during the war, and Prague was 
occupied by the Germans. Her father was born on 
Cernokostelecka Avenue – the Avenue of the Black 
Church. That was during the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. When her mother married her father 
and moved there, it bore the name of Marshal Foch. 
That was after World War I. Tamina spent her 
childhood on Stalin Avenue, and when her husband 
came to take her away, he went to Vinohrady – that 
is, Vineyards – Avenue. And all the time it was the 
same street; they just kept changing its name, 
trying to lobotomize it. 
There are all kinds of ghosts prowling these 
confused streets. They are the ghosts of the 
monuments demolished – demolished by the Czech 
Reformation, demolished by the Austrian 
Counterreformation, demolished by the 
Czechoslovac Republic, demolished by the 
Communists. Even statues of Stalin have been torn 
down. All over the country, wherever statues were 
thus destroyed, Lenin statues have sprouted up by 
the thousands. They grow like weeds on the ruins, 
like melancholy flowers of forgetting”.1 
 
"If one familiar set of metaphors for memory 
concerns depth and containment then - memory as 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is partly based on the article “Parallels. Construction and re-construction of the heritage of 
war in the urban landscape of Sarajevo – World War II and the 1992-95 conflict”, in D. Callebaut, J. Marik and 
J. Marikova-Kubkova (eds.), Heritage Reinvents Europe, Europae Archaeologiae Consilium (EAC) Occasional 
Paper no. 7, 2013, pp. 107-120. 
1 Kundera, Milan, “The Angels”, in Book of Laughter and Forgetting (Penguin Books, 1978), 158. 
 116 
closet, cauldron, archaeological dig - another set 
emphasises its topographical aspect, reminding us 
how closely memory is tied to place, and how many 
of its moments of disjuncture and complexity are 
associated with changes in a place, registering the 
uncanniness of being at once the same and 
different, at once time and space".2 
5.1 Introduction 
Public symbols such as plaques, statues, street names, monuments and memorial 
sites form a memorial landscape within the urban space. They do so by recalling 
historical events and figures and embedding them into the city's fabric, “framing the 
geographies of everyday life and [...] anchoring our collective social memory”.3 By 
attaching a society's development in time (its history/memory) to the space/territory 
it occupies in the present, public sculpture and monumental architecture “merge the 
past and its myths with the landscape”, with a twofold effect: “on the one hand, the 
landscape is invested with symbolic meanings. On the other hand, the 
commemorated past is reified by its integration into the physical environment and its 
subsequent identification with the 'natural order of the things in the world'”.4 
Materiality and spatiality are the pivotal attributes through which public monuments 
partake in the construction of place as a “a physical location imbued with human 
meaning”,5 and of landscape as “something defined [not] by space as an abstract 
 
                                                     
2 Hodgkin and Radstone. Contested Pasts, 11. 
3 Johnson, “Public Memory,” 316. 
4 Azaryahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names,” 320. In this sense, “the material aspects of the 
environment not only encode cultural messages but also support these messages independently of an 
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container but by the places that constitute it and make it what it is”.6 Public 
monuments appear in this way central to the construction of landscape as “always 
both objective physical place and a subjective cognized image of that place”,7 and 
more specifically of cultural landscape as a “form of spatial and cultural negotiation 
between representation of the past and imagination for the future”.8 As it has been 
remarked, by connoting the public space with meaning and partaking in the 
construction of particular places as memorial sites, public monuments “are not merely 
the material backdrop from which a story is told, but the spaces themselves 
constitute the meaning by becoming both a physical location and a sight-line of 
interpretation.9 
The functions of public monuments and built heritage with regards to the 
construction of cultural landscapes once again revolve around questions of identity: 
“What kinds of landscape and place we produce, and want, are inextricably bound up 
with the politics of identity, for ideas about both relate to whom we want to live with 
and whom we want to exclude, who belongs and who does not”.10 The fundamental 
trait of memorial landscapes in this respect is their “publicness,” and their role in 
shaping a memory that “occurs out in the open, in front of and with others”.11 This 
leads to a double set of considerations. One the one hand, public memory as 
occurring in front of others refers to public monuments as objects that display 
“statements about what the past has been, and how the present should acknowledge 
it”12 throughout public space. This implies that particular actors have or obtain the 
power to create and mould the memorial landscape in function of their (political) 
agendas. The result is the creation of “places of memory [that] punctuate and create 
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 118 
symbolic space, and function as nodes of collective politics at and through which 
notions of identity (such as race, class, gender, and the nation) are performed and 
contested”.13 In this sense, the politics of memory involved in the production of 
memory sites “refers to the spaces and processes of negotiation about whose 
conception of the past should prevail in the public realm”.14 On the other hand, public 
memory as occurring with others points to the fact that whoever has the power to 
manipulate the memorial landscape does not obtain it in a political or social vacuum, 
and that “there is always a chorus of voices in commemorations”.15 In other words, 
public monuments are not merely static objects displaying dominant views of the 
past, but emerge from negotiations between various actors with different interests 
and agendas. They can both represent the outcome of dialogue and mediation and 
become the resources for contestation and dissent over dominant narratives, as 
“national places of memory are not simply imposed onto an empty landscape by a 
seemingly coherent elite. Different political parties, factions, and 'publics' negotiate 
understandings of the past (and of social identity) at multiple scales through place”.16 
This perspective refers to public space as “the koinos cosmos where discussion with 
others is possible”17 and focuses on memorialisation as concerning dynamic processes 
involving multiple actors and interests in the negotiation and contestation of the 
symbolic capital and the meanings attached to landscape.18 I will address these 
aspects more extensively in chapter seven (Other memories/memories of the Other), 
while the present chapter concentrates on the analysis of public monuments as sites 
that display particular reconstructions of history and naturalise them as part of the 
urban environment.19 In this perspective, I focus here on public memory as occurring 
“in front of” others, and on the public space as “an arena of appearance that is 
tantamount to a shared reality”.20  
 
                                                     
13 Till, “Places of Memory,” 297. 
14 Ibid., 290. 
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2008), 64. 
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18 Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of Toponymic Inscription.” 
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memory” and “the memory of publics,” Phillips, “Introduction.” 
20 Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 34. 
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This connotation recalls the normative functions of memorial landscapes and their 
role as canon, i.e. “actively circulated memory that keeps the past present”.21 Public 
sculpture, monumental architecture and topographic inscriptions cast memory as 
“exteriorized, objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms that [...] are stable and 
situation-transcendent”,22 thus connoting the physical environment in a seemingly 
natural and permanent way and fulfilling the functions of repetition and re-use 
implied in the values and messages ascribed to them.23 These features constitute 
public memory as an “encircling horizon” consolidated in and through place,24 and 
tantamount to a shared reality insofar as “it is only by forgetting what lies outside the 
horizon of the relevant that [memory] performs an identity function”.25 
In this sense, memorial landscapes represent a society's identity and values by 
providing an “authorized index” of its history,26 as they “employ the agency of display 
to create an interpretive interface that mediates and thereby transforms that which is 
shown into a vision of history".27 This vision is most susceptible to change in periods 
of transition from one political regime to another, whereby symbols and icons of the 
past are reinterpreted and rearranged by the new group(s) in power in a way that 
legitimates the present order by revising the history that brought to it, making it 
particularly evident that “memory is more a matter of reorganizing, or reconstructing, 
bits of information into a general scheme than it is a matter of accurate recall of the 
isolated bits themselves”.28 Such process entails different techniques and strategies, 
such as the eradication of symbols pertaining to previous regimes (up to the erasure 
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24 Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 25. 
25 Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” 113. 
26 Azaryahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names,” 328. 
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of figures that had been central to previous official versions of history);29 their 
removal and storage in dedicated spaces;30 the rearrangement of topographic 
inscriptions;31 the reinterpretation of existing monuments through accretion and so 
forth.32 Overall, rearrangements of the memorial landscape in the context of regime 
change are increasingly analysed as “powerful message[s] […] about the new 
regime's control over a community's symbolic infrastructure”,33 and the memorial 
landscape unfolds as a “mythscape”: 
“the temporally and spatially extended discursive realm wherein the struggle for 
control of peoples memories and the formation of nationalist myths is debated, 
contested and subverted incessantly. The mythscape is the page upon which the 
multiple and often conflicting nationalist narratives are (re)written; it is the 
perpetually mutating repository for the representation of the past for the 
purposes of the present”.34 
In the case of former Yugoslavia, scholarly analysis has related changes to memorial 
landscapes and wider cultural policies to two intertwined processes, as the transition 
to democratic political regimes entangled with (ethno)nationalist wars in the early 
1990s. 
Sakaja and Stanic, for instance, analyse processes of removal/installation of public 
plaques and monuments and renaming of streets and squares in Zagreb as “a 
revealing indicator of political change and an instrument in the recodification of 
landscape”,35 whereby the city “is saturated with messages that indicate official 
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33 Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of Toponymic Inscription,” 460. 
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versions that prescribe new rules on the reading of history”.36 According to the 
authors, reinterpretations of the past through the remodelling of the city's memorial 
landscape correspond to cultural politics and discursive practices of Othering and Self-
referencing: “irregular” parts of the past are scored out from the city-text through 
the elimination, erasure or marginalisation of certain symbols, while the urban 
environment is imbued with references to one's own tradition, ancestry, culture and 
science through the installation of new monuments, plaques and street names.37  
Looking broadly at the region of Southeastern Europe, Dragicevic Sesic (2011) 
argues that the two processes of post-socialist transition and national (re)building 
crucially employed monuments in the manipulation of history to create new national, 
“ethnic” memories. According to her analysis, the reinterpretation of the common 
socialist past was carried out through strategies that she defines of appropriation 
(entailing a re-contextualisation of monuments where the original meaning went 
partly or totally lost); annihilation (through the elimination of non-national signs), and 
culturalization (whereby monuments are divested of their political or ideological 
content to become displayed as art).38 Concurrently, policies of (re)nationalisation of 
public symbols were carried out through the construction of new monuments and 
commemorative practices celebrating historical narratives relevant to a single 
group.39  
Overall, thus, processes of manipulation of the symbolic infrastructure of cities in 
periods of transition are manifestations of a revision of historical narratives that 
challenges previous versions of the past with new interpretations through a process 
that “eradicates the old [meaning] and thereby aims to “de-commemorate” the 
event/person/place that was previously remembered and, [...] establishes a new 
commemorative space”.40  
In the case of BiH, scholars related changes in street name inscriptions mainly to 
policies of nationalisation and exclusion. Robinson et al. (2001) mention the creation 
of an administrative commission endowed with the task of renaming streets by the 
first Sarajevo Canton post-war government, the work of which resulted in the 
symbolic marginalisation of street signs recalling events and figures linked to Serbia or 
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39 Ibid. 
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the Serb heritage, entailing the removal of old signs in Cyrillic script.41 The authors 
further argue that this process included a marginalisation of the Socialist past and the 
reinforcement of links to key events and figures from the Ottoman Empire and (to a 
lesser extent) the Habsburg period (1878-1914), in an effort to establish continuity 
with a specifically Bosnian past (especially a Bosnian Muslim past).42 Overall, thus, the 
renamings in Sarajevo appear to be 
“part of the deliberate creation of a specifically Bosnian history, with old 
‘negative’ associations replaced by names deemed to be more acceptable as 
part of a deliberate reshaping of this particular aspect of place. It is therefore a 
selective reconstruction of history to emphasise those elements likely to 
resonate with contemporary nationalistic needs”.43 
Palmberger (2012) notes that policies of (re)nationalisation and exclusion 
implemented through the manipulation of public space characterised the whole of 
BiH in recent years, resulting in the fact that the cities of Banja Luka, Sarajevo and 
(West) Mostar are today symbolically connoted by a predominance of street signs 
reminding, respectively, of the Serb, Bosnjak/Muslim and Croat national heritage.44 
Analyses of street names changes are important because they point to the 
functions assigned to memorial landscapes in wider processes of historical revision 
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and negotiation carried out through cultural policies involving monuments and 
heritage, whereby the city-text emerges as “a spatialized configuration of 
commemorated historical figures and events which is the result of a political selection 
process”.45 The use of plaques, sculptures, monuments and memorials thus appears 
instrumental to transforming the urban environment into a “cultural arena”46 and a 
“virtual political setting”,47 constructed through the arrangement of geographic 
elements (like buildings, markers, monuments and inscriptions) into a “spatial 
configuration of history”.48 Monuments and other memory markers are the 
constitutive elements of such spatial configurations of history across the urban space: 
their presence imbues particular physical locations with meanings and messages, 
partaking in the construction of “places” within the landscape, in the context of a 
“selective process of both remembering past events and reordering them, a 
technology of forgetting”.49 As the temporal dimension of historical chronology 
needs to be reconfigured in order to be (re)presented spatially onto the landscape, 
memory markers such as commemorative monuments and memorial sites “highlight 
key moments [...] that encapsulate, embody, symbolize and otherwise call to mind an 
entire plot […] and are therefore suffused with narrative meaning”.50 This is 
particularly pertinent to memorial sites/complexes, as they “can be conceived of as a 
series of hyper-redundant material signs to which the passers-through are exposed”,51 
that serve as “key object[s] and setting[s] for encoding social suggestions regarding 
life and death, group and individual identity, and other related social values”.52 
The protracted experience of war and the targeting of cultural heritage during 
armed conflict add complexity to the case of BiH, and “the attempts to establish the 
new state of Bosnia–Hercegovina in the aftermath of brutal conflict have highlighted 
the importance of the use of signs, symbols and an appeal to history as crucial 
elements in the process of state (and nation) formation”.53 As mentioned in the 
introductory chapters, revisions of historical narratives on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
polity and the character and identity of its constituent peoples (the three “ethnic” 
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groups of Serbs, Croats and Bosnjak/Muslims) were already apparent in the escalation 
to armed conflict and its subsequent unfolding between 1992 and 1996. Furthermore, 
the war itself entailed the “alteration” of the memorial landscape of BiH through 
deliberate targeting and destruction, which corresponded, on the one hand, to a 
violent rewriting of the country's past and, on the other hand, to the eradication of 
signs and symbols that wouldn't fit the envisioned (re)construction of separate 
“national” polities in the future. This connection is particularly relevant with regards 
to the post-war reconstruction (and manipulation) of cultural and memorial 
landscapes, as it highlights that 
“warfare creates the potential for places to be redeveloped and their images to 
be reinterpreted. War literally singles out and obliterates specific strategic 
places, assigning them special status and, therefore, opening a site for 
potentially new use and interpretation”.54 
In this perspective, the entanglement of regime change with armed conflict 
constitutes a sensitive context for the construction and manipulation of memorial 
landscapes. Adjustments and modifications (in terms of both rearrangements and 
creation of new monuments) establish “new rules” on the reading of history in 
function of the present and of the “new beginning” represented by the new regime. 
As the transition was intertwined with clashes, changes to the memorial landscape 
entail both reinterpretations of previous historical accounts and the construction of 
narratives on the war that just ended inaugurating the new beginning of the polity. 
Within this context, memorial landscapes “superimpose history onto the terrain”55 in 
peculiar ways. Monuments and other memory markers compose a spatial 
configuration of history where the dimension of chronological progression of time is 
replaced by an index of the most significant moments/events/persons in the history of 
the polity. In this way, memorial landscapes constitute an interpretive interface that 
evokes a vision of history through the agency of display. Memorial sites and 
complexes in this context acquire a particular importance, as they incorporate a 
multiplicity of signs and a variety of strategies to express and articulate the 
message(s) ascribed to them. They punctuate the urban landscape like “knots” or 
nodes of condensed significance and points for the orientation of meaning in the 
broader city-text. 
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In the framework of these considerations on the attributes of memorial landscapes 
with regards to the representation of history and their functions in periods of 
transition and post-conflict settings, the chapter concentrates on the analysis of two 
memorial sites dedicated to war in the city of Sarajevo. The choice of these two 
complexes is further motivated by two features concerning memorialisation that 
pertain to war memorials as a distinctive sort of commemorative sites. First, in a 
general sense, monuments erected to commemorate armed conflict emerge as a 
“particularly powerful instrument” in the politics of memory because “memorialized 
violence […] is intrinsically likely to be more noticeable, more memorable and laden 
with stronger, more enduring emotions”,56 especially (though not exclusively) when it 
recalls hostilities that affected the foundation of the polity in recent years, as is the 
case for BiH (see also chapter one). Second, and partly as a consequence of this first 
consideration, monuments to war are increasingly invested with functions/tasks 
concerning processes of closure, as they have attained relevance as one central 
aspect of transitional justice processes and reparation measures in post-conflict 
societies. War memorials thus emerge as sites “produced and maintained by various 
social institutions that attempt to achieve certain ends (e.g. increase nationalism, 
keep the memory of fallen soldiers alive, teach the public about war) and to guide 
human beings in their construction of meaning”.57 This also means that they acquire a 
symbolic role in public manifestations of dissent over recollections of past struggles 
by groups who claim visibility for divergent accounts, especially when closure hasn't 
yet been reached. This consideration is also pertinent to the case of BiH, where, to a 
certain extent, “the war is still being fought [...] in the politics of memory and 
collective shame, where the moral weight of our unique past is felt”.58 War memorials 
thus stand out as symbolic objects of heightened and condensed meaning that 
“anchor memories about past events and present societal (though contested) 
remembrances about these events and the nation”59 as they both display particular 
reconstructions of past struggles and “communicate or suggest certain ways of 
feeling and relating to the world”.60 
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The next sections will introduce two memorial complexes erected to 
commemorate war in Sarajevo: Vraca Memorial Park, dedicated to the resistance of 
the city during occupation in WWII and recognised as cultural heritage in recent years, 
and the Kovaci Shahid Cemetery Memorial, dedicated to the 1992-95 conflict and 
partly still in construction. 
5.2 Spomen Park Vraca 
Vraca Memorial Park stands on the slopes of Mount Trebevic on the Southern 
outskirts of Sarajevo, in a part of the city's neighbourhood known as Vraca. The site 
was originally fortified during the Austro-Hungarian rule with the construction of a 
stone blockhouse, completed in 1898.61 Between 1941 and 1945 the fort and 
surrounding area were turned into a torture and execution ground by German 
occupying forces, and used for the individual or mass killings of citizens of Sarajevo, 
who were also buried there, along with citizens who were killed or died in police 
torture chambers in the city. After the end of the war the site was abandoned as a 
military facility, and subsequently chosen as the location for a memorial to the 
suffering and resistance of the city's population against fascism. Although plans for 
the erection of a memorial existed since 1965, lack of funds prevented its actual 
construction for many years, and the memorial was officially inaugurated on the 25th 
of November 1981 – the date marking the Day of Statehood (Dan Drzavnosti).62 
The memorial complex was composed of several elements: an entrance plateau 
with a belvedere, an eternal flame with fountain and a ceremonial plateau; a sculpture 
to women combatants and an inscription marking the execution site; a memorial to 
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fallen fighters, a memorial to national heroes with mausoleum, a memorial to units of 
the National Liberation Army who took part in the liberation of the city; and various 
tributes/messages by Tito. The Austro-Hungarian fortress was used to host an 
exhibition on the struggle for Sarajevo, and the names of 9,091 victims of fascist 
terror were inscribed on the walls of its two atria (Figure 7 reproduces a map of the 
memorial, see also Fig. 8 for an aerial picture of the park in the 1980s). 
By looking at the disposition of the components of the memorial, it is possible to 
identify two main nucleuses of articulation of meaning on the site. Starting from the 
entrance plateau, the core of the memorial is constituted by the eternal flame and 
fountain and the ceremonial plateau with a message by Tito, from which the memorial 
to fallen fighters unfolds through various layers of stone walls carrying the 
inscriptions of 2,013 names, and steps leading to the mausoleum of 26 national heroes 
who died in action (points 5, 6, 7 and 8 on the map in figure 7, see Figures 9 to 14).63 
On significant dates of the official calendar, authorities would perform their ritual 
activities on the ceremonial plateau, in the vicinity of the eternal flame recalling the 
imperishable achievements of Socialism, and lay wreaths of flowers under Tito's 
central message, carved in stone at the bottom of the memorial to fallen fighters: 
“The glorious past will be of example to future generations, [showing] how the 
peoples of one small country were resolute to defend their country and 
freedom at the cost of the greatest sacrifice, being more gladly ready to die 
rather than slavishly knee in front of the fascist invaders. Tito” (figure 9).64 
This characterisation of the conflict in broad terms serves as a central synthesis of the 
memorial's scope, reminding both of the success in defending the homeland and the 
universal principle of freedom, and of the great sacrifice this choice required to the 
peoples of Yugoslavia, many of whom paid it with their lives. This sector of the 
memorial park thus focuses on struggle and revolution, stressing the heroic effort of 
those who got actively involved in the fight against fascism to protect their country 
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(memorials to fallen fighters and national heroes) and to uphold freedom, that 
culminated in a victorious revolution (eternal flame and fountain). 
A second cluster is articulated in/around the fortress (Figures 15 to 17), with Tito's 
tribute to combatants in occupied cities, the memorial to victims with a message by 
Tito, and the exhibition on the struggle of Sarajevo (points 9, 10 and 11 on the map in 
figure 7). Here the signs provide more specific characterisations of the conflict, the 
“country”, and both the perpetrators and the valorous fighters involved in the 
struggle. The core of this sector is constituted by the fortress, comprising both a 
memorial to victims and an exhibition of testimony on the struggle for Sarajevo. In the 
midst of 9,091 names of the victims of fascist terror inscribed on the walls of the two 
atria (point 10 in Fig. 7), a message by Tito defines the conflict “the most fearsome 
war in the history of mankind”, initiated and carried out by “insane Germans, Italian 
fascism, and their sanguinary servants” to establish Hitler's “new order” in Europe. 
Tito's message points to the memory of the war by mentioning that “camps of 
atrocities and death will remain in eternal times like uncanny warnings to all peoples 
not to ever allow the repetition of such tragedy”, implicitly recalling the importance 
of Vraca Memorial Park – used as a torture and extermination site during the conflict 
and subsequently chosen as location for a memorial. In Tito's tribute to combatants in 
occupied cities (point 9 fig. 7), the conflict is defined as a “constant battle for life or 
death” occurring throughout the country, in “Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo 
and other cities”. This tribute by Tito also identifies the combatants involved in the 
struggle in the communists, the workers, the youth, and the national intelligentsia, 
and names them “true patriots”. The exhibition inside the fort (point 11 fig. 7) 
completes the description of the conflict while focusing on the particular experience 
of the city of Sarajevo. Although the material was destroyed during the 1992-95 war, 
according to a synopsis made available by the Museum of the Revolution (nowadays 
Historical Museum of BiH) it comprised enlarged photographs, newspaper articles, 
maps, artworks, and other artefacts. It was articulated in 10 thematic clusters: (1) the 
Revolutionary Movement on the eve of WWII; (2) the occupation; (3) crimes of the 
occupier and collaborators – genocide, arrests and infiltration of the National 
Liberation Movement; (4) the 1941 uprising; (5) the battles of the armed forces of the 
National Liberation Movement, channels, communications and liberated territories 
around Sarajevo; (6) the conference in Ivancici and the events associated with the 
resolutions adopted; (7) continuity of the revolutionary action of the National 
Liberation Movement in the city during the war; (8) the growing strength of the 
National Liberation Movement in Sarajevo following the ZAVNOBIH and AVNOJ 
sessions; (9) “Operation Sarajevo”, the Yugoslav Army's battle for the final liberation 
of Sarajevo; (10) the early days of liberation. This sector of the site is further 
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complemented by the Memorial to Units of the National Liberation Army for the 
Liberation of the City (point 12 fig. 7), that reproduces an extract of the Order of the 
Day on the occasion of the liberation of Sarajevo, stressing the hardships that fighters 
had to endure to break the occupation and gain control of the city. This is the only 
message with the official slogan of Socialist Yugoslavia “Death to Fascism – Freedom 
to the people”, and the only one signed with the full name and designation of Tito 
“Supreme Commandant” and “Marshal of Yugoslavia”. 
The sculpture to women combatants and the execution site (points 2 and 3 fig. 7) 
stand apart from the rest of the memorial, isolated on its Eastern end. The execution 
site is marked with a short text mentioning that “communists and patriots” died “for 
the freedom of present and future generations” and concluding that “Vraca has 
become the inspiration and pride of Sarajevo”. The sculpture represents a woman 
reaching with her fists and her gaze towards the sky, but in the absence of any 
inscription it remains somehow enigmatic, conveying both feelings of rage, strength, 
and pain/sorrow, thus leaving it unclear that it refers to women combatants (see 
Figures 20 to 23). 
During the last decade of Socialist Yugoslavia, Vraca Memorial Park became the site 
for weekend pleasure trips and educative school excursions where classes would 
learn the history of the city's victimisation, struggle and resistance during the Second 
World War.65 
Due to its strategic position on the hills around the city, between 1992 and 1995 the 
site was used as a military location for heavy artillery and snipers of the forces 
besieging Sarajevo (Figures 18 and 19 offer a view of the city from the park at Vraca). 
The area was mined and laid waste, and after the end of the conflict it remained 
abandoned in conditions of decay. As it was lying on the outskirts of the urban area, 
on the newly delineated boundary line between Republika Srpska and the Federation 
of BiH, dangerous and derelict, the site became an area to avoid rather than visit.66 
 
                                                     
65 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 241. 
66 A reporter visiting the memorial in 1999 found out that young kids playing on the area were removing 
some letters from the names of the victims on the fortress walls to sell them to SFOR personnel. When he 
asked a kid “is this memorial site ours?” (probably with reference to the inter-entity boundary line on which 
the memorial stood) he obtained the reply “It's not, it's Tito's”, which became the article's title, Burić A. 
“Nije to naše to je Titino,’’ Dani, Sarajevo, August 6, 1999. The first time I visited Vraca in the fall of 2009, I 
entered with hesitation an empty and wasted area, to unexpectedly find a police car and three officers 
stationing at the site. As unrestrained vegetation prevented the view of the components of the site, I 
approached the officers with an old touristic leaflet of the memorial in my hand and asked them to direct 
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In 2004, the Union of Associations of Fighters of the National Liberation War (Savez 
Udruzenja Boraca Narodnooslobodilackog Rata – SUBNOR) promoted the draft and 
submission of a petition to designate Vraca memorial park as National Monument.67 
The Commission to Preserve National Monuments delivered its Decision in 2005, with 
the official recognition of Vraca Memorial Park as part of the built cultural heritage of 
BiH. Official recognition as national monument did not bring about the changes 
needed at the memorial, as no works of restoration or maintenance were actually 
performed in the years following the Commission's decision.68 In the face of ongoing 
neglect, in 2008 the Cantonal branch of the Social Democratic Union of BiH 
(Kantonalni Odbor SDU BiH) organised a “working activity” to clean the site from the 
dirt, trash and vegetation, to which, according to the newspaper Dnevni Avaz, around 
a hundred persons participated.69 In addition, in February 2010 an internet-based 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
me to the sculpture to women combatants. To my surprise, only one of them knew the sculpture and could 
show me the direction to its location. 
67 SUBNOR was created in 1947 as a war veterans' union that united all former partisans in a single 
organisation, with branches and commissions at the federal, republican and local levels. Its central task was 
that of “ensuring, paying tribute to, and developing further the traditions of the National Liberation War,” 
Karge, Heike, “Mediated Remembrance: Local Practices of Remembering the Second World War in Tito’s 
Yugoslavia,” European Review of History - Revue euronéenne d’histoire 16, no. 1 (2009), 50. Its “Commission 
for ensuring and developing further the traditions of the National Liberation War and the achievements of 
the revolution” (Komisija za njegovane i razvijanje tradicija NOB i tekovina revolucije, created in 1948) was in 
charge of commemorative activities as the erection of war monuments, the maintenance of the graves of 
fallen fighters, collaboration with schools and museums and the production of commemorative books and 
local war chronicles (Ibid.). Karge points out that in Socialist Yugoslavia SUBNOR acted as a central 
mediator of remembrance. After the end of the 1992-95 war, SUBNOR was reorganised in 2 separate 
branches in FBiH and RS: the Union of Antifascists and fighters of the National Liberation War in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Savez Antifasista I Boraca Narodnooslobodilackog rata u Bosni i Hercegovini - SABNOR BiH) and 
the Union of Associations of Fighters of the National Liberation War of Republika Srpska (Savez Udruzenja 
Boraca Narodnooslobodilackog rata Republike Srpske – SUBNOR RS). Both organisations are still involved in 
the preservation and care of the memory of WWII as during Socialist Yugoslavia, but their activities are 
carried out independently in each Entity and without coordination, with some isolated exceptions. For 
more information on the roles and activities of SABNOR BiH and SUBNOR RS see Karacic, Darko, “Od 
Promoviranja Zajednistva Do Kreiranja Podjela. Politike Sjecanja Na Partizansku Borbu U Bosni I Hercegovini 
Nako 1990. Godine,” in Re:vizija Proslosti. Politike Sjecanja U Bosnia I Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj I Srbiji Od 1990. 
Godine, Karacic, Darko, Banjeglav, Tamara, and Natasa Govedarica (Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung [FES] - 
Asocijacija Alumni Centra za interdisciplinarne postdiplomske studije [ACIPS], 2012). 
68 Delays in the realisation of the necessary works of reconstruction and rehabilitation are mainly due to 
lack of funds and to the inefficiency and disorganisation inherent to the heritage care system in BiH, see 
chapter four. 
69 “Radna Akcija na Vracama. Dobrovoljci cistili spomen-park” (Working action at Vraca. Volunteers cleaned 
the memorial park), Dnevni Avaz, May, 25, 2008. Reproduced on the page of the group ‘Spasimo i Obnovima 
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group named “Let's save and restructure Vraca Memorial Park” (Spasimo i obnovimo 
Spomen-Park Vraca) drafted a new petition concerning the lack of concrete measures 
for the park's reconstruction and restoration, and addressed it to the Prime Minister 
of FBiH. It took five years before the site was provided with the standard informative 
panel (a task pertaining to the Commission to Preserve National Monuments, see Fig. 
24) and some actual works of reconstruction were initiated. In 2010, the Mayor of 
Sarajevo Alija Behmen gathered a meeting with the Institute for the Protection of 
Cultural-historical and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo Canton, the Federal Institute for 
the Protection of Monuments, the Mayor of Novo Sarajevo municipality (comprising 
Vraca neighbourhood), the president of the Jewish Community, and Pokop funeral 
services for arrangements to start the reconstruction works.70 This resulted in some 
works of restoration of the memorial to national heroes, the memorial to fallen 
fighters and the ceremonial plateau later that same year, but as of 2012 the park as a 
whole still lay in conditions of decay and abandonment, which are particularly evident 
in the fort. Moreover, the site is still targeted for vandalisation, ranging from writings 
and graffiti to desecration, as happened in 2013 with the damage of the sculpture to 
women combatants, which was found laying on the ground with a broken arm.71 
Although the formal/legal recognition of Vraca as National Monument still has to 
produce its material consequences (e.g. restoration, rehabilitation), it seems relevant 
to note that it already bears a direct effect on a symbolic level. The 'value' of the site 
(as from the criteria for designation) was formally established in the Commission's 
Decision, whose salient paragraphs are now reported on the standardised informative 
panel that was installed on the ceremonial plateau in 2010. The panel – written in local 
language (in both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets) and English – recollects the history of 
the site with particular focus on its memorial functions in the 1980s, and adds 
information on its fate during the 1992-95 conflict: 
“Given its unique strategic position, the Vraca Memorial Park was used as the 
site from which Sarajevo was bombarded with heavy artillery and sniper fire 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Spomen Park Vraca.’ The Social Democratic Union was founded in 2002 by a group of ex-members of the 
Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP). The newly elected (March 2013) Mayor of Sarajevo Ivo Komsic is a 
representative of SDU BiH. 
70 “Gradonacelnik sazvao sastanak o sanaciji Spomen-parka Vraca” (The Mayor called a meeting on the 
restoration of Vraca Memorial Park), May 11th, 2010, webiste of the City of Sarajevo, www.sarajevo.ba. 
71 “Sakati spomenik paloj heroini Radojki Lakic” (Mutilated monument to the fallen heroine Radojka Lakic), 
11.06.2013, www.akcijagradjana.org; “Nakon osam mjeseci stajanja na ciglama: pala I Radojka Lakic” (After 
eight months standing on bricks: Radojka Lakic fell too), Oslobodjenje, October, 29, 2013; “Vandalism and 
restoration: Vraca, Alija Kucukalic and Radojka Lakic”, Sarajevo Culture Bureau, Novermber 25, 2013. 
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during the 1992-1995 war, when the entire complex was left in ruins and the 
exhibition of 'Witnesses to the Battle for Sarajevo' was completely destroyed”.72 
In this way, the designation of Vraca as National Monument resulted in a symbolic 
accretion of its significance, formalised in the panel and accessible to local people and 
tourists/foreigners alike (Fig. 24). 
5.3 Sehidsko Spomen-Mezarje Kovaci 
The Kovaci Shahid cemetery-memorial is located in the centre of the city, some 500 
metres from the central square of the historic area Bascarsija. In the past, the area 
used to host one of the oldest burial grounds in Sarajevo, probably existing since the 
14th century, comprising 9 plots, with tombstones with epitaphs dating from 1548 to 
1878.73 In 1964, the area was turned into a park with paths, and in the 1970s a sports 
centre was built on the site, so that nowadays only a few of the old tombstones have 
remained intact (around 200, out of the 400 surveyed in a study compiled in the 
1960s). In 2007, the Commission designated the three remaining plots National 
Monuments of BiH (see Figures 26 and 27). 
During the 1992-1995 war in BiH, the encirclement of the city and the high rate of 
casualties determined the formation of new cemeteries and the reactivation of old 
ones, so the area that used to be a park and sports centre at Kovaci was turned into a 
burial ground. The site has been undergoing a process of conversion into a memorial 
complex since 1997, led by the Fund for the construction and preservation of shahids 
and fallen fighters' cemeteries, memorial complexes and monuments to the victims of 
genocide (Fond za Izgradnju I ocuvanje grobalja sehida I poginulih boraca, memorijalnih 
centara I spomen-obiljezja zrtava genocida – the Fund, see chapter four), which was 
created in the same year as an organisation under the Ministry for Veteran Affairs of 
the Sarajevo Canton. Nowadays, the Kovaci cemetery-memorial is the largest burial 
 
                                                     
72 Informative panel at Vraca Memorial Park. 
73 Information on the old burial ground – including developments during Socialist Yugoslavia – and other 
areas around the Kovaci memorial complex are based on the Decisions of the Commission to Preserve 
National Monuments: Old Vratnik Fort, the architectural ensemble (2005), Doc. no. 05.12269/046, and Old 
burial ground in Kovaci, the cemetery ensemble (2007), Doc. no. 07.2-2-25/05-5, available on the website of 
the Commission, www.kons.gov.ba. 
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ground of shahids/fallen fighters of the 1992-95 war, with 1487 graves, including the 
mausoleum of first President of independent BiH Alija Izetbegovic, and the grave of 
Rasim Delic, Chief of Staff of ARBiH, buried in 2010.74 While some of its components 
are still under construction, the site is already operative, and it is visited on all major 
official ceremonies and commemorations on symbolic dates selected from the history 
of both the city and the country as a whole (see chapter six). The overall project of 
the site comprises – aside the cemetery, Alija Izetbegovic's mausoleum and Rasim 
Delic's grave – a central nisan-monument to Shahids; an amphitheatre and auditorium; 
a Museum to Alija Izetbegovic; a tekke (Islamic religious building); a Wall of Memory; 
and a Museum of the Siege (Figure 25 reproduces a map of the memorial, Figure 35 
offers a view of the cemetery-memorial).75 As of 2013, almost all these components 
have been completed, with the exception of the Wall of Memory and the Museum of 
the Siege: construction works in the amphitheatre-auditorium are ongoing, while the 
tekke has been completed and inaugurated in May 2013.76 
The memorial complex is composed of different units that reconstruct various 
aspects of the (more or less recent) past of BiH: the tekke is a reproduction of the 
Mevlevijska Tekija, a sufi house built in 1462 on the bank of the river Miljacka in the 
area of Bentbasa, and subsequently destroyed in 1957. The Museum dedicated to Alija 
Izetbegovic is hosted in the gatehouses on Ploca and Sirokac streets, and is divided 
into two clusters, one (Ploca tower) on the life and work of the former President of 
BiH, and the other (Sirokac tower) on his role during the 1992-95 war.77 Overall, the 
 
                                                     
74 Earlier a member of the Yugoslav Army (JNA), Delic joined the Territorial Defence forces of the RBiH in 
1992, which shortly after became the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). After the 
end of the 1992-95 war, Delic served in the Army of FBiH until his retirement in 2000. 
75 Unless otherwise specified, information on the memorial complex are taken from the website of the Fond 
Memorijala (www.dasenezaboravi.org), the website of Alija Izetbegovic Museum 
(www.muzejalijaizetbegovic.ba), and official documentation produced by the Fond Memorijala for the 
approval by the governing bodies of Sarajevo Canton (Izvještaj o radu Fonda Kantona Sarajevo za izgradnju 
i ocuvanje grobalja šehida i poginulih boraca, memorijalnih centara i spomen-obilježja žrtava genocida za 
period 01.01.-31.12.2012. godine, Sarajevo Canton Government, doc. no. 02-05-17477-16/13, approved on 
13.06.2013). 
76 The project was financed by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Turkish 
municipality of Seldzuk, and carried out in collaboration with the Old Town (Stari Grad) Municipality of 
Sarajevo. The rebuilt tekke has been denominated Balkan Mevlev research centre (Balkanski mevlevisko-
istrazivacki centar). See “Mevlevijska Tekija na Kovacima”, website of the Old Town Municipality of 
Sarajevo (http://starigrad.ba); “Otvorena Mevlevijska Tekija na Kovacima”, Dnevni Avaz, 8.05.2013; “Bosnia's 
Dervishes in a spin over rebuilt Tekke”, Balkan Insight, 8.04.2013. 
77 Both gatehouses have been designated National Monuments by the Commission in 2005, as part of the 
architectural ensemble of the Old Vratnik Fort, a fortification on the Eastern end of the city dating from 
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exhibits are organised into 9 smaller units: (1) Youth; (2) Sarajevo Process; (3) The first 
multi-party elections and breakdown of Yugoslavia; (4) International recognition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; (5) In the hell of Sarajevo; (6) The victory of the Truth; (7) The 
idea of Bosnia – challenge of all Humanists; (8) Departure into the eternal life; and (9) 
Others about Alija. Once completed, the amphitheatre will serve the double function 
of an open theatre for cultural manifestations consistent with the memorial's scope, 
and, in its lower part, a multimedia centre78. As already mentioned, the cemetery-
memorial is already completed and functioning, and it constitutes an independent 
unit of the site. 
The entrance is marked by three flags: the current flag of BiH, the first flag of 
independent BiH (a blue shield with a white bend and 6 yellow lilies, used between 
1992 and 1998), and the flag of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH, with the 
same design as the first flag of BiH, complemented with two swords and the logo of 
the Army, used until 1997. See Fig. 28). The entrance leads directly to the central nisan-
monument, where wreaths of flowers are ritually deposited on official ceremonies. As 
in the case of Vraca Memorial Park, this central spot is marked with an inscription: 
“Monument-marker to the fighters of the Army of BiH who gave their lives in 
defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 aggression” (Figures 
29 and 30).79 
While the writing appears neutral in providing a definition in broad terms of the 
conflict, it is perhaps interesting to note that the term “aggression” has implicit 
meaning with regards to the connotation of the 1992-95 conflict, over which there still 
are conflicting interpretations. In this sense, the term “aggression” dismisses the 
definition of the 1992-95 war as a civil war (referring to an internal conflict amongst 
groups unable or unwilling to reach an agreement over arrangements for power-
sharing) and fosters the vision of an unjust attack against Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
several different periods and comprising 5 bastions (the White Bastion, the Storsicka Bastion, the Yellow or 
Jekovacka Bastion, the bastion on Ravne bakije, the bastion on Zmajevac) and 3 gatehouses (the Visegrad 
Gatehouse, the gatehouse in Ploca, and the gatehouse in Sirokac). See Decision of the Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments, “Old Vratnik Fort, the architectural ensemble”. 
78 Information from “Sehidsko Spomen Mezarje Kovaci – Projekat Izgradnje” (Construction Project), 
available at www.dasenezaboravi.org.ba, and personal communication with the Director of the Fond 
Memorijala, May 2011. 
79 Original inscription: “Spomen obiljezje borcima Armije BiH koji su dali zivote u odbrani Bosne I Hercegovine u 
toku agresije 1992-1995”, translation: author. 
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neighbouring states (i.e. Croatia and Serbia) in pursue of territorial expansion. This 
view is easily associated with Bosnjak/Muslim interests and interpretations of the war.  
From the central nisan-monument, a path leads through the cemetery towards the 
grave and mausoleum of Alija Izetbegovic, positioned amidst the burial ground next 
to a pond of water in the shape of a half moon (see Figures 31, 32 and 33). An 
inscription reports a quote by Izetbegovic on his tombstone, with the words “We 
swear to the Almighty God that we shall not be slaves” (Fig. 34). From this point, a 
small stream of water runs back to the entrance plateau and symbolically rejoins the 
grave of the first President of independent BiH with the grave of Chief of Staff 
General Rasim Delic, positioned in front of the burial ground, not far from the central 
nisan-monument (see Fig. 36). The cemetery-memorial thus appears as a self-
referential unit within the wider memorial complex, with the inner paths forming a 
circular route from the central nisan-monument dedicated to the war effort through 
the President's grave symbolically reaffirming the determination to defend the 
independence of the country, and back to the starting point (Figures 31 to 37). The 
explicit dedication of the central nisan-monument to the recent armed conflict and 
the inscription on Izetbegovic's grave construct a particular interpretation of the war 
and link it to a religious commitment, which is further evoked by the shape of the 
water pond and the fact that all tombstones in the cemetery are a standardised type 
of nisan – a traditional tombstone of Muslims in BiH – erected to mark the resting 
place of Shahids – martyrs and witnesses of the Truth. Moreover, the positioning of 
the graves of Izetbegovic and Delic recalls the layout of an army, with the Chief of 
Staff at the front, and the President symbolically in the middle of the corpus of 
fighters. 
This symbolism is indicative of the way the memorialisation of the recent conflict is 
influencing the construction of identity in today's BiH, through the establishment of 
tight connections between the war effort, religion and tradition into the notion of 
'nation'. Custo (2013) makes the point that the new employ of terms like “shahid” and 
“nisan” denotes the characterisation of the new politics of memory with religious and 
traditional elements. Originally referring to Muslims who died a heroic death in a holy 
war or jihad (the literal meaning is witness of the Truth/faith, or martyr), in today's BiH 
the word shahid has become of common usage to refer generally to victims (soldiers, 
civilians, children) who died in the 1992-95 war and were buried as Muslims.80 At the 
same time, a subtle distinction is made in official speeches and documents through 
 
                                                     
80 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu, 87. 
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the use of the expression “Shahids and killed fighters” (Sehidi i poginuli borci), that 
implicitly refers to Muslim and non-Muslim fallen fighters.81 The use of this 
terminology has an impact on the ways in which memorialisation intertwines with the 
construction of identities: “the problem with the institution of sehid [is] not so much 
that it implie[s] an Islamic interpretation of the war as jihad but that it discriminate[s] 
between Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers”.82 
The choice of the nisan as tombstone represents a return to the Islamic traditions 
of BiH: the old nisans used to convey information about the deceased (e.g. sex, status, 
profession) through their individual shape, and had regional characteristics that 
differentiated them. The new nisan, on the other hand, has been established in 1996 
as a marker for shahids/fighters of ARBiH, with a process of design and selection 
carried out by an ad hoc Commission, and was originally envisaged as a unified 
solution for all fighters, with no distinction of religious belonging. The final 
standardised nisan marks the graves of fallen Bosnjaks/Muslims and is complemented 
with the inscription of a verse of the Quran and the symbol of the Lily, and is 
stylistically different from the nisan marking the grave of veterans who died after the 
end of the war or fighters of other religious belonging. As Custo remarks, “from this 
established symbolism we get the message that the defence of life during the siege 
and war for Bosnjaks is represented as and equated to the defence of identity and 
faith – of Islam”.83 
Finally, the flower of the lily, normalised as suitable symbol for the new identity and 
achieved independence of the country, has become omnipresent in cemeteries and 
 
                                                     
81 Bougarel, Xavier, “Death and the Nationalist: Martyrdom, War Memory and Veteran Identity among 
Bosnian Muslims,” in The New Bosnian Mosaic. Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, 
edited by Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings (Ashgate, 2007), 171. 
82 Macek, Sarajevo under Siege, 141. Moreover, Bougarel remarks that this rhetoric was sometimes felt as a 
posthumous imposition of religious connotations to the identity of the deceased, that not always reflected 
the religious beliefs of the deceased themselves. In the immediate aftermaths of war, the father of a young 
fallen soldier addressed an open letter to Alija Izetbegovic asking: “Why are you associating the religious 
term 'sehid' with the first name of my son and of so many other courageous fighters for the Bosnian cause? 
My son is not a sehid and I do not allow anybody to refer to him this way. In my language there are a 
thousand non-religious and non-partisan words to describe his sacrifice for Bosnia... Why are you reciting 
the fatiha for those who have been killed?”, quoted in Bougarel, “Death and the Nationalist,” 179, emphasis 
original. 
83 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu, 90, translation: author. The policy of standardisation of nisans was 
also received with some resistance. Bougarel reports that “in the Sarajevo Canton […] between 5 and 10 
percent of the families have expressed a desire to keep or put up a nisan that is different from the official 
one,” Bougarel “Death and the Nationalist,” 179. 
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graveyards. Against the background of dissent over the interpretation of the conflict, 
though, not even this symbol can be considered completely immune to contestation, 
as it emerged with the design of the new flag and coat of arms of BiH during the 
conflict, and can thus potentially be equated to the 'faction' that defended the 
country's independence, which is in turn often conflated with the Bosnjak/Muslim 
population of BiH, especially in narratives promoted by the establishment of RS.84 
Though not signalled on leaflets, in proximity of the central nisan-monument at 
Kovaci there is one more marker, dedicated to the “Shahids of the movement of the 
Young Muslims killed by the Communists in 1945 and 1949” (see Figure 38).85 The 
monument records the names of 6 members of the movement who died in 1945 and 7 
members who died in 1949, together with the inscription of a verse of the Quran: “Did 
you think that you would enter Heaven without Allah testing those of you who fought 
hard (In His Cause) and remained steadfast?”.86 The monument is particularly 
interesting because it constitutes the only direct reference to Socialist Yugoslavia in 
the symbolic reconstruction of the history of Bosnian Muslims that emerges from 
various elements of the memorial complex, including – as seen above – a replica of 
the tekke built in 1462, the remains of old burial grounds with traditional nisans and 
fortifications dating from different periods, all linked to the cemetery-memorial 
 
                                                     
84 Equating the symbol of the Lily exclusively to the Bosnjak segments of BiH's population wipes away the 
mixed background of both combatants and civilians secluded within the city during the siege. The relevance 
accorded to symbols is reflected by the inability to agree on a national flag and anthem on the part of the 
political establishment of BiH and the necessity of their imposition by the High Representative (see chapter 
four). Divergences in the interpretation of the 1992-95 conflict are apparent in the use of different epithets 
to refer to it as “Patriotic War of Liberation” (Odbrambeno-otazbinski rat) in RS, “Homeland War” 
(Domovinski rat) in Croatian-language versions of official documents and institutional websites and 
“Defense-Liberation War” (Odbranbeno-oslobodilacki rat) in Bosnian-language versions of official 
documents and institutional websites (see chapter two). 
85 The movement of the Young Muslims (Mladi Muslimani) was founded in 1941 and carried out religious 
activities for the youth and charitable initiatives. After the end of WWII and in the context of the militant 
atheism of the Communist regime, the movement became increasingly politicised, but also controlled and 
antagonised by the Socialist regime, and by 1950 it recruited members almost exclusively from the 
educated urban youth, functioned as an informal network and its work was limited to cultural activities of 
re-Islamisation. See Bougarel, Xavier, “From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence 
of a Pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Islamic Studies 36.2-3 (1997). 
86 In 1945 there was a first wave of arrests of members of the Young Muslims in Sarajevo, and in 1949 the 
wave of repression that followed the rupture with the USSR hit the movement with the arrest of its 
principal leaders, four of which were condemned to death, Bougarel “From Young Muslims to Party of 
Democratic Action,” 540. Their names are inscribed on the monument – N. Fazlibegovic, H. Biber, H. Kajtaz, 
O. Stupac. According to Robert Donia, nevertheless, these sentences were never carried out (Donia 
Sarajevo, 227). 
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dedicated to the recent conflict. This particular marker, thus, remembers Socialist 
Yugoslavia for its oppressive character and explicitly names the Communists as 
perpetrators, simultaneously establishing a similarity between the individuals killed in 
1945 and 1949 and those who fought and/or died during the 1992-95 war, as both are 
now Shahids. 
In April 2010, the Government of Sarajevo Canton proposed the recognition of the 
complex as an “area of public interest for the Sarajevo Canton”.87 
5.4 Similarities, differences, intersections 
The memorial complexes at Vraca and Kovaci can be regarded as the most important 
memory sites of, respectively, World War II and the 1992-95 war in the city of Sarajevo. 
Both sites commemorate the local experience of armed conflict – the occupation of 
1941-45 and the siege of 1992-96 – and make sense of it through the recollection of a 
wider interpretation of the war within which it occurred. Both sites had their own 
'role' during the conflict they recall: Vraca was used by German occupying forces as a 
torture and execution site; Kovaci became a burial ground out of necessity during the 
blockade of the city, not far from the frontline that encircled Sarajevo separating it 
from the outside world. Both sites remember a traumatic event in the past of the city, 
inscribing the social shock of war into a narrative that constructs the legitimation of 
the newly established state through the commemoration of its fallen, wounded, 
displaced citizens. They do so by providing a meaning to the losses caused by the 
conflict – resistance against an unjust oppressor and defence of freedom and 
independence, the efforts undertaken by 'true patriots' at the highest costs. On both 
sites, this recollection is sanctioned by the words of the leader, inscribed on stone in 
the form of messages by Tito at Vraca and reported on the walls of the Museum 
dedicated to Alija Izetbegovic at Kovaci and on his tombstone, although the physical 
presence of the former President in the Kovaci cemetery constitutes an obvious 
difference. On both sites the citizens fallen during the war are named as 'fighters', 
and both implicitly claim that armies were set up out of necessity and of the will to 
defend the city. Ethnic belonging is downplayed in the identification of these fighters, 
 
                                                     
87 Government of Canton Sarajevo, Proposal for Conclusion 02-05-17172-2/10, 16th April 2010, www. 
ks.gov.ba. 
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but while in the rhetoric of Vraca Memorial Park it is substituted by class and 
ideological identification ('true patriots' as workers, the youth, communists and the 
intelligentsia), at Kovaci references to religion and differences in the outlook of nisans 
implicitly identify the bulk of fighters as Bosnjaks/Muslims.88 Women are present on 
both sites (with a dedicated sculpture at Vraca and in the burial ground at Kovaci), but 
the representation of their role in the conflict is relegated to the margins by the 
difficulty to distinguish their graves at Kovaci and the ambiguity and inadequate 
visibility of the sculpture at Vraca. 
A fundamental difference between the two sites is constituted by the symbolic way 
they link past, present and future. Vraca focuses on the past and the experience of 
conflict to assert the values of communism/socialism and establish them as 
foundation for the future, stressing that the armed struggle to defend the city and the 
freedom/independence of Yugoslavia corresponded to the unfolding of a revolution. 
Suffering and sacrifice in this perspective are recollected as the cost of a victorious 
struggle. Kovaci, on the other hand, recalls the recent conflict and goes further back 
in time to revive old Bosnian traditions, integrating the recent war into a long history 
of victimisation (of the 'Bosnjak nation'). Moreover, although it asserted the 
independence of BiH, the struggle of the patriots honoured at Kovaci is not over, but 
is rather continued by the living as a “fight against collective forgetting” and for the 
“prevention of a possible falsification of history”.89 Finally, the memorial park at Vraca 
was erected in 1980, many years after the end of WWII and only just ten years before 
the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia, whereas the construction of the Kovaci memorial 
complex started soon after the end of the 1992-95 conflict, at the early stages of the 
new regime established with independent BiH. This places the two memorials in 
different positions with respect to both the conflict they commemorate and the 
broader politics of memory of the regime to which they belong.  
A more exhaustive investigation of similarities and differences, nevertheless, would 
require a detailed study and comparison of the politics of memory in Socialist 
Yugoslavia and independent BiH, which is beyond the scope of the present chapter. 
 
                                                     
88 But note that the different shape of nisan is used also to mark the graves of veterans, i.e. fighters who 
died after the end of the conflict. This consideration either makes the identification of religious/ethnic 
belonging more complex, or wipes it definitively away. In May 2013 a touch screen was inaugurated at the 
site, with information on the work and life of Alija Izetbegovic, the 1992-95 war, and a map with the 
locations of shahids/fighters in the burial ground, but it is not clear whether it reports additional 
information on their identity in terms of ethnic/national belonging. “Davutoglu I Izetbegovic oblisli mezarje 
Kovaci”, Oslobodjenje, 8.05.2013. 
89 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu, 92, translation: author. 
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Instead, the focus of analysis here is on how the two sites are placed within the 
continuum of the history they partake, and what are their meanings, roles and 
functions in today's Sarajevo.  
In this perspective, the first impression is that the two memorials belong to 
different spheres, or parallel strands of the politics of memory. On one level, Vraca 
Memorial Park, declared national monument in 2005, forms part of the cultural-
historic heritage of BiH, and was valued by the nationwide Commission to Preserve 
National Monuments for its architectural value and its endangered conditions, on the 
basis of previous legal protection. The Kovaci memorial complex pertains to a 
different level insofar as it is a memorial in course of construction and it seeks 
recognition from the Government of Sarajevo Canton as an “area of public interest” 
and significance. To a certain extent, this consideration recalls the differentiation 
between 'monument' and 'heritage' and draws attention to the implications of the 
distinction between the two – i.e. the existence of discrete systems and structures to 
assess a site's value and legally and materially dispose for its erection, protection, 
maintenance and promotion. The physical conditions of Vraca and the engagement of 
citizens and associations in initiatives to rehabilitate it expose the inefficiencies of 
BiH's system of heritage care and imply a fundamental lack of interest on the part of 
the current establishment and structures of government towards the site. On the 
other hand, the proliferation of markers to the recent conflict throughout the city and 
the monumental project of the Kovaci cemetery-memorial point to a stronger 
motivation, efficacy and skilfulness of various institutional levels when it comes to the 
current memorialisation of the recent conflict. In this parallel configuration, it seems 
that one strand (represented by the Commission) is committed to the preservation of 
the country's 'heritage' from far back in the past (an up until 1960), while a second 
strand (represented by the Fund) is devoted to the current process of construction of 
a memory of the recent conflict. These two strands also seem differentiated by the 
fact that the Commission and its work are in close connection to international trends 
in the conceptualisation and valorisation of heritage, whereas the operate of the Fund 
stems from local actors and interests. Despite their parallel development, though, 
both strands comprise today's politics of memory in BiH, which draws attention to the 
intersections between the two and their points of encounter. 
First, it seems significative that the Fund sought and obtained permission from the 
local organs of government to be in charge of the reconstruction and maintenance of 
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Socialist monuments in the area of the Canton.90 As these include Vraca Memorial 
Park, such decision by the Government of Sarajevo Canton generates a convergence 
between the two strands identified above. 
This initial 'convergence' has been complemented in recent years with a 
broadening of the tasks of the Fund to include the care of additional monuments in 
the area of city. In March 2012, the “Tunnel of hope” (Tunel Spasa) became propriety 
of the Sarajevo Canton with the signing of an agreement between the owner of the 
house at one end of the Tunnel Alija Kolar, the Minister for Veteran Affairs of the 
Sarajevo Canton (KS), the Director of the Institute for Construction of KS and the 
Mayor of Ilidza Municipality, where the Tunnel is located. In April 2012, the Fund was 
officially endowed with the further development and maintenance of this new 
memorial complex, which include the expansion of the existing exhibition in the 
house and plans for guided visits on both sides of the Tunnel.91 Concurrently, the 
Ministry for Veteran Affairs of Sarajevo Canton presented a proposal to the 
Government to declare the Tunnel a “cultural-historical and touristic destination”.92 
In May 2012, the Fund signed one more agreement with the government of 
Sarajevo Canton to undertake responsibilities for the reconstruction and maintenance 
of the “Sarajevo Roses” (Sarajevske Ruze), which are under protection by Cantonal 
institutions as a cultural monument. In October 2013, the first works of reparation to a 
“rose” were started, though it is not clear whether a final agreement on the methods 
 
                                                     
90 See also chapter four. The Fund was endowed with these tasks in 2008 (Doc. no. 02-05-11946-4/08 
approved on 16.04.2008 by the Government of Sarajevo Canton). 
91 The Tunnel was secretly dig under the airport of Sarajevo between March and July 1993, to connect the 
two free areas of Dobrinja and Butmir (for this reason it was originally called 'Tunnel D-B'). It measured 
approximately 800 metres and was high and wide approximately 1,5 per 1,5 metres, and it was used by 
military personnel as well as civilians, allowing movement in and out of the besieged city and the 
transportation of food and arms. The house at one entrance of the Tunnel, owned by the Kolar family, was 
turned into a museum and managed privately until recent years. See “Potpisan Sporazum na Ilidži: 
Nekadašnji „Tunel spasa“postao vlasništvo Kantona Sarajevo”, 09.03.2012 and “Tunel spasa u Butmiru 
zvanično u nadležnosti Fonda memorijala Kantona Sarajevo”, 25.04.2012, website of Sarajevo Canton 
(www.ks.gov.ba). 
92 See Prijedlog zaključka o usvajanju Elaborata o preuzimanju “Tunel spasa Dobrinja – Butmir” kao 
kulturno-historijske turističke destinacije (Proposal of conclusion for the approval of the study 'Tunnel  of 
Hope Dobranja-Butmir as cultural-historical touristic destination), Doc. no. 02051325021/12, 20.04.2012 and 
“Tunel Spasa kao turisticka atrakcija Sarajeva” (The Tunnel of Hope as touristic attraction of Sarajevo), 
Nezavisne Novine, 25.04.2012. 
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of reparation has been reached between the Fund and the Cantonal Institute for the 
Protection of Cultural-Historic and Natural Heritage of Sarajevo.93 
This expansion of the tasks and functions of the Fund in fact corresponds to an 
upgrade of its role with regards to the politics of memory within Sarajevo Canton, of 
which it is becoming the main central actor. Moreover, one of the effects of placing 
this assortment of monuments under the supervision and management of a single 
institution is presumably that different memorial sites will be integrated into a 
coherent interpretation, that suggests that the Fund will have a leading role in the 
configuration of the memory of both WWII and the recent conflict. Moreover, the 
relevance of the work of the Fund is not confined to the care of monuments and sites 
of interest of the Canton, but is further enhanced through a range of activities of 
memorialisation that include programs of collaboration with schools (together with 
the Cantonal Ministry for Science and Education) and guided visits of pupils to the 
Kovaci cemetery-memorial, that since 2012 have expanded to involve students from 
the whole area of the Federation of BiH.94 In the last few years, thus, the Fund is 
undergoing a development through which it is in fact overtaking the role and 
functions that in the previous regime pertained to the Republic's branches of 
SUBNOR. This seems the case regarding not only the role as principal “mediator of 
remembrance”95 but also the variety of activities carried out by the Fund (i.e. 
cooperation with museums and other similar institutions, history lessons, 
collaboration with schools), which are an element of continuity with the previous 
regime's memory practices.96 
 
                                                     
93 The “Sarajevo Roses” are scars left by mortar's shells on the concrete of sidewalks and streets during the 
siege, that have been subsequently filled with red resin (cfr. chapter two). See “Nakon što je potpisan 
Ugovor: Počela rekonstrukcija prve "Sarajevske ruže" (After the signign of the Agreement began the 
reconstruction of the first 'Sarajevo Rose'), website of the government of Sarajevo Canton 
(www.ks.gov.ba) and “Sarajevske Ruze se vracaju na ulice” (Sarajevo Roses returned to the streets), 
Oslobodjenje, 28.10.2013. 
94 Izvještaj o radu Fonda Kantona Sarajevo za izgradnju i ocuvanje grobalja šehida i poginulih boraca, 
memorijalnih centara i spomen-obilježja žrtava genocida za period 01.01.-31.12.2012. godine (Report on the 
work of the Cantonal Fund for the construction and preservation of shahids and fallen fighters' cemeteries, 
memorial complexes and monuments to the victims of genocide), Sarajevo Canton Government, doc. no. 
02-05-17477-16/13, approved on 13.06.2013. 
95 Karge, “Mediated Remembrance.” 
96 On the role and tasks of SUBNOR: Karge, “Mediated Remembrance,” Custo, “Kolektivna Memorija 
Grada,” Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu, Karacic, “Od Promoviranja Zajednistva Do Kreiranja Podjela.” 
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5.5 Conclusions 
Through the analysis of Vraca Memorial Park and the Kovaci Cemetery-Memorial, this 
chapter tried to explore the ways in which the memories of two distinct wars are 
shaped in today's Sarajevo. In this perspective, the two memorials stand at the ends 
of a continuum that starts symbolically with the death of Tito – on the same year of 
the erection of Vraca Memorial Park – and develops through the rise of (extreme) 
nationalism(s), the erosion of social and institutional cohesion, the disintegration and 
collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia into war and the establishment of a new state in the 
aftermaths of conflict. What places the two sites in close connection is the centrality 
of memory in both the Yugoslav crisis and the consolidation of the new regime in BiH. 
The erection of Vraca Memorial Park belongs to a 'second wave' of intensive 
construction of monuments to the National Liberation Struggle (NOB) in Sarajevo 
that took place in the 1980s, many years after the 'first wave' of monumentalisation 
of the 1950s and just a decade before the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia.97 
Accompanied by an emphasised “need for better coherence and refinement of the 
various components of the memory culture”, this wave revealed an “almost alarming 
need to preserve the official politics of memory […] when the foundations of 
Yugoslav socialism had already started to shake”.98 In the crumbling of Yugoslavia, 
“communist narratives of World War II [were] replaced by new official ones that 
rehabilitated the main nationalist forces of that period and denounced as a myth the 
Titoist insistence on 'Brotherhood and Unity' among the South Slavs”.99 Separated in 
time by the rise and unfolding of nationalism(s) in BiH and the wider region, Kovaci 
today pertains to an early phase of monumentalisation within the (new) society 
emerged from the ashes of nationalistic wars – a development that the intensification 
of monument erection in the 1980s could not prevent nor elude. 
The 1992-95 war itself entailed a revision and reinterpretation of the experience of 
WWII, that mostly brought about neglect and devastation of Socialist monuments 
both during the conflict and in subsequent years.100 The construction of an official 
 
                                                     
97 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu. Another monument that belongs to this wave is the statue of Tito at 
the former military barracks “Marshal Tito” (today hosting the University campus), regularly visited on 
official commemorations (see chapter six). 
98 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu, 54-5, translation: author. 
99 Bougarel “Death and the Nationalist,” 167. 
100 Socialist monument were damaged or destroyed not only during the armed conflict – as in the case of 
Vraca – but also in subsequent years when peace had already been re-established. An example of this is the 
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memory of the 1992-95 conflict in the present is thus entangled with a reconstruction 
of the memory of World War II and the partisan experience as foundational to the 
Socialist era, which is now reinterpreted through the prism of the recent war and 
from the standpoint of the newly established regime. Discussions over changes to the 
text of the most important Socialist monument in Sarajevo – the Eternal Flame 
(Vjecna Vatra) – exemplify this point. Custo (2008) reports that proposals were 
advanced for the first time in 1981 and discussed until 1994, although no agreement 
was ever reached and the text eventually remained unaltered.101 The last proposal 
foresaw the installation of two plaques aside the monument, one referring to the 
liberation of Sarajevo in the 1941-45 war and the other one to the defence of Sarajevo 
between 1992 and 1995. Although the actual establishment of a new regime (occurred 
with the establishment of independent BiH within the Dayton Peace Agreement) did 
not bring about changes to the monument, the discussion of possible changes in the 
period 1981-1995 highlights the malleability of public memory in times of social and 
political transition and links the reinterpretation of monuments to WWII to processes 
of construction of the memory of the 1992-95 conflict.102 
As seen in chapters four and five, the management of heritage and monuments as 
objects of material culture that display (re)interpretations of the past appears divided 
into two strands, whereby these tasks of revision of WWII's experience in Sarajevo 
are increasingly undertaken by the Fund. The Commission is carrying out an extensive 
work of research, documentation and assessment of built cultural heritage on a 
national scale, indispensable for the envisaged recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation 
and preservation of heritage on the part of the competent institutions. Overall, 
though, its work is hindered by the weaknesses of the legal framework regarding 
monuments and heritage, the inefficiencies of the institutional framework within 
which it operates, and a perennial lack of funds. The impact of its activities on the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
destruction of a socialist monument at Makljen (municipality of Prozor-Rama in Herzegovina) mined with 
explosives in 2000. Karacic argues that “the memory of WWII has remained an inevitable political topic in 
BiH since 1990 until today, and the differences [between] the official narrative from the times of Socialist 
Yugoslavia and the new revisionist interpretations of that past are often used in political programmes for 
the creation of divisions amongst the citizens of BiH,” Karacic, “Od Promoviranja Zajednistva Do Kreiranja 
Podjela,” 76. 
101 Custo, “Kolektivna Memorija Grada,” 110-114. 
102 In the aftermaths of conflict, policies of street-name changes also interweaved in varying ways with the 
memory of WWII. Karacic notes that in some instances references to the partisan efforts were marginalised 
as happened with references to 'undesirable' heritage, while in other instances they were appropriated and 
integrated with narratives on the recent conflict, Karacic, “Od Promoviranja Zajednistva Do Kreiranja 
Podjela.” 
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ongoing local process of construction of a memory of war is thus still marginal, and 
although the Commission's work addresses the damage inflicted to 
monuments/heritage during wartime, its influence on narratives of the conflict 
appears minimal. The informative panel at Vraca illustrates this point: while on the 
one hand the reference to the recent conflict adds one layer of meaning to the site, 
on the other hand the neutrality of this mention and the absence of connotations of 
the conflict limit the effect of this accretion to the plain information that the conflict 
took place – and that it entailed the destruction of a Socialist monument. 
A closer look at the two memorials of Vraca and Kovaci points to a primacy of 
processes of memorialisation of the recent conflict – in tight connection to the 
consolidation of group identity and the configuration of the new polity – over the care 
and rehabilitation of the memory of WWII, whose meanings and relations to the 
newly established regime are ambiguous and unresolved.  
The Kovaci memorial complex has no apparent connection to the memory of WWII, 
but it does recall the Socialist period with the individual marker to the killed Young 
Muslims, whereby the former regime is represented as a perpetrator and oppressor. 
This depiction is further sustained by the recollection of Izetbegovic's life in the 
dedicated museum, which stresses his membership in the Young Muslims (an 
“organisation with a very strong antifascist and anticommunist program”), the 1983 
incarceration because of his intellectual engagement on Islam (in works such as 
“Islam between East and West” and the “Islamic Declaration”), and his role in the 
1992-95 conflict and as President of independent BiH, “on which side were 
international law, justice and truth”.103 At the same time, the memorial connotes the 
recent conflict with traditional and religious elements, so that the memorialisation of 
war is interweaved with the delineation of a narrative on the history of the Bosnian 
Muslims and the configuration of the territories of their victimisation: “the cult of 
sehidi structures both space and time for the Muslim community, closely following the 
extent of its territory, emphasizing the imprint of war on its recovering social life, 
drawing new boundaries between profane and sacred space, Islamic time and secular 
time”.104 While this process is already entailing a reinterpretation of the Socialist 
period, it is still to be seen what material effects it will bear on the outlook of 
monuments commemorating the Second World War now that the Fund is in charge of 
their maintenance and reconstruction. 
 
                                                     
103 Quotes are from the Catalogue of the Exhibition “Life, personality and work of Alija Izetbegovic,” 
reporting the text of the permanent exhibition. Published in 500 copies by the Museum Alija Izetbegovic. 
104 Bougarel “Death and the Nationalist,” 172. 
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Appendix three: Vraca Spomen Park 
 
Figure 7: Map of Vraca Memorial Park. Source: Committee for the Construction of the 
Vraca Memorial Park, Various Authors, Spomen park Vraca, (Sarajevo: 
Directorate of the Vraca, Ivančići and Igman Memorial Complexes and 
Memorials, 1985). Modified by author. 
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Figure 8: Aerial view of Vraca Memorial Park in the 1980s. Source: Committee for the 
Construction of the Vraca Memorial Park, Various Authors, Spomen park Vraca, 
(Sarajevo: Directorate of the Vraca, Ivančići and Igman Memorial Complexes and 
Memorials, 1985). 
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Figure 9: Spomen Park Vraca, Message by Tito at the Ceremonial Plateau, April 2012. 
 
 
Figure 10: Spomen Park Vraca, Ceremonial Plateau with Eternal Flame and Fountain, 
October 2009. 
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Figure 11: Spomen Park Vraca, Eternal Flame and Fountain, November 2011. 
 
 
Figure 12: Spomen Park Vraca, Memorial to Fallen Fighters, October 2009. 
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Figure 13: Spomen Park Vraca, Memorial to Fallen Fighters, October 2009. 
 
 
Figure 14: Spomen Park Vraca, view of ceremonial plateau, October 2009. 
  151 
 
Figure 15: Spomen Park Vraca, Fortress, March 2011. 
 
 
Figure 16: Spomen Park Vraca, Fortress, October 2009. 
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Figure 17: Spomen Park Vraca, Fortress, October 2009. 
 
 
Figure 18: Spomen Park Vraca, view of the city from the ceremonial plateau, October 2009. 
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Figure 19: Spomen Park Vraca, view of the city from the ceremonial plateau, March 2011. 
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Figure 20: Spomen Park Vraca, Sculpture to Women Combatants, October 2009. 
 
Figure 21: Spomen Park Vraca, Sculpture to Women Combatants, October 2009. 
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Figure 22: Spomen Park Vraca, Execution Site and Sculpture to Women Combatants, 
October 2009. 
 
 
Figure 23: Spomen Park Vraca, Inscription at Execution Site, October 2009. 
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Figure 24: Spomen Park Vraca, Informative panel installed by the Commission, March 2012. 
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Appendix four: Kovaci Shahid Cemetery-Memorial 
 
Figure 25: Map of Kovaci Memorial Complex. Created by author on the basis of an 
informative leaflet collected at the Fund. 
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Figure 26: Burial ground with old nisans with Kovaci cemetery-memorial in the background, 
June 2011. 
 
Figure 27: Burial ground with old nisans between Ploca and Sirokac Streets, June 2011. 
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Figure 28: Flags at the entrance of Kovaci cemetery-memorial, April 2012. 
 
 
Figure 29: Kovaci, Central nisan-monument, June 2011. 
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Figure 30: Kovaci, Central nisan-monument, June 2011. 
 
Figure 31: View of Kovaci cemetery-memorial with path leading to the Mausoleum of Alija 
Izetbegovic, April 2012. 
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Figure 32: Kovaci, Mausoleum of Alija Izetbegovic, June 2011. 
 
Figure 33: Kovaci, Mausoleum of Alija Izetbegovic, June 2011. 
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Figure 34: Kovaci, Alija Izetbegovic's grave, June 2011. 
 
Figure 35: View of Kovaci cemetery-memorial, June 2011. 
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Figure 36: Kovaci, Grave of Gen. Rasim Delic, June 2011. 
 
Figure 37: View of the Kovaci cemetery-memorial with river, April 2012. 
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Figure 38: Kovaci, Monument to the Young Muslims, June 2011. 
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 6 Memory performed in Sarajevo 
“History is, to every reasonable man, the best 
teacher of life. In the past century she showed us 
two times that Bosnia and Herzegovina is, both as 
an idea and as a historic-legal fact, stronger than 
the forces of destruction and disintegration. She 
survived mighty enemies. And each attempt to 
divide this country only brought unneeded 
sufferings and massacres to its citizens, but also to 
those who aimed at dividing her”.1 
 
"The pageant is a drama in which the place is the 
hero and the development of the community is the 
plot".2 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Monuments and memorials do not automatically acquire functions of display and 
naturalisation of particular reconstructions of history in the public space, simply by 
virtue of being erected. If left unattended, monuments might as well become 
“invisible” - reminders of memories and messages that, instead of emerging as 
landmarks from the urban environment, become indiscernible parts of it and remain 
 
                                                     
1 Speech by member of BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegovic for the anniversary of November 25, Day of 
Statehood, 2010. Published on the website of the Presidency of BiH, www.predsjednistvobih.ba, 
translation: author. 
2 Langdon quoted in Burke, “Co-Memorations,” 116. 
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seemingly unnoticed. This chapter concentrates on official commemorative 
celebrations: the ritual actions performed by institutional actors on dates ascribed 
with symbolic significance, and staged at or around sites of memory charged with 
meaning within official accounts of the past.3 Winter (2008) argues that public 
monuments have a life cycle: the initial phase entailing the erection of markers and 
the introduction of ceremonies centred around them must be followed by “a period 
of institutionalization and routinization of their use”,4 after which the monument will 
either fade away or endure as an active site of memory. With commemorations, “the 
ritual action is grounded in the annual calendar and becomes institutionalised as part 
of civic routine”,5 with a twofold effect: the official ceremony invests monuments – 
and the version(s) of history they recollect – with significance for the (national) 
community; and the calendrical rite upholds and fixes the commemorated events in 
collective memory on account of its performative nature.6 
Anniversaries of historical events endowed with significance for the whole state 
are usually enhanced with the establishment of public holidays, that reinforce the 
memory of these recurrences by introducing new habits in everyday life; and the 
performance of formal ceremonies, through which government officials display 
compliance with the symbolic marking of the memory and identity of the nation, and 
convey messages related to both. As “to participate in a national memory is to know 
the key events of the nation's history, to embrace its symbols, and connect to its 
festive dates”,7 commemorations then serve the manyfold purpose of highlighting 
such key events as embodied by specific monuments, and bring people together 
around them in “collaborative acts of recall or recollection”.8  
Through the selection of particular moments in the history of the group and their 
endowment with significance for the community, commemorations elicit participation 
to a ritual “performance of consensus” around “an agreed interpretation of the past 
 
                                                     
3 Although some of the considerations exposed in this introduction might concern commemorations in 
general, practices of counter-commemoration and alternative modes of recollection of the recent past will 
be discussed in chapter seven, “Other memories/Memories of the Other(s)”. 
4 Winter, “Sites of Memory and the Shadow of War,” 61. 
5 Gough, “Commemoration of War,” 217. 
6 Connerton (1989) highlights the importance of the performative character of commemorative ceremonies 
and bodily practices as acts of transfer of collective memory, and argues that a focus on the performativity 
of rituals would enhance the study of “invented traditions” with regards to the “question of their 
persistence,” Connerton, How Societies Remember, 103. 
7 Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” 101. 
8 Burke, “Co-Memorations,” 106. 
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linked to shared views of the present”,9 and thus function in the interests of group 
identity construction and consolidation. Simultaneously, the ritual performance of 
symbolic actions and speeches concurs in the production and articulation of the 
meaning of the sites selected, and, by extension, of the “agreed interpretation of the 
past” at the centre of celebrations. In this way, reinforcing feelings of group affiliation 
while mediating on the meaning(s) of the events recalled, commemorations play a 
central role in the transmission and sustainment of both memory and identity 
constructs. 
As Ashplant, Dawson and Roper note, commemorations secure political effects 
insofar as they accomplish to weave memories together into “a narrative that is both 
widely held and publicly expressed”.10 In the absence of overt contestation, these two 
features are at least to some extent part and parcel of the functions of display and 
normalisation of official commemorations, whereby the establishment of public 
holidays on (selected) significant dates and the organisation of rituals performed by 
(the highest) authorities in the public space convey the impression that celebrations 
are accepted and endorsed by the wider public. From this viewpoint, 
commemorations stem out of, and manifest, “a conviction, shared by a broad 
community, that the moment recalled is both significant and informed by a moral 
message”,11 and that the observance of its recurrence is entwined with the identity of 
the community. In this way, as Azaryahu remarks, “a primary effect of public 
commemoration is that the 'past', that is, an authorized version of history, is 
potentially a shared cultural experience”.12 The function of such cultural experience, 
according to Schwartz, is twofold, as “collective memory affects social reality by 
reflecting it and shaping it”.13 This analytic distinction advanced by Schwartz allows to 
read collective memory – and commemorations within it – in two complementary 
ways: as “a model of society – a reflection of its needs, problems, fears, mentality and 
aspiration – [and as] a model for society – a program that defines its experience, 
articulates its values and goals, and provides cognitive, affective, and moral 
 
                                                     
9 Ibid., 108. 
10 Ashplant, Timothy G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, “The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration. Contexts, Structures and Dynamics,” in The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration. 
(Routledge, 2000), 20. 
11 Winter, “Sites of Memory and the Shadow of War,” 62. 
12 Azaryahu, “The power of Commemorative Street-Names,” 320. 
13 Schwartz, Barry, “Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II,” American Sociological 
Review 61.5 (1996), 910. 
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orientation for realizing them”.14 Finally, by consolidating selective historical accounts 
and narratives with the performance of public rituals around specific sites of memory, 
official commemorations contribute to the generation of “usable pasts”: “pasts [that 
are] made ‘available’ for present-day use not only by the events themselves, [...] but 
also by their subsequent incorporation into commemorative traditions”.15 
In sum, commemorations are regarded here as part of symbolic politics: a 
“meaning-producing exercise” that “draws on the full range of cultural imagery and 
historical myths at the disposal of nation states [...] with an eye to (re)constructing 
diachronic continuities of identity across periods and vertical congruities of allegiance 
between nations and states”.16 Within this perspective, commemorations share 
symbolic politics' “formal properties and main objective: through symbolic meaning 
production, which naturalizes the relationship between people and politics, nation 
and state, to cater mainly for vertical solidarity within a particular political community 
and to cast moral leadership and political values as consonant with the will and 
emotions of the populace”.17 
As is the case for monuments that recollect past violence (cfr. Chapter five), official 
commemorations pertaining to the memory of war have a heightened value, 
especially in the aftermaths of conflicts waged around particular constructions of 
(ethnic or cultural) identity that resulted in the establishment of new political regimes. 
Memories of past suffering and victimisation have the ability to evoke strong 
emotional responses within society, and to load feelings of group affiliation with 
moral categories through the allocation of guilt and blame and the definition of 
external perpetrators. These qualities make war memory a particularly powerful 
instrument to uphold and foster group identity and cohesion, and contribute to its 
centrality in struggles over the right and power to commemorate in the public space.18 
The importance ascribed to war-related commemorations has been connected to 
the nation-state with the argument that “in the modern era, it has been the nation 
which has been the prime arena for the articulation of war memories and the 
mobilization of commemoration, since war has been central to its identity and 
 
                                                     
14 Ibid., emphasis original. 
15 Brubaker and Feischmidt, “1848 in 1998,” 172. 
16 Hedetoft, Ulf, “Symbolic Politics and Cultural Symbols. Identity Formation between and beyond Nations 
and States,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology, edited by Jaan Valsiner and Alberto 
Rosa (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 596-7. 
17 Ibid., 592. 
18 For examples of the function of commemorations as resources to claim visibility in the public space see 
chapter seven “Other memories/Memories of the Other(s)”. 
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symbolic continuity”.19 Accordingly, the process of refinement of war memories for 
the purposes of commemoration most often links “violence suitably sanitized and 
transformed into valour and sacrifice for a cause”20 to the creation of the (newly 
established) state or regime. In this sense, “official memory is expressed most 
explicitly via permanent memorials, and through a calendar of ceremonies (annual 
and anniversary) which repeatedly recall key wartime events, and mediate on their 
meanings”.21 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, the recent experience of armed conflict along 
ethnic lines, on the basis of which different factions envisioned and pursued different 
solutions for the organisation of the country (or parts of it), has produced a situation 
in which unresolved post-war conflictuality is channelled into “three official memory 
narratives and ethnonational identity constructions [that] dominate the memory 
landscape while simultaneously disputing each other’s right to this shared space”.22 
The constant tension between state and nation that characterises post-Dayton BiH 
(cfr. Chapter four) thus induces to consider the notion of symbolic politics and the 
functions of commemorations in a more nuanced perspective, whereby the 
articulation of war-related memories has implications for the symbolic (re)definition 
of the polity on two intersecting planes. On the one hand, the recent conflict 
constitutes a milestone in the history of BiH as a state, not only because it broke out in 
the early phases of the transition from Socialist Yugoslavia to a new regime, but also 
because the Peace Accords signed to halt it contained its Constitution (Annex IV) and 
thus established its current configuration. On the other hand, the conflict was 
construed as central to the identity and continuity of the nations (i.e. ethnies) that are 
today recognised as constitutive segments of a multinational, multi-confessional and 
multicultural polity. The mobilisation of (war-related) commemorations in this case is 
not straightforwardly employed to assert (or challenge) the identity and legitimacy of 
the ‘nation-state’, as no such thing is in place in BiH. In this context, the functions of 
official celebrations in the symbolic articulation of memory and identity constructs are 
referred alternately to the state or nation in ambiguous and complex ways. 
 
                                                     
19 Ashplant et al., “The Politics of War Memory,” 22. 
20 Ashworth, “The Memorialization of Violence,” 233. 
21 Ashplant et al., “The Politics of War Memory,” 22. 
22 Moll, Nicolas, “Fragmented Memories in a Fragmented Country: Memory Competition and Political 
Identity-Building in Today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Nationalities Papers 41.6 (2013), 912, emphasis 
original. 
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This chapter investigates the meanings and messages ascribed to official 
commemorations of war with regards to the symbolic (re)definition of the identity of 
the polity in today’s BiH, concentrating on ceremonies organised and promoted by 
authorities in the capital city. The next sections present an overview of the legal 
framework pertaining to public holidays, and three official commemorations observed 
between 2010 and 2012: the Day of Statehood (Dan Drzanvosti, November 25); the Day 
of Independence (Dan Nezavisnosti, March 1) and the Day of the City of Sarajevo (Dan 
Grada Sarajeva, April 6). The study of these three celebrations, two recurrences of 
state-wide significance and one celebration of local import, aims at investigating the 
current processes of construction of narratives on the history and identity of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and the role of Sarajevo as capital city and stage for the symbolic 
recollection of past conflicts. 
6.2 The symbolism of state v. public holidays in BiH 
“Public commemoration is an activity defined by 
the gestures and words of those who come 
together at sites of memory to recall particular 
aspects of the past, their past”.23 
As is the case with the management of cultural heritage (cfr. Chapter four), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today does not have a common overall law on state holidays and 
celebrations. Perennial disagreements over state holidays have impeded until now the 
formal institutionalisation of dates of celebration for the whole country, so that public 
holidays are regulated at the level of the entities and (within FBiH) cantons, through 
the approval of calendars of dates/events of public significance and of decisions 
concerning individual recurrences. Given the symbolic functions of commemorations, 
the lack of a common calendar of recurrences conveys the image of “a state which is 
unfinished and which does not have common values that all the citizens agree to 
promote and celebrate”.24 
In 2009, the Ministry for Civil Affairs presented a draft law that envisioned four 
days of holiday for the whole state: New Year’s Day, May 1 (Workers’ Day), May 9 (Day 
 
                                                     
23 Winter, “Sites of Memory and the Shadow of War,” 70. 
24 Boskovic, “Happy Holidays for Whom,” 138. 
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of the Victory over Fascism and Europe Day), and June 26 (International Day in 
support of victims of violence), to which religious holidays would be added for 
believers of Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish faith. Although none of these 
dates was specifically related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its sovereignty, which 
would have caused disagreements, the draft was rejected by a majority of votes in the 
House of Representatives in late 2009.25 In November 2013, a new draft was 
submitted to the state parliament by Denis Becirovic, Second Deputy Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and member of the Social Democratic Party of BiH 
(Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine, SDP). This new draft proposed three 
types of holidays: state holidays, religious holidays, and a Day of Remembrance. While 
religious holidays correspond to different dates for believers of the Islamic, Orthodox, 
Catholic, Jewish and other faiths (five days for each group), the state holidays 
proposed for the whole country include: New Year (January 1-2); the Day of 
Independence of BiH (March 1); the International Workers’ Day (May 1); the Day of 
Victory over Fascism and Europe Day (May 9); the Day of entry of BiH in the United 
Nations (May 22); the Day of uprising against Fascism (July 27); the Day of Statehood 
of BiH (November 25). The draft states that these dates should be observed as 
holidays, and officially marked with the “highlighting, on the appropriate sites, of the 
symbols of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the law” (Art. 11, para 4). The 
Day of Remembrance is established in Article 14 as “Day of Remembrance of the 
victims of genocide in Srebrenica”, to be celebrated on July 11.26 Mr. Becirovic 
presented the draft to the Parliament stating that this law would “honour the country 
and its sovereignty, respect all peoples and citizens, demonstrate [the country’s] 
antifascist foundations and observe the guidelines of the European Parliament”.27 
 
                                                     
25 According to journalist Almin Terzic, the draft was met with as many as 70 amendments proposed by 
politicians from Republika Srpska, which showed a clear intention to dispute the law, “Zasto BiH nema 
zakon o drzavnim praznicima” (Why BiH does not have a law on state holidays), AlJazeera Balkans, 
1.03.2013. See also “Utvrden Prijedlog zakona o praznicima BiH” (Draft law on state holidays of BiH ratified), 
website of the Public Administration Reform Coordinator’s Office (Ured Koordinatora za Reformu Javne 
Uprave), 16.07.2009, http://parco.gov.ba, and R. Segrt, “Nesporni Nova Godina I 1. maj” (New Year and May 
1 uncontested), Nezavisne Novine, 04.01.2009. 
26 Prijedlog Zakona o Praznicima Bosne I Hercegovine (Draft Law on state holidays of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), 25.11.2013, available at the website of the Parliament of BiH, Laws in parliamentary procedure 
(Zakoni u parlamentarnoj proceduri), www.parliament.ba. No agreement has yet been reached on this 
draft. 
27 A. Terzic, “Novi prijedlog zakona o praznicima BiH u proceduri: postivanje drzave, naroda, gradana I 
antifasisticki temelja” (New draft law on state holidays in BiH in procedure: respect of the state, peoples, 
citizens and antifascist foundations), Oslobodjenje, 09.01.2014, translation: author. 
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These series of dates nevertheless soon opened up debates. In particular, the dates of 
March 1, marking the Day of Independence, and July 11, as Day of Remembrance of 
the victims of genocide, were criticised as recurrences in which “Serbs cannot 
identify, because [they represent] Bosnjak political propaganda and exclusively their 
vision of the past war”.28 
The 1st of March marks the anniversary of the 1992 referendum on the 
independence of BiH, required by the (then) European Community as a condition for 
the international recognition of the country.29 The referendum was held amidst 
tensions, in a period in which the dissolution of Yugoslavia had already degenerated 
into war in Slovenia and Croatia, and violence was spreading to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Politically, the country was divided between a segment in favour of 
independence, led by Muslim and Croat parties, and a segment strongly against it, 
with Serb representatives calling for a boycott of the referendum.30 This polarisation 
was made evident earlier that year with the proclamation, on January 9, of the 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska Republika Bosne i Hercegovine), 
envisaged as political administrative framework for Serb regions and areas in BiH, 
willing to remain part of Yugoslavia and thus ready, if necessary, to separate their 
territories from those of other political communities (of other peoples) of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Republic changed its name in August 1992 into Republika Srpska, 
and it’s nowadays one of the two entities comprising BiH.31 Although the turnout at 
 
                                                     
28 Lazar Prodanovic, representative of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez Nezavisnih 
Socijaldemokrata, SNSD, the same party of President of RS Milorad Dodik) in the state Parliament, in M. F., 
“BiH: Srbi protiv zakona o praznicima” (BiH: Serbs against the law on state holidays), Vecerne Novosti, 
17.01.2014, translation: author. 
29 The referendum was organised on 29th February - 1st March 1992, and posed the question: “Are you for a 
sovereign and independent Bosnia and Hercegovina, a state of equal citizens, the peoples of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina - Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and members of other nations - living in it?”. Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina: February 29-
March 1, 1992 (Washington, DC, 1992), 9. 
30 The first multiparty elections in November-December 1990 were won by parties structured around 
national interests: of the seven members of the Presidency, the two Muslim seats were won by the Party of 
Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA), the two Serb seats by the Serbian Democratic Party 
(Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS), and the two Croat seats by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ). These three parties also won the majority of seats in the Assembly. 
31 According to Correia (2013), the basic aim of this change of denomination was to erase reference to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the context of a “war against memory” whereby “the memory of past 
cooperation, mutual respect and influence among Bosnian nationalities had to be erased because the claim 
of legitimacy for the Serb nationalist project was based on the denial of the possibility of peaceful 
coexistence in multi-ethnic Bosnia; Correia, Sarah, “The Politics of Memory in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,” 
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the referendum amounted to circa 63% of the eligible voting population (which 
suggested a success of the boycott called by the Serb Democratic Party of BiH), the 
results endorsed the republic’s sovereignty and independence with over 90% of votes 
in favour (99.7%).32 In the immediate aftermaths of the referendum, war broke out in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and lasted until late 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement 
was signed. 
The recurrence of the referendum anniversary in today’s BiH is marked by 
contestation every year, as it provides the occasion for politicians of the main 
nationalist parties to disseminate through the media (re)interpretations of the (more 
or less recent) history of the country and reassessments of the causes and the 
outcomes of the 1992-95 conflict. The lack of institutional cohesion over the 
establishment of this date as symbolic recurrence is first of all conveyed by the fact 
that only two members of the state Presidency out of three perform formal 
ceremonies such as publishing a greeting to the citizens, holding a speech during 
gatherings in the Presidency building, and participating to commemorative rituals in 
the city33. The Serb member of the Presidency is usually – and symbolically – absent 
from all these events, and only seldom participates to debates in the media, where it 
is instead the President of Republika Srpska (and to some extent representatives of 
Croat nationalist parties) to emerge as “counterpart” to the state authorities. 
Overall, public interviews and speeches on occasion of symbolic recurrences 
annually provide the opportunity to exercise political rhetoric and reassert divergent 
definitions of the recent conflict. 
In 2012, for the 20th anniversary of the 1992 referendum, for instance, members of 
the Presidency Bakir Itezbegovic and Zeljko Komsic alluded to controversies over the 
significance of the Day of Independence in their speeches during the reception 
traditionally held for representatives of local institutions and the international 
community in the Presidency building. President Izetbegovic opened his speech with 
the remark that 
“[t]his day has a special place in the history of our country. On this day 20 years 
ago the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided the fate of their homeland. 
64 percent of them voted FOR a sovereign and independent Bosnia and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values, edited by Ola Listhaug and Sabrina Ramet 
(Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013), 331. 
32 CSCE, The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
33 The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a collective organism composed of three members, one for 
each constituent people of BiH. 
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Herzegovina. […] Notwithstanding this, there are still efforts to untruthfully 
interpret the events of 20 years ago”34 
and President Komsic asserted that 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina today is an independent state. Notwithstanding 
whether some like it or not, whether some observe today as a public holiday or 
not, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands and exists as an independent state. Even 
the biggest opponents of Bosnia and Herzegovina today must recognise this 
fact as reality”.35 
At the same time, the press reported statements of Serb and Croat politicians who 
“do not recognise the Day of Independence of BiH”, and reminded that March 1 
would be, as usual, a regular working day in Republika Srpska.36 The leader of the 
Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
Bosnie i Hercegovine, HDZBiH) Dragan Covic reportedly stated that in BiH “each one 
has the right to celebrate what they want, because [BiH] is such a state”, adding that 
this will be the case until parliamentary procedures establish state holidays that 
everybody will support and respect.37 Concurrently, RS President Milorad Dodik 
defined March 1 a “recurrence of the Bosnjak nation”, that Bosnjak politicians try to 
“impose by force as a state holiday” every year.38 According to President Milorad 
Dodik, in RS this holiday is associated with the beginning of the war, as it reminds of 
the referendum with which  
 
                                                     
34 Obracanje clana Predsjednistva BiH Bakira Izetbegovica na prijemu povodom Dana nezavisnosti BiH 
(Speech by member of the BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegovic at the reception on occasion of the Day of 
Independence of BiH), 2012, website of the Presidency of BiH, www.predsjednistvobih.ba, translation: 
author. 
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BiH (Speech of the Chair of BiH Presidency Zeljko Komsic at the reception on occasion of the Day of 
Independence of BiH), 2012, website of the Presidency of BiH, www.predsjednistvobih.ba, translation: 
author. 
36 “Covic i Dodik ne priznaju Dan nezavisnosti BiH” (Covic and Dodik do not recognise the Day of 
Independence of BiH), Fena reported on Oslobodjenje, 29.02.2012, www.oslobodjenje.ba, translation: 
author. 
37 Ibid. HDZBiH is the largest political party representing Croats in BiH. Its president Dragan Covic is 
currently Croat representative in the House of Peoples of BiH, elected in 2010 with 10,99% of votes from the 
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38 “Dodik: Dan nezavisnosti je praznik bosnjackog naroda” (Dodik: the Day of Independence is a holiday of 
the Bosnjak nation), BH News, 01.03.2012, www.bh-news.com, translation: author. 
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“the Muslim-Croat majority decided on the secession of BiH” from Yugoslavia, 
after which “not considering the political stance of the Serb people of BiH, 
[Croats and Bosnjaks], with the forced secession led by Alija Izetbegovic and his 
followers, did what they did, with dramatic consequences, deaths and sufferings 
of people on the whole territory of BiH”.39  
The submission of a new draft law on state holidays intensified such debates in the 
media and was met with the contention that “Serbs will never celebrate or observe 
the Day of Independence of BiH as public holiday”.40 
Although, as reported above, Croat representatives often question official 
celebrations and advocate the right to separate holidays, the Entity of FBiH does not 
emerge as a unitary political-institutional subject acting in opposition to the overall 
state of BiH. This is partly due to its structure and mechanisms of government: a 
federation of ten highly autonomous districts where calendars of significant dates are 
not established at the level of the Entity but rather approved individually by each 
Canton. Within this framework, the symbolic contestation of state-wide public 
holidays is somehow mitigated by the fact that limited compliance with Federal 
directives on public holidays, and additional celebrations related to events deemed 
significant for the Croat population, maintain a local character.41 Additionally, the 
Sarajevo Canton, within which Sarajevo acts as capital city of both the Federation and 
the overall state of BiH, follows calendars that establish March 1 as Day of 
Independence of BiH, and annually celebrates its symbolic significance with official 
commemorations. This means that, while controversies might be amplified in and by 
the media, debates within the common organs of government of the Federation do 
not reach a situation of institutional stalemate as is the case at the state level. The 
main opponent to the establishment of common dates of celebrations at the state 
level is thus represented by the political establishment of Republika Srpska, 
supported by Serb representatives within common institutions. 
The government of Republika Srpska follows a Law on State Holidays approved in 
2005, according to which five dates are declared republican holidays: Republic Day 
 
                                                     
39 “Dodik: ne slavimo Dan nezavisnosti BiH” (Dodik: we do not celebrate the Day of Independence of BiH), 
Radio-televizija Srbije, RTS, 27.02.2014, www.rts.rs, translation: author. 
40 Ibid. 
41 For instance, on the two dates celebrated as state holidays by the highest authorities in Sarajevo (March 1 
and November 25, see the following section of the chapter) limited compliance is exercised either by 
keeping offices of local institutions open as in working days (while local offices of state institutions are 
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Herzegovina. 
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(January 9); New Year (January 1-2); the International Workers’ Day (May 1-2); the Day 
of Victory over Fascism (May 9); and the Day of Establishment of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 21).42 Within 
this series, the two dates that symbolically define the polity are January 9, day of the 
proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and 
November 21, date of the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, which recognised 
RS as an Entity and thus legitimised its existence. 
With no public holiday or commemoration related to the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, official celebrations marking the creation of RS entangle with the 
symbolic contestation of BiH. This entails the recollection of the events that led to 
armed conflict in 1992 and their articulation into a narrative that sustains the 
legitimacy of RS. Such narrative purports the creation of RS as the only viable 
measure to protect the rights of the Serb population of BiH, and ascribes the blame 
for the outbreak of war to the Bosnjak political leadership, as exemplified by the 
speech held by President Milorad Dodik on occasion of the 20th anniversary from the 
establishment of RS, on January 9 2012: 
“In the time of emergence of RS, there existed no state of BiH, which would 
only with the referendum of March 1, 1992, with no participation of the Serb 
peoples, try to impose itself illegally. […] When BiH started on that path, the 
Serb people did not have any choice. It had to protect its legal and legitimate 
rights. […] Republika Srpska came into existence as a historical need and 
expression of the legitimate desire of the Serb peoples and not as a result of 
armed conflict, because at that time there was peace in BiH. Republika 
Srpska is an oath that we will live like free and dignified people”.43 
Within this reconstruction of the recent history of the country, participation to the 
peace talks at Dayton in 1995 provided the recognition of the international 
community, hence the establishment of November 21 as date of symbolic importance: 
"We [demonstrated] and for the most part sustained our legitimacy and legality, 
as foundations of sovereign authority, with the signing of all 11 annexes of the 
Dayton Agreement. [...] We must repeat it once and for all: the rights pertaining 
to Republika Srpska according to [this] international Agreement and to 
 
                                                     
42 Zakon o Praznicima Republike Srpske, Doc. No. 01-477/05, July 27, 2005, available on the website of the 
Government of Republika Srpska, www.vladars.net. 
43 Speech held by RS President Milorad Dodik on occasion of Day of the Republic (Dan Republike), 
09.01.2012, website of the Presidency of Republika Srpska, www.predsjednikrs.net, translation: author. 
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international law belong to all its citizens, and this is why we insist so much on 
them. When we see what is being done to damage Republika Srpska, it becomes 
even more an obligation than a right. We want and we struggle to protect the 
status of Republika Srpska in Dayton BiH. For this we say that our politics and 
stance can be summarised in the motto: independent Republika Srpska in 
Dayton BiH”.44 
In January 2013, member of BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegovic submitted an Appeal for 
a review of the constitutionality of the RS Law on public holidays to the Constitutional 
Court of BiH. The Appeal contested the designation of January 9 as republican 
holiday, arguing that its celebrations are discriminatory of other ethnic groups in BiH, 
since “every signing of public holidays of an entity which symbolises only one, or only 
two out of three constitutional peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, represents 
measures which have been calculated for differentiation, exclusion or preferment”, 
and thus violate the country’s Constitution.45 Presenting the Appeal, Izetbegovic 
reminded that the “Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serb 
people of BiH” adopted by the Assembly of the Serb people of BiH on January 9, 1992, 
clearly manifested the intention to create a state of the Serb nation based on the 
exclusion and discrimination of all other nations and the suppression of their rights, 
which would later become evident “during the aggression of BiH, when a systematic 
and planned ethnic cleansing of all non-Serbs was carried out on its territory, […] 
culminating in the genocide against Bosnjaks in Srebrenica”.46 This perspective 
strongly challenges the legitimacy of Republika Srpska and considers it an entity 
“created through the aggression, genocide and ethnic cleansing of Bosnjaks and 
Croats”.47 
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Constitutional Court of BiH an Appeal for a Review of Constitutionality of Article 2.b) and Article 3.b) of the 
Law on Public Holidays of RS”, website of the Presidency of BiH, 17.01.2013. 
47 “Izetbegovic: RS nastala agresijom i genocidom” (Izetbegovic: RS was created through aggression and 
genocide), Nezavisne Novine, 29.11.2012, www.nezavisne.com, translation: author. 
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6.3 The commemorative tour: celebrating the state in 
Sarajevo 
The lack of a common law on public holidays does not inhibit the performance of 
official celebrations of events symbolically connected to the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. On the contrary, observation in the field conveys the impression of a 
commemorative routine in the process of standardisation and consolidation, 
particularly with regards to recurrences of symbolic significance for the 
history/identity of the country.48 
Among the official celebrations annually held in the city of Sarajevo, two dates 
represent anniversaries of state-wide importance, recollecting events that have been 
endowed with symbolic significance as foundational moments in the history of the 
country: the 1st of March, Day of Independence (Dan Nezavisnosti), and the 25th of 
November, Day of Statehood (Dan Drzavnosti). 
The 25th of November is the anniversary of a meeting held in Mrkonjic Grad in 1943, 
during which almost 250 delegates of the partisan movement of BiH created the State 
Anti-fascist Council for the People’s Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zemaljsko 
Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja Bosne i Hercegovine, ZAVNOBIH). 
Established within the administrative umbrella organisation of the Yugoslav Partisans 
(the Anti-fascist Council for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia – Antifasisticko 
Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ), ZAVNOBIH was proclaimed to be 
the only recognised representative of the people(s) of BiH during the war of 
liberation. In this context, a unanimously approved Resolution declared ZAVNOBIH’s 
main objectives to be the strengthening of the unity and fraternity of the Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims of BiH; the further advancement of the armed struggle against 
the occupiers; and the consolidation of the Partisan Committees as organs of power. 
Through the development of the principles delineated in Mrkonjic Grad and 
formalised in documents issued at subsequent meetings, ZAVNOBIH became the 
 
                                                     
48 Commemorative rituals on anniversaries of local events related to the 1992-1995 conflict in the city of 
Sarajevo take place very frequently, in some periods of the year almost on a daily basis, and vary from 
events organised and performed by specific associations (e.g. associations of veterans, associations of 
relatives of victims), to events involving the participation of authorities or institutional representatives from 
the levels of administration pertinent to the event commemorated. This section will not survey such rituals, 
but rather concentrate on commemorations of events endowed with meaning for the whole state of BiH, 
and accordingly performed by the highest authorities of the country. 
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highest governing organ of the anti-fascist movement in BiH and the bearer of 
Bosnian statehood.49 
November 25 and March 1 were endowed with significance and proclaimed, 
respectively, Day of Statehood and Day of Independence with laws issued in 1995 and 
published in the Official Gazette of what was, at the time, the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (RBiH). As mentioned above, the endowment of these two dates with 
state-wide significance is symbolically sanctioned by the country’s highest authority – 
the State Presidency – with the publication of written greetings and the delivery of 
speeches on the eves of the two dates, and with personal participation of two 
Presidents to ritual public commemorations. To provide a formal institutional 
framework to the celebrations, in the absence of an overall legally approved calendar, 
the Federation of BiH annually issues a communication whereby it proclaims these 
dates public holidays. For instance, during the days preceding the 25th of November, 
through the news page of the website of the Federal Government, the FBiH Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policies informs that “by the Law on the proclamation of the 25th 
of November Day of Statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina,50 it was determined that 
the 25th of November is Day of Statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that on that 
day state institutions, enterprises and other legal persons do not work”.51 
Public ceremonies on these two dates follow the same rituals and essentially 
consist in official visits of representatives to a series of monuments throughout the 
city, with the formal laying of wreaths bearing the names of individual authorities and 
institutions. 
The core of this commemorative tour comprises three monuments in the centre of 
the city: the Eternal Flame (Vjecna Vatra), the Shahid cemetery-memorial at Kovaci 
(Sehidsko Spomen Mezarje Kovaci), and the Monument to the killed children of 
besieged Sarajevo (Spomenik ubijenoj djeci opkoljenog Sarajeva 1992.-1995. godine). 
 
                                                     
49 Redzic, Enver, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War, (London: Cass, 2004), 230. ZAVNOBIH 
met again in Jaice in November 1943, where a temporary government was created; in June-July 1944 in 
Sanski Most, where the Decision concerning the formation of ZAVNOBIH as the highest legislative and 
executive representative body of Bosnian peoples and the Declaration on the rights of the Citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were approved; and in April 1945 in Sarajevo, where the Law regarding the 
transformation of ZAVNOBIH into the People’s Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Law on 
People’s rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina were issued; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World 
War, 230-236. 
50 “Official Gazette RBiH”, no. 9/95. 
51 Communication issued on 16.11.2011, translation: author. The same formula with minor variations is usually 
employed in communications issued on the days preceding the 1st of March. See 
http://fbihvlada.org.ba/bosanski/aktuelno. 
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The Eternal Flame was erected for the first anniversary of the liberation of Sarajevo 
from Nazi occupiers at the end of World War II, the 6th of April 1946. Located at the 
corner between Marshal Tito Street (Ulica Marsala Tita) and the pedestrian Ferhadija 
Street, this monument bears the symbol of the five-pointed star and an inscription 
giving thanks to the units of the Yugoslav Army who participated in the liberation of 
the city, carved in the three colours of the Yugoslav flag – blue, white and red: 
“With courage and the jointly spilled 
blood of the fighters of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian, 
Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian brigades 
of the glorious Yugoslav National Army; with the joint  
efforts and sacrifices of Sarajevan patriots 
Serbs, Muslims and Croats – on the 6th of April 1945 
was liberated Sarajevo, capital  
city of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Eternal glory and gratitude to the fallen heroes 
of the liberation of Sarajevo and our homeland, 
on the first anniversary of its liberation 
a grateful Sarajevo” (see figure 39).52 
The erection of this monument also provided the occasion for the renaming of the 
street, previously dedicated to King Alexander, after Marshal Tito.53 
Among the first monuments to be erected in Sarajevo after the end of World War 
II, the Eternal Flame was endowed with a particular meaning for the city, within which 
“the event of the liberation of Sarajevo did not signify only a victory over fascism, but 
rather that date symbolically represented the beginning of the construction of a new 
socialist society under the leadership of the communists”.54 The flame burning on the 
monument, “witness[ing] the struggle for freedom and the will to build a new 
 
                                                     
52 Original text: “Hrabroscu I zajednicki prolivenom/ krvlju boraca Bosansko-Hercegovackih,/ Hrvatskih, 
Crnogorskih I Srpskih brigada/ slavne Jugoslavenske Armije, zajednickim/ naporima I zrtvama Sarajevskih 
rodoljuba/ Srba, Muslimana I Hrvata – 6 Aprila 1945/ godine oslobodeno je Sarajevo glavni/ grad Narodne 
Republike Bosne I Hercegovine/ Vjecna slava I hvala palim junacima/ za oslobodjenje Sarajeva I nase otadzbine/ o 
prvoj godisnici svog oslobodjenja/ Zahvalno Sarajevo”. 
53 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 56. During World War II, the street had been renamed “Ante 
Pavelic”, leader of the Ustasa movement and ruler of wartime Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna 
Drzava Hrvatska, NDH), and in August 1945 it had been temporarily returned its old name, “King Alexander” 
(Ibid.). 
54 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 56, translation: author. 
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society”,55 was lit in 1946 and almost never went out, with the exception of the years 
of the siege in the early 1990s, when the absence of the flame became associated 
with the “attempt to extinguish the life of the city”.56 
Custo reports that during the 1980s and early 1990s some proposals to modify the 
text and symbolism of the Eternal Flame were advanced and discussed.57 While none 
of these entailed the monument’s dismantlement or the eradication of its original 
meaning, the latest proposals envisaged a refinement of its meaning through the 
integration of the 1992-95 war – as the most recent defence and liberation of the city 
– aside the (revised) text referring to the older experience of WWII, with both the 
symbols of the five-pointed star and the Lily.58 In the end, though, the monument 
maintained its original form, enduring armed conflict as well as social and political 
transition. The fact that the visit to the Eternal Flame constitutes the starting point of 
the commemorative tour held annually on important dates, attended by 
representatives of all levels of government, suggests that it is still regarded as a 
central symbol of the city (see figures 40, 41, 42). 
The second site usually visited on commemorations is the Kovaci cemetery-
memorial, perhaps the most important site of the memory of the 1992-95 conflict in 
today’s Sarajevo (cfr. Chapter five). Located near the historic centre of the city, the 
memorial integrates the local experience of conflict into a broader, ‘national’ (i.e. of 
the state) narrative on the emergence and affirmation of independent BiH. On official 
celebrations, authorities usually lay wreaths of flowers at the central nisan-monument 
dedicated to the 1992-1995 war, while some representatives additionally walk through 
the cemetery to pay tribute to the mausoleum of the first president of independent 
BiH (see figures 43, 44, 45, 46). On these occasions, personnel wearing uniforms hold 
the flags of BiH at the entrance of the ceremonial plateau and stand at attention with 
their hand on military salute aside the central monument and the grave of Alija 
 
                                                     
55 Ibid., translation: author. 
56 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 61, translation: author. To be precise, the flame went off on a couple 
more occasions due to the fact that bills were not paid to the gas company, but always for very brief 
periods. 
57 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 57-61, see also chapter five. 
58 The new configuration of the monument would entail the installation of two separate plaques. One of 
them would bear the inscription “To the liberators of Sarajevo – to the fighters of the national liberation 
war 1941-45” (Oslobodiocima Sarajeva – borcima narodnooslobodilacke borbe 1941-45. godine) and the symbol 
of the five-pointed star; the other would recite “To the defenders of Sarajevo in 1992-1995. The citizens of 
Sarajevo” (Braniocima Sarajeva 1992-1995. godine / Gradjani Sarajeva), complemented by the symbol of the 
Lily; Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu.” 
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Izetbegovic, conveying a character of solemnity to the official ritual (see figures 47, 
48). 
The Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo (Spomenik ubijenoj djeci 
opkoljenog Sarajeva 1992.-1995. godine) was advocated by the Association of Parents 
of Children Killed During the Siege (Udruženja roditelja ubijene djece opkoljenog 
Sarajeva 92.-95. godine) and was inaugurated in 2009 as part of the overall Project 
“Siege and Defence of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995”, adopted by the Sarajevo 
Canton in 2006.59 It consists of a round shape fountain surrounding two abstract glass 
sculptures that represent a mother willing to protect her child (see figures 49 to 52). 
The ring around the fountain has a bronze surface imprinted with the footprints of 
kids siblings of the children commemorated. Tribute to the most innocent victims of 
the war, the monument was complemented in 2010 with some columns engraved 
with the names of the deceased children (see figure 51). During the period of its 
erection, the monument was at the centre of public debates concerning its cost, 
name and outlook, and ultimately its overall meaning.60 The controversy revolved 
around the dedication of the monument (exclusively) to those children killed within 
besieged Sarajevo, and the inference that it excludes children who died during the 
war in areas of the city that were under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. This 
distinction appears mainly significant with reference to the allocation of blame that it 
entails for the killing of innocent children. In this sense, the dedication of the 
monument seems limited to those children who fell victims of Bosnian Serb attacks, 
excluding the (equally innocent) children who died from non-Serb fire (and thus by 
hand of the mostly Bosnjak Army of BiH), implying that victims killed in those areas of 
the city under Serb control wouldn’t deserve the same reverence as those targeted by 
Serb forces encircling the city, and suggesting that children had been divided into 
‘ours’ and ‘theirs’.61 Although its erection was met with criticism, the monument is 
 
                                                     
59 Parliament of Sarajevo Canton, Odluka o usvajanju projekta ‘Opsada I odbrana Sarajeva 1992-1995. 
godine’, 23.03.2006, Doc. no. 01-05-12591/06, with amendments in 2007 and 2012: Odluka o Izmjeni I dopuni 
odluke o usvajanju projekta ‘Opsada I odbrana Sarajeva 1992-1995. godine’, 26.04.2007, Doc. no. 01-05-
11004/07; Odluka o dopumana odluke o usvajanju projekta ‘Opsada I odbrana Sarajeva 1992-1995. godine’, 
05.07.2012, Doc. no. 02-05-21353-5/12. 
60 “Orkestrirani napadi na Spomenik ubijenoj djeci” (Orchestrated attacks against the Monument to killed 
children), February 25, 2009, Fena, reproduced on www.klix.ba. 
61 S. Pecanin, “Nasa i njihova djeca” (Our and their children), Dani, April 13, 2007. Curiously, the original name 
of the monument in the Project "Siege and Defence of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995" approved in 2006 
was "monument-marker to our children of besieged Sarajevo" (Spomen-obiljezje svoj djeci opkoljenog grada 
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nowadays regularly visited on most commemorative occasions, and due to its central 
location it is increasingly known by tourists. 
After the central visits to these three monuments, some officials extend the 
commemorative tour to further sites in the city. Representatives of the Sarajevo 
Canton usually visit Vraca Memorial Park (see figs. 53, 54), dedicated to the suffering 
and liberation of the city during World War II (cfr. Chapter five), and officials of the 
City of Sarajevo lay wreaths of flowers at three more sites: the statue of Tito at the 
University Campus (former barracks of the Yugoslav Natinal Army, JNA); the Lav 
cemetery (where a monument to WWI is located), and the Square dedicated to 
ZAVNOBIH in the suburb of Alipasino Polje (Trg Zavnobih-a).  
The complete tour of celebrations of March 1 and November 25 lasts for a whole 
morning and draws a rather complex path across the city of Sarajevo. At each site, 
representatives and institutional delegations perform the same standardised 
gestures: they approach the monument, position a wreath of flowers at its basis, and 
stand in front of it in sign of respect, either unmoved or with the hands in front of the 
face in sign of (Islamic) prayer (e.g. fig. 84). No words or speeches are pronounced in 
front of the monuments, so that the ritual is performed in silence under the gaze of 
the media and the present audience. The number and location of the sites visited on 
these occasions, nevertheless, makes it virtually impossible for the general public to 
attend the complete celebrations. Because many sites are not at walking distance, 
people willing to attend the celebrations must choose the locations they are 
interested in. From on year to the other, moreover, there are small variations in both 
the timetable of celebrations and the list of locations, and delegations of 
representatives sometimes split, so that they can effectively be in two places at 
once.62 
The symbolic core of these state commemorations is thus constituted by the three 
monuments usually visited at the beginning of the tour – the Eternal Flame, the 
Kovaci cemetery-memorial and the Monument to killed children – which are located in 
the centre of the city at walking distance from each other and invariably visited by 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Sarajeva, emphasis added), subsequently changed into "Monument-marker to the killed children of 
besieged Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995" with an amendment approved in 2007. 
62 For the Day of Statehood, for instance, delegations of the City of Sarajevo visited Lav cemetery in 2010 
but did not do so in 2011 and 2012. In 2010 the delegation split and representatives visited the Kovaci 
cemetery-memorial and the statue of Tito (some 4km away) at the same time; the same happened in 2011 
with the visits to Vraca Memorial Park and Zavnobih Square. 
 184 
representatives from all levels of government (Presidency of BiH, Federation of BiH, 
Sarajevo Canton and Sarajevo City, with the exception of Serb representatives). 
The endowment of these sites with a central role in such celebrations appears 
significant under two (interrelated) aspects. First, it highlights the functions of official 
performances in the consolidation of specific sites as part of the naturalised memory 
landscape. Second, to the extent that official commemorations “may be seen as 
statements that use the language of the past to say something about the present”,63 
it draws attention to which (emblems of) selected historical events are symbolically 
ingrained in projections of the country’s identity.  
In the case of these specific celebrations, the memory sites (in the broad meaning 
of the term, encompassing both dates and monuments) through which such 
projection is construed evoke World War II (the 1943 ZAVNOBIH meeting held on the 
25th of November and the Eternal Flame) and the 1992-1995 conflict (the 1992 
referendum date of March 1, the Kovaci cemetery-memorial and the Monument to the 
children of besieged Sarajevo), embedding war in the identity of the country. The fact 
that official celebrations on two dates recalling historical events of different periods 
are performed in the same exact manner, moreover, symbolically entwines the two 
armed conflicts into a single narrative. The ritual marking of the 25th of November and 
the visit at the Eternal Flame represent a legacy of the previous regime, often valued 
in today’s BiH through the recollection of its anti-fascist tradition and predicaments. 
The Eternal Flame celebrates the common efforts and sacrifices of the multinational 
partisan army led by Tito and the establishment of a new society in liberated Sarajevo, 
city of “Serb, Muslim and Croat” patriots (as the inscription recites). Concurrently, the 
first ZAVNOBIH’s meeting is recalled as the occasion on which, “[for] the first time in 
the history of BiH, the representatives of all its peoples/nations met and issued a 
political decision that responded to their common interests”, identified as “the 
struggle against fascism, the struggle for the equality of all peoples/nations and 
citizens, and the struggle for Bosnia and Herzegovina”.64 These two memory sites 
(the date and the monument), recollect the more distant past to promote the 
principles of anti-fascism and multiculturalism as constitutive elements of BiH. Within 
this perspective, the ritual marking of March 1 as date of symbolic importance for the 
whole country likewise November 25, establishes a direct relationship between the 
two events and thus purports the 1992 referendum as continuation of the path 
 
                                                     
63 Burke, “Co-Memorations,” 106. 
64 Speech of member of BiH Presidency Zeljko Komsic on occasion of the 25th of November 2010, Day of 
Statehood of BiH, website of the Presidency of BiH, www.predsjednistvobih.ba, translation: author. 
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initiated jointly by all BiH’s peoples in 1943. Along this path, according to this vision, 
the country had to endure and overcome suffering and sacrifice a second time in the 
1990s. Official visits to the Kovaci cemetery-memorial and the Monument to killed 
children in besieged Sarajevo accordingly symbolically honour the moral imperative to 
embed the remembrance of BiH’s heroic defenders and helpless victims into its 
foundations. 
Overall, thus, the symbolism of state celebrations seems based on a recollection of 
(some elements of) the legacy of WWII, reinterpreted and articulated through the 
experience of the 1992-95 conflict and from the perspective of post-Dayton BiH. 
6.4 April 6: Day of the City of Sarajevo 
The celebration of the Day of the City of Sarajevo (Dan Grada Sarajeva) is a 
consolidated memory practice that acquired further symbolic value in the recent past. 
Its recurrence on the 6th of April was established during Socialist Yugoslavia to 
commemorate the liberation of the city in 1945, immortalised on its first anniversary 
with the erection of the Eternal Flame in the heart of the city. Almost fifty years later, 
on the same date in 1992, the European Community recognised the independence of 
the country, and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina definitively broke out.  
The months preceding the recognition had seen a rapid escalation of tensions and 
the irreversible polarisation of nationalist parties, exacerbated by the proclamation of 
the Serbian Republic of BiH in January and the results of the referendum on 
independence at the beginning of March.  
The week preceding the recognition of BiH’s independence had been characterised 
by outbreak of violence in various areas of the country. The northeastern town of 
Bijeljina, for instance, had been assaulted at the beginning of the month by Serb 
paramilitary forces who killed, beat or expelled non-Serb inhabitants.65 On the eve of 
the recognition, April 5, Serb paramilitary units attacked and captured the police 
academy on the hills of Vraca, and barricades were erected in the area surrounding 
the Parliament building.66 On the same day, when Sarajevans gathered in the streets 
 
                                                     
65 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 282. 
66 Barricades had been erected also during the days of the referendum at the beginning of March, on key 
transit points and on the route connecting Sarajevo and Pale, which was being reorganised as capital of the 
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in anti-war and anti-nationalist demonstrations, two women – Suada Dilberovic and 
Olga Sucic – were killed by fire opened at the crowd. On the day the recognition of the 
European Community became effective, April 6, gunmen from the Holiday Inn in the 
centre of the city opened fire on the crowd of demonstrators, who had returned to 
the streets in the number of almost fifty thousands, while mortar and artillery fire was 
directed at the centre of the city, and JNA units seized control of Sarajevo’s airport.67 
In post-Dayton BiH, the date of April 6 has come to metonymically represent the 
rapid series of events through which the situation irrevocably deteriorated in early 
April 1992 and to symbolise the beginning of the war in BiH. The Day of the City of 
Sarajevo thus emblematically recollects both the end (1945) and the beginning of 
armed conflict (1992), enclosing the time span between the foundation and the 
disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia. 
Official annual celebrations of this recurrence are marked by the same 
performance pertaining to the 25th of November and the 1st of March, with a 
commemorative tour of monuments across the city: starting at 9 o’clock in the 
morning, delegations lay wreaths of flowers at the Eternal Flame (figures 55, 56, 57); 
the Kovaci cemetery-memorial (fig. 58); the Monument to the killed children of 
besieged Sarajevo (fig. 59); the Bridge dedicated to Suada Dilberovic and Olga Sucic; 
the statue of Vladimir “Valter” Peric; the statue of Tito at the University Campus (figs. 
65, 66); Vraca Memorial Park (figs. 67 to 70); the Monument to the antifascists 
hanged in Marijin Dvor in 1945; ZAVNOBIH Square in Alipasino Polje; and the Jewish 
Cemetery.  
A few sites are thus “added” to the commemorative tour performed on November 
25 and March 1. 
The Bridge Suada Dilberovic and Olga Sucic (Most Suade Dilberovic i Olge Sucic, 
previously Vrbanja Bridge) was at first renamed in 1996 after Suada Dilberovic, with 
the installation of a plaque bearing her name and a sentence reciting “a drop of my 
blood flows and Bosnia does not dry out”.68 In 2001, the plaque and the name of the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Serb-ruled parts of BiH. The reorganisation of Pale was part of a longer process started in the fall of 1991 
with the split of the BiH parliament over the decision to hold a referendum on independence, whereby Serb 
leaders of the SDS (Serb Democratic Party – Srpska Demokratska Stranka) walked out and formed a 
separate Serb Assembly; Donia, Sarajevo, 249-286. 
67 Donia, Sarajevo, 285. The Holiday Inn, not far from the Parliament building, had become a venue for SDS 
leaders and Serb paramilitaries. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) had been reorganised in the previous 
months and had become predominantly Serb in its composition. 
68 Original text: “Kap moje krvi potece i Bosna ne presusi.” 
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bridge were changed to include the names of both victims (see figures 60, 61).69 The 
bust of Vladimir Peric remembers a leader of the Yugoslav Partisans of Sarajevo 
during World War II, killed during the night between the 5th and 6th of April 1945, at 
the eve of the liberation of the city (see figures 63, 64). Known by the code name 
Valter, he directed the formation, training and deployment of the units that liberated 
Sarajevo, becoming a legendary figure of the resistance struggle and “Sarajevo’s 
embodiment of the postwar Partisan memorial culture”.70 Emblem of the city’s 
resistance to tyranny, Valter has remained a powerful symbolic reference for 
Sarajevans until present days, and his name is often invoked to support various 
causes, as was the case during the anti-nationalist and antiwar demonstrations of 
March-April 1992.71 The Jewish cemetery is a Sephardic burial ground dating back to 
the 17th century, located on the ropes of Mount Trebevic and renowned for its 
antiquity and the beauty of its tombstones. During the 1992-95 conflict, it endured the 
same fate as Vraca Memorial Park: situated on the frontline, it was used as location 
for the artillery of besieging forces and gravely damaged by the fightings. Like Vraca, 
it was mined by Bosnian Serb forces before their withdrawal, which made its postwar 
rehabilitation both complex and dangerous. The monument to the antifascists in 
Marijin Dvor (Spomen obiljezje antifasistima objesenim na Marijin Dvoru 1945. godine) 
commemorates fifty-five citizens of Sarajevo hanged at the end of March 1945 by 
decision of the Ustasa Martial Court.72 Located in front of the Faculty of Philosophy in 
the neighbourhood of Marijin Dvor, it consists of a stone cube bearing the inscriptions 
of the names of the victims on the sides. It was erected in 2008 and became part of 
the celebrations of the Day of the City from 2011 onwards. 
Overall, similarly to official celebrations on the 25th of November and the 1st of 
March, the monuments visited on the 6th of April recollect a series of significant 
 
                                                     
69 S. Mulic-Busatlija, “Trci, Nora, trci! O mostu, Suadi I Olgi...” (Run, Nora, run! About the bridge, Suada and 
olga...), Dani, Special Issue “Sjecas li se Sarajeva”, 2008, p. 33. 
70 Donia, Sarajevo, 238. 
71 The symbolic identification between Valter and the “essence” of Sarajevo has its epitome in the final 
scene of the 1972 movie “Valter brani Sarajevo” (Valter defends Sarajevo), with the dialogue between two 
German officers demoralised for failing to capture Valter: when asked the real name of Valter, the officer 
indicates the city replying “Das ist Walter!”. Demonstrations in 1992 had begun already in March, against 
the first barricades erected during the referendum. The daily newspaper Oslobodjenje had saluted these 
“largely leaderless street gatherings” with a front page reporting the headline “Das ist Walter,” Donia, 
Sarajevo, 279.  
72 At the time, Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the combined occupation of Nazi Germany and the 
Ustasa Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, NDH).  
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events of World War II and the 1992-95 conflict, symbolically assigning to war a central 
role in the history and identity of the city.  
Whereas the core of the commemorative tour performed on these three dates is 
the same, though (Eternal Flame, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Monument to the 
children killed during the siege), celebrations on the Day of the City seem to unfold 
primarily around monuments representing events and figures of the partisan 
resistance during WWII (Eternal Flame, Vladimir Peric-Valter, Tito, Vraca memorial 
park, monument to antifascists in Marijin Dvor, Jewish cemetery), establishing a 
closer connection to the Socialist memory tradition.73 
The incorporation of consolidated memory sites and practices of Socialist 
Yugoslavia in today’s official commemorative performances highlights the presence 
of elements of continuity across the change of regime and the caesura of the war, 
regarding both the form and the content of the emerging memory culture. 
With regards to the form, the way of celebrating important anniversaries follows 
the stereotyped ritual consolidated in Tito’s Yugoslavia with the “establishment of 
unique criteria for the public display of respect at monuments, partisan cemeteries, 
tombstones […] and other monumental objects”,74 which “involved visits of the 
representatives of the government, of different political institutions, with the 
obligatory praxis of laying wreaths at the monuments”.75 The endurance of practices 
of the previous regime’s memory culture is also exemplified by the habit of holding 
“history lessons” at the sites of the events commemorated, typically included in both 
educative and commemorative activities organised by SUBNOR as part of its mission 
to preserve and develop the achievements of the National Liberation War during 
Socialist Yugoslavia (see also chapter five). The program of events of the 6th of April 
2010 and 2011, for instance, entailed a lecture on the liberation of the city at the 
Vratnik Gate (Vratnicka Kapija, see fig. 73, 74), from which units of the Yugoslav 
partisan army entered the city upon its liberation in 1945. 
With regards to the contents of commemorative practices, on the other hand, 
elements of continuity with the Socialist past are of more complex interpretation, and 
their relation to present projections of the country’s identity remains ambiguous. The 
 
                                                     
73 Moreover, when included also in “state” celebrations, visits to these monuments are performed as part 
of the program of representatives of the City of Sarajevo, whereas state authorities personally attend only 
the ritual visit of the three core monuments in the city centre (Eternal Flame, Kovaci cemetery, Monument 
to children). 
74 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 44, translation: author. 
75 Ibid., 43, translation: author. 
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simultaneous marking of sites dedicated to the 1992-95 conflict and WWII shows a 
tendency to integrate the recollection of the partisan struggle into a new narrative on 
the recent war. This becomes evident in the symbolic juxtaposition of the 6th of April 
in 1945 and 1992, and in explicit references to the antifascist tradition whereby the 
enemy of the 1990s is construed as fascist and the war is memorialised as a struggle 
for freedom.76 Such appropriation of the legacy of Socialism and the memory of WWII, 
nevertheless, is never fully feasible, and becomes a further element of controversies 
within disputes over interpretations of the recent war (see below). 
In 2012, celebrations for the Day of the City were heightened with the organisation 
of a variety of events, and the date was endowed with additional meanings. The city 
Mayor Alija Behmen remarked that the recurrence of the 6th of April had a threefold 
importance: as 550th anniversary of the foundation of the city, 67th anniversary of the 
liberation from fascism, and 20th anniversary of the beginning of the aggression of 
Sarajevo77. The celebrations had wide resonance both at a local and international 
level, and entailed, aside the usual commemorative practice of visiting monuments 
across the city (see figures 75 to 89), a multitude of events organised by different 
actors on themes related to the “triple” anniversary, among which particular visibility 
was given to the presentation of a new Museum of the Siege of Sarajevo (see chapter 
seven).78 
For the first time, commemorations were complemented with an official 
programme in memory of the victims of the siege. The project revolved around a 
particular artistic-commemorative event/installation in the central street of the city 
(Ulica Marsala Tita), and was realised by a collaboration between the City of Sarajevo 
and EastWest theatre company.79 Named “Sarajevo Red Line” (Sarajevska Crvena 
 
                                                     
76 For examples of the symbolic reference to antifascism see below. On the recollection of the 1992-95 war 
as a defensive struggle within opposed narratives see chapter two. 
77 Website of the City of Sarajevo, www.sarajevo.ba. 
78 The events lasted several days, and included: an exhibition of Sarajevan artefacts on occasion of 550 
years from the foundation of the City of Sarajevo; an exhibition of the Historical Archive of sarajevo titled 
“Sarajevo: light of the past from archival documentation”; a conference gathering war reporters at the 
Holiday Inn; the presentation of the Virtual FAMA Collection and the project "Museum of Sarajevo Siege – 
Art of Living 92-96” (see chapter seven); a public discussion titled “How to remember Sarajevo?” organised 
by the Association of Alumni of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies of the University of 
Sarajevo, among many others. 
79 The Company is led by Haris Pasovic. It was created in 2005 with the mission to “to raise awareness of the 
importance of multiculturalism in the Balkan region and around the world, as well as to serve as a platform 
for artists coming from the Balkan region and around the world to produce the works of art of the highest 
standard”, see website at http://eastwest.ba. 
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Linija), the initiative entailed the performance of a concert on a stage set up at the 
Eternal Flame, in front of 11,541 (empty) red chairs disposed in 825 rows along Marshal 
Tito Street (see figures 90 to 97). The chairs represented the number of citizens killed 
in the city during the siege, and formed a 800 metres-long red line from the Eternal 
Flame to the Ali Pasha mosque at the end of the street, past the Presidency building. 
As the chairs were meant to remain empty, the event was conceived as a “drama and 
music poem dedicated to the Sarajevans killed during the 1992-96 siege of their city” 
and as a symbolic “tribute to these silent heroes”.80 The initiative was further 
complemented with an exhibition of posters related to the period of the siege in shop 
windows along the street and the installation of screens displaying a list of names of 
the victims in constant loop (see figure 88). 
This special project dedicated to the city’s recent experience of armed conflict was 
not repeated in the following years, and remained a unique event. Its organisations 
and performance, though, took place in the context of revived debates and 
controversies, due to the co-occurrence of the 20th anniversaries of the referendum 
for independence of March 1, and the establishment of Republika Srpska on January 
9. The particular atmosphere surrounding the 2012 commemorations transpires in this 
statement from an interview to City Mayor Alija Behmen: “We are marking the 20th 
anniversary of the longest siege of a city in Europe. Now this might sound now like a 
commonplace, but it seems we must constantly repeat ourselves in order to construct 
a memory culture of what happened, with the goal to spread peace, to raise the 
awareness of Europe, who failed at that time, and to tell the aggressors what really 
happened. They know it, but they try to redefine history”.81 The celebrations of the 
symbolic anniversary of the beginning of the war thus reinscribed the Day of the City 
within national disputes. 
 
                                                     
80 Haris Pasovic, author of the project, http://eastwest.ba. See also E. Krehic and S. Milovanovic, “Sarajevo 
hosts a concert 20 years after siege”, AlJazeera, 05.04.2012, www.aljazeera.com. 
81 M. Sadikovic, “Sarajevska Crvena Linija: 20. godisnjica opsade” (Sarajevo Red Lin: 20th anniversary of the 
siege), Radio Slobodna Evropa, 06.04.2012, www.slobodnaevropa.org, translation: author. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
"Nations which have undergone dramatic changes 
of regime need to establish a way of remembering 
that will bridge the gap between past and present, 
asserting continuity and identity at the same time 
as difference".82 
The inability (or unwillingness) to reach agreement over a common law on public 
holidays at the state level, and the resonance and animosity of the controversies 
related to official celebrations in today’s BiH, well exemplify the symbolic functions of 
commemorative practices with regards to memory and identity constructs.  
Against the legacies of the recent conflict, these unfold on various levels, as the 
endowment of particular recurrences and memorial sites with significance, through 
the performance of official rituals in the public space, symbolically conveys particular 
narratives on the 1992-95 conflict that sustain (or challenge) the legitimacy of the 
current state. The celebrations of the Day of Independence on March 1 provide the 
clearest example in this sense. In this case, disputes revolve around the importance 
ascribed to a date that is claimed to have opposite meanings for different segments 
of (the population of) Bosnia and Herzegovina. Celebrated by state institutions as the 
day on which the people of BiH democratically decided for the country’s unity, 
independence and sovereignty in 1992, the 1st of March is reinterpreted by the political 
establishment of Republika Srpska as the anniversary of a unilateral secession from 
Socialist Yugoslavia, initiated without the consent of one of the three ethnic groups of 
the country. The rejection and contestation of the commemoration of this date is thus 
used to posit the illegitimacy/illegality of a unitary state of BiH and purport the cause 
of an autonomous (if not independent) RS. This particular narrative of the recent past 
assigns blame for the breakout of war to the advocates of the 1992 referendum, who 
are now identified with the promotors of its ritual commemoration. Accordingly, 
Republika Srpska symbolically “responds” to the ceremonies on March 1 with the 
establishment of its own foundational anniversary on January 9. Dissent over this 
celebration in RS is articulated in a specular manner, through a recollection of the 
recent conflict whereby Bosnian Serbs are blamed for the aggression of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and RS is construed as an entity founded on genocide. 
 
                                                     
82 Hodgkin and Radstone, Contested Pasts, 170. 
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Public speeches and statements to the media on these symbolic dates convey a 
clear impression of continuation of the wartime opposition of political elites over  
“the political makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. These different 
concepts, still present in the political life of the country, have resulted in three 
different memories that are exclusive of each other and obliterate each other. 
The historical and socio-psychological foundation and alternative narratives of 
the recent past stay alive because of fictitious enemies who exist for the 
existence of ethno-nationalism, allowing ethno-nationalistic ideology to be 
established in public as a hating system”.83 
Within this framework, the performance of a “commemorative tour” of 
monuments on significant dates contributes to the establishment and consolidation 
of (newly erected) sites that sustain the narrative underpinning celebrations.  
The Kovaci cemetery-memorial is the only site in Sarajevo that recollects the recent 
armed conflict within a wider historical perspective (cfr. Chapter five). Dedicated to 
preserve the memory of the aggression of BiH between 1992 and 1995 by honouring 
the country’s defenders, the complex represents a vision whereby the war is put in 
the context of a longer history of victimisation suffered by the Muslim/Bosnjak 
“nation”. Extensive reference to Islamic traditions and the symbolic construction of 
the fallen fighters of the recent war as “Shahids”, result in an ethnicisation of the 
memory of the conflict, symbolically represented as an unjust aggression of the 
country that revolved around a pivotal Serb-Muslim/Bosnjak axe of confrontation 
within a long tradition of (Muslim) victimisation. As the case of the Monument to the 
killed children of besieged Sarajevo suggests, ethnic/national attributes are always 
part of the identification and construction of both victims and perpetrators within 
officially sanctioned narratives, whether implicitly or explicitly.84 In this context, 
 
                                                     
83 Lovrenovic, Dubravko (forthcoming), “Bosnia and Herzegovina as the stage of three parallel and 
conflicted historical memories,” paper presented at the seminar “Regimes of Memory. Types of trauma 
management in Central and Eastern Europe”, Academia Europaea Knowledge Hub, Wroclaw, Poland, 
September 2014. 
84 Bigger monuments and memorial complexes in the city of Sarajevo do not represent or identify explicitly 
the enemies of the conflict, but rather concentrate on victims and heroes. This recollection of the conflict is 
anyway complemented by other elements of the urban memorial landscape, where the perpetrator of 
wartime violence is named directly. In particular, a series of plaques erected since 1996, to mark the spots 
where a high number of civilians was killed or injured during the siege, bears the standardised inscription: 
“At this place Serb criminals (date) killed (number) citizens of Sarajevo”, and (in smaller letters, below) 
“May the dead rest in peace, recite Al-Fatiha and pray, remember and warn.” See also Musi, Maja, “Carving 
War onto the City: Monuments to the 1992-95 Conflict in Sarajevo,” in Yugo (Re)Membering: Transforming 
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disagreements around the Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo 
regarded a particularly sensitive implication of memorialisation, and highlighted that 
“with the division of victims [...] along ethnic lines, the opportunity to initiate a 
demilitarisation of the memory of war and establish a trans-ethnic memory [of the 
victims] was abandoned”.85 As Moll remarks, one of the patterns characterising the 
emerging memory narratives on the recent conflict is constituted, both in BiH and in 
RS, by the “glorification of one's own battles and soldiers combined with a strong 
emphasis on one's own victimhood, together with the spreading of blame and 
resentment against other national groups and a denial of the 'dark sides' of one's own 
history”.86 
The symbolic marking of monuments pertaining to WWII in the official ceremonies 
described highlights further features of the construction and (re)definition of both 
identities and memory narratives in post-Dayton BiH.  
On the one hand, it exposes elements of continuity with the Socialist memory 
culture, whereby current processes of memorialisation appropriate the praxes and 
contents (i.e. sites) established during the previous regime. The construction of the 
official memory of the recent past – entailing the establishment of newly erected 
monuments and their endowment with (new) meanings – is in this way mingled with 
the recollection of an already consolidated “past”, through standardised rituals. This 
points to the possibilities and constraints of memory entrepreneurship, reminding 
that “what makes a past ‘available’ [...] is governed not only by the ‘events 
themselves’ [...] but also, and crucially, by the ways in which the events were – or 
were not – incorporated into commemorative traditions”.87  
On the other hand, the recollection of Socialist monuments within official visits 
indicates that the process of construction of official memories of the 1992-95 conflict 
encompasses a reassessment and reinterpretation of the legacies of WWII. Such 
reinterpretation has not yet accomplished the integration of the two conflicts into a 
single coherent narrative, as the systematisation and articulation of such a narrative 
still seem to constitute an ongoing process. Nonetheless, current commemorative 
practices show a tendency to symbolically appropriate the memory of the previous 
conflict in two ways: through the evocation of correspondences between the two 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
National Heritages in the Former Yugoslavia, edited by Britt Baillie and Francesco Mazzucchelli (Palgrave 
MacMillan, forthcoming 2015). 
85 Custo, Uloga Spomenika U Sarajevu,” 111, translation: author. 
86 Moll, “Fragmented Memories,” 914. 
87 Brubaker and Feischmidt, “1848 in 1998,” 204. 
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wars (recurrent, for instance, on the 6th of April, or at sites like Vraca Memorial Park), 
and by appeals to principles established in the framework of the partisan struggle (as 
with references to antifascism, or the ascription of symbolic value to the anniversary 
of the ZAVNOBIH meeting). In this sense, references to (fascism and) antifascism (as 
exemplified in the previous paragraphs) draw attention to the ways in which the past 
is symbolically reinterpreted from the perspective of the present and to respond to 
present needs, as in member of Presidency Zeljko Komsic’s speech on occasion of the 
2009 celebrations of the Day of Statehood: 
“Today, supporters of defeated ideologies and individuals lay claim to the state 
of BiH or individual parts of it as exclusively Serb, Croat or Bosnjak [and] see 
[BiH] as they want to see it, exclusively according to their own criteria, without 
taking into account [the others]. The reason for this is the vulgar perception of 
individual parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina [as] war booty of nations, parties, 
[or] individuals, and exclusive living space [of] members of one ethnicity, 
religion, political or any group. This is indeed fascism”.88 
While reference to the Socialist past implicitly recalls the coexistence, cooperation 
and solidarity of the people(s) of BiH (in the specific vision of “brotherhood and 
unity” established by the Socialist regime’s memory politics), its use and inclusion in 
the emergent memorialisation practices – where it is juxtaposed with ethnicised 
recollections of the conflict and definitions of identities – impairs its association with 
pluralism as a shared experience. The legacy of antifascism, in this perspective, is not 
just reinterpreted, but rather appropriated as a symbolic tool, especially in the 
definition of the ‘Other’ as opposing counterpart, sustained by the recollection of the 
1992-95 conflict as a pair to WWII’s struggle against (the universally rejected principles 
of) fascism. 
 
                                                     
88 Speech of member of BiH Presidency Zeljko Komsic on occasion of the 25th of November 2009, Day of 
Statehood of BiH, website of the Presidency of BiH, www.predsjednistvobih.ba, translation: author. This 
evokes the mechanism of “keying” introduced by Schwartz in relation to the two aspects of collective 
memory as a model of/for society (cfr. Introduction): “Keying transforms memory into a cultural system, 
not because it consists of invisible mental operations, but because it matches publicly accessible (i.e. 
symbolic) models of the past (written narratives, pictorial images, statues, motion pictures, music, and 
songs) to the experiences of the present. […] As models of society, past events are keyed to the present; as 
models for society, past events are keyed by the present,” Schwartz, Barry. “Memory as a Cultural System,” 
911, emphasis original. 
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Appendix five: The commemorative tour: celebrations on the Day of Statehood 
(Dan Drzavnosti, November 25) and Day of Independence (Dan Nezavisnosti, 
March 1) 
 
Figure 39: Vjecna Vatra, Eternal Flame, 2011.
 
Figure 40: Representatives with wreath, Eternal Flame, Day of Statehood 2011. 
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Figure 41: Representatives of the City of Sarajevo, Eternal Flame, Day of Statehood 2011. 
 
Figure 42: Member of BiH Presidency Z. Komsic interviewed by the media, Eternal Flame, 
Day of Independence 2012. 
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Figure 43: Flowers at the Central Nisan-monument, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of 
Independence 2012. 
 
Figure 44: Members of BiH Presidency Zeljko Komsic and Bakir Izetbegovic, Kovaci 
cemeterymemorial, Day of Statehood 2011. 
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Figure 45: Mausoleum Alija Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of Independence 
2012. 
 
Figure 46: Military personnel, Mausoleum Alija Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, 
Day of Statehood 2011. 
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Figure 47: Mausoleum Alija Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of Statehood 2011. 
 
Figure 48: Central Nisan-monument, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of Statehood 2011. 
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Figure 49: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, 2010. 
 
Figure 50: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, detail, 2010. 
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Figure 51: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, with columns of names 
(background left), 2011. 
 
Figure 52: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, with columns of names 
(background left), 2011. 
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Figure 53: Representatives at Vraca Memorial Park, Day of Statehood 2011. 
 
 
Figure 54: Wreaths, Vraca Memorial Park, Day of Independence 2012. 
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Appendix six: Day of the City of Sarajevo (Dan Grada Sarajeva) 
 
Figure 55: Representatives at the Eternal Flame, Day of the City 2011. 
 
Figure 56: Delegation of SUBNOR at the Eternal Flame, Day of the City 2011. 
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Figure 57: Representatives standing at the Eternal Flame, Day of the City 2011. 
 
 
Figure 58: Representatives of the City, Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of the City 2010. 
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Figure 59: Representatives of the City laying wreath at the Monument to the killed children 
of besieged Sarajevo, Day of the City 2010. 
 
Figure 60: Bridge Suada Dilberovic and Olga Sucic, 2012. 
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Figure 61: Plaque dedicated to Suada Dilberovic and Olga Sucic, 2010. 
 
Figure 62: Bridge Suada Dilberovic and Olga Sucic, Day of the City 2010. 
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Figure 63: Bust of Vladimir Peric-Valter, 2011. 
 
Figure 64: Poster of Valter at the location of bust, Day of the City 2010. 
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Figure 65: Statue of Tito, University Campus, 2011. 
 
Figure 66: Mayor Behmen at the Statue of Tito, Day of the City 2011. 
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Figure 67: Vraca Memorial Park, Day of the City 2010. 
 
Figure 68: Vraca Memorial Park, Day of the City 2010. 
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Figure 69: Vraca Memorial Park, Day of the City 2011. 
 
Figure 70: Representatives of the City, Vraca Memorial Park, Day of the City 2011. 
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Figure 71: Monument at Old Jewish cemetery, Day of the City 2011. 
 
Figure 72: Monument at the Old Jewish cemetery, detail, 2011. 
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Figure 73: Vratnik Gate (Vratnicka Kapija), 2010. 
 
Figure 74: Plaque at Vratnik Gate, 2010. 
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Appendix seven: 2012 Day of the City and Sarajevo Red Line (Sarajevska Crvena 
Linija) 
 
Figure 75: Eternal Flame, Day of the City 2012. 
 
Figure 76: Representatives at Eternal Flame, Day of the City 2012. 
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Figure 77: Representatives of the City, Eternal Flame 2012. 
 
Figure 78: Members of BiH Presidency Z. Komsic and B. Izetbegovic, Eternal Flame 2012. 
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Figure 79: Media coverage 2012 celebrations of the Day of the City. 
 
Figure 80: Mayor Behmen interviewed at the Eternal Flame, 2012. 
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Figure 81: Flags at the entrance of Kovaci cemetery-memorial, Day of the City 2012. 
 
Figure 82: Members of Presidency Z. Komsic and B. Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-
memorial, 2012. 
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Figure 83: Members of Presidency Z. Komsic and B. Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-
memorial, Day of the City 2012. 
 
Figure 84: Members of Presidency Z. Komsic and B. Izetbegovic, Kovaci cemetery-
memorial, 2012. 
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Figure 85: Mausoleum Alija Izetbegovic, Day of the City 2012. 
 
Figure 86: Mausoleum Alija Izetbegovic, Day of the City 2012. 
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Figure 87: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, Day of the city 2012. 
 
Figure 88: Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, with screen with names 
in the background, Day of the City 2012. 
 220 
 
Figure 89: Representatives of the City at Vraca Memorial Park, Day of the City 2012. 
 
Figure 90: Sarajevo Red Line, back of concert stage at Eternal Flame. 
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Figure 91: Sarajevo Red Line, concert stage Marshal Tito Street. 
 
Figure 92: Sarajevo Red Line, chairs, first row. 
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Figure 93: Sarajevo Red Line, 11,541. 
 
Figure 94: Sarajevo Red Line, chairs with stage in the background. 
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Figure 95: Sarajevo Red Line, woman leaving flower on a chair, photographed by press. 
 
Figure 96: Sarajevo Red Line, Presidency building. 
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Figure 97: Sarajevo Red Line, end of Marshal Tito Street, chairs with flowers left by 
passers-by. 
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 7 Other memories/Memories of the 
Other(s) 
“Public memory is not a sure thing. It has its own 
degrees of endurance and reliability. Being public 
does not guarantee constancy over time: to be 
public is to be subject to continual reassessment 
and revision”.1 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters presented some main features of the work of reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of BiH’s cultural heritage (chapter four) and of processes of 
construction and articulation of official memories of war in the public space of 
Sarajevo (chapters five and six), focusing on the underpinning legal documents, the 
pertinent administrative bodies and actors, and some commemorative practices 
performed by governing authorities. Such analyses concentrated mainly on memory 
entrepreneurship as exercised by (various levels of) the structures of government of 
today’s BiH, through the investigation of the meanings ascribed to public monuments 
and ritual celebrations, and the ways these are employed to convey messages that 
symbolically entwine particular reconstructions of ‘the past’ with projections on the 
identity of the polity. This perspective focused on the top-down dimension of 
processes of memorialisation and aimed to draw attention to the authoritative and 
normative effects of institutionalised sites of memory (and their symbolic 
 
                                                     
1 Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 29. 
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endorsement by political representatives) over the construction of both memory and 
identity and their articulation in the public space. The emphasis was put on the way(s) 
memorial elements (monuments, commemorative plaques, streetnames) are 
employed in the “ongoing cultural production of a shared past”2 and in the 
construction of the urban environment as a virtual political setting3 and the city as 
text.4  
This chapter widens the reflection to concentrate on the urban landscape as a 
cultural arena,5 a common space within which different subjects compete for the right 
to participate in the construction of public memory and the power to negotiate the 
contents of narratives on the (more or less recent) past. The aim is to draw attention 
to the inherent pluralism of memory and the dynamic characteristics of its 
construction, starting from the observation that “although elites have had more 
control over the establishment of places of memory in public settings, they cannot 
control how they are perceived, understood, and interpreted by individuals and 
various social groups”.6 In other words, while on the one hand public memory reflects 
social relations and power (im)balances, on the other hand the city-text is to be seen 
as an “open-ended symbolic system”7 susceptible to be influenced and shaped by 
individuals as well as groups through a wide range of strategies. Through these 
lenses, collective memory emerges as “a socio-spatially mediated political process”8 
whereby agency is distributed among a variety of social actors, and the urban 
memorial landscape comes to constitute a “community’s symbolic infrastructure”9: a 
repository of symbolic capital available to different segments of society as a resource 
to resist dominant narratives and claim participation in the construction of the polity’s 
identity. 
In this sense, public memory is more complex and multilayered than the ‘indexed 
history’ (paraphrasing Azaryahu) embedded in the memoryscape, and (collective) 
remembrance is a practice exercised beyond the intentions of those elites who have 
 
                                                     
2 Azaryahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names,” 312. 
3 Azaryahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names.” 
4 Palonen, “The City-Text in Post-Communist Budapest;” Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of Toponymic 
Inscription;” Sakaja and Stanic.,“Other(ing), Self(portraying), Negotiating.” 
5 Cf. Chapter three, Dwyer and Alderman, “Memorial Landscapes;” Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of 
Toponymic Inscription.” 
6 Till, “Places of Memory,” 297. 
7 Dwyer and Alderman, “Memorial Landscapes,” 167. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of toponymic inscription,” 460. 
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the power to control the public space and in a dialogical relationship (of 
appropriation, reinterpretation, opposition, negotiation) with the narratives they 
promote.  
Direct engagement with memory policies implemented by governing institutions 
can be exercised at various levels, whether as part of every-day routines or in the form 
of public gatherings, demonstrations and ‘actions’ in the public space and/or on 
particular dates. Such engagement shows that commemorative elements in the 
landscape or the official calendar are not just passively experienced by the citizenry: 
the meanings and messages ascribed to them are exposed in the open and can thus 
be received and embraced as well as opposed, resisted, re-interpreted or challenged. 
One basic example of the possibilities of active involvement with the memorial 
landscape (and thus with memory policies) through everyday-life practices can be 
found in the colloquial use of street-names among (some) Sarajevans, who often refer 
to locations in the city using their old designations. In the face of changes in both the 
demographic composition of the city and the system of urban references, this habit 
primarily connotes the identity of citizens living in Sarajevo since before the conflict, 
who have knowledge of pre-war urban toponymy by way of personal experience. The 
practice of using old street-names distinguishes them from both foreigners and 
recently settled people from elsewhere in BiH, through the use of a system of 
references that has been altered and is thus not comprehensible to all anymore. While 
its primary intention is perhaps to connote the identity of the speaker as a “true” 
Sarajevan, it engages in memory politics insofar as it acknowledges the symbolic 
function of toponymy while resisting the ‘contents’ of post-regime-change renamings 
through the refusal to adopt them, thus subverting the meanings ascribed to the 
urban environment and using the memoryscape for symbolic resistance.10 
The dialogic dimension of memory most clearly pertains to the emergence of 
interest groups or the organisation of initiatives concerned with particular memories 
that claim and achieve visibility in the public space, thus coming to constitute a voice 
in ongoing memorialisation processes. In recent years, for instance, different 
associations carried out activities around a particular kind of reminders of the conflict 
in Sarajevo, the Sarajevo Roses (Sarajevske Ruze), in order to preserve these markers 
 
                                                     
10 While this practice clearly deserves more detailed investigation (including ad hoc field research) to unfold 
its various meanings and functions, it is mentioned here essentially as an example of how agency can be 
reclaimed and exercised in everyday routines, in accordance with the remark of Rose-Redwood et al., while 
discussing “toponymic resistance”, that “the very choice not to use the official place-name system is a 
practice of self-determination”. Rose-Redwood et al., “Geographies of Toponymic Inscription,” 463. 
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as (counter-)monuments. The Roses are traces left on the asphalt by mortar shells 
and grenades during the siege of the city, that were filled with red resin since 1996 
and have come to represent scars on the landscape. They have not been 
complemented with any plaque, written text or explanatory sign, so that the 
interpretation of their meaning has remained open to different understandings and 
free to mingle with personal memories, and they have become a ‘silent symbol’ that 
belongs to everyday life. Neglected by institutions and overlooked by official 
commemorative practices for many years, several roses have been destroyed or 
damaged by the passing of time and by urban reconstruction, renovation and 
management.11 In April 2009, the association Akcija Gradjana coloured some of these 
shell craters in the city area of Dobrinija as part of the action “Sarajevo, do you 
remember Sarajevo?” (Sarajevo, sjecas li se Sarajeva?), ideated in response to the 
removal of a rose during the works of erection of a new monument to the 1992-1995 
conflict in the city centre, which took place several months earlier.12 In subsequent 
years, the association Youth Initiative for Human Rights accomplished similar actions 
on various roses in the city, especially in concomitance with the celebrations of the 6th 
of April, Day of the City of Sarajevo (Dan Grada Sarajeva, cf. Chapter 6).13 Focusing on 
these particular reminders, such initiatives also drew attention to the fact that the 
process of construction of an official memory of the conflict was effectively erasing 
markers of personal, informal memories by the urban landscape.14 
These initiatives demonstrate how official memory politics comes to provide a 
repository of resources that can be appropriated or reclaimed by particular groups 
who wish to participate in the ongoing memorialisation of the recent past. In this 
case, elements of both the memorial landscape (the Roses) and the official calendar 
of commemorations (the date of the 6th of April) were employed to address the 
 
                                                     
11 Custo, Uloga Spomenika u Sarajevu, 114. 
12 This was the Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo, see chapter 6. The aim of the initiative 
was to “remind the public, as well as the responsible city and cantonal administration, that the 
disappearance of these monuments to the victims of the siege of Sarajevo is inadmissible and that the 
citizens will not tolerate such degree of neglect”, “Sarajevu vraceno 13 ‘ruza’” (13 ‘roses’ returned to 
Sarajevo), source: www.sarajevo-x.com, 17.04.2009. 
13 “Ulicnom akciju obiljezili Dan Sarajeva” (The Day of Sarajevo commemorated with street action), 
Oslobodjenje, 07.04.2012; “Sarajevske Ruze ponovo pocrvenile, Sarajlije ostavljale pozitivne poruke” 
(Sarajevo Roses coloured again, Sarajevans leave positive messages), Oslobodjenje, 06.04.2013. 
14 Junuzovic argues that the removal of the Roses factually enhances ‘oblivion’, to the extent that “citizens 
can [only] rely on their not too consistent memory to recall whether some of the Roses used to be there or 
not,” Junuzovic, Sarajevske Ruze, 231. 
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governing authorities and the wider society and affirm the will to preserve a particular 
kind of memories that were perceived as threatened.15 
The next sections present three initiatives undertaken in Sarajevo with the aim to 
advocate and promote alternative approaches to memorialisation and/or alternative 
memories of the 1992-95 conflict. While they differ from each other under many 
respects – the subjects involved in their ideation and organisation, the kind of 
activities they entail, the ways they intervene in the public space, their relationship to 
official memory policies – they all represent efforts to participate in the construction 
of memories of the recent past. Section 7.2 focuses on a cycle of initiatives promoted 
by the Sarajevo Centre for Contemporary Art (SCCA) between 2004 and 2007, through 
which three monuments were donated to the city of Sarajevo. Section 7.3 presents a 
recent (counter-)commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street (today renamed after local 
historian Hamdija Kresevljakovic), organised since 2010 to remember an incident that 
took place at the beginning of the conflict and still provokes heated debates. Section 
7.4 introduces the Siege of Sarajevo Museum – the Art of Living 1992-1996, a “virtual 
bank of knowledge” organised around a collection of audio-visual and digital 
mementos of the siege, which was presented and endorsed by the city authorities 
during the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the beginning of the war (6th April 
2012). 
7.2 De/Construction of Monument 
“The number of monuments erected to glorify one 
person is in direct proportion with the lack of 
individual freedoms”.16  
 
                                                     
15 The stance of institutions towards these particular monuments gradually changed into an approach of 
concernment which resulted in the endorsement of the tasks and responsibilities of preservation and 
valorisation of the Roses. In May 2012, the Government of the Sarajevo Canton officially entrusted the Fond 
Memorijala (cfr. Previous chapters) with tasks of reconstruction and maintenance of the Sarajevo Roses. 
See “Nakon što je potpisan Ugovor: Počela rekonstrukcija prve Sarajevske ruže" (“After signing the 
agreement: reconstruction of the first ‘Sarajevo Rose’ begins), Vlada Kantona Sarajeva 25.04.2012; E. Zolj-
Balenovic, “Sarajevske Ruze se vracaju na ulice” (The Sarajevo Roses return to the streets), Oslobodjenje, 
28.10.2013; E. Zolj-Balenovic, "Fond Memorijala obnavlja Sarajevske ruze" (The Fond Memorijala renovates 
Sarajevo Roses), Oslobodjenje 14.07.2014. 
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Between 2004 and 2007, the Sarajevo Centre for Contemporary Art (SCCA) developed 
a project titled “De/Construction of Monument” (De/Konstrukcija Spomenika), in 
collaboration with Urban Movement (Mostar), the Centre for Informative 
Decontamination (Banja Luka), and the Neuer Berliner Kunstverein (Berlin, Germany). 
The project entailed panels, lectures, seminars, exhibitions and interventions in the 
public space, including several open meetings with artists and professionals 
(historians, sociologists, anthropologists, art historians, journalists...) for public 
discussions concerning a variety of topics, ranging from art and the public space to 
the roles and functions of monuments, public art and memory, the notion of counter-
monument, and monuments to a negative past.17 The overall project aimed at opening 
up a discussion about representations of the past in the public space as embodied by 
monuments, and to prompt active involvement in a reflection about the (ab)uses of 
memory and the relationship with the past in post-war BiH, based on the premise that 
“the process of overcoming [the] past cannot be truly commenced unless history ceases 
to be identified with collective memory, national epic poems, tales of heroes, myths of 
eternal heroism and sacrifice”.18 In this perspective, the starting point of the project 
was identified in the remnants of already existing monuments dating from different 
periods, conceived as a “materialization of ruling political, ideological and aesthetic 
values”, and thus “ideal material for the critical analysis of the state”.19  
This kind of engagement with existing monuments is aptly exemplified by a 
previous initiative of artists Kurt & Plasto, promoted and organised by the SCCA in 
2001, which revolved around memorialisation processes in post-war BiH in relation to 
questions regarding the ownership of public space. Kurt and Plasto’s 2001 work, titled 
“By the Commission’s decision: everyone to one’s own” (Odlukom Komisije: svi na 
svoje), addressed the work of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments and 
the process of reconstruction of the country’s cultural heritage, concentrating on a 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16 Gordana Andjelic Galic. Original language: “Kolicina spomenika podignitih jednoj licnosti proporcijnalna je 
nedostatku licnih sloboda”. The sentence was printed on a temporary banner hanged in the centre of 
Sarajevo (Ferhadija Street, 30 June-10 July 2004) as part of the SCCA project De/Construction of Monument. 
17 Among the many activities undertaken in the framework of the project, I will concentrate here in 
particular on the “New Monument” sub-project, on account of its significance with regards to the themes 
treated in this research. 
18 Introduction to the project, SCCA website. As the project was developed years before my personal stay in 
Sarajevo for field research, the aspects reported here were not observed directly, and their review is based 
on information taken from the SCCA website (available in English language, http://scca.ba/), secondary 
material, informal meetings with SCCA personnel and an interview with one artist involved in the project. 
19 SCCA website, Introduction to the sub-project titled “New Monument.” 
  231 
series of busts of eminent writers located in a central square of the city 
(Liberation/Alija Izetbegovic Square - Trg Oslobodjenja/Alija Izetbegovic), removed 
from their pedestals in 1992 to be protected from the conflict.20 Noting that the busts 
had not yet been returned to their pedestals, the artists argued that the hidden 
political reason for this failure lay in the fact that the writers had different national 
backgrounds, which made the celebration of some of these personalities “politically 
incorrect” in nationally divided post-war BiH. By the Commission’s Decision thus aimed 
to raise two sets of questions: “1. who are the owners of the public spaces in the cities – 
citizens or the governing political authorities? 2. Who owns our memory, who controls 
and decides on cultural and artistic heritage, who erases the memory but also the history 
and writes new ones?”21 
The initiative consisted of various phases. A preparatory phase entailed the 
creation of several bronze-looking busts of the artists themselves, and the sending 
out of anonymous messages to the media (newspapers, magazines, radio and TV 
stations) announcing an approaching event with the text “(number) days until the 
decision of the commission is made”, for a period of three weeks.22 The second phase 
of the project took place on the 24th of November 2001, on the eve of the Day of 
Statehood (Dan Drzavnosti, see chapter 6), with the installation of the heads/busts of 
Kurt and Plasto on the empty pedestals on which the names of the eight writers were 
carved. Passers-by and people attending the event were handed leaflets signed by the 
artists with the sentence:  
“By the Commission’s decision: everyone to one’s own. It is necessary to 
influence the change of the reigning practice in the past and present time, 
where not only artists, but all citizens have always been hostages to forgetting 
their own heritage, or objects to erasing memory”.23  
On the same day, the SCCA held a public debate about the ownership of public 
space, during which it was agreed to perform an action of civil disobedience and 
return the original busts to their pedestals without seeking official permissions. The 
 
                                                     
20 The writers were Ivo Andric, Skender Kulenovic, Branko Copic, Isak Samokovlija, Mesa Selimovic, 
Rodoljub Colakovic, Veselin Meslesa and Mak Dizdar. 
21 SCCA website, Kurt & Plasto – By the Commission’s Decision: everyone to one’s own. 
22 “Act One”, 20 October – 24 November 2001. The busts were sculpted by local artist Darko Sobot. 
23 Original text: “Odlukom Komisije: SVI NA SVOJE. Potrebno je utjecati na promjenu proslog I postojeceg, 
vremena u kojima su svi gradani, ne samo umjetnici, uvijek bili taoci zaboravljanja vlastitog nasljeda, subjekti 
brisanja pamcenja. Kurt & Plasto”. English translation from the presentation of the project on the website of 
SCCA. 
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action was carried out, and on the 27th of December 2001 all the busts, with one 
exception, were back on their pedestals.24 
Through their artistic work, Kurt and Plasto and the SCCA undertook a civic action 
of direct engagement with memory and monuments that tackled several unresolved 
issues. The choice of dealing with busts erected during Socialist Yugoslavia raised the 
question of heritage reconstruction, pointing to the fate of monuments of the 
previous regime within the context of post-war reconfigurations of identities and 
historical revisions. With the temporary installation of busts portraying the two artists 
(repeated eight times) instead of replicas of the original busts, the project 
symbolically placed the artists in the first person on the pedestals of public memory, 
suggesting that memorialisation is a process that should not only involve but also 
remember each citizen personally. Ultimately, especially with the autonomous re-
installation of the original busts as an act of ‘civil disobedience’, the project implicated 
– and called for – a reappropriation of public space and public memory on the part of 
society as a whole. 
A few years later, the De/Construction of Monument project developed by the 
SCCA culminated with a final phase titled “New Monument” that represented a new 
artistic/civic intervention on the urban landscape of the kind of the one performed by 
Kurt and Plasto in 2001.25 New Monument was conceived as “an attempt at re-defining 
the notion and form of materialization of monuments (as we know them), their 
function, connotation and message they convey”.26 In this context, the SCCA 
supervised the process of erection of three new monuments to be donated to the 
city, through the organisation of an open competition, an exhibition of the proposals 
received, a selection based on public voting and the opinion of an international jury, 
and finally the realisation and installation of the artworks in public locations.27 This 
 
                                                     
24 The project presentation on the SCCA website reports that the bust of Veselin Maslesa could not be 
returned because of the opposition of the publishing house Svjetlost, that claimed ownership of the area in 
which the pedestal was located. The bust was thus returned ten years later, in 2011, with the help of the 
Mayor of Sarajevo. 
25 In fact, the work of Kurt and Plasto was considered “immediate motive for a new ‘De/Construction of 
Monument’ project initiated in 2003;” SCCA website, Kurt & Plasto – By the Commission’s Decision: 
everyone to one’s own. 
26 SCCA website, New Monument. 
27 The jury was composed by Meliha Husedžinović, art historian and director of the National Gallery of BiH 
(Sarajevo); Marina Gržinić, curator, art theoretician and art critic (Ljubljana); Želimir Koščević, art critic and 
curator of the Museum of Contemporary Art (Zagreb); Shkelzen Maliqi, philosopher and director of the 
Center for Humanistic Studies “Gani Bobi” (Priština); Frieder Schnock, artists, art historian and curator 
(Berlin), SCCA website, New Monument, Decisions and Explication of the Jury. 
  233 
time, the conceptualisation of the project accorded a particular relevance to the 
formal process of installation of the monuments, not as an act of civic disobedience 
but as a dialogue with the competent authorities and institutions to provide the 
relevant documentation and obtain the necessary permits. This process was 
monitored as a “test of how the relationship between governments and civil 
initiatives functions and an answer to the question: Who owns public space?”28 
The SCCA first contacted the offices and Mayor of the pertinent Sarajevo 
Municipality (Municipality Centre, Opcina Centar) in September 2005, providing all 
relevant documentation on the monuments, including an official letter with the 
decision of the Jury on the awarded authors and titles, sketches, and information on 
the material, dimensions and locations of the artworks.29 The procedure to obtain 
permits would involve a variety of actors, requiring that the Municipality 
administration examine the original request and forward it to the Mayor of the City of 
Sarajevo with an opinion (either positive or negative). The City Council would then 
examine again the file and, in case of positive response, send its conclusion to the 
Urban Planning Service of the Municipality in which the permits were requested. After 
an initial meeting with the Mayor of Centre Municipality in the fall of 2005, the 
process was stalled with a long period of silence on the part of the administration that 
lasted until May 2006, and support to the initiative was finally issued by the City 
Council in a session of July 2006.30 The process lasted until the end of that year, and 
the final outcome entailed changes in the locations of the monuments, which on the 
other hand became permanent installations (whereas they were originally envisioned 
by the SCCA as temporary). 
Today, the presence of the artworks selected within the “New Monument” project 
enriches the memorial landscape of Sarajevo with alternative gazes not only on the 
recent past of BiH but also on the conceptualisation of memory and its relation(s) to 
the present.  
Despite changes in their proposed locations, the three artworks are located in 
relatively central areas of the city. 
 
                                                     
28 SCCA website, New Monument, Introduction. 
29 Information on this process is reported in a dedicated section of the SCCA website titled “Reports”, as 
part of the description of the New Monument project, see http://scca.ba/. 
30 During this period, the SCCA repeatedly solicited response from the pertinent offices without success. In 
April 2006 the SCCA lawyer gave oral warning that the SCCA would file a law suit for “silence of 
Administration”, which probably prompted a first written response in May. 
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Artist Braco Dimitrijevic’s work stands right aside the entrance of the Historical 
Museum of BiH (previously Museum of the Revolution), and consists of a stone block 
(150x150x300 cm) with an inscription in four languages reciting “Under this stone lies 
a monument to the victims of War and the Cold War” (see figure 98). As the short 
presentation of the monument on the SCCA website remarks, this empty pedestal 
reminds the situation of monuments in post-war Sarajevo, populated with plinths 
from which busts have been removed. Its ironic connotation is highlighted by the 
inscription indicating that an ‘actual’ monument lies below the stone block, 
suggesting that it has been ‘buried’ in the ground. This irony is complemented by a 
certain degree of ambiguity: not only the monument is not visible, but the generic 
dedication to “victims of War and the Cold War” provides a puzzling indication.  
This artwork thus subverts the conventional paradigms of monumentalisation and 
questions the (dominant) notion of monument: by ‘burying’ a monument under the 
ground and erecting only the marker to such hidden monument, it disengages from 
both figurative and abstract representation and avoids the material construction of a 
memory ‘object’ (though it still creates a memory site); moreover, by referring 
enigmatically to ‘War and the Cold War’ (thus armed conflict in generic terms, but also 
the specific legacy of the Cold War), it rejects the selection of a particular event or 
cause for commemorative purposes. Finally, while refusing to glorify a particular 
recollection of the past on the pedestal of public remembrance, Dimitrijevic’s piece 
also distances from the symbolic recollection of a particular community. Ultimately, 
thus, instead of conveying particular messages or statements about the past, this 
‘anti-monument’ emerges as a thought-provoking work of social art that questions 
and rejects the standardised patterns of official memorialisation.31 
The piece donated by Nebojsa Seric Soba is located in the vicinity of Dimitrijevic’s 
stone block, in a green area between the Historical Museum and the National 
Museum of BiH, closer to the river Miljacka.  
To a certain extent, this work is more similar to a ‘classic’ monument: an enlarged 
model of a beef can stands on a pedestal carrying the inscription “Monument to the 
International Community” (Spomenik Medunarodnoj Zajednici) signed by the “Grateful 
Citizens of Sarajevo” (Zahvalni Gradjani Sarajeva) (see figures 99, 100). This 
conventional technique of monumental representation, nevertheless, is used in an 
ironic way to convey an original message about the recent conflict, where two 
 
                                                     
31 In this sense, Dimitrijevic’s work for the SCCA “New Monument” project is conceptually in line with some 
of his previous work, which similarly engaged with themes related to history and memory. See 
www.bracodimitrijevic.com. 
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features appear particularly relevant. First, the monumentalisation of one item 
pertaining to everyday life under siege centres remembrance on ordinary Sarajevans, 
recollecting (one aspect of) their experience of survival. Whereas public monuments 
most often commemorate specific events (i.e. battles, massacres), groups (i.e. 
fighters, victims, factions), and dates (i.e. April 6) that metonymically symbolise the 
conflict, or focus on death, loss and mourning (especially those dedicated to honour 
the victims), this work remembers what it was like to live in Sarajevo during the war 
and thus, at least to a certain extent, focuses on survival and ‘speaks’ from the 
standpoint of survivors. In so doing, the memory it recollects is imbued with sarcasm: 
“Ikar was that famous can of meat, with its never-confirmed content, expiration date, 
country of origin and other similar data that comes with products like this. The only 
sure thing about the can was that we did not have anything better, neither had we 
any choice”.32 As explained by SCCA Director Dunja Blazevic at the inauguration of the 
monument, “the Ikar canned beef is remembered by the people of Sarajevo with 
disgust. Cats and dogs did not want to eat it, and people had to”.33 
The second remarkable feature of Soba’s work is its straightforward dedication to 
the international community, that in this way emerges as the principal recipient of a 
message about foreign humanitarian aid and foreign involvement in crucial moments 
of BiH’s recent history. 
In this sense, Soba’s work employs sarcastic ‘gratefulness’ for the object it portrays 
to question the role and interests of outsiders in relation to the conflict and give voice 
to a broader critique: “[the] political assistance Bosnia is receiving now from the West 
equals in quality the assistance we have been receiving in edible form during the war. 
Mysterious content, mysterious manufacturer, unknown expiration date”.34 As aptly 
noted by Sheftel, Soba’s monument “subverts colonialist notions of a people being 
‘grateful’ for the assistance they received by focusing on its inadequacy, which is 
demonstrated through a very literal depiction of what that assistance entailed”,35 and 
thus stands in “in constant, visible opposition to the international community’s 
narrative of what it accomplished, and continues to accomplish, in Bosnia”.36 
 
                                                     
32 Statement by Nebojsa Seric-Soba, published online on November, 18 2003, http://balkansnet.org/zamir-
chat-list/transfer/nss/eng.html. 
33 “Bosnians Raise Monument to Canned Beef,” Reuters, 6 Apr. 2007. 
34 Statement by Nebojsa Seric-Soba, 18 November 2003. 
35 Sheftel, Anna, “‘Monument to the International Community, from the Grateful Citizens of Sarajevo’: Dark 
Humour as Counter-Memory in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Memory Studies 5.2 (2012), 157. 
36 Ibid., 158. The artist originally proposed that the monument be located in Marshal Tito Street, in front of 
the Presidency building, as “this would clearly send a symbolic message to representatives of the 
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The third monument donated to the city of Sarajevo within the SCCA “New 
Monument” project was Nermina Omerbegovic and Aida Pasic’s “Eglen Park, Pedestal 
for Remembering” (Eglen park, postament za podsjecanje), a stone pedestal located in 
the small park in front of the Presidency building, with inscriptions on the four sides 
reciting “I THINK, I SEE, I HEAR, I TALK” (Ja mislim, ja vidim, ja cujem, ja govorim) (see 
figures 101, 102, 103). The work responds to the “complaint that […] citizens of BiH 
and Sarajevo are passive about what’s going on in their country”37 with the proposal 
to create a space for open speech. Such proposal further transcends the conventional 
notion of monument to concentrate on the present and tackle the issue of agency, 
especially in its individual dimension. The pedestal in fact does not represent a 
‘memory object’ in the strict sense of the word, but rather aims at becoming a site 
where citizens are allowed and encouraged to express their opinions. The location of 
this work appears as important as the pedestal itself: while the choice of a green area 
is linked to the idea of the park as a place of socialisation among citizens, the specific 
location selected by the artists has a strategic positioning vis-à-vis buildings of various 
institutions, thus promoting an open and direct dialogue with the governing 
authorities.38 The pedestal in this perspective has a double function, presented in the 
artists’ proposal as a project in two possible phases: as a “monument for itself”, it 
reminds passers-by of the potential inherent in each citizen to take initiative; as a 
pedestal, it provides a “platform for speeches” and constitutes a “warn[ing] that 
citizens of this country […] know how to think and talk, […] are capable of listening 
to others and see what’s going on around them”.39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
international community visiting the presidency: We know what we have to swallow!!!” Statement by 
Nebojsa Seric-Soba, 18 November 2003. 
37 SCCA website, Proposals, Nermina Omerbegovic and Aida Pasic. 
38 This concept of parks as places where people would gather is mentioned in the artists’ proposal, which 
also entailed a rearrangement of the green area around the pedestal (i.e. delimitation of the space with 
particular plants and reparation of broken benches). The institutional buildings in the area surrounding the 
pedestal mentioned in the artists’ proposal are the BiH Presidency, the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Party 
offices and the European Commission; SCCA website, Proposals, Nermina Omerbegovic and Aida Pasic. 
39 SCCA website, Proposals, Nermina Omerbegovic and Aida Pasic. 
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7.3 Dobrovoljacka Ulica 
“Public memory is where and how groups struggle 
to gain cultural authority to selectively represent 
and narrate their past”.40 
Since 2010, a new commemorative rite has begun to emerge in the centre of Sarajevo, 
to mark the anniversary of an event that took place in the early phases of war in 1992. 
The commemoration, consisting of a peaceful walk with the laying of wreaths and 
candles at a particular spot, takes place on the 3rd of May in Hamdije Kresevljakovic 
Street, previously Dobrovoljacka Street (Dobrovoljacka Ulica), and since its first 
organisation it provoked heated debates in the media and the public sphere and 
tensions among politicians.  
The gathering takes place to commemorate the incident during which a column of 
vehicles and personnel of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, 
JNA) was attacked by forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina while leaving 
Sarajevo on May, 3 1992.  
At the time, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been internationally recognised as an 
independent state, and life in the country was being disrupted by outbreaks of 
violence. During the month of April 1992, paramilitary formations loyal to Bosnian 
Serb nationalists erected barricades in various areas of Sarajevo, seized the city’s 
airport, shot civilians from high-rise buildings (see chapter 6) and set up military 
positions on the surrounding hills.41 While the newly established state of BiH was still 
in the process of organising its armed forces, which at the time consisted of various 
loosely connected military and paramilitary formations, the Yugoslav People’s Army 
had become an all-Serb force.42 The reconstitution of Serbia and Montenegro into the 
 
                                                     
40 Till, Karen E., “Staging the Past: Landscape Designs, Cultural Identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin’s 
Neue Wache,” Cultural Geographies 6.3 (1999), 255. 
41 Since the first war events entailing shootings at the crowd and the attack at the Military academy at Vraca 
on the weekend of April 5-6, violence hit the city on a daily basis, with bombardments, sniper fire, machine-
gun fire, shelling, gun battles etc, see Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VI, 
Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo. Donia asserts that by the end of the month of April 1992 “most 
elements of the Sarajevo siege were in place,” Donia, Sarajevo, 293. 
42 On the creation of separate Serb political institutions (including police forces) in and around Sarajevo and 
on the “ethnicisation” of the JNA see for instance Donia, Sarajevo, 264-277, who argues that “the evolution 
of the JNA into a Serb-dominated force was manifest in the streets of Sarajevo and its surrounding hills in 
the last several months of 1991” (p. 273). According to Donia, all three nationalist parties had been 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 27, 1992) formally made the JNA in BiH a foreign 
occupying force: the units located in army bases throughout Sarajevo were ordered 
by the BiH Presidency to leave the country, and became vulnerable to be encircled 
and captured by BiH forces, motivated by both defence strategies and a deep need of 
weapons.43 
On the 2nd of May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces launched an offensive in the centre of 
Sarajevo, in the attempt to seize the Presidency building and take over the 
government and city. Faced with unexpected resistance by tactical assault units of the 
Territorial Defence (TO), the operation failed and the attackers withdrew after 
suffering various casualties44. Later that day, President Izetbegovic, who was 
returning from failed peace talks in Lisbon, was captured by JNA forces after landing 
at Sarajevo airport and held hostage at the Lukavica barracks in the outskirts of the 
city. With the mediation of UNPROFOR, it was thus arranged that President 
Izetbegovic be released in exchange for JNA General Milutin Kukanjac and a 
contingent of JNA soldiers, located in army barracks in the Bistrik area, on the south 
bank of the river Miljacka (at one end of Dobrovoljacka Street). 
President Izetbegovic and General Kukanjac were exchanged with the mediation of 
UNPROFOR Commander General MacKenzie, reaching Dobrovoljacka Street together 
on a UN armoured personnel carrier. In a narrow part of the street, the rear of the 
column of JNA vehicles was attacked by local BiH forces, who opened fire killing (at 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
preparing for war with the creation of armed formations and the recruit of volunteers already since 1991, 
although the JNA held a monopoly on heavy artillery, armoured vehicles, planes, helicopters and modern 
military equipment (Ibid.). The various armed formations that converged into the Army of BiH (Armija BiH, 
ARBiH) or fought on its side included special police units, units of the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna 
Odbrana, TO, was one section of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, organised 
at the level of the republics, beside the overall JNA federal army); and the Patriotic League and Green 
Berets, two Muslim/SDA controlled paramilitary formations emerged in 1991, see e.g. Donia, Sarajevo, 273-7. 
43 Donia, Sarajevo, 291-99. 
44 According to the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, the attack entailed both 
artillery and mortar shelling from the hills towards specific targets (such as the Radio-Television Sarajevo 
building and the public transportation network) and close-range fighting in the historic centre of the city. 
Although the number of casualties is not clear, it was reported that bodies of civilians and fighters remained 
lying on the streets for hours after the fighting (Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, 
Annex VI, Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, entry of 2/5/92). On the early morning of that same day, 
the main Post Office in Sarajevo was sabotaged with an explosion that severed local telephone lines, 
interrupting communications both within the city and with the outside, see RFE/RL, “What really happened 
during the Dobrovoljacka attack?”, Omer Karabeg, 8.03.2010, interview with interview with Jovan Divjak). 
The 2nd of May 1992 is since remembered as the day on which the blockade of Sarajevo effectively began. 
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least) six and taking dozens of prisoners.45 After the attack, the convoy eventually 
resumed its westward movement and finally reached the JNA Lukavica barracks out 
of the city. 
The events of Dobrovoljacka Street are still at the centre of controversies 
concerning both the number of casualties and the responsibilities for the attack. 
While the RS establishment claims that 42 members of the JNA were killed, 73 were 
wounded, and 215 were taken prisoners, first-hand accounts of the assault, such as 
former ARBiH General Jovan Divjak and former JNA General Milutin Kukanjac’s, report 
that the number of casualties amounted to six to eight people.46  
One hypothesis for such a considerable difference is that estimates advanced by 
Republika Srpska include victims from the failed offensive of the previous day (May, 2) 
 
                                                     
45 It is not yet clear who ordered or decided to attack the convoy, nor the exact number of casualties (see 
below in the text and note 46). 
46 See, for instance, “Obiljezavanje godisnjice stradanja u Dobrovoljackoj Ulici” (Commemoration of the 
anniversary of the massacre in Dobrovoljacka Street), Radio Televizija Bijeljina (Rtvbn), 3.05.2010, 
www.republikasrpska.net, and Omer Karabeg, “What really happened during the Dobrovoljacka attack?”, 
interview with Jovan Divjak, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 08.03.2010, www.rferl.org. The UN 
Commission of Experts Final Report on the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo reports ten dead during the 
morning of the 3rd of May; fifteen casualties from the weekend street warfare, and two JNA soldiers and 
two colonels “killed in an ambush” (UN Commission of Experts Final Report, Annex VI, entry of 3/5/92). An 
article appeared in 2012 reports that investigations of the Office of the Prosecutor of BiH led to an estimate 
of 7 people killed and 14 wounded during the attack of the 3rd of May, whereas the Republican Centre for 
the Investigation of war, war crimes and the search for missing persons (Republicki Centar za istrazivanje 
rata, ratnih zlocina I trazenje nestalih lica, under the Ministry of Justice of Republika Srpska) claims 42 people 
were killed: ten officials, twenty-eight soldiers and four civilians, see Rade Radovanovic, “Slucaj 
Dobrovoljacka: falsifikovanje istine” (The Dobrovoljacka case: falsification of the truth), Al Jazeera Balkans, 
03.05.2012, https://balkans.aljazeera.net (earlier appeared in Belgrade newspaper Dani). According 
Schwartz-Schilling (2010), the figures presented by Republika Srpska “refer to all those killed or missing in 
combat operations all over Sarajevo for a five day period from 29 April to 3 May.” Schwartz-Schilling, 
Christian, “The Ejup Ganic Case. How Serbia Attempted to Manipulate the British Justice System,” L’Europe 
en Formation 3.357 (2010), 184. King (“The Siege of Sarajevo,” 260-1) reports that twenty-five people were 
killed and wounded overall, and over 90 were taken prisoner. JNA General Milutin Kukanjac, who was 
present at the scene, reportedly stated that six officers were killed during the attack (see e.g. 
“Dobrovoljacka Street deaths commemorated”, BIRN BiH, 04.05.2010; Marija Arnautovic, “Slucaj 
Dobrovoljacka ponovo u centru paznje” (The Dobrovoljacka Case in the spotlight again), Radio Slobodna 
Evropa, 27.04.2010; R. Radovanovic, “Slucaj Dobrovoljacka: falsifikovanje istine”, Al Jazeera Balkans, 
03.05.2012), thus presenting an estimate close to the one reported by former ARBiH General Jovan Divjak 
(for Jovan Divjak’s view of the Dobrovoljacka case see Radio Slobodna Evropa, Svjedoci Rata (Witnesses of 
war), Omer Karabeg, “Jovan Divjak za RSE o Dobrovoljackoj” (Jovan Divjak for RSE on Dobrovoljacka), 
RSE/RFE, 06.10.2009, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/svjedoci_rata_divjak/1841868.html). 
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in the centre of the city.47 At the same time, though, the attack against the JNA 
convoy is denounced by the RS establishment as an unnecessary deliberate assault 
during a peaceful withdrawal, in a perspective that downplays the context in which it 
occurred (i.e. the offensive of the 2nd of May and the encirclement and blockade of 
Sarajevo) and the fact that the withdrawing JNA convoy was ambiguously part of the 
forces attacking the city. Whereas this perspective labels the attack in Dobrovoljacka 
Street a ‘massacre’, antithetical recollections present it as an ‘incident’ generated by 
the tensions raised by the abduction of the President and the lack of coordination 
among military and paramilitary formations of the (at the time) emerging Army of 
BiH. 
Discrepancies in the count of casualties, however, are just one aspect of 
controversies over the “Dobrovoljacka case”, whereby different interpretations of 
the events of the 3rd of May 1992 relate to disputes over the attribution of 
responsibilities for the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo and the war in BiH. 
According to Erjavec, Volcic, Kovacic and Vobic, “the problem of defining the 
beginning of the war in BiH [and the politically and ideologically related] question of 
identifying the group responsible for the conflicts that followed [are] connected to 
the question of who is responsible for the war incident on Dobrovoljacka Street in 
Sarajevo”.48 Reproduced and amplified by the local media, the polarisation around the 
Dobrovoljacka case is thus used by both sides to blame the opposite faction for 
initiating the aggression and claim that what followed was motivated by self-
defence.49 
 
                                                     
47 As mentioned above, after the failed offensive to seize the Presidency building on the 2nd of May, many 
bodies remained in the Skenderija area across the Miljacka river (at the South-West end of Dobrovoljacka 
Street), as sniper fire prevented ambulances from reaching the dead and wounded (UN Commission of 
Experts Final Report, Annex VI, entry of 3/5/92). 
48 Erjavec, Karmen et al.. “Journalistic Views on Post-Violent Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in 
Peace Psychology in the Balkans. Dealing with a Violent Past While Building Peace, edited by Olivera Simic, Zala 
Volcic, and Catherine R. Philipot (Springer, 2012), 95. 
49 Erjavec, Volcic, Kovacic and Vobic concentrated specifically on media renderings of the so-called 
“Dobrovoljacka case” through the analysis of newspaper articles appeared in 2009 (from February to June) 
and in-depth interviews with eight journalists conducted in November 2010. Analysing four main BiH daily 
newspapers – Sarajevo-based Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz, and Banja Luka-based Nezavisne Novine and 
Glas Srpske – the authors identified the main narratives underpinning articles on the events of 
Dobrovoljacka Street and recollected them to two opposing narratives on the subsequent war. Articles 
published in Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz relied mostly on Bosnjak sources and presented the 
Dobrovoljacka events as an “incident” occurred during the defence of BiH and the liberation of kidnapped 
president Izetbegovic, while articles appeared in Nezavisne Novine and Glas Srpske labeled the attack as an 
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Since 2009, an arrest warrant issued by the War Crime section of the Prosecutor’s 
Office of Serbia against 19 BiH officials has put the Dobrovoljacka case back under the 
spotlight of the media, drawing the attention of the public both locally and 
internationally and re-opening the controversy over whether the attack should be 
considered as a war crime or a legitimate act of defence.50 As a consequence, on 
March 1, 2010, former Presidency member Ejup Ganic was arrested in London by 
British authorities acting upon the Serbian warrant, which indicted him of having 
ordered the 1992 attack against the JNA convoy.51 
The arrest of Mr. Ganic took place on a symbolic day – on the Day of Independence 
of BiH and the opening session of the trial against Radovan Karadzic at the ICTY – 
raising tensions and stiffening the polarisation over the Dobrovoljacka case just two 
months before the first commemoration of the event in the city centre.52 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“ambush” orchestrated despite previous agreements on the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA and claimed 
that this event marked the beginning of a campaign against the Serb population of BiH. Accordingly, the 
authors argue that “reporting patterns are mostly homogenized according to ethno-national lines, as well 
as their connections with dominant political discourses within ethnic groups” (Erjavec et al., “Journalistic 
Views,” 92). 
50 “Serbia charges 19 Bosnian officials with war crimes”, Reuters, 26/02/2009; Erna Mackic, “Serbian probe 
into JNA deaths alarms Bosnians”, BIRN BiH, 22/04/2009; Omer Karabeg, “Slucaj Dobrovoljacka: ratni zlocin 
ili legitimna odbrana” (The Dobrovoljacka case: war crime or legitimate defence), Radio Slobodna Evropa, 
07/03/2009. 
51 Ljudmila Cvetkovic and Biljana Jovicevic, “Ganicu odreden pritvor” (Ganic ordered into custody), Radio 
Slobodna Evropa, 01/03/2010; “Former Bosnian vice president arrested”, CNN, 02/03/2010; “Bosnian war 
leader arrested in UK”, BBC, 01/03/2010. In 1992, Ejup Ganic was one of the seven members of the 
Presidency of BiH, which, after the general elections of 1990, was composed of two members for the 
Bosnjak nation (Fikret Abdic and Alija Izetbegovic, for the Party of Democratic Action – Stranka 
Demokratske Akcije, SDA), two members for the Serb nation (Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic, for the 
Serbian Democratic Party – Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS), two members for the Croatian nation 
(Stjepan Kljuic and Franjo Boras, for the Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) 
and one elected from the category of Others (Ejup Ganic, for the Party of Democratic Action, SDA). For the 
time of President Izetbegovic’s abduction and during the negotiations for the JNA convoy withdrawal in 
Dobrovoljacka, Mr. Ganic was de facto acting as president. 
52 Radovan Karadzic was Republika Srpska’s President during the war in BiH. Arrested in Belgrade in 2008, 
he is under trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes 
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during the siege of Sarajevo and for having ordered the 1995 
genocide at Srebrenica. Tension and anger in Sarajevo were expressed with a public demonstration in the 
centre of the city on March 5, 2010, which started in Liberation/Alija Izetbegovic Square (Trg 
Oslobodjenja/Alija Izetbegovic) to reach the British Embassy and the Embassy of Serbia (personal 
observation, March 2010, see also chapter 3, paragraph 3 “participating in commemorations, performative 
aspects of memory”). Protestors carried signs with writings as “the aggressors arrest the victims”, “wake 
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While Mr. Ganic was eventually released by British authorities and his extradition to 
Serbia denied, his arrest and detention heightened tensions both within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and among BiH and Serbia.53 In particular, it was argued that Serbia has 
no basis for claiming the right to take over the Dobrovoljacka case, since it claims it 
did not take part in the war in BiH and all the indictees are citizens of BiH, where the 
crime was committed, which led many to conclude that the Serbian case against Ganic 
“is a politically motivated case. Its aim is to take the attention away from Karadzic’s 
case and to create balance between what the Serbs did and what perhaps the 
Bosnjaks did”.54 
Barely two months after the arrest of Ejup Ganic, the first commemoration of the 
Dobrovoljacka events took place in the centre of Sarajevo. The tensions raised by the 
latest events related to the case and the controversies over its interpretation and 
significance predictably affected the performance of the commemoration itself, 
which was perceived by some as a provocation. A few days before the anniversary of 
the 3rd of May, Sarajevo Mayor Alija Behmen sent a memo to the Cantonal Minister for 
Internal Affairs Zeljko Mijatovic seeking the revocation of permissions for the 
commemoration, invoking the Cantonal Law on Public Gatherings, according to which 
“a public gathering can be banned insofar as it aims at the appeal and fomentation to 
armed conflict or the use of violence […], national, religious or other forms of hatred, 
i.e. when there is clear danger of violence and breach of public order and peace on a 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
up Bosnia”, “Serbia is fascist and genocidal”; “Great Britain shame on u. War presidency thanks for life” 
(personal observation, March 2010). 
53 Mr. Ganic returned to BiH after the Westminster Magistrates’ Court ruled that “[the] proceedings [were] 
brought and [...] being used for political purposes and as such amount to an abuse of process of this court,” 
quoted in Schwartz-Schilling, “The Ejup Ganic Case,” 178. See also “Former Bosnian leader returns to 
Sarajevo after U.K rejects Serbian extradition”, Radio Free Europe, 28/07/2010; “Serbia accused of abusing 
the law”, BBC, 11/06/2010; “Ex-Bosnian leader Ejup Ganic’s UK extradition blocked”, BBC, 27/07/2010. 
54 British journalist Robin Harris, quoted in Sabina Cabaravdic, “Slucaj na kojem se prelamaju ukupni odnosi 
na Balkanu” (The case through which all relations in the Blakans refract), Radio Slobodna Evropa, 
06/03/2010. Two previous investigations led by the ICTY and the Prosecution of BiH concluded, respectively, 
that there is no case against Mr. Ganic and that the case against him was politically motivated (BBC, “Ex-
Bosnian leader Ejup Ganic’s UK extradition blocked”, 27/07/2010). Contrary to these conclusions, former 
president of the Military Court of Belgrade Dorde Trifunovic, who investigated the Dobrovoljacka case in 
the 1990s, asserts that Ejup Ganic ordered the attack. The claim is based on evidence collected during the 
investigations, which include a recording of radio communications where Ganic allegedly said “Order for all 
units, destroy all moving vehicles of the enemy. Prepare inflammable mixtures and burn all. Block one unit 
and immediately go after them;” Goran Maunaga, “Dorde Trifunovic: Ganic naredio I vodio napad” (Dorde 
Trifunovic: Ganic ordered and led the attack), Glas Srpske, 04/03/2010). Donia also asserts that the “ARBiH 
troops opened fire in accord with orders from Ganic” (Sarajevo, 296). 
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large scale”.55 As Behmen further explained in a statement for the public, the request 
of a ban was motivated by the understanding of the commemoration as “part of an 
organised campaign of revision of legally established facts on the aggression of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and crimes perpetrated on its territory and its citizens [and 
as] an effort to criminalise the defence of Sarajevo”.56 Serb authorities responded to 
the news of the Mayor’s request claiming their own right to commemorate victims of 
the recent war in the city’s public space, and suggesting that the commemoration 
would reveal the inclusiveness of Sarajevo (and, by extension, of post-Dayton BiH as a 
whole) towards its Serb component. In particular, the gathering in Dobrovoljacka 
Street would “test” whether the city is actually pluralist as it claims: “should the 
commemoration of the massacre in Dobrovoljacka be banned it would become self-
evident that Sarajevo is a city whose political and ethnic structure is mononational 
and in which there is no tolerance”.57 As the Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova, MUP) decided to allow the event, on the 3rd 
of May 2010 a crowd of approximately 150 relatives and friends of the victims, 
including some politicians of RS, walked the street carrying wreaths and candles and 
positioned them at a particular spot in sign of remembrance. Barely half an hour 
earlier, however, a “counter-commemoration” organised by the association of the 
“Green Berets”, one of the armed groups defending the city between 1992 and 1995, 
was held in Dobrovoljacka Street to pay tribute to the defenders of BiH, which 
reportedly caused a delay to the Serb commemoration for security reasons.58 
The gathering on the 3rd of May 2010 was not an isolated occurrence, but rather the 
first celebration of an anniversary that is gaining increasing relevance. Accordingly, it 
is included in the twenty “events of national importance” comprising the Calendar of 
Significant Historical Events of the Liberation Wars issued by the SubCommittee for 
 
                                                     
55 “Behmen-Mijatovicu: obliljezavanje dogadaja u Dobrovoljackoj bilo bi uvreda za sve nevine zrtve 
Sarajeva” (Behmen to Mijatovic: the commemoration of the events in Dobrovoljacka Street would be an 
affront to all innocent victims of Sarajevo), Official webpage of Sarajevo City, 28/04/2010. 
56 “Izjava za medije gradonacelnika Sarajeva povodom najave dogadaja u Dobrovoljackoj 1992” (Statement 
of the Mayor for the media on the announcement of the events in Dobrovoljacka), Official webpage of 
Sarajevo City, 28/04/2010. 
57 Igor Radojicic, President of the RS Parliament, in “Sta je nama Dobrovoljacka” (What is Dobrovoljacka for 
us), BUKA, 29/04/2010, translation: author. 
58 “Sarajevo: dva skupa bez incidenata” (Sarajevo: two gatherings without incidents), B92, 03/05/2010; 
“Dobrovoljacka Ulica”, Glas Srpske, 03/05/2010; “Commemoration in Sarajevo held without incident”, Balkan 
Insight, 04/05/2010. 
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Nurturing the Traditions of the Liberation Wars (Pododbor za njegovanje tradicija 
oslobodilackih ratova) under the RS Government. 
The second time it was organised, the Dobrovoljacka commemoration was marked 
by as many tensions as it was in 2010, this time with former ARBiH General Jovan 
Divjak detained in Vienna on the basis of the arrest warrant issued in 2009 by Serbia’s 
Prosecution Office.59 
On the morning of 3 May 2011 the perimeter around Dobrovoljacka Street in 
Sarajevo was controlled by police forces (including riot squads) preventing the access 
to passers-by, so that it was not possible to witness the commemoration if not by 
directly taking part in it.60 A small crowd of people gathered on the opposite bank of 
the Miljacka river at the Drvenija Bridge to try and follow the event, although the view 
was impeded by the presence of large billboards. A few members of the Green Berets 
veterans association stood on the bridge aside the police cordon, observing the 
commemoration from a closer standpoint (see figures 104, 105).  
In preparation for the anniversary, the RS Minister of Labour and Veterans Affairs 
Petar Djokic encouraged Federal authorities, the City administration and ordinary 
Sarajevans to participate in the commemoration to show solidarity with the victims’ 
families, as a “symbol of hope for the future, [showing] that we understood what was 
the essence of those unfortunate events, to demand all together that those who are 
responsible answer before legal institutions”.61 The participation of (non-Serb) 
Sarajevans in this contested commemoration would symbolically compensate the 
chance missed on 3 May 1992, when, according to Djokic, “[there was] heavy shooting 
in peacetime in BiH, as at that time armed conflict had not spread to the whole of BiH, 
although several armed incidents had occurred. There was the opportunity to 
demonstrate mutual trust, which unfortunately was missed in Sarajevo with [...] the 
breach of the deal for the release of the JNA convoy”.62 During the commemoration, 
Bogdana Tomovic, mother of a young soldier killed in the Dobrovoljacka attack, 
demanded through her statement for the media that the authorities of the Federation 
 
                                                     
59 See e.g. “Sarajevo ogorceno zbog Divjaka” (Sarajevo embittered because of Divjak), B92, 05/03/2011. 
60 Personal observation, 3 May 2011. 
61“Godisjnica Dobrovoljacke: Dokic pozvao Sarailije na razumijevanje” (Dobrovoljacka anniversary: Dokic 
called Sarajevans to understand), Nezavisne Novine, 19/04/2011, translation: author. 
62“Dobrovoljacka: odata pocast ubijenim voinicima JNA” (Dobrovoljacka: tribute payed to the killed JNA 
soldiers), Nezavisne Novine, 03/05/2011, translation: author. 
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and the City of Sarajevo erect a commemorative plaque on the site of the incident, to 
enable respectful remembrance of the victims.63 
This time, the veterans’ association “Green Berets” organised its own gathering in 
remembrance of the defenders of Sarajevo during the afternoon hours, to avoid 
simultaneity with the Serb gathering in the morning. The decision, however, was not a 
sign of approval of the emerging new commemoration, as clearly conveyed by 
Muhamed Zvrakic, president of the “Green Berets” association, who stated for the 
press: “from next year they will surely not come to mark this date as they do now. If it 
becomes necessary to fight, even against our own Ministry of Internal Affairs, we will 
fight, and we will physically prevent the aggressors from provoking in this way the 
defenders of BiH”.64 
In 2012, on the 20th anniversary of the Dobrovoljacka incident, the 
commemoration’s activities lasted two days, with the organisation of a gathering in 
the Cultural Centre of Eastern Sarajevo on the 2nd of May (Duhovna Akademija, literally 
spiritual academy), preceding the customary walk with wreaths and candles on the 
site of the attack on May 3.65 Broadcasted live on RS television, the gathering at the 
Cultural Centre opened with a choir singing the anthem of Republika Srpska and saw 
the participation of various representatives of RS institutions. Their speeches touched 
upon the themes of pluralism and equality of treatment of all constituent nations in 
BiH, especially with regards to justice for crimes committed during the war and 
freedom of memorialisation of particular events of the past conflict. 
The President of the RS Team for Tracing Missing Persons (Operativni tim Republike 
Srpske za trazenje nestalih lica) deplored the lack of monuments significant to the Serb 
population in FBiH (especially in comparison to the presence of monuments to 
Bosnjaks in RS) and asserted that Sarajevo cannot be regarded as an inclusive capital 
city, as it is not representative of all of the country’s citizens, but has rather become 
the “[ethnically] cleanest city in BiH”.66 The RS Minister for Labour and Veterans’ 
Affairs Petar Djokic recalled that the convoy withdrawing from Dobrovoljacka Street 
was multiethnic in its composition (with some Muslim and Albanian soldiers) and 
stated that the days of 2-3 May bring deep sadness especially to Bosnian Serbs and to 
 
                                                     
63“Dobrovoljacka: odata pocast ubijenim voinicima JNA” (Dobrovoljacka: tribute payed to the killed JNA 
soldiers), Nezavisne Novine, 03/05/2011. 
64 M. Kukan, “Ove godine smo ih pustili u Dobrovoljacku, iduce necemo” (This year we let them in 
Dobrovoljacka, the next we won’t), Dnevni Avaz, 03/05/2011, translation: author. 
65“Dvodnevno obiljezavanje stradanja vojnika JNA u Dobrovoljackoj” (Two-days commemoration of the 
massacre of JNA soldiers in Dobrovoljacka), Oslobodjenje, 17/04/2012. 
66 From fieldwork notes during personal observation, 2 May 2012. 
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all those who believed in the chance to avoid the war in BiH, until the Dobrovoljacka 
attack “proved them wrong”. He further asserted that any attempt at preventing the 
commemorative walk in Dobrovoljacka Street on the following day would once and 
for all demonstrate that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not exist as a (common, 
unitary) state.67  
The commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street on the 3rd of May 2012 was finally 
open for by-standers to observe. Before the arrival of the delegation from Eastern 
Sarajevo, a group of people and representatives of veterans’ associations of Sarajevo 
Canton gathered in the same area to pay tribute to members of the wartime Army of 
BiH. The Serb delegation was greeted with shouts of protest from the small crowd 
previously assembled, and the commemoration unfolded under the control of police 
squads, deployed in the streets in various units to keep the two gatherings separated 
and secure the whole area (see figures 106, 107). Despite the tense atmosphere, the 
commemoration followed the same pattern as the previous years: the delegation 
approached a particular spot of Dobrovoljacka Street, lay roses and candles and 
released interviews and statements to the press (see figure 108). A few minutes later, 
members of the Green Berets and other veterans’ associations carried out the same 
ritual a few metres away, laying flowers aside the commemorative plaques on the 
building next to Drvenja Bridge (see figures 109 and 111). When the two groups 
evacuated the area, a few policemen remained positioned in a circle around the roses 
and candles left by the Serb delegations, to prevent their damage or removal (see 
figures 110 and 112). 
7.4 The Siege of Sarajevo Museum – the Art of Living 1992-
1996 
“As citizens, witnesses and participants of the 
siege, we have an obligation towards the past. 
People who do not remember the past have no 
vision of the future. This museum will be a very 
important testimony of the spirit of this city during 
the siege. It would round off a very significant 
 
                                                     
67 Personal observation, 2 May 2012. 
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chapter of the life of the city, but also of our lives. 
With its construction we will be able to say that the 
blockade of Sarajevo has been lifted.”68 
On the 30th of May 2011, a press conference organised with the participation of the 
City Mayor and the Municipality of Sarajevo Centar announced the project of a new 
museum on the 1992-1996 siege of Sarajevo, created by four Bosnian NGOs – FAMA 
International, MESS International Theatre Festival, the association Education Builds 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (OGBiH), and the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (YIHR BiH). With a collection composed of interactive maps, digital 
chronologies, an animated encyclopaedia, a video archive, photographs, sketches, 
artefacts, over 1,400 oral testimonies and 3,000 visual documents, this particular kind 
of museum was conceived as a “monument to human intellect, achievements, 
creativity, and strength of the human nature showed by the people of Sarajevo during 
the 4-years period of the siege”.69 The press conference also announced plans for the 
construction of the Museum’s building in the city centre and gave public access to the 
collection via the internet through the dissemination of its web address and related 
password. 
The Museum of the siege derives from projects initiated since 1992 (when the city 
was encircled and under attack), from which it developed during the years into a 
multilayered recollection of the endurance of war centred around the notion that 
“the experience of Sarajevo Siege highlights [the] capacity of human mind, body and 
soul to respond and to survive a major urban cataclysmic event and defy terror”.70 The 
prodromes of this underpinning approach are exemplified by one of FAMA’s early 
projects, the Sarajevo Survival Guide, finalised under the siege in 1993 and presented 
as 
 
                                                     
68 Dino Mustafic, Director of the International Theatre Festival MESS, quoted in “Interaktivni Muzej opsade 
Sarajeva” (Interactive Museum of the siege of Sarajevo), Radio Sarajevo, 30/05/2011, translation: author. 
69 Statement by Suada Kapic (founder of FAMA) at the press conference, reported in “Muzej opsade 
Sarajeva u maju iduce godine” (The Museum of the siege of Sarajevo [will open] in May next year), Official 
page of Sarajevo City, 30/05/2011, translation: author. 
70 Project presentation document, October 2011/March 2012, FAMA collection website. Suada Kapic, founder 
of FAMA and leader of the project, recalls its origins as a kind of foresight, stating: “from the very beginning 
of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we knew that documentation, of all types and forms, would play a vital 
role in the fate of current and future generations. In keeping with our own personal principles, our methods 
rely on fact, oral history and recorded documentation (documented documents)”, FAMA collection 
website, Methodology, www.famacollection.org. 
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“a version of Michelin, taking visitors through the city and instructing them on 
how to survive without transportation, hotels, taxis, telephones, food, shops, 
heating, water, information, electricity. It is a chronicle, a guide for survival, a 
part of a future archive which shows the city of Sarajevo not as victim, but as a 
place for experiment where wit can still achieve victory over terror”.71 
The Guide was fashioned as a mock tourist handbook to besieged Sarajevo, with 
information covering various topics such as eating72 and drinking (p. 18), shopping (p. 
36), the city by night (p. 14), transportation (p. 57), entertainment and 
accommodation (p. 82), in a humorous tone that constituted at once a form of 
denunciation and a weapon against the violence of war. Translated into English and 
reprinted many times, today it can be regarded as an essay of cultural resistance to 
the dehumanising conditions of the siege, where ‘dark humour’ had the double 
function to “assert the spirit of the Bosnian people in the face of their annihilation, 
and, by taking things to their logical conclusion, to point out just how severe the 
siege, the war, and their consequences for contemporary understandings of 
humanity, were”.73 
From this early project, the work of research and documentation undertaken by 
the creators of FAMA evolved into the conceptualisation of the Museum of the Siege 
– the Art of Living, aimed at “launching a new way of interacting and learning about 
the phenomenon of the Siege of Sarajevo by focusing on the Mechanism of Survival 
vs. Mechanism of Terror” (Project presentation document). The range and scope of 
the materials collected between 1992 and 2010 are now said to constitute the “world 
largest independent collection of multimedia projects on the siege of Sarajevo and 
the events related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia”.74 
Since 2010, the team working at the Museum expanded to form a Consortium 
(composed of the four organisations mentioned above – FAMA, MESS, OGBiH and 
YIHR BiH) and started to establish two networks related to the project: a network of 
international cities and regions interested in developing the Museum’s model of 
recollection of the past for educational purposes, and an academic network to 
establish partnerships with universities, research institutes, museums, libraries and 
 
                                                     
71 FAMA, Sarajevo Survival Guide, (Sarajevo: FAMA, 1993), Preface. 
72 FAMA, Sarajevo Survival Guide, 19, complemented with a “War cook book 1992/93” (pp. 20-7). 
73 Sheftel, “‘Monument to the International Community,” 148. 
74 “Veceras predstavljanje Muzeja opsade Sarajeva 1992.-1996. I virtuelne FAMA kolekcije” (Tonight 
presentation of the Museum of the siege of Sarajevo 1992-1006 and the virtual FAMA collection), Official 
page of Sarajevo City, 05/04/2012, translation: author. 
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archives. The project has now the official patronage of the City of Sarajevo and has 
developed partnership with the Municipality of Sarajevo Centar, which donated a plot 
of land for the location of the Museum’s building in the area of Marijn Dvor, on the 
path from the city centre to the Parliament’s square.  
The Museum’s project was officially presented on the evening of 5 April 2012, on 
the eve of the Day of the City of Sarajevo and 20th anniversary of the beginning of the 
siege, with a public gathering introduced by the City Mayor on the future location of 
the Museum’s building, entailing the screening of a trailer on the Museum’s collection 
and building plans.75 According to the architectural sketches, the Museum’s building 
was envisaged as a ‘space of experience’ that recalls the years of the siege: instead of 
a conventional entrance, it will be accessed either from the rooftop or through a 
tunnel, as was the case for besieged Sarajevo, when the only ways to transit in and 
out of the city were constituted by the airport and an underground tunnel (now 
Tunnel of Hope Museum, see previous chapters). With its permanent collection 
organised and disposed as a fractal cube, to allow visitors to move across 60 thematic 
boxes, the Museum will be designed as “a space in which not only specific knowledge 
transfer occurs, but also a space where [the] mindset of visitors is changed for at least 
a moment”, as an “infrastructure that in a dynamic and versatile way can be filled 
with knowledge, memories and creativity that themselves change with time”.76 
When established in its own building, the Museum of the Siege is envisioned to 
articulate over three levels: (a) the Museum proper, with a permanent collection, 
temporary installation and exhibits, ongoing educational projects, a research centre 
(with digital library and archives); (b) the virtual FAMA collection, as multi-lingual and 
interactive web portal; and (c) a Survival Home travelling exhibit, to bring the 
Museum’s experience to other cities of the network.77 
Despite being defined as a “museum”, the Art of Living project advances a model 
of memorialisation that defies the conventional musealisation of the past and 
proposes an alternative viewpoint and narrative on the conflict that ravaged Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, centred on the theme of survival and thus also dedicated to 
survivors. Initiated during the war under harsh conditions, the project does not aim at 
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77 FAMA, Project Presentation Document, October 2011/March 2012. 
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creating an exhaustive explanation of the armed conflict, nor aspires to provide its 
own grandiose narrative on the war effort. Rather, its creators chose to focus the 
recollection on the actual experience of the city of Sarajevo and limit their interpretive 
grip as much as possible, to render the multifariousness of lived experience while 
trying to “avoid any manipulation […] and […] create a model of education in which 
[future generations] will come to terms with what happened”.78 The particular angle 
that permeates the project is that of first-hand involvement in the siege itself. In 
opposition to memorialisation processes that construct narratives on the victims and 
heroes of the conflict, with repercussions over the controversial assessment of guilt 
and blame and the division of the country’s population into “us” and “them”, the 
project’s motive is to “honour the experience of ordinary Sarajevans by continuing to 
collect and preserve artefacts, voices and faces of the Siege phenomenon for future 
generations”.79 
7.5 Conclusions 
The three initiatives presented in this chapter constitute, each in its own way, 
alternative models of memorialisation of the recent past of BiH, either because they 
promote different ways to remember the conflict, opposed views on the events it 
entailed, or innovative approaches to public memory. 
The emerging commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street, organised by the RS 
establishment and performed in the standardised way of official commemorative 
rituals (the visit to the site of a war event to lay wreaths and light candles, with the 
participation of government officials and major media visibility), adopts conventional 
memorialisation techniques to foster a divergent account of the recent conflict. Both 
in its form and substance, it is specular to official commemorations organised and 
performed by the (mostly Bosnjak-Croat) FBiH establishment and the Sarajevo Canton 
and City, insofar as it fosters an antithetical recollection of the 1992-1995 war whereby 
Bosnian Serbs are remembered – and constructed – as victims, contrary to dominant 
narratives as they are monumentalised in BiH’s capital city (e.g. at the Kovaci 
 
                                                     
78 Suada Kapic, in “Interaktivni Muzej opsade Sarajeva” (Interactive Museum of the siege of Sarajevo), 
Radio Sarajevo, 30/05/2011, translation: author. 
79 FAMA, Project Presentation Document, 3.  
  251 
Memorial). Against the background of conflicting recollections of the recent war and 
ongoing controversies over the institutional arrangements stemmed from the Dayton 
Agreement, the commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street constitutes an opportunity 
to annually reassess the state of BiH and argue for different political solutions on the 
basis of claims of Serb discrimination. 
In doing so, nevertheless, and despite its politically motivated character, it also 
provides an example of the ways in which public memory can be used by minority 
groups (in this case Serbs in post-war Sarajevo) to claim their own visibility in public 
space and establish divergent recollections as part of the (official) memory culture of 
the country. The tensions it provokes, on the other hand, can be regarded as 
indicators of the dangers of official memorialisation, whose implications on the 
construction of group identities (conflating ‘us’ and ‘them’ with the moral categories 
of victims and perpetrators) polarise society and keep past traumas alive in the 
present instead of providing a means to come to terms with what happened. 
The search for alternative approaches to memorialisation that allow for both 
personal and social engagement with ‘the past’ beyond the construction of 
(dominant) memory narratives and templates appears to be the salient characteristic 
of the SCCA De/Construction of Monument project developed between 2004 and 
2007. Here, the works of prominent local artists were used to intervene in the public 
space and partake in the construction of the memorial landscape with unconventional 
reminders of the war experience. With the symbolic donation of three artworks to the 
city of Sarajevo, the SCCA project did not concentrate exclusively on the contents of 
memories monumentalised in the landscape, but rather tackled issues pertaining to 
the functions of monuments and the ownership of public space, fostering a 
nonconformist approach to memorialisation that questions its tropes and its relation 
to the present rather than asserting its own vision. In this perspective, it is not 
surprising that the initiative was met with inertia on the part of local institutions, who, 
after the initial involvement in the establishment and inauguration of the monuments, 
apparently ignored their existence. 
The Museum of the Siege – Art of Living collection constitutes yet a different 
approach to the memorialisation of the recent conflict, whose main features are the 
specificity of the experience it recalls and the innovative way in which it tries to do so. 
The very ideation and development of the project as a grassroots initiative within a 
context of extreme danger, destruction and deprivation, establish memorialisation as 
a practice of cultural resistance and empowerment. Although in comparison to the 
earlier project of the Sarajevo Survival Guide the Museum of the Siege appears less 
centred on sarcasm and irony as alternative tools of critique and self-expression, the 
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recollection it presents evades the conventional trope of victimhood and strives to 
render the multifariousness of (memories of) war as a lived experience. 
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Appendix eight: SCCA New Monument 
 
Figure 98: New Monument by Braco Dimitrijevic. Source: SCCA  information material. 
 
Figure 99: Monument to the International Community, Nebojsa Seric-Soba. Source: SCCA  
information material. 
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Figure 100: Monument to the International Community, Nebojsa Seric-Soba. July 2011. 
 
Figure 101: Eglen Park - Pedestal for Remembrance, inauguration. Source: SCCA  
information material. 
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Figure 102: Eglen Park - Pedestal for Remembrance. March 2010. 
 
Figure 103: Eglen Park - Pedestal for Remembrance, Presidency Building in background. 
March 2010. 
 256 
Appendix nine: Dobrovoljacka Ulica 
 
Figure 104: People gathered across the Drvenija Bridge to observe the commemoration in 
Dobrovoljacka Street, 3 May 2011. 
 
Figure 105: Police preventing access to Dobrovoljacka Street and people observing the 
commemoration, 3 May 2011. 
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Figure 106: Commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street, secured by local police, 3 May 2012. 
 
Figure 107: (Serb) commemoration of the Dobrovoljacka incident/attack (left) and 
simultaneous gathering of observers and Green Berets association (right) 
separated by police, 3 May 2012. 
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Figure 108: (Serb) commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street, authorities interviewed by the 
media, 3 May 2012. 
 
Figure 109: Observers and members of the Green Berets association, Dobrovoljacka Street, 
3 May 2012. 
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Figure 110: Roses and candles positioned by the RS delegation in Dobrovoljacka Street, 3 
May 2012. 
 
Figure 111: Wreath positioned during the Green Berets commemoration in Dobrovoljacka 
Street, 3 May 2012. 
 260 
 
Figure 112: Police protecting the roses and candles after the end of the (Serb) 
commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street, 3 May 2012. 
  261 
 8 Conclusions 
8.1 (Re)constructions of memories in BiH 
This study was conceived as an investigation and analysis of memorialisation 
processes in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a focus on the ways in which the 
recent experience of armed conflict is recollected through (official) monuments and 
commemorations. 
The choice was motivated by the crucial role assigned to “the past” in the war that 
ravaged the country and the wider region two decades ago, whereby “history” and 
“memory” were reinterpreted to invoke past sufferings and wrongdoings as inflicted 
on/by collective subjects, and thus instrumentalised to corroborate irreconcilable 
“ethnic” differences. Such historical revisionism, accomplished by rising extreme 
(ethno)nationalism during the deterioration of Socialist Yugoslavia, made the 1992-95 
conflict appear like a “war over memory”,1 appealing to the resurfacing of previously 
suppressed “ancient hatred” among ethnic groups, now constructed in essentialist 
and mutually exclusive terms (Serb-Orthodox v. Croat-Catholic v. Bosnjak-Muslim). 
Within the ensuing reconfiguration of the geopolitical and demographic map of BiH 
through systematic violence against the ethnic Other, the conflict additionally became 
a war on memory: “memory was literally blown up, as monuments, mosques and 
other concrete manifestations of collective memory were erased, and mnemonic 
maps were rewritten as normative maps for an ethnically reconfigured future”.2 
Placing “memory” at the core of populist justifications of intergroup incompatibility 
 
                                                     
1 Muller, Jan-Werner, “Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over 
Memory,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past, edited by Jan-
Werner Muller (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17. 
2 Ibid. 
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and animosity supported the deliberate targeting of the country’s cultural heritage, 
with the double function of obliterating the traces of its pluralist past and cleansing its 
territory to prevent heterogeneity in the future. The conflict was thus “imbued” with 
memory in both its preludes and unfolding, and its outcomes inevitably pose new 
questions, for “those who survived, on all sides, ha[ve] new and tangible memories of 
hate and fear [...] delivered by the neighbours and friends of yesterday”.3 Because 
today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina – its existence as an independent, internationally 
recognised state, and its configuration as a consociational power-sharing system – 
derives from the Dayton Agreement that halted the war, (official) memories of the 
recent conflict entangle with the definition of a shared identity of the state and with 
claims for or against its legitimacy. 
Given the range of the topic, the scope of this work was intentionally circumscribed 
under many respects, with the twofold intention of defining its limits while refining its 
focus.  
Parts I and II of the thesis illustrated the research’s contextualization and 
framework, with three introductory chapters dedicated to outline the theoretical 
background and methodological guidelines, and provided some factual and 
conceptual premises on the experience of war and destruction in Sarajevo. 
In Part I, chapter one introduced the reflection on post-war memorialisation 
processes in BiH and presented the aim and questions of the research. I defined my 
overall approach as one based on a “politics of memory” perspective, thus 
particularly interested in the entanglements between memorialisation and the 
construction of (group) identities, and linked it to the investigation of the impacts of a 
global “politics of heritage”, developed by UNESCO and the Council of Europe, on the 
particular context of BiH. 
First and foremost, the research was undertaken from an angle that concentrates 
on memory in its collective declination. This implied a disengagement from the 
individual dimensions and mnemonic aspects of remembering, in order to confront 
memory as a socio-political construct, to investigate how particular accounts of the 
history of the collective are shaped by selective remembrance and functional 
forgetting and carved into the urban memorial landscape with the erection of 
monuments and memorials, whose meaning(s) are mediated and consolidated 
through the performance of official commemorations. 
 
                                                     
3 Bet-El, Ilana R, “Unimagined Communities: The Power of Memory and the Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past, edited by J.-W. 
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The study thus endeavoured to emphasise the entanglements and intersections 
between the production of public memory and the delineation of the identity of the 
collective that is posited as the subject of remembrance, directing attention to 
institutionalised and official processes of memorialisation and studying recollections 
and articulations of the recent past within a top-down perspective. Accordingly, 
ongoing processes of memorialisation in the newly refashioned state of BiH were 
analysed with reference to power relations and dynamics of inclusion/exclusion, and 
were investigated focusing on their relations to present concerns of legitimation and 
future projections of identity of the polity. 
This “politics of memory” perspective, focused on the ongoing process of 
memorialisation of war undertaken by BiH’s institutions and authorities, was 
complemented with the analysis of a parallel “politics of heritage” encouraged by 
international actors and developed in line with what I call the “international heritage 
doctrine” based on UNESCO and Council of Europe’s documents. Such international 
politics of heritage was taken to represent one aspect of memorialisation processes in 
today’s BiH in light of the involvement of the international community in the country’s 
stabilisation and development, and in particular because of the creation of an ad hoc 
institution of state-wide scope concerned with cultural heritage within the peace 
agreement that halted the 1992-95 conflict and established the constitutional 
configuration of the state (Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Annex 8 of 
the Dayton Agreement, cf. chapter four). 
The inclusion of this international approach to cultural heritage in the analysis of 
BiH’s memorialisation processes seems important to underline some features of the 
study of the politics of memory in more general terms. On the one hand, it allows to 
investigate the ‘international heritage doctrine’ as expression of a global politics of 
memory whose import extends beyond the borders of states. In this sense, it points 
to the similarities between (national) processes of construction of public memory and  
(international) mechanisms of valorisation of heritage as practices that deal with 
“that part of the past that we select in the present for contemporary purposes […] 
and choose to bequeath to a future”.4 Within this perspective, the research aimed at 
detecting and analysing the (political) implications of both the protection and 
rehabilitation of built cultural heritage and the creation of new symbols evoking a 
particular past, since both entail selective remembering, relate to ideas about the 
collective such remembering represents, and naturalise particular versions of the past 
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as embodied throughout the memorial landscape. On the other hand, this gaze 
stimulates the exploration of the differences between ‘heritage’ and ‘memory’ 
politics, especially with regards to the scope of their import, as the former appears 
conceived to have a global reach and devoted to cherish the legacies of an all-
encompassing community (that of humankind), while the latter finds (at least 
theoretically) its fullest expression within state borders and with reference to a 
particular national collective. 
The integration of these two (only partly distinct) approaches highlights the 
implications of international conceptualisations and strategies concerning heritage on 
memory policies within specific contexts (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina), and thus 
prompts the exploration of the entanglements between local and global dimensions 
of processes that deal with the construction of memories and identities. 
Overall, the study identified four central notions – heritage, memory, identity and 
conflict – and concentrated on their entanglement and articulation within various 
themes: (a) the construction of narratives on the recent experience of armed conflict, 
entailing (re)interpretations of its causes, dynamics and unfolding; (b) the recollection 
of transition, regime change and war as a historical caesura and the post-Dayton 
period as a ‘new beginning’; (c) the ways particular accounts of the war implicitly or 
explicitly sustain the collective identity of the state and/or group identities at the sub-
state level; (d) the role of assessments of guilt and blame in relation to claims for or 
against the legitimacy of the overall state of BiH and as attributes of group identities. 
Part II was subdivided into two chapters that refined, respectively, the premises at 
the basis of the research and its methodological framework. Chapter two presented 
the choice of Sarajevo as a case study and provided some additional factual and 
conceptual considerations on the city’s recent experience of war.  
Because of the lack of consensus over the causes, circumstances, episodes and 
consequences of the 1992-95 conflict (in political as well as moral terms), the current 
proliferation of memory marks throughout the country is shaping a discordant (and 
puzzling) memorial landscape. In this context, the research focused entirely on the 
city of Sarajevo, and refrained from generalisations that would be highly debatable in 
post-war Dayton BiH, whose demographic and administrative configuration amounts 
to a patchwork of (more or less) ethnically homogeneous units with varying degrees 
of autonomy and no overarching coherence on memory policies (nor, apparently, any 
common will to achieve it). 
I thus adopted a perspective that would concentrate on a single “bounded” case 
and take into account its distinctive contextual attributes, within which Sarajevo was 
chosen for its role as capital city, and thus as a privileged locus for the observation of 
the construction of public memories (including the performance of official 
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commemorations) that symbolically and normatively represent the polity to both 
local/national and international audiences. 
Some opening considerations on the recent experience of the siege were deemed 
useful to draw attention to its implications on both the individual identity of the city 
and broader conceptions regarding pluralism and the urban space. These were 
presented through the notion of Urbicide5 and the valuable insights it brings to the 
understanding of wartime destruction. This view concentrates on the targeting of 
those “mundane” elements of the built environment that are not bestowed with 
symbolic meaning as (cultural) ‘heritage’, and argues that it amounts to a form of 
political violence per se, whose aim is to annihilate the milieu that enables life in 
common. The concept of urbicide thus enhances the reflection on wartime 
destruction with a perspective that takes into account the (urban) built environment 
as a whole, as opposed to one that singles out individual items of heritage as 
representative of a particular memorial and cultural landscape. In this sense, the 
notion of urbicide constitutes a conceptual tool for a critical analysis of processes of 
(heritage) reconstruction in the aftermaths of war and for the articulation of 
alternative approaches, which will be discussed in the conclusive remarks. 
Having laid the premises of the research, chapter three discussed some aspects of 
its methodological guidelines and concerns. The investigation entailed the review and 
analysis of legal and official documents concerning culture and monuments as well as 
regulations, policies and instructions pertinent to the management of heritage in BiH. 
In line with the approach of the research, I reviewed materials issued by local bodies 
and institutions at various administrative levels (Cantons, Entities, overall State of 
BiH) as well as official documents (international conventions and recommendations) 
issued by intergovernmental organisations like UNESCO and the Council of Europe. 
Besides the analysis of written documents, great importance was accorded to residing 
in Sarajevo and observing the urban environment and the performance of 
commemorations and other events over a prolonged period of time (from early 2010 
to mid-2012). Observation was carried out through participation at public celebrations 
(documented with photographs) and aimed at grasping the meanings and 
interactions entailed in the performances without entering in close contact with other 
participants nor establishing a specifically defined role for myself in the context of the 
event. As I highlighted, this “open” approach to field research allowed me to adapt to 
different settings and reflect on the subjective aspects of observation.  
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Part III of the thesis comprised the corpus of research, which was organised into 
four main subject areas: the management of heritage and monuments; the 
monumentalisation of the recent war; public commemorations celebrating the state 
and the city; alternative memories and memories of the ‘Other’. 
Chapter four concentrated on the general framework pertaining to the care and 
management of heritage, to provide an overview of the mechanisms and institutions 
that regulate this specific realm. In the absence of an overall law and/or ministry 
pertaining to culture of state-wide scope, the review of regulations and bodies in 
charge of heritage at all administrative levels of BiH showed that this domain is 
fundamentally characterised by complexity and fragmentation. Within the 
consociational power-sharing system of BiH (based on ethnic principles of 
identification and dominated by mechanisms for the protection of collective rights), 
the cleavages of such fragmentation run along ethnic lines, supported by a 
fundamental reluctance to establish shared principles concerning culture, that is 
instead regarded as a realm of primary importance for the preservation of ethnic 
identities and traditions. The inability to reach consensus over national laws 
concerning monuments and heritage exemplifies the role assigned to memory in the 
sustainment of group identities. Within this environment, conflicting views attached 
to heritage and culture are politicised and ethnicised at the sub-state level, and the 
administrative/institutional/political structure of the State appears weak and 
fragmented to the point of inefficiency. 
The analysis of BiH’s system of heritage care, furthermore, allowed to explore the 
intertwinement of the international heritage doctrine with local memory politics. 
The key question I ask in this respect concerns the impact of global notions on the 
heritage of mankind on specific contexts (like BiH) where the formulation of collective 
identities in essentialist and exclusivist terms appeals to memory and culture, and the 
implications of discourses on diversity and intercultural dialogue on the 
conceptualisation of cultural identity as (incommensurable) difference. This question 
is based on the observation that notions of heritage and identity contained in the 
body of UNESCO and CoE’s texts stand in an ambiguous relation with the declination 
of citizenship and identity in collective (ethnic) terms within the constitutional 
arrangements of BiH. Comparing the work of the Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments and that of the Fond Memorijala, I reached the (partial) conclusion that, 
because of this ambiguity, definitions of cultural identity and diversity as articulated 
within the international heritage doctrine are prone to be used as instruments of self-
legitimation by (collective) subjects fostering particularistic accounts of the past and 
thus risk to reiterate essentialist approaches to identity. 
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Chapter five focused on the symbolic recollection of armed conflict through 
monuments, with the analysis of two memorial complexes erected to commemorate 
war in Sarajevo – Vraca Memorial Park, inaugurated in 1981 and dedicated to the city's 
experience of WWII, and the Kovaci Shahid Cemetery-Memorial, still in course of 
construction. In particular, observation of the Kovaci complex aimed at exploring the 
way in which the 1992-95 conflict is recollected in the central and biggest memorial 
site of the city. The analysis of its various components thus highlighted two central 
features of this recollection. On the one hand, the recent war is remembered as an 
unjust “aggression” against the freedom of Bosnia and Herzegovina: memory is thus 
primarily dedicated to the fighters (both Army members and ordinary citizens forced 
to take up arms in self-defence and in defence of “just” principles) who sacrificed 
their lives for the future of the country. On the other hand, such armed aggression is 
depicted as embedded in a longer history of victimisation of the Bosnjak/Muslim 
“nation” of BiH, through the extensive use of symbols recalling the Islamic culture 
and faith (e.g. the use of the term Shahid and nisan).  
Overall, I argued that the symbolic recollection of the recent armed conflict at the 
Kovaci memorial complex is centred on a narrative on the victimisation of Bosnian 
Muslims, within which “the defence of life during the siege [...] is equated with the 
defence of identity and faith” of the Bosnjak 'nation'.6  
This account of the recent war has profound implications in the present life of the 
country, for it creates a fundamental ambiguity and overlapping between the 
delineation of the identity of the collective as Bosnian (pertaining to the state of BiH) 
or Bosnjak (denoting one of the constituent peoples of BiH). This ambiguity stems 
from a recollection where, despite the presence of non-Muslim elements (e.g. fighters 
of other faiths in the burial ground of the Cemetery-Memorial), the main causes and 
dynamics of the conflict are associated with hostility towards the Bosnjaks as a group, 
whose fight is in turn represented as a struggle for the freedom and dignity of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
Connoted by extensive reference to (Islamic) religion and tradition, however, this 
recollection is tightly linked to Bosnjak identity, and is thus embedded in the context 
of conflicting interpretations of the war. Significantly, its proponents (the Fond 
Memorijala and the political segment sustaining its work) present it as the 'true' 
account, and conceive memorialisation as a struggle against oblivion and falsification 
and as a continuation of the 1992-95 conflict itself. 
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The juxtaposition of the Kovaci complex with the Memorial Park dedicated to the 
Second World War at Vraca introduced some similarities and continuities in the 
representation of armed conflict as a foundational moment of the new polity within 
different regimes (on which I expanded in the following chapter). In addition, because 
Vraca Memorial Park has been declared National Monument by the Commission in 
2005, it allowed for further exploration of the entanglements between the ongoing 
memorialisation of war and heritage policies within BiH.  
In this respect, the two realms appear to constitute parallel strands of a wider 
politics of memory: one dedicated to heritage care under the guidance of the 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments, whose work is hindered by the 
complexities of the administrative structure of BiH and a perennial lack of funds; the 
other concerned with the construction of new sites, more closely connected with 
specific levels of government and apparently characterised by greater efficiency and 
higher availability of funds. I thus noted that the Fond Memorijala (principal actor of 
this second strand) is lately expanding its scope both in the management of sites of 
memory pertaining to the 1992-95 conflict (e.g. Tunel Spasa, Sarajevske Ruze) and 
through the acquisition of new competencies of maintenance and rehabilitation of 
older (Socialist) monuments. As these include Vraca Memorial Park, the overlap 
between 'memory' and 'heritage' policies becomes tangible, and poses new questions 
on the possible outcomes of the consolidation of the work of the Fond Memorijala as 
process of standardisation of (Bosnjak) memory politics in BiH. 
In chapter six I analysed official commemorations as part of symbolic politics,7 to 
explore the ways in which ritual performances select and recall key historical events 
pertaining (mainly) to armed conflict and relate them to the legitimation of the polity 
and the formulation of collective identities. In this respect, the core of the reflection 
revolved around the tension between the categories of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ inherent in 
BiH’s constitutional structure and in its configuration as a multicultural polity. 
Overall, official celebrations seem to constitute the clearest example of a common 
tendency to reduce BiH’s pluralism to three main collective subjects and channel it 
along separate politics of memory conceived in ethno-national terms.8 Accordingly, 
proposals of a shared framework for the formal establishment of public holidays are 
hindered in the State Parliament, and specific recurrences (e.g. March, 1) are regularly 
contested through the media and with the organisation of symmetric but opposite 
celebrations (e.g. January, 9 in RS). On these occasions, public speeches of political 
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representatives stress the symbolic importance of particular dates pertaining to 
versions of the past that sustain claims to either increased cohesion within the overall 
state or the legitimacy of the autonomy of its entities, and the symbolic definition of 
the polity appears fractured along a central axe of confrontation between BiH and RS. 
In this context, I observed official commemorations of dates established as 
founding moments of the State (25th November 1943 and 1st March 1992) and City (6th 
April 1945 and 1992), as they are performed in Sarajevo, capital of both the country 
and one of the entities it comprises (FBiH). These “new” commemorative 
performances, analysed as expression of the symbolic politics of the post-Dayton 
regime, recollect the experience of World War II and embed it in narratives on (the 
Bosnian experience of) the war of dissolution of Yugoslavia, by drawing on elements 
of the politics of memory of the Socialist period in both their form (e.g. 
commemorative ‘tours’ and ritualised behaviour of authorities during celebrations) 
and contents (e.g. previously established symbolic recurrences and 
monuments/memorials). 
Although the reinterpretation of WWII and the Socialist period entailed in these 
new commemorations is ambiguous and its integration in new narratives appears to 
be still in course of refinement, I advance two main considerations on its role(s). On 
the one hand, it highlights aspects of continuity across regime change, and points to 
the functions of memory politics in consolidating particular recollections of history as 
part of that “past” that is available to be (re)used in memorialisation processes.9 On 
the other hand, it draws attention to some of the implications of such continuities 
within memory/identity politics in the case of post-Dayton BiH. Despite ongoing 
processes of revision and reassessment of its effects on (the freedom, wellbeing and 
mutual relations among) the various (ethnic) groups of the region, the experience of 
Yugoslav Socialism (including its memory) can be regarded as a common legacy. 
Against a background permeated by dissent and contestation, therefore, its inclusion 
in narratives of the 1992-95 conflict amounts, at least to a certain extent, to an 
appropriation of (the symbols of) once shared values within accounts of the past that 
can be seen as particularistic.  
In this sense, the significance ascribed to the Eternal Flame in commemorations 
that symbolically mark contested anniversaries (March 1) and within celebrations that 
include sites recollecting a narrative based on the dichotomy Bosnjak/victim v. 
Serb/aggressor (the Kovaci memorial and the Monument to Killed Children) cannot 
 
                                                     
9 Brubaker and Feischmidt, “1848 in 1998.” 
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just be assumed to unproblematically represent a continuity of memory. Because 
some aspects related to the Socialist experience are claimed by all groups as a valued 
legacy10, their inclusion in rival versions of the past can be regarded as an 
appropriation in an exclusivist sense. References to antifascism in public speeches 
during recollections of the recent war, for instance, implicitly inflect fascism in ethnic 
terms, i.e. characterise the (ethnic) Other as embracing the universally rejected 
principles of fascism. In this way, the Other is both excluded from, and deprived of, 
shared memories that would constitute an “available past”. 
To conclude, chapter seven complemented the research with a gaze on some 
initiatives promoted in Sarajevo in recent years with the aim to propose alternative 
approaches to memorialisation and advance memories of the 1992-95 war divergent 
or distinct from the ones recollected within official calendars and performances. 
Although restricted in its scope, the chapter aimed at addressing the proliferation of 
initiatives concerned with the construction of memories of the conflict, and thus the 
dialogical aspects of public memory, which in turn point to questions related to 
agency and participation in the public space. 
The three initiatives analysed differ as to their form, aims, promotors and contents, 
but present a common trait in their direct engagement with memory and identity 
discourses through activities that claim (more or less permanent) visibility and/or 
incorporation in the urban memorial landscape and culture.  
The SCCA De/Construction of Monument project and the Dobrovoljacka Ulica 
commemoration, in particular, test the accessibility, inclusiveness and malleability of 
public memory, to the extent that they endeavour to use the same mechanisms 
and/or strategies pertaining to official processes of memorialisation to then assert 
approaches and contents that challenge current recollections.  
The De/Construction of Monument project used, and monitored, the institutional 
channels and decision procedures for the erection of monuments, in order to obtain 
all the documentation required for the construction of memory objects and sites 
across the city. In this way, the SCCA managed to constitute itself as a recognised 
subject (a mediator between society and the organs of government) and achieved the 
power to intervene onto the memorial landscape (although we might assume that 
such role and power were contingent to the implementation of that particular 
project). As I attempted to show, the “contents” of the SCCA project (i.e. the 
monuments donated to the city) challenge official/institutional memorialisation 
 
                                                     
10 On the reorganisation SUBNOR and the continuation of Socialist memory practices with separate 
commemoration in BiH’s entities see Karacic 2012. 
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processes in that they represent a radical approach that deconstructs and subverts 
conventional notions on memory in various ways. In this respect, the inertia of the 
local administration during the project’s development and the impression of relative 
invisibility of the donated monuments might hint at a fundamental inability of the 
institutions to open up to perspectives on memorialisation that appear so distant 
from the established (top-down) ways of dealing with memory. 
The Dobrovoljacka Ulica commemoration represents a different example. 
Organised with the support and participation of political and institutional 
representatives of RS and performed along standardised practices (e.g. peaceful 
walk, laying of candles and flowers, public speeches to the media), it metaphorically 
enacts a ritual that appears specular to official celebrations in all its formal aspects. 
Most importantly, it shares with the “counterpart” it aims to challenge the same 
approach to the memorialisation of the recent conflict, whereby responsibilities for 
the war and moral categories of victims and perpetrator are intertwined with ethnic 
identifications. Ultimately, thus, its claims concern the right to purport a divergent 
account of events, which stands in (irreconcilable) contrast with the memorial 
environment of the city.  
This leads to a twofold consideration on the openness and dialogical dimension of 
memory processes. On the one hand, the eventual integration of such a diverse 
recollection within the city’s memorial landscape would confirm the functions of 
memory as a resource for groups that feel to be in a “subaltern” position, and create 
a profoundly pluralist environment. This partly corresponds to the claim of RS 
politicians that the attitude of the Sarajevo administration towards the event reveals 
the truthfulness of its commitment to multiculturalism and inclusion, and to the fact 
that the commemoration has taken place regularly since its first performance in 2010. 
On the other hand, nevertheless, the consolidation of this particular commemoration 
– and the account it sustains – within the city’s various memorial practices might 
rather crystallise incompatible interpretations of the past into a (heterogeneous) 
public memory permeated by tension and conflictuality, whereby dialogue among 
diametrically opposed recollections appears not likely. 
The chapter thus did not contain definitive conclusions on this topic, but rather 
aimed at prompting reflection on how the dialogical dimension of memorialisation 
effectively unfolds – and to what extent its contents are negotiable – in qualitative 
terms. The inquiry, in this sense, is not only directed to the accessibility of 
(institutional) mechanisms and channels of participation in the construction of public 
memory, but also asks whether particular approaches to memory and identity and/or 
modes of recollection have more success than others in their efforts to achieve 
visibility and inclusion. 
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The next sections recollect the research questions posed at the beginning of the 
research. Section 8.2 addresses the relations between ongoing processes of 
memorialisation of the recent conflict and the (re)definition of collective identities 
with regards to ethnic groups (or BiH’s ‘constituent peoples’) on the one hand, and 
the overall identity of the polity on the other. Section 8.3 concerns the international 
dimension of the construction of memories, investigating the effects of the 
international heritage doctrine on the specific context of post-war BiH. Section 8.4 
recollects the notion of urbicide to relate it to processes of heritage reconstruction in 
the aftermaths of war and to (alternative) modes of memorialisation. 
8.2 Interweaving memories and identities in a local 
perspective 
"Rival versions of the past do not necessarily lead to 
violent conflicts; but keeping these historical 
contests alive through narratives of theft, 
martyrdom, denial, or vindication stirs the flames 
of discord, whether the events in question occurred 
in the Middle Ages, during the seventeenth or 
nineteenth centuries, during World War II, or in the 
1990s. Narratives of the longue durée invariably 
insist on the autochthony of the teller's group; 
proof of nationhood (which sometimes includes the 
denial of others' national claims); and assertions of 
self-defense that often function to absolve the 
protagonist and his group from any wrongdoing or 
responsibility vis-à-vis others".11 
One axe of the research concentrated on the interplay of memory and identity 
constructs within the framework constituted by the entanglement of transition and 
regime change with the outbreak and unfolding of war in the early 1990s. 
This process was dominated by the rise of extreme nationalisms and the 
pervasiveness of rhetoric and propaganda that conceived – and constructed – the 
identity of the collective in ethnic terms. Regime change thus entailed not only the 
 
                                                     
11 Markowitz, Sarajevo. A Bosnian Kaleidoscope, 56. 
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redefinition of the nature of the state, but also the recollection of separate ethnic 
identities, and the dismantlement of their past experience of coexistence through the 
reinterpretation and instrumentalisation of memories framed in ethnic terms. In the 
mixed pluralist setting of BiH, the divisive drives fostered by separate nationalist 
political ideologies were further exacerbated by the impossibility to reconcile 
territorial-political models of codification of nationhood with ethnocultural ones, 
resulting in strategies to alter the demographic configuration of the country through 
extreme violence. 
In this sense, 
“the wars have been about the forced unmixing of peoples whose continuing 
coexistence was counter to the political ideologies that won the free elections 
of 1990. Thus extreme nationalism in the former Yugoslavia has not been only a 
matter of imagining allegedly ‘primordial’ communities, but rather of making 
existing heterogeneous ones unimaginable. In formal terms, the point has been 
to implement an essentialist definition of the nation and its state in regions 
where the intermingled population formed living disproof of its validity: the 
brutal negation of social reality in order to reconstruct it”.12 
The re-establishment of peace in late 1995 ratified the international recognition and 
juridical independence of the (new) state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reconsigned 
it to an unfinished process of transition/regime change, which now entangled with 
post-war reconstruction and stabilisation. To a certain extent, BiH was still a “state-in-
the-making”, whose “sociological ‘stateness’ remain[ed] to be established” through 
the settlement of questions concerning the (re)definition of citizenship and 
nationhood, such as: 
“Who ‘belongs’, by formal citizenship, or in some other sense or status, to the 
state? What circle of persons comprises, or should comprise, the citizenry of the 
state? To what extent should citizenship depend on, and coincide with, 
ethnocultural nationality? [...] [W]hat kind of citizenship will the state 
institutionalize? Will citizenship be held individually, or will it be mediated, in 
some form, by ethnic or national group membership?”13 
These questions partly derived from the process of transition and regime change set 
in motion with the decline of Yugoslavia, to the extent that earlier definitions of 
 
                                                     
12 Hayden, “Imagined Communities and Real Victims,” 783-4. 
13 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43. 
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citizenship and belongingness based on Socialist principles and narratives on the 
(creation of) the state needed to be replaced by (and/or reinterpreted within) the 
ideological framework of the new (democratic) regime and the modes of 
identification pertaining to it. The unfolding of war between 1992 and 1995, 
nevertheless, loaded them with the burden of a profound social trauma entailing the 
first-hand experience of extreme violence among fellow-citizens, articulated along 
essentialist constructions of ethnicity. 
Institutional processes of memorialisation of the recent war partake in the 
symbolic politics that contribute to (re)imagine the new collective(s) of BiH at 
different levels. With respect to the processes of transition and regime change, the 
construction of (official) narratives on the armed conflict impinges on the definition 
of the polity and the sustainment (or contestation) of its legitimacy. In this sense, it 
also contributes to the institutionalisation of (national v. civic) notions of identity and 
citizenship, to the extent that it entails the re-elaboration of ethnocultural identities 
within the newly established “multicultural” setting and thus tackles (more or less 
directly and explicitly) issues of present and future coexistence in post-Dayton BiH. 
The investigation of memorialisation processes in these respects concentrated on 
newly erected monuments and memorials and (official) commemorations, 
endeavouring to detect the ways in which the conflict’s causes and outcomes are 
recollected and trace the implications of particular accounts within local dynamics of 
(symbolic) inclusion and exclusion and in the (re)formulation of the overall definition 
of the country. 
The overview of the legal and institutional frameworks pertaining to the care and 
management of heritage presented in chapter four introduced the general 
environment in which culture and memory policies are delineated and developed in 
post-Dayton BiH as one characterised by fragmentation and complexity. Overlaps of 
tasks and responsibilities across different administrative levels, inefficiency and 
reluctance to collaborate at the overarching level of the state suggest that memory 
policies are regarded by political representatives and other interested actors as a 
central tool to construct the identity of ethnic groups in cultural terms at the sub-
state level and maintain distinctions between them as separated units. 
Looking more closely at the recollection of the 1992-95 war in official documents, 
administrative bodies and memory marks punctuating the public space, 
fragmentation and competition emerge as the defining features of ongoing 
memorialisation processes. These traits appear evident in the juxtaposition of official 
epithets in use in different Entities and/or Cantons (i.e. documents, memorials, 
institutions, corresponding to geopolitical units in function of their ethnic 
composition), from which it seems that the recent conflict unfolded through three 
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distinct but simultaneous wars of defence on the same territories: a (Croat) 
“Homeland War” (Domovinski rat), a (Serb) “Patriotic War of Liberation” 
(Odbrambeno-otazbinski rat), and a (Bosnjak) “Defence-Liberation War” 
(Odbrambeno-oslobodilacki rat). Taken together, these epithets delineate a general 
picture in which the construction of distinct and parallel narratives on the recent 
conflict is articulated through a system of implicit references that leave both the 
“external aggressor” and the “defended/liberated homeland” vaguely defined. The 
impression of inconsistency emanated by this triple depiction is indicative of an 
environment whereby the recollection of war is inflected in ethnic terms through the 
implementation of memory politics and constructs that reflect divergent views, 
developed antagonistically by the institutions and political representatives of the 
three ‘constituent peoples’. In other words, as Moll remarks, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is confronted - like no other country - with the co-existence and 
competition of three official memory narratives and ethnonational identity 
constructions”.14 
The Dayton Peace Accords and the constitution that derived from them have a 
crucial role in this respect, insofar as they  “officially recognized that BiH's population 
is constituted of three incommensurable nations, each holding inalienable rights to 
their own language, history, culture, territory, and self-governance".15 At its core, this 
constitutional arrangement configures the structures and mechanisms for the 
accommodation of ethnocultural identities within a broader multicultural state, 
endeavouring to prevent the domination of one group over the other(s). These 
mechanisms, however, also produce the crucial side effect of anchoring the new state 
to notions of belonging and (political) representation framed primarily in collective 
ethnic terms.  
The “ethnic principle” that permeates the political-institutional system established 
at Dayton, in this sense, creates a level of collective identification that mediates the 
relationship between individual citizens and the governmental structures. In this way, 
ethnicity is cemented as a primary mode of identification and a privileged channel for 
the articulation of basic rights, which are inflected in collective terms. As Lovrenovic 
remarks, the  
“current ethnic division, generated from near and distant history […], is being 
kept alive by domestic political pseudo-elites as well as by international 
 
                                                     
14 Moll, “Fragmented Memories in a Fragmented Country,” 912, emphasis original. 
15 Markowitz, Sarajevo. A Bosnian Kaleidoscope, 55, emphasis added. 
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community with different political and economic interests of its members. The 
state of pseudo-democracy perfectly suits the preservation of three parallel and 
confronted historical memories of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks”.16 
The Dayton arrangements have key functions in culture and memory politics, 
intersecting with the post-war situation in multifaceted ways. The endowment of 
ethnicity with a central role in the declination of citizenship and identity creates the 
premises, and provides the legal-institutional instruments, for the development of 
memory policies aiming at group consolidation and homogenisation in a way that 
obstructs collaboration within the common structures of the state and thus 
reproduces rigid formulations of (ethnic) difference.  
The opposition of the Government of Republika Srpska to the state-level Draft Law 
on Cultural Properties proposed by the Ministry for Civil Affairs in 2008 (cf. chapter 
four) constitutes a case in point. The explicit appeal to a ‘lack of constitutional basis’ 
for the formulation and enactment of laws governing culture and cultural property by 
the RS establishment denotes the pivotal role assigned to public memory with 
respects to the reproduction and maintenance of (ethnically connoted) collective 
identities, whose delineation relies on the consolidation of distinctive cultural traits, 
within which heritage is endowed with fundamental functions. The formalisation of 
ethnic groups as constituent peoples with inalienable rights pertaining to “culture, 
tradition and cultural heritage”17 thus provides the legal basis to oppose collaboration 
in those fields and claim and achieve independence in their management at the level 
of the Entities/Cantons, which in turn enables the construction of culture and tradition 
as defining traits of the ethnic community. 
The construction and articulation of memories of the recent conflict have a 
particular importance in relation to delineations of separate ethnic identities centred 
on culture and tradition. Overall, recollections of the causes and unfolding of the war 
are framed in “ethnic” terms, to the extent that they are interpreted from the 
viewpoint of a particular group. This association between particular interpretations 
and individual groups is reinforced by the interweaving of specific accounts with the 
recollection of ethnic identities across time. The lack of agreement over the causes 
and events of the war, furthermore, produces the double effect of reiterating 
(essentialist) ethnic identities as mutually exclusive and perpetuating the antithesis 
 
                                                     
16 Lovrenovic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina as the stage of three parallel and conflicted historical memories” 
(forthcoming). 
17 Cf. definition of vital interest as from Art. 4 of the OHR Agreement on the Implementation of the 
Constituents' Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 2002. 
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generated through the conflict. In this sense, processes of memorialisation of the 
1992-95 war are embedded, and partake, in broader processes of institutionalisation 
of ethnicity as a “political and cultural form”, and as “practical category”, 
“classificatory scheme” and “cognitive frame”, that serve both for the recollection of 
the past and for the present and future delineation of identities.18  
The permanence of divergences in the ways the war is interpreted is immediately 
conveyed by the use of the three official epithets mentioned above. So the conflict is 
defined as an “aggression” that impelled efforts of self-defence and the sacrifice of 
lives both within the recollection delineated at the Kovaci cemetery-memorial19 and 
within the narrative of the RS ‘Patriotic War of Liberation’, according to which Serbs 
had no other choice than to defend their rights and freedom.20 
The entwinements of memories and identities inflected in ethnic terms acquire 
particular significance when these antithetical accounts of the recent conflict are 
embedded in narratives that recollect the ‘history’ of specific groups across a longer 
time-span, thus concurring in the reiteration of essentialised identities. The official 
Calendar of Significant Historical Events of RS, for instance, opens the listing of a 
series of “events of national importance” with an introductory note whereby the Serb 
people are characterised by courage and patriotism, within a narrative that recollects 
the attacks moved against them over a time range of more than two centuries, of 
which the 1992-95 war constitutes the most recent episode: 
“For centuries the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were impelled to 
defend their hearts, freedom and honour from the influx of various invaders.  
Courage, determination and unrestrained love for the fatherland labelled a Serb 
soldier in all liberation wars – from the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through I and 
II World War [sic.], to the last patriotic war of liberation. Our forefathers, and 
our contemporaries, very often sacrificed to the altar of their fatherland the 
most sacred thing they owned – their lives.  
 
                                                     
18 Cf. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. I rely on Brubaker’s approach to ethnicity and nation not as entities 
but as ways of seeing the world, as templates and filters for the representation and organisation of social 
knowledge (see also chapter one). In this sense, I refer to the institutionalisation of ethnicity recalling his 
analytical questions about nationhood: “We should not as “what is a nation” but rather: how is nationhood 
as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as practical 
category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against 
states more or less resonant or effective? What makes the nation-evoking, nation-invoking efforts of 
political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?” (Ibid., 16). 
19 E.g. the inscription on the central nisan-monument, cf. chapter five. 
20 Cf. speech of RS President Milorad Dodik on January 9, 2012, chapter six. 
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Only in the past Patriotic War of Liberation of the Republik of Srpska, more than 
20 thousands patriots lost their lives”.21 
The Kovaci cemetery-memorial similarly entangles the memory of the recent war with 
a broader recollection of Bosnjak identity, albeit in a more implicit way, through the 
juxtaposition of symbols and markers recalling different historical periods. While the 
inscription on the central nisan-monument is dedicated to the “fighters of the Army of 
BiH who gave their lives in defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 
aggression”, the overall memorial complex is connoted with elements of Islamic 
tradition.22 Among these, the replica of a tekke (Sufi building) dating back to 1462, 
originally located in the vicinity of the river Miljacka, refers back to the founding 
period of the city of Sarajevo, and the monument to the “Shahids of the movements 
of the Young Muslims killed by the Communists in 1945 and 1949” recalls the years of 
the establishment of Socialist Yugoslavia. In this way, the recent conflict is 
symbolically recollected as one of many episodes of victimisation of the ‘Bosnjak 
nation’, whose presence in BiH is also linked to the origins of the city. 
These entanglements of memories and identities produce the effect of translating 
opposition over the interpretation of the recent conflict into irreconcilable group 
difference. The initiation of veto procedures for the protection of vital interests by the 
Croat and Bosnjak Clubs of delegates to the Parliamentary Assembly of RS against the 
Draft Law on Monuments of the Liberation Wars under discussion in 2011 (cf. chapter 
four) somehow summarises the various aspects of memorialisation processes 
recollected above. The procedures rejected the draft Law denouncing the fact that it 
was “written only for the members of one – the Serb – nation and that members of 
the other two nations, as well as members of ‘the Others’, [could not] identify in it”.23 
The explanation of the procedure initiated by the Bosnjak Club started from the 
premises that “Bosnjaks and Croats characterise the events of the period between 
1992 and 1995 differently from Serbs”,24 to reassert the importance of public memory 
 
                                                     
21 “Calendar of Significant Historical Events of Liberation Wars – Events of National Importance”, 
Government of Republika Srpska, Committee for Cherishing the Tradition of the Liberation Wars, available 
on the website of the Government of RS, www.vladars.net. 
22 I.e. the Mausoleum of President Izetbegovic shaped as a half moon, cf. chapter five. 
23 Decision on the initiation of the procedure of protection of vital interests of the Croat nation, 
Explanation, point 4 (Odluka o Pokretanju zastite vitalnog interesa Hrvatskog Naroda, Obrazlozenje), 14 
November 2011, available at the website of the Council of Peoples of RS: http://vijecenarodars.net/. 
24 Decision on the initiation of the procedure of protection of vital interest of the Bosnjak nation (Odluka o 
Pokretanju postupka zastite vitalnog interesa Bosnjackog Naroda), 25 November 2011, available at the 
website of the Council of Peoples of RS: http://vijecenarodars.net/. 
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in both individual and collective terms, highlighting that “the primary function [of 
monuments in BiH] is to provoke an emotional reaction, first of all in the members of 
the family of the victim(s), but also of the ethnic community that identifies itself with 
the victims or events to which the monuments are dedicated” (emphasis added).25   
In this context, a central element of contrast between divergent accounts is 
constituted by the fact that the 1992-95 war is recollected as a foundational event – 
albeit for different collectives. Under this respect, ongoing processes of 
memorialisation interweave the (re)definition of ethnic identities as pertaining to 
BiH’s constituent peoples with the symbolic recollection and legitimation of the 
political identity of the newly created state and its institutional configuration.  
The performance of official commemorations and the establishment of 
anniversaries of ‘national’ significance delineate a multi-layered picture in this respect. 
The regular absence of the Serb member of the State Presidency at ritual celebrations 
performed by representatives from all administrative levels (cf. chapter six) 
symbolically conveys a rather strong message of non-endorsement or non-recognition 
of the overall Bosnian state on the part of the RS establishment and the Serb element 
within common institutions. In fact, this symbolic behaviour forms part of a broader 
underlying disagreement over the selection and establishment of recurrences of 
shared importance, voiced through the opposition to the approval and enactment of 
a Law on Public Holidays at the level of the state (cf. chapter six).  
The rejection of draft laws on public holidays in BiH’s Parliament in 2009 and 2013 is 
correlated with the previous impositions of a Law on the Flag of BiH (1998) and a Law 
on the National Anthem (1999) by binding Decision of the OHR, and testifies for the 
determination to keep separate views that impede agreement on common state 
symbols. 
Discord over the establishment of shared anniversaries appears to revolve primarily 
around the foundational meanings ascribed to specific events within opposed 
narratives. The date of March 1st, ritually marked with celebrations attended by the 
Croat and Bosnjak members of the Presidency and various other representatives, 
recollects the referendum on the country’s independence held in 1992. The 
referendum was required by the (then) European Community as condition for BiH’s 
international recognition, which was formalised on the following 6th of April, the date 
that has come to metonymically represent the beginning of the conflict both locally 
 
                                                     
25 Decision on the initiation of the procedure of protection of vital interest of the Bosnjak nation (Odluka o 
Pokretanju postupka zastite vitalnog interesa Bosnjackog Naroda), 25 November 2011, available at the 
website of the Council of Peoples of RS: http://vijecenarodars.net/. 
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and internationally. Because the boycott of the referendum called by Serb nationalist 
parties provoked the abstention of a substantial part of the population, the RS 
establishment presently rejects the endowment of this date with national significance 
on the grounds that it is representative of a Croat and Bosnjak “forced secession”.26 
National importance is instead ascribed to the date of proclamation of Republika 
Srpska, which “came into existence as a historical need and expression of the 
legitimate desire of the Serb peoples”27 on the 9th of January 1992. Accordingly, 
through the endowment of January 9th as a founding event, it is the Entity of RS that 
emerges as the polity “of inestimable value for all its citizens, because in it are 
embedded the lives of figthers and civil victims – most often the powerless who were 
massacred by criminals”.28 Here, different dates are selected and endowed with 
significance for different constituent peoples, within divergent accounts of the 1992-
95 conflict as the context of foundation of two distinct polities – the state of BiH and 
the entity of RS.  
Within the narrative promoted by the RS establishment, however, the dismissal of 
common dates of national significance – symbolically displayed through the absence 
from official commemorations – is not necessarily linked to a total negation of the 
state of BiH per se.  The RS establishment relies on a narrative whereby the unfolding 
and outcome of the war are recollected in function of the creation of a separate 
autonomous entity for the Serb people within BiH. Accordingly, such narrative 
sustains the existence of the current state of BiH, and in particular the political-
institutional configuration established with the Constitution elaborated in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, as constitutive of the legitimacy of the Entity of RS. For this, during 
the celebrations of the 20th anniversary since the proclamation of RS, President 
Dodik’s reasserted that “our legitimacy and legality, as foundations of sovereign 
authority, was provided and mostly maintained through the signign of all 11 annexes 
of the Dayton Agreement. [...] We want and we struggle to protect the status of RS in 
Dayton BiH”.29  
 
                                                     
26 Dodik, in “Dodik: ne slavimo Dan nezavisnosti BiH,” cf. chapter six. 
27 Speech held by RS President Milorad Dodik on occasion of Day of the Republic (Dan Republike), 
09.01.2012, translation: author. 
28 Speech held by RS President Milorad Dodik on occasion of the Day of the Republic (Dan Republike), 
09.01.2012, website of the Presidency of Republika Srpska, www.predsjednikrs.net, translation: author. 
29 Speech held by RS President Milorad Dodik on occasion of the Day of the Republic (Dan Republike), 
09.01.2012, website of the Presidency of Republika Srpska, www.predsjednikrs.net, translation: author. 
Accordingly, the 21st of November is included in the list of public holidays of RS as the Day of Establishment 
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The legitimation of Republika Srpska as the “fatherland” of Serbs (and other 
constituent peoples) in this sense entails the recognition of the legitimacy of the 
overall state of BiH as configured at Dayton, i.e. as a multinational/multi-
ethnic/multicultural polity regulated by consociational mechanisms of power-sharing, 
within which the RS establishment endeavours to retain as much decision-making 
power as possible. 
The recollection of the overall polity that emerges from the symbolism of dates and 
celebrations of ‘national importance’ as performed by the Croat and Bosnjak 
members of the state Presidency and other authorities with the ‘commemorative 
tour’ (cf. chapter six) is similarly based on BiH’s multicultural character. Here, the date 
of March 1 is juxtaposed to the date of the 25th of November, recalling the 1943 
ZAVNOBIH meeting, established by the Socialist memory politics as “Day of 
Statehood” (Dan Drzavnosti). This date was symbolically endowed with meaning with 
respect to the origins of post-WWII Bosnian statehood and its multinational 
character.30 In this sense, despite the boycott of large part of the Serb population, the 
referendum of March 1, 1992 is constructed as a reassessment and continuation of the 
multinational Bosnian state emerged at the end of WWII. The ‘commemorative tour’ 
performed by authorities on these dates, on the other hand, is articulated along sites 
that recall interpretations of the war that might have exclusivist implications, to the 
extent that they entangle with narratives centred on a long history of Bosnjak/Muslim 
victimisation and thus partake in the ‘ethnicisation’ of memories. The Fond 
Memorijala explicitly aims at the creation of markers (i.e. cemeteries, tombstones) of 
standardised outlook, to make the “sacrifice endured by the defenders of the Army of 
BiH between 1992 and 1995” visible throughout the whole country and symbolically 
embed it “in the system of social values of the new Bosnian state”.31 In this sense, and 
especially through the recollection articulated at the Kovaci cemetery-memorial, it 
fuses the perspective of a particular ethnocultural community with the interests of 
the overall polity and state. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as from the 2005 Law on Public 
Holidays of RS, see also chapter six. 
30 Cf. ZAVNOBIH’s main objectives entailed in the Resolution unanimously approved on November 25, 1943: 
the strengthening of the unity and fraternity of Serbs, Croats and Muslims of BiH; the advancement of the 
struggle against the occupiers; the consolidation of the Partisan Committees as organs of power, see also 
chapter six. 
31 Introduction, website of the Fund, www.dasenezaboravi.org.ba, translation: author. 
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This recollection entangles with assessments of guilt and blame for past sufferings 
as implicitly inferred at the Monument to the killed children of besieged Sarajevo32 
and in the broader urban memorial landscape of Sarajevo, punctuated by plaques 
marking the spots where “Serb criminals (date) killed (number) citizens of Sarajevo”,33 
which are prone to be read as interpretations that conflate the moral categories of 
victim/perpetrator with collective (ethnic) identities. The symbolic sanctioning of this 
recollection by the highest authorities of the state through ritualised performances on 
official celebrations thus creates ambiguity as to the actual pluralism of institutional 
memorialisation. The emerging commemoration in Dobrovoljacka Street (cf. chapter 
seven) responds to this environment with a claim to visibility (as a condition for 
dignity and mourning) for other (non-Bosnjak) victims, but, in doing so, it strives to 
reverse the roles assigned to Bosnjaks and Serbs, as groups, without challenging the 
underpinning ethnic rationale of dominant recollections. The commemoration of an 
episode of the conflict that had peculiar characteristics (in that the emerging Army of 
BiH, and, metaphorically, the city of Sarajevo were not only victims but had the means 
and occasion to infer an attack), is embedded in a wider narrative that misrepresents 
the causes of the outbreak of hostilities and thus crystallise conflictuality within 
memory. To this extent, its consolidation cannot testify for the pluralism and 
inclusiveness of BiH’s public memory, but rather mark it with unsolvable antagonism. 
In conclusion, processes of memorialisation of the recent conflict seem to partake 
in broader processes of institutionalisation of ethnicity.  
Recollections of the conflict are inflected in ‘ethnic’ terms to the extent that they 
interweave antagonistic interpretations of the war with formulations on the identity 
and ‘history’ of incompatible (ethnocultural) communities. This creates an 
environment in which institutionalised processes concerned with the memorialisation 
of the recent war seem to provide little or no space at all for the construction of 
memories that are not framed in ethnic terms. The pervasiveness of ethnic principles 
of identification and representation delineates the overall state of BiH as an 
Ethnopolis, governed by “ethnoabsolutism” as the political attitude whereby “society 
as a whole is understood as a mosaic of ‘individually homogeneous’, self-enclosed 
 
                                                     
32 The dedication of the monument to the children killed within besieged Sarajevo was criticised at the time 
of its erection for implicitly excluding the (equally innocent) children who died in areas under Serb control, 
thus from non-Serb fire (i.e. of the Army of BiH), cf. chapter six. 
33 The complete inscription recites, “In this place, Serb criminals (date) killed (number) citizens of Sarajevo”, 
and, in smaller letters: “May the dead rest in peace, recite Al-Fatiha and pray, remember and warn. The 
citizens of Sarajevo”. Original text: “Na ovom su mjestu Srpski zlocinci (…) godine ubili (…) gradana Sarajeva. 
Rahmet, pokoj I sutnja mrtvima. Porucit Fatihu I pomolite se. Pamtite I opominjite. Gradjani Sarajeva”. 
  283 
mono-cultures, timeless atomic particles that exist parallel to each other”.34 Within 
this Ethnopolis, memories of the recent war maintain a character of conflictuality and 
are highly problematic, because, despite the political dimensions of their uses and 
misuses within wider narratives, they are based on a lived experience of violence35, 
which makes them prone to be instrumentalised by an “ethnopolitics” whose “raison 
d'être is crisis, appeal to constant existential danger of the group”.36 
8.3 Heritage, culture, identity: the international heritage 
doctrine in BiH 
“If all heritage, by being someone’s, must disinherit 
someone else, then a World Heritage is not a happy 
summation of local and national heritages, but 
rather a denial of them”37 
 
A second plane of the reflection concerned the effects and implications of global 
principles on heritage valorisation and rehabilitation in relation to post-war 
reconstruction in BiH. This axe of research started from the observation that the 
development of a global ethics on heritage, culture and identity by the supranational 
organisations of UNESCO and the Council of Europe has come to constitute an 
international dimension of memory politics within states, especially in the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the creation of a Commission to Preserve National 
Monuments by international treaty (as by Annex 8 of the Dayton Agreement) formally 
established heritage as an integral part of processes concerned with the re-
 
                                                     
34 Mujkic, Asim, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, (Sarajevo: Centar za Ljudska Prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 
2008), 21. The term ‘Ethnopolis’ is also used in Vlaisavljevic, Ugo, “Yugoslav Communism and after: The 
Continuity of Ethnopolitics,” Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 2.2 (2003). 
35 Although I generally adopt an ‘instrumentalist’ approach to ethnicity, I refer here to the observation that 
"despite the 'invention of tradition' that [the construction of ethnicity] may involve, unless it also makes 
genuine contact with people's actual experience, that is with a history that happened, it is not likely to be 
effective" (Peel (1989), quoted in Eriksen 2010:113, emphasis original). 
36 Mujkic, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, 22, emphasis original. 
37 Ashworth, Gregory J. “Is There a World Heritage?” The Urban Age 4.4 (1997), 12. 
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establishment of peace and post-war recovery and stabilisation.38 This fact was taken 
to represent a first concrete application of the notions and principles on the functions 
of heritage contained in what I term the international heritage doctrine (cf. chapter 
one). 
This doctrine was developed through a series of documents and conventions 
promoted by the UNESCO and the Council of Europe that originated in response to 
the wartime destruction of built heritage experienced during WWII, with the adoption 
of the 1954 Hague convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (UNESCO). Over the years, and through gradual but constant 
refinement, the notions and principles delineated in this body of texts shaped a 
discourse on heritage, culture and identity of global import, that increasingly 
underpins international development programmes and projects concerned with post-
war reconstruction, as is the case for BiH and the wider region of South-East Europe.39 
Within this discourse, heritage has been endowed with particular significance in 
relation to both the definition of group identities, the promotion of ‘diversity’ and 
‘intercultural dialogue’, and post-war ‘reconciliation’. In addition, it has emerged as 
pivotal in the delineation of a global ‘culture of humanity’ (UNESCO), paralleled, in 
recent years, by the formulation of the notion of a ‘common European heritage’ (Coe, 
2005 Faro Convention). The core aspects of this doctrine are thus its global scale and 
the establishment of a shared notion of heritage, that constitute it as the instrument 
of an international “politics of heritage”. In this respect, I started by noting that the 
doctrine is characterised by an inner friction between, on the one hand, the 
universalistic aspirations of notions on the cultural diversity and richness of 
humankind and, on the other hand, a relativism that permeates both its formal 
mechanisms (i.e. the centrality of ‘High Contracting Parties’, that is, nation-states, in 
the adoption and implementation of the conventions) and its conceptual apparatus 
(i.e. the endowment of heritage with pivotal functions in the delineation of the 
identities of ‘peoples’, or ‘communities’, as bounded units). Given the particular 
configuration of post-Dayton BiH – its power-sharing mechanisms within a context of 
administrative fragmentation, and the institutionalisation of ethnicity as central mode 
of group identification in mutually antagonistic terms – it seemed important to 
dedicate part of the reflection to the implications of this international philosophy and 
 
                                                     
38 Cf. Hadzimuhamedovic, “Reconstruct or Forget?” and Hadzimuhamedovic, “Nasljede U Miru Nakon 
Rata.” 
39 Cf. Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe launched by the CoE in 
2003. 
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the ways it informs heritage reconstruction, which in turn entangles with the 
memorialisation of the recent war.  
Reflection on these aspects starts from considerations on the Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments, whose work channels international standards and 
principles on heritage in the local context and whose creation represents an 
expression of the international ascendancy in BiH and a concrete application of the 
ideals at the basis of the international heritage doctrine (cf. chapter one). Through the 
example of the Commission, the case of BiH highlights some problematic nodes 
concerning the application of international principles on heritage in settings that 
differ from that of the nation-state, in relation to both the country’s administrative 
complexity and the political implications of the valorisation of heritage within a 
context characterised by competing and conflicting politics of memory and identity. 
This leads to a further level of reflection, focused on the increasing importance of 
heritage in post-conflict development and ‘reconciliation’ processes, and on the latest 
developments of the international doctrine with regards to the formulation of notions 
on ‘diversity’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’, and the introduction of the ideas of 
‘common heritage’ and ‘heritage community’. 
The involvement and ascendancy of the international community in BiH is 
composed of two main (related) aspects. In the political-institutional realm, it was 
concretised in the constitutional arrangement of interethnic relations (among the 
three identified “constituent peoples” of Serbs, Croats and Bosnjaks) within the 
framework of a confederation (as from Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement). As 
recalled in the previous section, this power-sharing system established mechanisms of 
government and decision-making permeated by principles of ethnic identification and 
representation, and created an environment where the conceptualisation of rights 
and vital interests in collective terms entangles with a permanent friction between 
interests and agendas at the state v. sub-state levels.  
In the realm of the politics of memory, international ascendancy is predicated upon 
principles that sustain the valorisation of diversity and the importance of intercultural 
dialogue and ‘reconciliation’. In the specific context of BiH, this international 
approach to heritage is channelled through the work of the Commission to Preserve 
National Monuments, whose operate addresses the reconstruction of the country’s 
cultural landscape within a limited time frame (items erected until 1960), excluding 
monuments of recent erection or in course of construction and other salient aspects 
of current memory policies (such as streetname changes, for instance). In this sense, 
the international heritage doctrine informs primarily a work of reconstruction of the 
cultural heritage of BiH, as opposed to the work of construction of “new” memories 
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of the recent past, and the two processes appear to have developed since the re-
establishment of peace along parallel planes.  
The fact that the Commission is endowed with the management of cultural 
heritage as distinct from newly erected monuments and memorial sites (cf. the 
Commission’s Criteria, time frame), and that it is the unique body with such tasks at 
the national level, seem to maintain it separated from policies implemented at the 
lower administrative levels of Entities and Cantons and one-sided or exclusivist 
recollections of the recent conflict. Its work of reconstruction is undertaken through 
the designation and rehabilitation of heritage within a broad historical perspective on 
BiH’s cultural milieu as a whole, whereby individual items of heritage are regarded as 
representative of the various cultural traditions that developed historically on the 
country’s territories, shaping its outlook and influencing its identity. In this respect, an 
overview of its operate suggests that its approach is based on the valorisation of the 
different influences that shaped BiH’s memorial landscape throughout history and, by 
extension, on a principle of ‘parity of esteem’ between those groups that in today’s 
BiH identify, in whole or in part, with their legacy. Using various instruments – a 
petition system open to any juridical or physical person, a list of endangered heritage 
and a provisional list of national monuments (cf. chapter four) – the work of the 
Commission constitutes a direct response to the damage and destruction brought 
about by the conflict, which appears committed to the reconstruction of the cultural 
landscape in its pre-war configuration. 
The Commission’s tasks, however, are subject to strong constraints, deriving 
primarily from its position within the institutional structure of Dayton BiH. As the only 
body with state-wide scope and mandate concerning heritage, the Commission 
stands, quite literally, “above” the country’s administrative fragmentation, but its 
work is impaired by the absence of a harmonised legal/institutional framework, a 
perennial lack of funds and the factual inability to implement its own decisions. 
Although the formal designation confers (or confirms) symbolic meaning to 
(particular items of) heritage, their concrete management is demanded to local (i.e. 
Entity, Cantonal, Municipal) institutions, and hence re-inscribed into processes 
influenced by the interplay of (ethnicised) political interests. The difficulties 
encountered by the Commission in its endeavours in this sense highlight the fragility 
and inconsistencies of the system established at Dayton, as one that simultaneously 
prescribes inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation while acknowledging and 
sanctioning ethnic difference, and providing the constitutional instruments for 
enacting it in opposition to the common framework of the state. The particular 
situation of post-war BiH, moreover, exposes an unresolved aspect of the 
international heritage doctrine, pertaining to the ways in which the ascription of 
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meaning to heritage within formulations of identities entangles with settings that 
differ from that of the nation-state. In this respect, as mentioned above, international 
conventions and documents are connoted by an inner contradiction between the 
centrality of State Parties as the main subjects involved in their ratification and 
implementation, and an evolving conceptualisation of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ that 
transcends the national dimension, to the extent that it increasingly refers to 
‘communities’ and ‘peoples’ while promoting a global ethics on heritage. 
The intersections of the principles embedded in the international heritage doctrine 
with local power relations and dynamics pertaining to the construction of memories 
and identities in BiH thus highlight some crucial ambiguities in the conceptualisation 
of the value and functions of heritage for society.  
A first aspect of these ambiguities revolves around an understanding of heritage 
that describes it as a set of traces that bear “inestimable witness to our past” and 
postulates that it should be preserved and valorised because it makes part of a 
“system of cultural references”,40 that stands in close relationship with the idea of the 
inherited cultural identity of a group. The unproblematic adoption of this definition 
reproduces the conventional logic and mechanisms of memory politics, whereby 
particular items of the built environment are taken to constitute symbols of the 
“past” of a group and are accordingly endowed with significance within a (selective) 
recollection of that group’s “history”, that simultaneously concurs in the construction 
and sustainment of its identity. In this respect, the international heritage doctrine 
constitutes a “politics of heritage”, that untangles memory from the nation as a 
privileged setting but remains embedded in power relations and dynamics of 
inclusion/exclusion, to the extent that it valorises (cultural property recognised as) 
‘the heritage’ as symbolic capital for smaller sub-national entities, cities and regions 
alike. In a setting like that of BiH, characterised by the ubiquitous appeal to 
essentialist/exclusivist constructions of identity, these pivotal functions assigned to 
heritage entangle with the logics of collective ethnic identification that permeates the 
Dayton consociational arrangements, and often translate into situations of political 
stalemate over the monopoly of heritage policies at each level of government.41  
Although the work of the Commission does not partake in policies centred on the 
recollection of individual identities marked by difference and opposition, the ‘parity of 
esteem’ principle and its corollary idea of ‘balanced’ designation of National 
Monuments do not question the implicit link between markers of past cultural 
 
                                                     
40 Council of Europe 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, Granada. 
41 Cf. e.g. RS opposition to the Draft Law on Cultural Properties in 2008. 
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influences and the formulation of present ethnic identities. Individual items 
designated as ‘heritage’ thus remain prone to be appropriated by interested political 
actors and integrated into broad historical narratives on particular (ethnic) groups, 
which become potentially conflictual when entwined with antagonistic recollections 
of the recent war (see previous section). 
In this perspective, the entanglement of processes of reconstruction of the 
country’s heritage and construction of memories of the 1992-95 conflict becomes 
problematic and raises questions on the extent to which recognised ‘national 
monuments’ can effectively represent a common heritage for all the people(s) who 
live in today’s BiH. 
One example of such entanglements is provided by the use of two gatehouses 
belonging to the architectural ensemble of the Old Vratnik Fort (National Monument 
since 2005) to host a Museum dedicated to Alija Izetbegovic at the Kovaci cemetery-
memorial (cf. chapter five). In the overall context of ‘ethnicisation’ of accounts of the 
recent conflict and recollections marked by dissent and contestation, the combination 
of (parts of) a national monument with this memorial complex implicitly connotes it, 
by prompting associations with the recollection of the conflict presented at the site, 
and thus constitutes, at least symbolically if not formally, an appropriation, that 
potentially deprives “others” of the possibility to look at items designated as 
‘heritage’ as part of a common legacy. The expansion and enhancement of the 
competencies of the Fond Memorijala with tasks of maintenance of a variety of 
monuments in the Sarajevo city and Canton (e.g. Sarajevo Roses, Tunnel of Hope) 
raises the same questions, especially with regards to the care of Socialist monuments 
and their reinterpretation within narratives on the recent war (cf. chapter five). This 
points to a fundamental discrepancy between the principles informing heritage care 
and management as operated by the Commission and the actual fate of monuments 
once they have been formally designated.  
This discrepancy shows that in the context of BiH the inherent contradiction 
between universalism (i.e. the aspiration to a global ethic and the ideal of a common 
heritage of humanity) and relativism (i.e. the centrality of states and the significance 
of heritage for the identity of ‘bounded’ cultures) permeating the international 
heritage doctrine remains unresolved. Despite the fact that the doctrine implicitly 
relies on the state as the “unproblematic subject of traditional cultural expression”,42 
in the particular post-conflict setting of BiH the values ascribed to heritage are used to 
 
                                                     
42 Albro, “The Challenges of Asserting, Promoting, and Performing Cultural Heritage,” 6. 
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challenge the role of the state as an overarching framework. Whereas the 
implementation of projects based on the international heritage doctrine might 
provide opportunities to assign shared values to heritage and find common grounds 
for its management,43 the importance ascribed to heritage is used to claim the right to 
autonomy in heritage policies at the sub-state level. The endowment of heritage with 
pivotal significance for ‘a people’ or ‘a culture’ at the basis of this global philosophy 
heightens its functions as symbolic capital for collective subjects at various scales, but 
does not grant sufficient attention to “the phenomenon of identity politics, whereby 
culture is politicized and used to legitimize not just exclusiveness, but exclusion as 
well”.44 
The endowment of heritage rehabilitation with crucial functions in post-war 
recovery within the international heritage doctrine, which relates it to notions of 
‘reconciliation’, ‘diversity’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’, seems to reproduce the same 
questions.  
The notions of reconciliation, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue emerged 
through a change in the doctrine’s perspective and attitude towards the fate of 
heritage in armed conflict, which shifted from the initial “need to preserve cultural 
masterpieces in time of war” underlying the 1954 Hague Convention to an 
appreciation of heritage “as a potential tool to be used to help defuse conflict”45 of 
more recent texts (like the 2005 CoE Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural 
Heritage for Society). 
The positioning of the Annex establishing the Commission (Annex 8) after Annex 7 
on the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons loaded heritage rehabilitation and 
care with symbolic significance in relation to a reconciliation process centred on 
“preserving the spirit of the communities”, “restoring the social cohesion that 
prevailed before the conflict”, and “resuming development processes on the basis of 
the past reference framework”,46 whereby heritage emerges as a central element of 
the re-creation of landscapes of belonging for particular communities. This 
perspective relies on a classical view in which heritage, as a signifier of memories and 
identities, constitutes a link between cultural communities and place, thus hinting at a 
 
                                                     
43 Cf. the efforts to adopt a state Law on Cultural Properties as linked to the Institutional Capacity Building 
Plan (ICP) in the framework of the Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-East 
Europe promoted by the CoE since 2003. 
44 Eriksen, “Between Universalism and Relativism,” 136. 
45 Fojut, Noel. “The Philosophical, Political and Pragmatic Roots of the Convention.” Heritage and Beyond. 
(Council of Europe, 2009), 16. 
46 Council of Europe, “The Role of Culture and Cultural Heritage,” 4. 
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territorial dimension of (collective) identities. This understanding presents two 
ambiguous aspects. Conceptually, it mirrors the correlation between place, identity 
and heritage at the basis of the deliberate targeting of the memorial landscape within 
the violent redefinition of the geopolitical and demographic composition of the 
country during the war.47 Practically, it determines a process of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of heritage committed to the re-creation of the geo-ethnic composition 
of BiH to match its pre-war configuration, which amounts to an effort to reverse the 
course of events, or ‘undo’ what the conflict has ‘done’ (cf. chapter four). The 
doctrine, nevertheless, does not address the inherent contradiction between these 
two aspects. In this sense, global notions on heritage appear to rely on “a top down 
definition of ‘culture’ as if it were common sense or ‘natural’”48 that overlooks the 
political implications of culture and avoids engagement “with the issue of 
contestation over the power to define”.49 
The case of BiH, in this respect, highlights the fundamental importance of a process 
of (re)definition of the concept of ‘culture’ at the basis of international conventions 
and declarations. In present formulations, the concept is vaguely defined50, and the 
unproblematic positing of cultural identity as a group attribute recalls an 
understanding of ‘culture’ as ‘way of life’ or ‘tradition’, which places it in ambiguous 
relation with the construction of ethnic identities. 
This ambiguity is not tackled by the enhancement of the universalist aspirations of 
this global politics of heritage and its positing that “cultural diversity is a defining 
characteristic of humanity” (2005 UNESCO, Preamble), because this encompassing 
perspective mirrors the image of a mosaic whereby the “common heritage of 
humanity” results from a sum of the world’s different cultures, based on the idea that 
“culture takes diverse forms across time and space and that this diversity is embodied 
in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities and cultural expressions of the 
peoples and societies making up humanity”.51 The application of this international 
 
                                                     
47 Ashworth et al., Pluralising Pasts, and chapter one. 
48 Wright, Susan, “The Politicization of ‘Culture,’” Anthropology Today 14.1 (1998), 15. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
50 As, for instance, in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity: “culture should be 
regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social 
group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs”, UNESCO, Paris, 2001. 
51 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, Paris 2005, 
Preamble, approved by the Council of the European Union in 2006. Throughout conventions, the notion of 
‘culture’ is attributed to collectives and remains unspecified, cf. e.g. the definition of “Cultural Diversity”, 
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doctrine on heritage to the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina raises a number of 
questions, for it potentially provides, at least in principle, “groups/peoples” at the 
sub-state level with the instruments to claim cultural distinctiveness within a 
framework devoted to “giv[ing] recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural 
activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, values and meaning”.52 As Eriksen 
remarks, this tension between universalism and relativism constitutes a problematic 
node, for  
“[i]f an archipelago vision of culture is maintained, then it is easy to defend 
cultural rights and to support endeavours aiming at the strengthening of 
symbolic and social cohesion among collectivities seen as culture-bearing 
groups; but in that case, the notion of global ethics becomes difficult to 
maintain. In addition, there is no guarantee that this notion of culture will be 
used in a 'tolerant and respectful' way [...] and not in a hostile and defensive 
way”.53 
Recent developments and refinements of the notions of ‘culture’ and ‘heritage’54 
devoted increased attention to the dynamic aspects of cultural identity, thus in a 
sense endeavouring to disengage from perspectives that stand in an ambiguous 
relation with cultural essentialism.55 Newer concepts such as that of a “common 
heritage of Europe”, for instance, disengage from a static understanding that equated 
heritage exclusively to the “traces of the past”, to define it as “the ideals, principles 
and values, derived from the experience gained through progress and past conflicts, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
which “refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find expression. These 
expressions are passed on within and among groups and societies” (2005 Convention on the protection 
and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, Art. 4(1)). 
52 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, Paris 2005, 
Objectives and guiding principles, Art. 1(g). 
53 Eriksen, “Between Universalism and Relativism,” 140. 
54 Especially through the UNESCO 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions and the Council of Europe 2005 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural 
Heritage for Society. 
55 In fact, there has been a constant process of revision of the definitions contained in UNESCO and CoE’s 
texts since the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, whereby the initial notion of “cultural property”, mainly referred to historic buildings, 
archaeological sites and monuments as pertaining to nation-states was gradually refined in the search for 
more inclusive understandings of cultural identities and, possibly, a “holistic” definition of heritage (cf. 
chapter one, see also Fojut 2009). 
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which foster the development of a peaceful and stable society”56. The notion of 
heritage community, in particular, acknowledges that the identity of groups is not only 
“inherited”, but can be actively constructed around the valorisation of “specific 
aspects of cultural heritage” that are identified as a “reflection and expression of [...] 
constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions”.57 
The adaptation and material consequences of such notions in a context like that of 
BiH, nevertheless, are open to diverse interpretations. Here, the “ideals, principles 
and values, derived from the experience gained through [...] past conflicts” have been 
inflected in the past two decades in ethnic terms through the development of 
memory policies that foster essentialist formulations of cultural identity. To a certain 
extent, the notion of “heritage communities” might constitute a resource for the 
creation of collective subjects that wish to promote more inclusive accounts of the 
recent war within non-ethnic perspectives (such as the new Museum of the Siege or 
the SCCA project). On the other hand, though, such notions are still embedded in a 
conceptualisation of ‘diversity’ (and related notions such as ‘dialogue’ and 
‘reconciliation’) that remains opaque with regards to the relationship between 
uniqueness and pluralism.58  
This makes them prone to be instrumentalised within an understanding of 
“multiculturalism” that reproduces the image of a mosaic, whereby (ethno)cultural 
communities conceived as self-enclosed homogeneous units stand in an 
“entrenchment of mutual solitudes”59 and relate to each other and to the common 
framework of the state within a logic riddled by the “impossible reciprocities of 
collective representation”.60 
 
                                                     
56 Council of Europe 2005 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, Faro, Art. 
3(b). 
57 Faro Convention, Art. 2(a) and 2(b), emphasis added. 
58 For example, the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (UNESCO) defines “Interculturality” as “refer[ring] to the existence and equitable interaction 
of diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and 
mutual respect” (Art. 3(8)). On the inherent tension between universalism and relativism in the UNESCO 
concepts of culture see Eriksen 2001. 
59 Ashworth et al., Pluralising Pasts, 15. 
60 Mujkic, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, 21. 
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8.4 After urbicide: concluding remarks 
“In rather unfashionable terms, one could say that 
the question is not what the destruction signifies, 
but what the urban fabric is and what its 
destruction discloses”.61 
 
“If the modern ‘problem of identity’ is how to 
construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, 
the postmodern ‘problem of identity’ is primarily 
how to avoid fixation and keep the options 
open”.62 
The analysis of processes of reconstruction of heritage as part of memory politics in 
post-Dayton BiH highlights one more fundamental aspect pertaining to the 
conceptualisation of (collective) cultural identities and their arrangement within 
pluralist settings. As highlighted in the introductory chapters, the deliberate targeting 
of the country’s cultural heritage within the 1992-95 conflict was part and parcel of 
military campaigns for the reconfiguration of the demographic and geopolitical maps 
of BiH within the strategic conquest and/or partition of its territories. The destruction 
of (particular items of) cultural heritage aimed at erasing evidence of the historical 
presence of certain groups from the landscape in order to articulate claims of 
belongingness upon contested physical spaces. 
This process rested on a view of heritage as the embodiment of a set of traditions, 
memories, myths and narratives through which particular identities are ascribed to 
specific territories. Violence against the memorial landscape, in this sense, relied upon 
the pivotal nexus among place, heritage and identity63 that underpins nationalist 
projections of “imagined” identities and memories as pertaining to specific bounded 
territories.64 
As I observed in chapter four, a similar nexus place-heritage-identity appears to 
permeate also post-war (re)construction processes within BiH. The Fond Memorijala, 
for instance, aims at the architectonic unification of memory markers across the 
country, through the erection of stylistically homogeneous and recognisable plaques, 
graves, monuments and memorial sites that mark the territories of (Bosnjak) 
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62 Bauman 1996, quoted in Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, 174. 
63 Cf. Ashworth et al., Pluralising Pasts. 
64 Cf. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. 
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victimisation. To a certain extent, thus, its work is committed to a symbolic 
reappropriation of the national territory, including areas where the conflict entailed 
attempts to erase the presence of a particular community or its historical traces. 
Processes of reconstruction of the country’s memorial landscape devoted to 
‘reconciliation’ similarly rest on the importance of built cultural heritage as a physical 
marker of memories and identities. The work undertaken by the Commission to 
Preserve National Monuments has a double function. While with the List of 
Endangered Monuments it tackles the reconstruction of the heritage damaged during 
the war, aiming at the re-creation of the cultural landscape of BiH; with the ongoing 
process of designation of cultural heritage it metaphorically endeavours to recollect 
the multicultural character of the country through a balanced recognition of items 
taken to represent the different communities that comprise it. The international 
perspective on the Commission’s work, and on heritage in general, relies even more 
clearly on the nexus place-identity-heritage, insofar as it sees the reconstruction of 
the country’s landscape as intimately connected to the process of return of refugees. 
The problematic aspect of the reiteration of this nexus is that it does not challenge 
the logics underpinning the destruction of the built environment that was part and 
parcel of violent practices of reconfiguration of the country’s demographic 
composition and geopolitical arrangement. In this sense, reconstruction (and return) 
processes seem devoted to reverse the course of events and re-create some aspects 
of pre-war BiH without tackling the outcomes of the conflict. 
The notion of urbicide articulates the reflection on the violent destruction of 
cultural heritage along a different perspective. At its core, it highlights that the 
concernment for the destruction of buildings that are endowed with significance (i.e. 
recognised as ‘The heritage’) implicitly accepts the reasoning underpinning their 
deliberate targeting, and thus the inner logics of ethnonationalist constructions of 
identities.  
As expressed by Coward, 
"this generic understanding comprises a more general concept in which 
buildings are understood to be representative of the achievements or character 
of a culture. However, the status of ‘cultural heritage’ is bestowed only upon 
those buildings/monuments that are taken to either exemplify the achievements 
of, or typify the development and existence of, a given culture (usually 
restricted to religious buildings, monuments, cultural institutions and striking 
examples of indigenous architecture). [...] Analyses that concentrate on the 
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destruction of cultural heritage imply that those buildings not defined as such 
are in some way dispensable for that culture".65 
Within this perspective, 
"culture is taken to be something that belongs to national and/or ethnic groups 
and thus this interpretation must accept the political landscape of ethnic 
nationalism as its starting point. Insofar as a building cannot be said to be part 
of a distinct ethnic or national culture, its destruction cannot be said to be the 
destruction of cultural heritage. [...] [B]uildings of indistinct cultural provenance 
escape this interpretation. After all, these buildings are part of the cultural 
landscape of all Bosnians, and not any specific national, ethnic or religious 
group".66 
This critical approach to the built environment helps refine one node that tends to go 
overlooked or unproblematically subsumed within reflections on the destruction and 
reconstruction of cultural heritage, namely, the relationship of both these practices 
with the construction and sustainment of (collective) identities. Views that assign to 
reconstruction crucial functions for the re-creation of a ‘sense of place’ and 
landscapes of belonging for particular communities presume the collective 
significance of specific buildings or parts of the built environment as evidence of 
ethnic, cultural or historic identities. In this way, however, these views neglect the 
functions of wartime targeting and destruction as a process that “acts upon and 
transforms the identity and agency of its authors”.67 The perspectives advanced by 
urbicide and warchitecture68 fill a gap in interpretations of the annihilation of the built 
environment by stressing the features of violence as a performative enactment of 
identities, and thus highlighting its implications as a practice that concurs in the 
production of subjectivities. The core aspect that these views contribute to identify is 
that “targeting […] is a way for its perpetrators to arrogate a collective identity, as 
opposed to simply mediate an identity that preexists its violent performance”.69 
These considerations crucially point to the centrality of the ways in which collective 
(ethnic) identities are understood and conceptualised, highlighting that 
“organizations, not ethnic groups as such, are the chief protagonists of ethnic conflict 
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and ethnic violence and […] the relationship between organizations and the groups 
they claim to represent is often deeply ambiguous”.70 
The approach and involvement of the international community in post-war BiH 
seem to fail to acknowledge the centrality of this aspect, taking ethnic belonging as a 
fait accompli instead of regarding it as a relational process and practice. 
The pervasiveness of the ethnic principle of identification within the Dayton 
arrangements acknowledges the conflictual potential of rigid formulations of identity, 
but responds to it providing a system of representation and mechanisms of 
protection of “vital” rights and interests that allow the political representatives of 
ethnic groups to entrench in defensive positions vis-à-vis the ‘Other’. In this sense, it 
does not tackle the politicisation of ethnic identities but rather constitutes the basis 
for an environment characterised by the institutionalisation of ethnicity in all realms. 
Here, the formulation of inalienable rights in collective terms, centred on “identity of 
one constituent people, […] education, religion, language, promotion of culture, 
tradition and cultural heritage”,71 enables the pursue of exclusivist politics of identity 
and partakes in the “paradox of multiculturalism”, whereby “citizens are not only 
given the right to ‘have a culture’, but in many cases […] are positively forced to 
adorn themselves with an ethnic label, whether they want it or not”.72 
Most importantly, it creates a situation in which 
“[t]he ethnocentric organization of the country is obviously not capable of 
ensuring a sufficient level of human rights protection. Further ethnic 
fragmentation of the country would contribute to the creation of even more 
homogeneous territorial units, an increase in social exclusion and perhaps even 
lead to a more serious deadlock in the functioning of common institutions. The 
establishment of republican, civic-based arrangements is also impossible given 
the nature of the political cleavages and relations of power, and because 
strategic links of this conception with particular ethnic visions aid only one of 
the Bosnian groups and marginalize others”.73 
The principles contained in the international heritage doctrine at the basis of the 
reconstruction of built cultural heritage similarly remain entangled in this logic, to the 
extent that they posit heritage as a marker and signifiers of memories and identities 
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inflected in collective terms. In this sense, the vagueness of current definitions of 
‘culture’, whereby it is ambiguously related to the ‘ways of life’ and ‘traditions’ of ‘a 
people’, constitutes a main shortcoming in that it fails to clearly distinguish culture 
from ethnicity. In this way, the doctrine implicitly reiterates a specific understanding 
of the role of culture in the construction and reproduction of ethnicity and 
nationhood, and allows for interested actors to re-inscribe heritage care and 
rehabilitation within memory and identity politics aiming at group consolidation and 
homogenisation in exclusivist terms. Furthermore, as Eriksen remarks, this vision 
promotes a notion of pluralism that 
“does not seem to include post-plural hybrid forms, the millions of mixed 
'neither-nor' or 'both-and' individuals inhabiting both global megacities and rural 
outposts in many countries. In other words, the right to an identity does not 
seem to entail the right not to have a specific (usually ethnic) identity”.74 
This vision masks the fact that ethnicity is not a ‘thing’,75 or a cultural property of a 
group, but rather an “aspect of relationship”.76 The insights offered by urbicide and 
warchitecture on violence and destruction as constitutive practices (in that they 
forcefully construct the identities of their protagonists) also relate to a view of 
ethnicity as “situational”, and ethnic relations as “fluid and negotiable”.77 This 
perspective helps contextualise the instrumentalisation and politicisation of 
(collective) identities, stressing that “[i]t is only when they make a difference in 
interaction that cultural differences are important in the creation of ethnic 
boundaries”.78 In this sense, as Vlaisavljevic sustains, “[i]t was only war, […] a 
markedly local and interethnic war, that could construct constitutive ethnic difference 
able to wipe out all interethnic proximity - or at least, all trace of politically productive 
ethnic proximity”.79 
To a certain extent, thus, both memorialisation processes of the recent conflict 
that recollect it as an experience framed by collective belonging and processes of 
reconstruction of heritage based on the ambiguous definitions of culture and identity 
of the international heritage doctrine, risk to partake in the reification of ethnic 
identities as they were constructed by and through the conflict.  
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Within this context, among the instances of memorialisation reviewed in this 
research, the initiative that dissociated most decidedly from this “ethnicisation of 
memory” is represented by the SCCA project De/Construction of Monument (cf. 
chapter seven). In its development, the project managed to avoid the reiteration of 
ethnic attributes and perspectives through a subversion of standardised notions on 
memorialisation that entailed the questioning of the functions assigned to 
monuments in relation to constructions of (collective) identities, reasserting the 
importance of the relational aspects of remembrance. This was accomplished through 
the erection of “reminders” that do not represent self-referential statements about 
the past, but rather remain open to different interpretations, thus endeavouring to 
prompt public reflection and engagement in the task of making sense of the recent 
past. To do this, the project crucially tackled the issues of agency and participation in 
the public space as a means to partake in the recollection of the past and the 
construction of the present polity. In this sense, efforts towards effective cultural (if 
not “intercultural”) dialogue as part of processes of re-elaboration of the recent 
experience of conflict, transition and regime change, seem to require not only the 
questioning of formulations of identity in collective terms, but also the rejection of 
conventional tropes on memorialisation and the reinterpretation of its functions in 
relations to both the past and the present. 
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English Summary 
 
In the early 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed into a set 
of wars dominated by aggressive nationalist ideologies, that crucially reinterpreted 
‘history’ and ‘memory’ to recollect past sufferings and intergroup animosities and 
corroborate ethnic distinctiveness in essentialist terms. In the mixed area of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the conflict (1992-1995) entailed the use of systematic violence to 
eradicate and/or eliminate the ethnic “Other” from contested territories, bringing 
about massive destruction and causing a total displacement of more than 2 million 
people. As the rhetoric of war produced monolithic juxtaposed constructions of 
“Serbs(/Orthodox)”, “Croats(/Catholic)” and “Bosnjaks(/Muslim)” as distinct ethnies 
animated by reciprocal “ancient hatreds”, the onslaught against people was 
complemented by the deliberate targeting of the built environment and its cultural 
and religious symbols. Such targeting obliterated the image a pluralist and 
heterogeneous shared cultural space to annihilate traces of past coexistence and 
prevent future claims over (“cleansed”) territories, highlighting the meanings and 
functions ascribed to monuments/heritage as signifiers and physical markers of 
memories and identities. 
This research investigates memorialisation processes in today’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with a focus on the ways in which the recent experience of armed 
conflict is recollected through (official) monuments and commemorations. Because 
the war entangled with the processes of transition and regime change – constituting a 
milestone in the affirmation of BiH as an independent state, configured as a 
consociational power-sharing system – the study explores how (official) memories of 
the conflict entwine with the definition of a shared identity of the polity, the 
articulation of claims for or against its legitimacy, and the delineation of ethno-cultural 
group identities at the sub-state level. The research endeavours to map out the 
implications and uses of divergent accounts of the war within an environment of 
dissent and contestation over its causes and unfolding, through the analysis of the 
meanings and functions assigned to monuments and commemorations as part of 
symbolic politics and in the reiteration of ethnicised identities. 
Reflection concentrates on the mutually constitutive character of memory and 
identity constructs, adopting a perspective that integrates the study of the local (i.e. 
national) “politics of memory” with the analysis of a global “politics of heritage” 
encouraged by international actors and developed in line with what I call the 
international heritage doctrine based on UNESCO and Council of Europe’s documents. 
This doctrine mainly informs processes of heritage reconstruction, endowing them 
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with crucial functions in post-war recovery and stabilisation. The study thus examines 
the impact of global notions on the heritage of mankind on specific contexts (like BiH) 
where the formulation of collective identities in essentialist and exclusivist terms 
appeals to memory and culture, and the implications of discourses on diversity, 
reconciliation and intercultural dialogue on the conceptualisation of cultural identity 
as (incommensurable) difference and in the aftermaths of first-hand experiences of 
intergroup violence perpetrated upon rigid constructions of groups as “nations”. 
The research is based on the analysis of legal and official documents concerning 
monuments, heritage and commemorations at various administrative levels of BiH 
and the examination of UNESCO and CoE texts on heritage, and relies on personal 
observation of commemorative events over a prolonged permanence in the country 
(2010-2012), taking the institutional and symbolic functions of Sarajevo in its role of 
capital city as a case study. The corpus of the work approaches memorialisation from 
various angles, starting from the observation that ongoing processes of erection of 
new monuments and processes of heritage reconstruction seem to develop along 
parallel planes. Investigation on BiH’s multifaceted politics of memory/heritage is 
undertaken through four stages: an overview of the formal/legal system of heritage 
care and management at various administrative levels (municipal, cantonal, entity and 
state), and the work of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments; the analysis 
of the central memorial sites dedicated to armed conflict in Sarajevo (Vraca Memorial 
Park for WWII and the Kovaci Shahid Cemetery-Memorial for 1992-95 war); the 
observation of three commemorative performances celebrating the state (Day of 
Statehood and Day of Independence) and city (Day of the City of Sarajevo); and the 
presentation of a contested commemoration (Dobrovoljacka Street) and two 
initiatives promoting alternative modes of memorialization (the SCCA project 
De/Construction of Monument 2004-2007 and the Museum of the Siege presented in 
2012). 
Analysis of these instances of memorialization shows that public memory is 
endowed with pivotal functions in the reproduction and maintenance of (ethnically 
connoted) collective identities. Recollections of the recent war are inflected in ethnic 
terms through the articulation of accounts that reflect divergent views, developed 
antagonistically by the institutions and political representatives of the three 
‘constituent peoples’. Anniversaries marked with official celebrations provide the 
opportunity to display contestation of the recent past and publicly reassess 
responsibilities for the outbreak of the war. Opposition to a common national 
calendar of public holidays, and the establishment of parallel ritual performances, 
symbolically recollect and construe distinct polities for different segments of the 
population (e.g. Entity of RS v. State of BiH). Observation of the main memorial 
  301 
dedicated to the war in Sarajevo (Kovaci Shahid Cemetery-Memorial) and 
commemorative celebrations of state import attended by the highest authorities, 
suggest that the symbolic recollection of the overall state is also embedded in 
dynamics of ethnicisation, especially through the articulation of accounts that 
conflate the perspective of one particular ethnocultural community (Bosnjak) with 
the interests of the overall polity. The symbolic interweaving of opposed 
(re)interpretations of the conflict with distinct polities of belonging in ‘national’ (as 
opposed to civic) terms, produces the effect of translating antagonism over the 
interpretation of the recent conflict into irreconcilable group difference. Ultimately, 
processes of memorialisation of the 1992-95 war partake in broader processes of 
institutionalisation of ethnicity, where little or no space at all is left for recollections of 
memories and identities in non-ethnic terms. The ethnicisation of recollections of the 
recent conflict is further accomplished through the reinterpretation of the legacies of 
previous conflicts (i.e. WWII and antifascism) and the appropriation of elements of 
the built environment recognised as ‘heritage’. Among the instances of 
memorialisation that propose alternative views, those who achieve greater visibility 
seem to partake in the ethnicisation of memories (e.g. Dobrovoljacka Street counter-
commemoration), while initiatives that question the conventional patterns of top-
down memory politics remain largely unnoticed by the institutions (e.g. SCCA project 
De/Construction of Monument 2004-2007), or get promoted at the local level (e.g. 
Museum of the Siege, 2012). 
The realm of heritage care remains separate from this environment only in 
principle. The formalisation of ethnic groups as constituent peoples with inalienable 
rights pertaining to “culture, tradition and cultural heritage” in post-Dayton BiH 
provides the legal basis to oppose collaboration in those fields and claim and achieve 
independence in their management at the level of the Entities/Cantons, which in turn 
enables the construction of culture and tradition as defining traits of the ethnic 
community. In this context, notions of heritage and culture contained in the body of 
UNESCO and CoE’s texts stand in an ambiguous relation with the declination of 
citizenship and identity in collective (ethnic) terms, as they fail to distinguish neatly 
the notion of ‘culture’ from that of ‘ethnicity’, and remain marked by an inner 
contradiction between a relativistic understanding of identity and the promotion of a 
global ethics. I argue that definitions of cultural identity and diversity as articulated by 
the international heritage doctrine are prone to be used as instruments of self-
legitimation by (collective) subjects fostering particularistic accounts of the past and 
thus risk to reiterate essentialist approaches to identity. 
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Dutch Summary (Samenvatting) 
 
In het begin van de jaren negentig viel de Socialistische Federale Republiek 
Joegoslavië ten prooi aan gewelddadige nationalistische oorlogen, wat 
noodgedwongen tot een herinterpretatie leidde van ‘geschiedenis’ en ‘herinnering’ 
om het doorstane leed en interne vijandigheden te kunnen duiden en etnische 
verschillen te kunnen determineren.  De gemengde populatie binnen het gebied van 
Bosnië en Herzegovina zorgde ervoor dat het conflict (1992-1995) leidde tot het 
systematisch gebruik van geweld om de etnische ‘Ander’ uit te roeien en/of te 
verwijderen uit de omstreden gebieden, met een massale vernietiging en twee 
miljoen mensen op vlucht tot gevolg. Terwijl de oorlogsretoriek rigide associaties 
creëerde zoals Serviërs/orthodox, Kroatiërs/katholiek en Bosniakken/moslim en oude 
vijandelijkheden het zogenaamde verschil in etniciteit oppookten, werd naast de 
agressie naar mensen ook bewust uitgehaald naar de opgebouwde leefomgeving en 
diens culturele en religieuze symbolen. Zodoende werd de idee weggevaagd van een 
pluralistische en heterogene gemeenschap en alle sporen van een gedeeld verleden 
weggewist. Eventuele toekomstige claims op, ondertussen ‘gezuiverde’, regio’s 
werden op deze manier eveneens voorkomen. De focus kwam te liggen op erfgoed 
waarvan verondersteld werd sterk in te spelen op herinneringen en identiteiten. 
Dit onderzoek gaat dieper in op de herinneringsprocessen van het huidige Bosnië-
Herzegovina, meer bepaald wordt nagegaan hoe de ervaring in een nabij verleden van 
een gewapend conflict herdacht wordt in (officiële) monumenten en herdenkingen. 
De oorlog, gekenmerkt door  overgangsprocessen en regimewijzigingen, waarvan de 
erkenning van Bosnië-Herzegovina als onafhankelijke staat, gevormd op basis van een 
consociationeel systeem van machtsverdeling, als mijlpaal geldt, gaat deze studie na 
hoe (officiële) herinneringen vervlochten worden met de idee van een gedeelde 
identiteit binnen de gemeenschap, de uitingen vóór of tegen de legitimiteit van deze 
staat en de aflijning van etno-culturele groepen op regionaal niveau. Het onderzoek 
tracht de gevolgen en de afwijkende versies van de oorlog in kaart te brengen in een 
omgeving die verdeeld is over oorzaken en verloop van deze oorlog. Dit gebeurt via 
analyse van de betekenissen en functies die toegewezen werden aan monumenten en 
herdenkingen als onderdeel van de politieke symboliek en in de continuatie van 
geëtniciseerde identiteiten. 
Er wordt gefocust op zowel herinnering als identiteitsconcepten. Hiervoor wordt 
een perspectief genomen dat de studie van de  lokale (d.w.z. nationale) 
‘herinneringspolitiek’ integreert met de analyse van een globale ‘erfgoedpolitiek’. 
Deze wordt versterkt door internationale actoren en ontwikkeld volgens wat ik noem 
de ‘internationale erfgoeddoctrine’ gebaseerd op documenten van de UNESCO en de 
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Europese Raad. Deze doctrine bezorgt ons voornamelijk processen van 
erfgoedreconstructie waardoor deze  cruciale functies krijgen in de periode van na-
oorlogs herstel en stabilisering. Het onderzoek legt zich bijgevolg toe op de impact 
van globale begrippen i.v.m. menselijk erfgoed in specifieke contexten (zoals Bosnië-
Herzegovina). Voor de formulering van collectieve identiteiten in essentialistische en 
exclusivistische termen wordt daar een beroep gedaan op herinnering en cultuur en 
de gevolgen van denkwijzen op het gebied van verscheidenheid, verzoening en 
interculturele dialoog op de begripsvorming van culturele identiteit als 
(incommensurabel) verschil en in de nasleep van eerstehandservaringen met intern 
geweld gepleegd op basis van rigide groepsconstructies als ‘naties’. 
Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op de analyse van wettelijke en officiële documenten 
over monumenten, erfgoed en herdenkingen op verschillende administratieve 
niveaus van Bosnië-Herzegovina en de doorlichting van teksten van de UNESCO en de 
Europese Raad rond erfgoed en steunt op persoonlijke observatie van 
herdenkingsgebeurtenissen tijdens een langdurige aanwezigheid ter plekke (2010-
2012), waarbij de institutionele en symbolische functie van Sarajevo in haar rol van 
hoofdstad als casus werd genomen. Het corpus van het onderzoek benadert 
herdenking vanuit verschillende perspectieven, startend vanuit de perceptie dat 
lopende processen om nieuwe monumenten op te richten en processen ter 
reconstructie van erfgoed zich op gelijkaardige manieren lijken te ontwikkelen. 
Onderzoek naar de veellagige houding van Bosnië-Herzegovina t.o.v. 
herinnering/erfgoed werd uitgevoerd in vier stappen: een overzicht van het 
formele/wettelijke systeem van erfgoedzorg en beheer op verschillende 
administratieve niveaus (gemeentelijk, kantonaal, eenheid en staat) en de 
inspanningen van de Commissie ter Bescherming van Nationale Monumenten; de 
analyse van de centrale herdenkingssites opgedragen aan het gewapend conflict in 
Sarajevo (Vraca Memorial Park voor WOII en het Kovaci Shahid Begraafplaats-
Gedenkteken voor de oorlog van 1992-’95); de observatie van drie 
herdenkingsvoorstellingen om de natie te vieren (Nationale Feestdag en Dag van de 
Onafhankelijkheid) en de stad (Dag van de Stad Sarajevo); en de voorstelling van een 
gecontesteerde herdenking (de Straat van Dobrovoljacka) en twee initiatieven ter 
promotie van alternatieve manieren van herdenking (het SCCA project 
‘De/Constructie van het Monument 2004-2007’ en het Belegeringsmuseum 
voorgesteld in 2012). 
De analyse van deze herdenkingsinstanties toont aan dat collectief geheugen 
begiftigd is met centrale functies in de reproductie en instandhouding van (etnisch 
geconnecteerde) collectieve identiteiten. Herinneringen aan de recente oorlog 
kregen een etnische terminologie; uit de manier waarop verklaringen verwoord 
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worden, blijken uiteenlopende visies. De vijandige ontwikkeling van deze visies is te 
wijten aan de instellingen en politieke vertegenwoordigers van de drie ‘deelvolkeren’. 
Verjaardagen die herdacht worden met officiële vieringen bieden de mogelijkheid om 
het recente verleden te betwisten en het publiekelijk herbenoemen van 
verantwoordelijken voor het uitbreken van de oorlog. Zo is er verzet tegen een 
gemeenschappelijke nationale kalender met erkende feestdagen en worden er 
parallelle rituele voorstellingen in het leven geroepen en worden er symbolische 
herinneringen en afwijkend beleid geduid voor verschillende segmenten van de 
bevolking (bv. Deelstaat Servische Republiek versus de Federatie Bosnië-
Herzegovina). Observatie van het voornaamste gedenkteken aan de oorlog in 
Sarajevo (het Kovaci Shahid Begraafplaats-Gedenkteken) en nationale 
herdenkingsvieringen die door de hoogste autoriteiten worden bijgewoond, 
suggereren dat de symbolische herinnering van de totale staat ook ingebed is in 
etnische bewegingen, in het bijzonder door de bewoordingen van de verklaringen die 
het perspectief van één specifieke etnoculturele gemeenschap (Bosniak) vermengt 
met de belangen van de globale gemeenschap. De symbolische verweving van 
tegengestelde (her)interpretaties van het conflict met verschillende visies  rond 
toewijzing in ‘nationale’ (tegengesteld aan civiele) terminologie, creëert het effect 
van vertaling van vijandelijkheid betreffende de interpretatie van het recente conflict 
als onverenigbare groepsverschillen. Herdenkingsprocessen van de oorlog 1992-’95 
maken ten slotte ook deel uit van ruimere processen van institutionalisering van 
etniciteit waar weinig of geen plaats wordt overgelaten voor het herdenken van 
herinneringen en identiteiten in niet-etnische termen. De etnicisering van 
herinneringen aan het recente conflict wordt verder in de hand gewerkt  door de 
herinterpretatie van wat overgeërfd is uit eerdere conflicten (d.w.z. WOII en 
antifascisme) en de toeëigening van aspecten uit de opgebouwde context die als 
‘erfgoed’ bestempeld worden. Onder de herdenkingsinstanties die alternatieve 
standpunten voorstellen, lijkt het erop dat deze die deel uitmaken van de etnicisering 
van herinneringen (bv. Dobrovoljacka Straat Contra-herdenking) meer in het oog 
springen, terwijl initiatieven die de conventionele patronen van top-down 
herinneringspolitiek in vraag stellen, grotendeels onopgemerkt blijven door de 
instellingen (bv. SCCA project De/Constructie van Monument 2004-2007) of 
gepromoot worden op lokaal niveau (bv. Museum van de Belegering, 2012). 
Het domein van erfgoedzorg blijft enkel in principe gescheiden van deze omgeving. 
De formalisering van etnische groepen als constituerende volken m.b.t. ‘cultuur, 
traditie en cultureel erfgoed’ in het post-Dayton Bosnië-Herzegovina biedt de 
wettelijke basis om samenwerking op deze vlakken tegen te werken en aanspraak te 
kunnen maken op eigen bestuur op het niveau van de Entiteiten/Kantons, wat de 
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constructie mogelijk maakt van cultuur en traditie als bepalende kenmerken van de 
etnische gemeenschap. In deze context staan begrippen rond erfgoed en cultuur 
zoals opgenomen in de teksten van de UNESCO en de Europese Raad in een ambigue 
relatie met de terugval van burgerschap en identiteit in collectieve (etnische) termen, 
aangezien ze er niet in slagen om de begrippen ‘cultuur’ en ‘etniciteit’ duidelijk van 
elkaar te onderscheiden en gekenmerkt blijven door een inherente contradictie 
tussen een relativistisch begrip van identiteit en het promoten van een wereldethiek. 
Ik ben van mening dat definities van culturele identiteit en –verschillen zoals 
opgesteld door de internationale erfgoeddoctrine het risico lopen om als 
instrumenten voor zelflegitimering te worden gebruikt door inwoners die een 
voorliefde hebben voor particularistische verhalen uit het verleden waardoor het 
gevaar bestaat om opnieuw een essentialistische benadering van identiteit te creëren. 
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